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Abstract 
‘Climate change inundation’ — the process whereby climate change-related harms 
such as rising sea levels, higher storm surges and changing rainfall patterns interact 
with existing vulnerabilities like poverty, resource scarcity and inadequate 
infrastructure — will eventually leave low-lying coral atoll island states uninhabitable. 
Climate change inundation demands our attention because of the unique challenge it 
presents to the state, which provides the international legal personality and political 
infrastructure through which individual and collective human rights are protected, 
treaties are negotiated and so on. 
While recognising the positive features of proposals for the planned migration of 
individual islanders, this thesis is concerned with what they fail to capture: the threat 
posed by climate change inundation to the collective autonomy and independence of 
atoll island populations. It explores this threat from the perspective of self-
determination, a legal principle whose relevance in this context has been widely 
acknowledged but not yet explored in detail. The thesis identifies the populations of 
atoll island states as self-determining peoples, argues for the recognition of climate 
change inundation as a grave, foreseeable, external threat to their self-determination, 
and examines the reasons other states may have for acting (or not acting) to address 
this threat.  
It then proposes a collective decision-making framework for atoll island peoples, 
drawing inspiration from the Declaration on Friendly Relations. The first option in this 
decision-making framework is the ‘[re-]establishment of a sovereign and independent 
State’ with jurisdiction over a defined territory; the second is ‘the emergence into any 
other political status freely determined by a people’, including a so-called 
‘deterritorialized state’; and the third is to enter into ‘free association or integration 
with an independent State’, a choice that would protect the collective political status of 
a people but abandon any claim to statehood or exclusive territorial jurisdiction. 
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I. Climate Change Inundation 
1. Climate Change Inundation and Atoll Island States 
1.1 Introduction 
‘Where will these people go if and when it becomes impossible for them to remain 
in their own country? … [H]ow will they retain their national identity? Is the world 
ready to accept the idea of a state without a territory? These are questions that the 
international community has only just started to consider and which now require 
serious attention.’ António Guterres (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)1 
‘When you relocate and you lose your country, what happens? What’s your status 
in the country you relocate to? Who are you? Do you have a government there? 
Government of what?’ Ronald Jumeau (Seychelles Ambassador to the United States and 
the United Nations)2  
‘Climate change inundation’ — the process whereby climate change-related harms 
such as rising sea levels, higher storm surges and changing rainfall patterns interact 
with existing vulnerabilities like poverty, isolation, resource scarcity and inadequate 
infrastructure — will eventually leave low-lying coral atoll island states like Kiribati, 
Tuvalu and the Maldives uninhabitable. The issue of climate change inundation 
demands our attention because of the unique challenge it presents to the state, which 
provides the international legal personality and political infrastructure through which 
individual and collective human rights are protected, treaties are negotiated and so on. 
Without a habitable territory or permanent population, the existence of atoll island 
states becomes increasingly uncertain. 
This threat is fairly localised and the number of people affected relatively small.3 As 
Grenadian Foreign Minister Karl Hood observes of his country’s population: ‘You 
could pick them up and fit them in the corner of a small bar in London and no one 
                                                
1 Cited in Singh, ‘Disaster Prevention Key to Stopping Climate Displacement’, UNISDR Secretariat (19 
January 2012). 
2 Interviewed by Neil Conan, ‘Seychelles Sink as Climate Change Advances’, National Public Radio (22 
September 2010). 
3 The combined population of Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Maldives is just over 500,000, compared with the 
estimated 330 million that will be displaced if temperatures rise by 3–4ºC. Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), World Factbook, accessible at https://cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html; 
UNDP, Human Development Report 2007/2008. Fighting Climate Change: Human Solidarity in a Divided World 
(Summary) (2008), at 18. 
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would notice’. 4  And yet, in absolute terms, it is significant, raising far-reaching 
questions about statehood, sovereignty, territory and belonging.5  These questions 
transcend state boundaries, implicating the populations of both the atoll island states at 
risk and the states to which they will eventually flee. 
This opening chapter provides some empirical context in which to situate the ideas that 
follow (section 1.2). It defines the central problem — that of ‘climate change 
inundation’ (section 1.3) — and explains why we should take the time to think through 
its implications (section 1.4). In doing so, it briefly introduces the central arguments of 
the thesis, explains the interdisciplinary perspective adopted, and indicates the 
contributions made to the existing literature. It concludes by outlining those issues that 
the thesis is concerned with, and those it sets aside (section 1.5).  
1.2 The empirical context: Climate change and atoll island states 
Climate change is ‘unequivocal’ and is happening now.6 It is extremely likely7 that 
much of the increase in global average temperature is due to anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions, very likely that heat waves and periods of heavy rainfall 
will become more frequent, and virtually certain that there will be more days that are 
warmer and fewer days that are colder.8 Sea levels are projected to rise by 26–82cm by 
the end of this century and are virtually certain to continue to rise for centuries to 
come.9 Thermal expansion alone will result in a 1–3m sea level rise post-2100 and, 
should there be a sufficient increase in the global average temperature, the loss of the 
Greenland ice sheet will cause a global sea level rise of up to 7m.10 
The impacts of climate change tend to fall unevenly across the globe. Some 
communities, states and regions are more exposed — and, at the same time, less able to 
                                                
4 Hood, ‘COP 17: The Awakening of the Climate Vulnerables’, LSE Public Lecture (22 March 2012). 
5 Park, ‘Climate Change and the Risk of Statelessness: The Situation of Low-Lying Island States’, UNHCR 
Legal and Protection Policy Research Series (2011), at 3. 
6 IPCC, ‘Summary for Policymakers’, in T. Stocker et al. (eds), Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science 
Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the IPCC (2013) 3, at 4. 
7 ‘Virtually certain’ refers to a 99–100% probability, ‘extremely likely’ to a 95–100% probability, ‘very 
likely’ to a 90–100% probability and ‘likely’ to a 66–100% probability. Ibid, at 4, note 2. 
8 Ibid, at 17, 20 and 22. 
9 Ibid, at 25 and 28. 
10 Ibid, at 28–29. See further Church et al., ‘Sea Level Change’, in Stocker et al. (eds), supra note 6, 1137, at 
1169–1170 (and, regarding the Antarctic ice sheet, 1172–1176). Some suggest that mass ice-sheet loss may 
occur before 2100. Rignot et al., ‘Acceleration of the Contribution of the Greenland and Antarctic Ice Sheets 
to Sea Level Rise’, 38 Geophysical Research Letters (2011) L05503; Vermeer and Rahmstorf, ‘Global Sea Level 
Linked to Global Temperature’, 106 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA (2009) 21527. 
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adapt — to rising sea levels, higher temperatures and changing rainfall patterns than 
others.11 Small island developing states (SIDS) have been identified as one of several 
‘hot spots’12 where ‘even small climatic changes can have catastrophic consequences for 
lives and livelihoods’.13 They have been described by the Secretariat of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as ‘a special case 
requiring the help and attention of the international community’.14 Despite being 
among those least responsible for climate change — on average, SIDS contribute 
around 1.5% of the greenhouse gas emissions of industrialised states15 — they are 
among those most likely to suffer its adverse consequences. 
Of around 50 SIDS, those that are formed of low-lying coral atolls — including Tuvalu 
and Kiribati in the Pacific Ocean and the Maldives in the Indian Ocean — are among 
those most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and it is this subgroup 
with which the thesis is concerned. Atoll island states share a particular set of 
characteristics that ‘enhance their vulnerability and reduce their resilience to climate 
variability and change’, to the extent that they ‘have legitimate concerns about their 
future’.16 Each consists of a group of far-flung, low-lying coral atolls with an average 
elevation of one to two metres above sea level.17 Each is a least developed country with 
a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of as little as US$3,500,18 limited natural 
                                                
11 Bindoff et al., ‘Observations: Oceanic Climate Change and Sea Level’, in M. Parry et al. (eds), Climate 
Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the IPCC (2007) 387, at 409; Hewitson et al., ‘Regional Context’, in C. Field et al. (eds), Climate 
Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment 
Report of the IPCC (2014) 1133, at 1148; Nurse et al., ‘Small Islands’, in Field et al. (eds), supra note 11, 1613, 
at 1619–1620; UNFCCC Secretariat, Climate Change: Small Island Developing States (2005), at 15. 
12 Hugo, ‘Climate Change-Induced Mobility and the Existing Migration Regime in Asia and the Pacific’, in 
J. McAdam (ed.), Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (2010) 9, at 18. See 
generally J. Barnett and J. Campbell, Climate Change and Small Island States (2010), at ch.1; J. Connell, Islands 
at Risk? (2013), at ch.7. 
13 OHCHR, Report on the Relationship between Climate Change and Human Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/61 
(2009), at para.93. 
14 UNFCCC Secretariat, supra note 11, at 2. Compare Article 1(c)(i) of the Bali Action Plan, Decision 
1/CP.13, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session, UN Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (2007). 
15 UNFCCC Secretariat, supra note 11, at 9. Compare Barnett and Campbell, supra note 12, at 10–11. 
16 Mimura et al., ‘Small Islands’, in Parry et al. (eds), supra note 11, 687, at 690. Compare Agenda 21, 
adopted at the UN Conference on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26, vol. II 
(1992), at paras.17.123–17.126; E. Ferris, M. Cernea and D. Petz, On the Front Line of Climate Change and 
Displacement: Learning from and with Pacific Island Countries (2011); Nurse et al., supra note 11, at 1635; 
UNFCCC Secretariat, supra note 11, at 14. 
17 Barnett and Adger, ‘Climate Dangers and Atoll Countries’, 61 Climatic Change (2003) 321, at 322. Kiribati 
is usually included in this category despite the fact that Banaba Island is not an atoll. 
18 CIA, supra note 3. 
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resources and freshwater supplies and few safeguards against global19 and domestic 
socio-economic pressures.20 They therefore tend to be heavily reliant on imported 
goods (including staple foods, fuel and construction materials), foreign aid and 
remittances.21 They are often found in regions with more frequent and intense natural 
disasters,22 and their narrow land mass means that a large proportion of housing and 
infrastructure is built along the coastline, leaving communities highly exposed to rising 
sea levels, storm surges and coastal erosion.23 As a former Tuvaluan cabinet member 
explains:  
‘[O]n the island where I live, Funafuti, it is possible to throw a stone from one side 
of the island to the other. Our islands are very low-lying. When a cyclone hits us 
there is no place to escape. We cannot climb any mountains or move away to take 
refuge. It is hard to describe the effects of a cyclonic storm surge when it washes 
right across our islands … The devastation is beyond description.’24 
However, while atoll island states undoubtedly face grave climate change-related risks, 
their story is not simply one of vulnerability and decay.25 Coastal ecosystems like coral 
reefs and mangroves are dynamic and resilient, shifting and growing in response to 
changing environmental conditions. 26  Likewise, island communities have proven 
resourceful over time, using local adaptation strategies — such as raising houses, 
                                                
19 Examples include global financial crises, trade liberalisation, rising energy costs and foreign debt. 
Mimura et al., supra note 16, at 692. 
20  Examples include rapid urbanisation, overcrowding, inadequate infrastructure and rising 
unemployment. On overcrowding in Malé and Funafuti, see Republic of the Maldives Ministry of 
Environment, Energy and Water, National Adaptation Programme of Action (2006), at 9 and 21–22; Tuvalu 
Ministry of Natural Resources, Environment, Agriculture and Lands, National Adaptation Programme of 
Action (2007), at 6 and 15. On poverty and income inequality, see ibid, at 692 and 707. 
21 Kiribati receives around US$5 million in remittances and 20–25% of its GDP in foreign aid each year. 
CIA, supra note 3; UNFCCC Secretariat, supra note 11, at 14; Republic of Kiribati, National Adaptation 
Programme of Action (2007), at 7. The Maldives imports all of its food except tuna and coconuts. Republic of 
the Maldives, Submission to the OHCHR under Human Rights Council Resolution 7/23 (2008), at 34. Compare 
Barbados Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of SIDS, UN Doc. A/CONF.167/9 (1994), 
at paras.4 and 8. 
22 Mimura et al., supra note 16, at 693; Ferris, Cernea and Petz, supra note 16, at 5; Tuvalu Ministry, supra 
note 20, at 12, 23, 30 and 31. 
23 Agenda 21, supra note 16, at para.17.126; Mimura et al., supra note 16, at 692 and 701; Nurse et al., supra 
note 11, at 1623. 
24 Hon. Teleke P. Lauti, speaking at COP6 in 2000. Cited in UNFCCC Secretariat, supra note 11, at 13. 
25 For a counterpoint to the narrative of island vulnerability, see Barnett and Campbell, supra note 12, at 
156–165; Farbotko and Lazrus, ‘The First Climate Refugees? Contesting Global Narratives of Climate 
Change in Tuvalu’, 22 Global Environmental Change (2012) 382; Stratford, Farbotko and Lazrus, ‘Tuvalu, 
Sovereignty and Climate Change: Considering Fenua, the Archipelago and Emigration’, 8 Island Studies 
Journal (2013) 67. 
26 Webb and Kench, ‘The Dynamic Response of Reef Islands to Sea-Level Rise: Evidence from Multi-
Decadal Analysis of Island Change in the Central Pacific’, 72 Global and Planetary Change (2010) 234; L. 
Yamamoto and M. Esteban, Atoll Island States and International Law (2014), at 24–30. 
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building seawalls and improving food and water storage facilities27 — as well as labour 
migration to avoid or adapt to environmental hazards.28  
Climate change, however, interacts with and exacerbates existing socio-economic and 
environmental constraints and will gradually overwhelm traditional coping 
mechanisms.29 While the coral reefs on which atoll islands depend are capable of 
adjusting to changing sea levels, they will find it difficult to cope with the combination 
of rising ocean temperatures, increasing acidification and higher sea levels that climate 
change will bring.30 And, without substantial financial and technological assistance, 
large-scale adaptation projects designed to combat storm surges and coastal erosion 
will remain ‘well beyond the financial means of most small island states’31 and 
households.32 The tetrapods recently constructed around the island of Malé in the 
Maldives, for example, cost US$4,000 per metre and were only possible with significant 
financial support from Japan.33 Atoll islanders therefore share a ‘sense that traditional 
ways of coping with the extreme weather events are no longer adequate because the 
nature of the events have changed from being manageable to being unmanageable’.34 
The rest of this section provides a brief overview of the current and predicted impacts 
of climate change on the populations of atoll island states. As is already clear, these 
impacts are ‘not unique contributors’ to the vulnerability of atoll island states; instead, 
they interact with and exacerbate existing geographical, environmental and socio-
                                                
27 Barnett, ‘Adapting to Climate Change in Pacific Island Countries: The Problem of Uncertainty’, 29 
World Development (2001) 977; Nurse et al., supra note 11, at 1636–1637; Republic of Kiribati, supra note 21, 
at 27–29. 
28 Barnett and Webber, ‘Migration as Adaptation: Opportunities and Limits’, in McAdam (ed.), supra note 
12, 37. On island resilience and adaptation to change, see Barnett and Campbell, supra note 12, at ch.2. 
29 The ‘[e]fficacy of traditional community coping strategies is expected to be substantially reduced in the 
future’. IPCC, ‘Summary for Policymakers’, in Field et al. (eds), supra note 11, 1, at 24. Compare Mimura et 
al., supra note 16, at 692–693 and 707; Nurse et al., supra note 11, at 1636. 
30 Frieler et al., ‘Limiting Global Warming to 2ºC is Unlikely to Save Most Coral Reefs’, 3 Nature Climate 
Change (2013) 165; Kench, Perry and Spencer, ‘Coral Reefs’, in O. Slaymaker, T. Spencer and C. Embleton-
Hamann (eds), Geomorphology and Global Environmental Change (2009) 180; Nurse et al., supra note 11, at 
1621 and 1628; Yamamoto and Esteban, supra note 26, at 35–49. 
31
 Mimura et al., supra note 16, at 694 and 706. 
32 Mortreux and Barnett, ‘Climate Change, Migration and Adaptation in Funafuti, Tuvalu’, 19 Global 
Environmental Change (2009) 105, at 105. 
33 UNFCCC Secretariat, supra note 11, at 27. On a failed attempt to construct sea walls around South 
Tarawa, see Republic of Kiribati, supra note 21, at 11–12. On financial constraints on adaptation, see ibid, at 
105; Republic of the Maldives, supra note 20, at 6; UNFCCC Secretariat, Vulnerability and Adaptation to 
Climate Change in Small Island Developing States (2007), at 26–27. 
34 Republic of Kiribati, supra note 21, at 35. 
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economic limitations.35  
Water 
The already limited freshwater resources of atoll island states ‘are likely to be seriously 
compromised’ by the impact of rising sea levels, coastal inundation and changing 
rainfall patterns. 36 In the Maldives, for example, freshwater supplies are already 
extremely scarce at 103m3 per capita (well below the threshold of water scarcity at 
1,700m3) and increasingly threatened by saltwater contamination and unpredictable 
rainfall patterns.37 In Kiribati, where it is estimated that only 44% of the population 
currently has access to adequate potable water, studies suggest that a 50cm sea level 
rise coupled with a 20% reduction in rainfall would reduce the size of the freshwater 
lens by a further 65%.38 While Tuvalu and the Maldives have recently installed 
expensive desalination plants, these are plagued by operational issues and high 
maintenance costs and cannot provide a reliable solution.39 A chronic shortage of fresh 
water is likely to be one of the earliest drivers of movement from atoll island states.  
Agriculture, fishing and food 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts that it is ‘very likely’ 
that the agricultural and fishing industries on which atoll communities depend for 
nutrition and income40 will be adversely affected by climate change-related impacts 
like rising sea levels, increasingly severe storms, saltwater contamination of soil and 
freshwater resources, higher sea temperatures and ocean acidification.41 By 2007, up to 
60% of Tuvalu’s pulaka (taro) pits were reported to have already been destroyed by 
saltwater intrusion, and more frequent tropical storms are predicted to decrease 
subsistence crop yields by 50–60%,42 leading to a noticeable ‘decline in local food 
                                                
35 Mimura et al., supra note 16, at 692. 
36 Ibid, at 689. Compare Nurse et al., supra note 11, at 1622–1623; UNFCCC Secretariat, supra note 11, at 17. 
37 UNEP, Atlantic and Indian Ocean Environment Outlook (2005), at 26. Cited in Republic of the Maldives, 
supra note 21, at 21. 
38 Mimura et al., supra note 16, at 697, citing World Bank, Cities, Seas and Storms: Managing Change in Pacific 
Island Economies. Vol. IV: Adapting to Climate Change (2000). 
39 Mimura et al., supra note 16, at 697; Republic of the Maldives, supra note 20, at 34. 
40 UNFCCC Secretariat, supra note 11, at 19–20; Republic of the Maldives, supra note 20, at 30; Republic of 
the Maldives, supra note 21, at 22–23 and 26–2; Republic of Kiribati, supra note 21, at 4 and 13–14. 
41 Mimura et al., supra note 16, at 689; Republic of the Maldives, supra note 20, at 29. 
42 Tuvalu Ministry, supra note 20, at 21, 24, 27 and 28. 
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security’.43 Elsewhere, a World Bank study estimates that a group of low-lying islands 
like Tarawa, in Kiribati, could see additional agricultural costs of up to US$16 million 
each year (equivalent to 17–18% of Kiribati’s GDP at the time of the study) as a result of 
impacts like these.44  
Socio-economic conditions 
Their smallness, isolation and dependence on one or two industries45 leaves atoll island 
economies ‘generally more exposed to external shocks, such as extreme events and 
climate change’.46 In fact, the IPCC predicts that ‘land loss from sea-level rise … is 
likely to be of a magnitude that would disrupt virtually all economic and social sectors 
in these countries’.47 The impact of climate change on tourism, for example — a 
significant source of income and employment in many atoll island states48 — is likely to 
be ‘largely negative’.49 Rising sea levels and temperatures will exacerbate beach erosion 
and coral bleaching and coastal inundation will destroy cultural heritage sites, 
decreasing the value of atoll island states as tourist destinations. Water shortages and 
an increase in vector-borne diseases are also likely to deter tourists. Storms and sea 
surges may damage tourism infrastructure and disrupt transport and 
communication.50 
Health 
The impact of climate-sensitive diseases 51  on atoll island populations will be 
exacerbated by increasingly severe storms, floods, higher temperatures and a lack of 
                                                
43 Former Tuvalu Red Cross Secretary Siuila Toloa, cited in Friends of the Earth International, Climate 
Change: Voices from Communities Affected by Climate Change (2007), at 32. 
44 World Bank, supra note 38. Cited in Mimura et al., supra note 16, at 698. 
45 For example, in the Maldives, tourism and fishing account for around 37% of GDP, over 50% of 
government revenue and over 10% of the workforce. Republic of the Maldives, supra note 20, at 15 and 30; 
Republic of the Maldives, supra note 21, at 27–28; World Bank, Maldives: Sustaining Growth and Improving 
the Investment Climate (2007). 
46 Mimura et al., supra note 16, at 701. Compare Nurse et al., supra note 11, at 1625–1626. 
47 Nurse et al., ‘Small Island States’, in J. McCarthy et al. (eds), Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation and 
Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report of the IPCC (2001) 845, at 855. 
Compare UNFCCC Secretariat, supra note 11, at 17.  
48 CIA, supra note 3; Republic of the Maldives, supra note 20, at 25. 
49 Mimura et al., supra note 16, at 689. 
50 Ibid, at 701–702; Republic of the Maldives, supra note 21, at 23 and 34–35. 
51 Including malnutrition, respiratory diseases and vector-, water- and food-borne diseases. See Ebi, Lewis 
and Corvalan, ‘Climate Variability and Change and Their Potential Health Effects in Small Island States: 
Information for Adaptation Planning in the Health Sector’, 114 Environmental Health Perspectives (2006) 
1957; WHO, Using Climate to Predict Infectious Disease Outbreaks: A Review (2004). 
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fresh water,52 along with existing factors like inadequate public health infrastructure, 
poor waste management and lack of access to health services.53 According to a report 
by the Kiribati Ministry of Health, ‘human health is the recipient of all [the] 
downstream effects of the impacts of climate change on other sectors’. 54  The 
contamination of freshwater supplies by rising sea levels and flooding is linked to an 
increase in diarrhoeal diseases; the adverse impacts of changing rainfall patterns and 
salinization on agricultural productivity will lead to greater food insecurity and 
malnutrition; and increasingly severe floods correlate with a higher incidence of 
drowning and injury.55 In the Maldives, for example, diseases like acute gastroenteritis, 
dengue fever, chikungunya and scrub typhus have recently appeared, re-emerged or 
rapidly spread in response to changes in environmental conditions.56  
Housing and infrastructure 
In atoll island states, ‘all development and settlement is essentially coastal’:57 housing, 
schools, utilities, hospitals, government buildings, airports and roads all lie along the 
coastline and are already facing the pressures of high population growth and rapid 
urbanisation.58 In the event of rapid sea level rise, storm surges and coastal erosion, this 
leaves island communities vulnerable to evacuation, property damage, and closures 
that affect transport, agriculture, education and healthcare services, as well as the 
distribution of basic food and water supplies.59 In Tuvalu, for example, where over 90% 
of housing and most of the infrastructure lies near the coast and recorded rates of sea 
                                                
52 Mimura et al., supra note 16, at 701. See further L. Russell, Poverty, Climate Change and Health in Pacific 
Island Countries (2009); Singh et al., ‘The Influence of Climate Variation and Change on Diarrhoeal Disease 
in the Pacific Islands’, 109 Environmental Health Perspectives (2001) 155. 
53 WHO, ‘Workshop Report’, Synthesis Workshop on Climate Change and Health in Small Island States 
(1–4 December 2003). 
54 Republic of Kiribati Ministry of Health and Medical Services, Contribution to NAPA Kickoff Meeting: 
Human and Public Health (2004). 
55 Nurse et al., supra note 11, at 1624–1625; Republic of Kiribati, supra note 21, at 15 and 19; Republic of the 
Maldives, supra note 21, at 21–22, 32–33 and 37–38. 
56 Moosa, ‘Adaptation Measures for Human Health in Response to Climate Change in Maldives’, 12 
Regional Health Forum (2008) 49; Republic of the Maldives Ministry of Health, Epidemiology and Disease 
Surveillance Unit of the Department of Public Health (2008); Republic of the Maldives, supra note 20, at 31–32; 
Republic of the Maldives, supra note 21, at 26. 
57 Nurse et al., supra note 11, at 1623. 
58 Mimura et al., supra note 16, at 700–701; ibid. For example, in the Maldives, both international airports lie 
within 50m, and 47% of all houses, 90% of resort infrastructure, 70% of fisheries infrastructure, 80% of 
powerhouses, 90% of waste disposal sites and 75% of communications infrastructure lie within 100m of 
the coast. Republic of the Maldives, supra note 20, at 23–24; Republic of the Maldives, supra note 21, at 21. 
59 Mimura et al., supra note 16, at 702–703. See also J. Hay et al., Climate Variability and Change and Sea Level 
Rise in the Pacific Islands Region (2003); Republic of the Maldives, supra note 21, at 31–32. 
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level rise have been three times higher than the global average,60 coastal erosion has 
been nominated as a key priority.61 Ongoing sea level rise and coastal erosion will see 
some atolls abandoned altogether, which will be socially, culturally and financially 
disruptive and ‘may be beyond what most of these atoll countries can afford’.62  
Coastal land and resources 
In fact, sea level rise — and, with it, higher storm surges and increased coastal flooding 
and erosion — threatens coastal infrastructure, facilities and housing on all atoll 
islands, thereby ‘compromis[ing] the socio-economic well-being of island communities 
and states’.63 In light of this threat, the ‘long-term viability of some atoll states has been 
questioned’64 — a question that was first raised in the IPCC’s initial report over 25 
years ago.65 
Again, impacts vary between islands and regions: some atolls are likely to deteriorate 
while other ‘morphologically resilient’ atolls may remain intact.66 Evidence suggests 
that inhabited islands are less likely to survive: those ‘which have been subject to 
substantial human modification are inherently more vulnerable than those that have 
not’.67 Even where inhabited islands continue to maintain their landmass, this will 
generally be because erosion along one part of the coastline is matched by accretion 
along another, causing displacement and damage to vital infrastructure.68 
Anecdotal and scientific evidence in Tuvalu suggests that erosion is occurring at a rate 
                                                
60 Becker et al., ‘Sea Level Variations at Tropical Pacific Islands Since 1950’, 80–81 Global Planetary Change 
(2012) 85; Nurse et al., supra note 11, at 1620. 
61 Tuvalu Ministry, supra note 20, at 12. Compare Mimura et al., supra note 16, at 689 and 700–701. 
62 UNFCCC Secretariat, supra note 11, at 21. 
63 Mimura et al., supra note 16, at 689. See also Adger et al., ‘Human Security’, in Field et al. (eds), supra 
note 11, 755, at 768–770; Wong et al., ‘Coastal Systems and Low-Lying Areas’, in Field et al. (eds), supra 
note 11, 361. 
64 Mimura et al., supra note 16, at 697. Compare Nurse et al., supra note 11, at 1618, 1620 and 1639–1640. 
65 Tegart et al., ‘Policymakers’ Report’, in W. Tegart et al. (eds), Climate Change: The IPCC Impacts 
Assessment. Contribution of Working Group II to the First Assessment Report of the IPCC (1990) 1, at 4.  
66 Kench, McLean and Nicholl, ‘New Model of Reef-Island Evolution: Maldives, Indian Ocean’, 33 Geology 
(2005) 145; Webb and Kench, supra note 26. On the autonomous adaptive capacity of island ecosystems, 
see also Mimura et al., supra note 16, at 706. 
67 Mimura et al., supra note 16, at 698. 
68 This is reportedly the case with the Carteret Islanders. Zukerman, ‘Pacific Islands Defy Sea-Level Rise’, 
New Scientist (5 June 2010). Compare Rayfuse, ‘Sea Level Rise and Maritime Zones: Preserving the 
Maritime Entitlements of “Disappearing” States’, in M. Gerrard and G. Wannier (eds), Threatened Island 
Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate (2013) 167, at 169; Tuvalu Ministry, supra 
note 20, at 19 and 29. 
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of around 3m per year.69 At least one island is already said to have been submerged 
and the largest atoll is reported to have lost a significant part of its coastline.70 
Meanwhile, in Kiribati, there have been reports that a village on one of the outer 
islands has been forced to relocate due to severe coastal erosion.71 As Kaateti Toto, 
Kiribati’s Minister of Environment, Lands and Agriculture Development, has 
remarked, ‘[t]here’s no place to run. Maybe our adaptation strategy should be to build 
an ark.’72 
Toto’s comment, while somewhat flippant, foreshadows the grave implications of the 
climate change-related impacts outlined in this section. The tangible, often irreversible 
impacts of climate change on health, shelter, livelihoods, infrastructure and land are 
‘threatening the habitability and, in the longer term, the territorial existence of a 
number of low-lying island states‘.73 As acknowledged in a report by the United 
Nations (UN) Secretary-General, ‘[m]any island States face the prospect of loss of 
significant amounts of territory to sea-level rise and inundation, and some face the 
prospect of complete submersion’.74 Displacement is likely to occur long before this 
happens, however, as the cumulative weight of the impacts outlined above becomes 
too great to bear.75 Climate change therefore threatens not just lives and livelihoods but 
also the territorial integrity, sovereignty and statehood of atoll island populations.76 
1.3 Defining ‘climate change inundation’ 
 ‘I have no doubt that at current levels of emissions of greenhouse gases … 
submergence is a possibility. The primary point is, however, that a long, long time 
before that point is reached, our reefs could be dead, our fishes fleeing, our 
groundwater completely salinated, our food crops depleted and our islands made 
                                                
69 Tuvalu Ministry, supra note 20, at 12, 31 and 32. 
70 Ibid. Compare Crouch, ‘Tiny Tuvalu in Save Us Plea over Rising Seas’, Sunday Mail (5 October 2008); 
Lies, ‘Situation in Sinking Tuvalu Scary, Says PM’, Planet Ark (26 May 2006). 
71 Tessie Lambourne, Secretary of the Kiribati Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interviewed by Carrick, 
‘Climate Change: The Pacific’, ABC Radio National (22 November 2011). Compare Republic of Kiribati, 
supra note 21, at 11. 
72 Cited in Ferris, Cernea and Petz, supra note 16, at 15. 
73 OHCHR, supra note 13, at para.40. Compare Agenda 21, supra note 16, at para.17.125; Kälin and 
Schrepfer, ‘Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate Change: Normative Gaps and 
Possible Approaches’, UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series (2012), at 15; Mimura et al., supra 
note 16, at 690; UNFCCC Secretariat, supra note 11, at 2. 
74 UN Secretary-General, Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications, UN Doc. A/64/350 (2009), at 
para.71. 
75 Ferris, Cernea and Petz, supra note 16, at 18–19; UNHCR Expert Meeting, ‘Climate Change and 
Displacement: Summary of Deliberations’ (22–25 February 2011), at para.28. 
76 Adger et al., supra note 63, at 758, 771 and 775; IPCC, supra note 29, at 20. 
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uninhabitable.’ Isaac V. Figir (Speaker of the Congress, Federated States of Micronesia)77 
This brings us to the concept of ‘climate change inundation’ that lies at the heart of this 
research. This thesis considers what happens when climate change-related impacts, 
alongside existing socio-economic and environmental constraints, leave atoll island 
states uninhabitable, causing their populations to uproot and move elsewhere. Climate 
change, in this sense, does not act in isolation but as a ‘threat multiplier’78 that interacts 
with and exacerbates existing pressures. While there may be ‘no mono-causal 
relationship between climate change and displacement’, 79  climate change will 
nevertheless act as a ‘tipping point’ in the gradual process by which an atoll island 
state’s territory becomes uninhabitable, thereby triggering the movement of islanders.80 
It is this process that is referred to throughout the thesis as ‘climate change 
inundation’, a phrase that deliberately evokes a sense of being overwhelmed by, or 
submerged beneath, the cumulative weight of many intersecting harms. 
One way of thinking about the concept of climate change inundation is through the 
lens of vulnerability. The IPCC defines vulnerability as ‘the degree to which a system is 
susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change’, where this is 
determined by (a) the extent to which it is adversely affected by climate change and (b) 
its capacity to adapt.81 Climate change inundation lies at the extreme end of both of 
these axes of vulnerability. The concern here is not with those low-lying but 
prosperous states that are highly exposed to the impacts of climate change but have the 
capacity to adjust to or mitigate its consequences.82 Nor is it with those vast, less 
prosperous states in which adaptive capacity is low but a significant proportion of the 
territory remains habitable.83 Instead, it is with the particular subset of states in which 
                                                
77 Cited in UNFCCC Secretariat, supra note 11, at 24. 
78 Norwegian Refugee Council, Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st Century 
(2011), at 19, at 18; Park, supra note 5, at 2; UNHCR, supra note 75, at para.2. 
79 UNHCR et al., ‘Forced Displacement in the Context of Climate Change: Challenges for States under 
International Law’ (2009), at 2. Compare Barnett and Campbell, supra note 12, at 171–172; Hugo, supra note 
12, at 9; Kälin and Schrepfer, supra note 73, at 6–7. 
80 UNHCR, supra note 75, at paras.2 and 28. Compare UNHCR et al., supra note 79, at 2; Zetter, ‘Protecting 
People Displaced by Climate Change: Some Conceptual Challenges’, in McAdam (ed.), supra note 12, 131, 
at 140. 
81 White et al., ‘Technical Summary’, in McCarthy et al. (eds), supra note 47, 20, at 21. On vulnerability, see 
also Barnett and Campbell, supra note 12, at 159–167. The latest IPCC report adopts the similar but broader 
concept of risk. IPCC, supra note 29, at 5. 
82 For example, the Netherlands. Faiola and Eilperin, ‘Dutch Defence against Climate Disaster: Adapt to 
the Change’, Washington Post (6 December 2009). 
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 For example, Bangladesh, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Ethiopia. Maplecroft, ‘Climate Change and 
Environment Risk Atlas 2015’ (29 October 2014), accessible at http://maplecroft.com/portfolio/new-
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exposure to the impacts of climate change is so great and adaptive capacity so limited 
that the permanent, cross-border displacement of entire populations is reasonably 
foreseeable.  
Climate change inundation therefore brings together two related problems. On the one 
hand, the issue is not merely that climate change has serious impacts, but that these 
impacts are exacerbated by existing disadvantages that constrain adaptive capacity.84 
While it may be ‘technically possible to adapt to several metres of sea level rise, the 
resources required are so unevenly distributed that in reality this risk is outside the 
scope of adaptation’ for the populations of atoll island states, 85 whose adaptive 
capacity is already constrained by physical, environmental and socio-economic 
limitations. On the other hand, the issue is not merely that populations are unable to 
adapt to environmental changes, but that the effects of climate change are more severe 
than those previously experienced. The government of Kiribati observes that, ‘over 
hundreds of years, communities and households in Kiribati developed great resilience 
in the face of climate-related hardships’. However, ’climate change will most likely 
exacerbate these hardships and … could overpower this “great resilience” of Kiribati’.86 
1.4 Why should we care about climate change inundation? 
While recognising that there is ‘continuing uncertainty about the severity and timing of 
climate change impacts’,87 this thesis starts from the assumption that the point at which 
atoll island states will become uninhabitable is foreseeable enough that we should 
worry about it now. As the IPCC makes clear, ‘[u]ncertainty in the projections is not a 
sufficiently valid reason to postpone adaptation planning in small islands’.88 There is 
enough certainty that sea level rise will cause enough damage to atoll island states to 
provide state representatives, lawyers, policymakers and academics with good reason 
to investigate this further.  
                                                                                                                                          
analysis/2014/10/29/climate-change-and-lack-food-security-multiply-risks-conflict-and-civil-unrest-32-
countries-maplecroft/  
84 Barnett and Campbell, supra note 12, at 160; Nicholls et al., ‘Coastal Systems and Low-Lying Areas’, in 
Parry et al. (eds), supra note 11, 315, at 317. 
85 IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the IPCC (2007), at 65, note 27. 
86 Republic of Kiribati, supra note 21, at 20. 
87 IPCC, supra note 29, at 9. Compare Nurse et al., supra note 11, at 1626 and 1634–1635. 
88 Nurse et al., supra note 11, at 1644. 
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Indeed, they are increasingly doing so, from early scoping studies89 through to the 
more recent work of international lawyers, 90  philosophers, 91  geographers and 
migration experts.92 Atoll island states have emphasised the threat posed by climate 
change to their ‘very existence’ for over 25 years,93 and have recently formed a 
Coalition of Atoll Nations on Climate Change in order to achieve greater international 
negotiating power.94 Prominent international experts and intergovernmental bodies 
have begun to call for action and establish multilateral partnerships to address this 
issue.95  Emerging international research and advisory groups on climate change-
related movement tend to have a strong focus on atoll island states.96 The International 
Law Association (ILA) has also recently established a Committee on International Law 
                                                
89 For example, Caron, ‘When Law Makes Climate Change Worse: Rethinking the Law of Baselines in 
Light of a Rising Sea Level’, 17 Ecology Law Quarterly (1990) 621; F. Hampson, Expanded Working Paper on 
the Human Rights Situation of Indigenous Peoples in States and Other Territories Threatened with Extinction for 
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Maritime Limits and Boundaries’, 37 Netherlands International Law Review (1990) 207. 
90 For example, International Bar Association, Achieving Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate 
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Journal of International Law (2013) 1; Wyman, ‘Sinking States’, in D. Cole and E. Ostrom (eds), Property in 
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359; Ödalen, ‘Underwater Self-Determination: Sea-Level Rise and Deterritorialized Small Island States’, 17 
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94 ABC News, ‘“Our Entire Survival is at Stake”: Kiribati President Anote Tong Calls for International 
Community to Deliver on Climate Funding Pledge’ (11 July 2014). 
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and Sea Level Rise, whose mandate is to study the ‘implications under international 
law of the partial and complete inundation of state territory’.97 
However, the assumption that we should consider the implications of climate change 
inundation for atoll island states is often met with one of four main objections. 
Wouldn’t it be more useful to focus on mitigation and in-situ adaptation strategies? 
First, there is the concern that, by focusing on migration or resettlement, we draw 
attention and resources away from mitigation and adaptation strategies that enable 
islanders to ‘lead the kind of lives they value in the places where they belong’.98 From 
this perspective, any discussion of displacement that allows wealthier states to 
downplay their mitigation obligations and encourages international donors to 
prioritise migration over local adaptation strategies is seen as detrimental.99 While the 
government of Tuvalu, for example, initially explored options that would enable 
Tuvaluans to resettle elsewhere, it has become increasingly resistant to this idea, 
fearing that developed states may see it as an acceptable alternative to climate change 
mitigation.100 In fact, former Tuvaluan Prime Minister Saufotu Sopoanga reportedly 
requested that Tuvalu’s annual migration quota to New Zealand under the Pacific 
Access Category scheme be reduced from the proposed 300 to 75 in order to shift the 
focus from resettlement to sustainable local development.101 
There are at least two responses to this objection. First, states can and do have multiple 
concurrent obligations under international law. In the context of climate change, it is 
widely accepted that affluent states have at least three sets of legal obligations: (a) to 
mitigate climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions;102 (b) to assist poorer 
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ILA, ‘International Law and Sea Level Rise’, accessible at www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/ 
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states by providing financial and technical support for adaptation103 and perhaps 
compensation for damages incurred;104 and (c) to ensure that the individual and 
collective human rights of those affected continue to be realised, both domestically and 
through international assistance and cooperation. Even where states do have 
obligations under international law to facilitate the resettlement of displaced islanders, 
this does not allow them to sidestep their mitigation and adaptation obligations. 
Following from this first point, there is a second obvious point to note. Affluent states 
are far from fulfilling these mitigation and adaptation obligations. Climate change 
mitigation — that is, action taken to prevent ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system’105 — is generally understood to require the global average 
temperature to rise by no more than 2ºC above pre-industrial levels. However, existing 
mitigation commitments are both poorly implemented and insufficient to meet this 
target. According to the IPCC’s latest findings, greenhouse gas emissions continue to 
increase rapidly despite current mitigation efforts, 106 and the emissions-reduction 
commitments made at the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP17) fall well below what 
is needed to limit a global temperature increase to 2ºC,107 particularly if we factor in the 
added pressure of future economic and population growth108 and the long-term impact 
of existing atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide.109 Thus, according to the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), ‘unless very rapid 
and costly emission reductions are realised after 2020’, temperatures will exceed the 
2ºC mark and ‘[m]ore disruptive climate change is likely to be locked in’.110 
If current mitigation efforts appear unlikely to prevent a global temperature rise of 
more than 2ºC, one might assume that wealthier states have chosen to funnel their 
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resources into adaptation funding instead. However, this does not seem to be the case. 
While the World Bank estimates that adaptation will cost between US$4–US$37 billion 
annually,111 the adaptation funds established under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol 
have received less than US$1.5 billion in contributions over the past decade, much of 
which is yet to be spent.112 A Green Climate Fund established to distribute up to 
US$100 billion a year in adaptation funding is ‘up but … not yet running’ because 
states have yet to follow through on their funding commitments.113 
In any case, for the populations of atoll island states, ‘[w]ithout effective climate 
change mitigation measures … [in-situ] adaptation may no longer be feasible’.114 Even 
the IPCC recognises that ‘rapid sea-level rise that inundates islands and coastal 
settlements is likely to limit adaptation possibilities, with potential options being 
limited to migration’.115 Such inundation is looking increasingly likely, particularly in 
light of claims that the IPCC’s sea level rise projections are conservative at best.116  
Therefore, as Walter Kälin recently observed, while local adaptation strategies remain 
important, ‘even more importantly, [we should] plan for climate change adaptation so 
that human mobility is factored in’.117 The IPCC similarly encourages ‘early proactive 
planning’ for the collective resettlement of atoll island communities.118 Atoll island 
states themselves recognise that the best-case scenario — one in which aggressive 
mitigation strategies ensure that their territory remains habitable — is looking 
increasingly unlikely. According to Kiribati President Anote Tong, ‘[w]e’re not talking 
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about reducing carbon emissions because we’re already beyond that stage. What we 
need is urgent action’ to address the foreseeable threat of climate change inundation.119 
This chapter has thus far observed that states have multiple obligations under 
international law, that wealthier states are failing to adequately fulfil their obligations 
of mitigation and adaptation, and that atoll island states are likely to eventually 
become uninhabitable. Given this, it would seem wise to consider what states’ legal 
obligations might look like in the event that whole populations are displaced from 
their territory, on the understanding that this is a complementary rather than 
alternative area of research. 
Shouldn’t we be concerned with deprivation and displacement more generally? 
A second concern is that, by focusing specifically on climate change inundation, we 
unfairly exclude others who are suffering. The scope of our inquiry should therefore 
expand to include all those displaced by the impacts of climate change, or by 
environmental degradation and disaster, or indeed by deprivation of any kind. This 
objection has two main strands. The first is analytical: given the relationships between 
climate change and (a) environmental degradation and disaster and (b) existing socio-
economic, cultural and political constraints, how can we meaningfully separate climate 
change-related displacement from other forms of displacement? 120 The second is 
normative: given that climate change, environmental disasters, poverty and conflict 
displace countless people every year, why should we single out atoll island 
populations for special attention?121 
In response to the first objection, the case of climate change inundation is one in which 
the causal contribution of climate change-related impacts to human displacement is 
reasonably clear, particularly given the effects of rising sea levels and ocean warming 
and acidification on the coral reefs, freshwater lenses, arable land and coastal 
infrastructure on which atoll island states depend. While islanders could remain in 
place for longer if they had sufficient resources to reduce overcrowding, store food and 
water and construct state-of-the-art sea defences, a link between climate change and 
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movement will ultimately ‘exist irrespective of pre-existing socio-economic or 
environmental conditions’.122  
The second objection, which allows us to introduce some of the main themes of the 
thesis, is of more interest here. The main reason for drawing a normative distinction 
between climate change inundation and other drivers of displacement is the threat it 
poses to the territorial integrity, sovereignty and international legal personality of 
existing states.123 As the impacts of climate change inundation gradually worsen — 
rendering their territory uninhabitable, displacing large numbers of their citizens 
across international borders and calling into question their autonomy and 
independence — the legal status of atoll island states will become increasingly 
uncertain. This raises at least two concerns.  
The first relates to the ongoing protection of the human rights of displaced islanders. 
Should their state cease to exist as a matter of law, their citizenship will also cease, 
rendering them stateless.124 Even if their state does retain its legal status despite a loss 
of habitable territory, an atoll government-in-exile will face considerable constraints on 
its capacity to regulate, protect and provide basic services for its citizens. In practice, its 
‘population would be likely to find themselves largely in a situation that would be 
similar to if not the same as if statehood had ceased’,125 rendering its citizens de facto 
stateless.126 Whether de jure or de facto stateless, an islander displaced from her home 
state risks being cast adrift as an ‘object of international law for whom no subject of 
international law is responsible’. 127  Citizenship is the primary ‘link between 
individuals and their rights, benefits and duties of international law’;128 it is, in Hannah 
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Arendt’s terms, the ‘right to have rights’.129 Without the protection of a state, islanders 
face the possibility that neither their ‘right’ to membership in a state nor the ‘rights’ 
this entitles them to will be realised. 
Chapter 3 considers one potential solution to this problem: the expansion of existing 
migration pathways to allow islanders to migrate and secure citizenship elsewhere. 
This is championed by many as a pragmatic, targeted strategy that relies on existing 
domestic and bilateral agreements rather than calling for the adoption of a new 
international legal treaty. However, alongside other weaknesses discussed in Chapter 
3, it cannot address the initial objection raised above. There are currently around 10 
million stateless people worldwide — why narrow our focus arbitrarily to those 
islanders rendered stateless by climate change inundation?  
Rather than focus on the deprivation and potential statelessness of individual 
islanders, therefore, this thesis turns its attention to a second concern — one that is 
related to the first but emphasises the collective dimension of islanders’ loss. In the 
contemporary international and political system, states are instrumentally valuable for 
various reasons. It is typically states that provide the legal and political infrastructure 
through which laws are enforced, treaties are negotiated, sovereignty is exercised over 
natural resources and claims are brought before international adjudicative bodies. The 
primary focus of this thesis, however, is the role of the state in providing the 
framework through which a people can exercise its capacity for legal and political 
autonomy and independence — a capacity captured, for the purposes of international 
law, under the rubric of self-determination.  
While some argue that permanent resettlement within a democratic, rights-protecting 
state — as per the planned migration solution discussed in Chapter 3 — replaces 
everything of value that would be lost with the disappearance of a state’s territory,130 
this thesis takes a different perspective. There is something worth preserving here that 
is not captured by planned migration proposals, including a set of political institutions 
that have been shaped over time to reflect shared values and pursue distinctive 
collective goals. What is at stake here is not just the individual loss of citizenship but 
also the collective loss of the legal and political institutions through which a people has 
exercised its capacity for self-determination over time. This loss cannot be remedied by 
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granting membership to individual islanders elsewhere (although this is certainly a 
useful strategy in its own right). Instead, it requires a collective response that takes into 
account the wishes of islanders themselves; one that relies upon the legal norm of self-
determination. 
Of course, by identifying the loss of statehood and self-determination as its normative 
issue of concern, this thesis does not fully respond to the objection raised above: atoll 
islanders are not the only group to face this threat. However, it does significantly 
narrow the field of candidates of concern to those peoples whose shared political 
institutions face some grave external threat, such as colonial occupation or foreign 
subjugation. The case of climate change inundation stands out from among these as 
unprecedented and therefore able to provide a unique insight into the way in which an 
unsettled area of law (self-determination) might be applied to emerging issues of 
concern (in this case, climate change inundation). 
The status of self-determination as a peremptory norm of customary international law 
that generates obligations erga omnes demonstrates its normative significance for the 
international community as a whole. There is also a growing awareness of the 
significance of its potential loss in the face of climate change inundation. This has long 
been recognised by islanders themselves.131 More recently, however, the Human Rights 
Council, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the World 
Bank and other intergovernmental bodies have acknowledged its relevance in this 
context,132 as have a growing number of lawyers and practitioners.133 However, legal 
scholars have yet to assess in any detail the relevance or application of the legal norm 
of self-determination in this context, perhaps because it does not fit within the 
traditional legal narrative of self-determination as a tool of emancipation from foreign 
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subjugation or occupation.134 Thus, while it is increasingly recognised that the ‘biggest 
challenge’ in this context is ensuring that atoll island populations continue to ‘exist as 
viable communities even after the loss of most or even all of their territory’, ‘effective 
responses to this challenge do not exist’.135 
In an attempt to address this lacuna, this thesis argues that the legal concept of self-
determination should be understood in terms broad enough to apply to all peoples 
facing some grave external threat to their capacity for self-determination, including 
atoll island populations at risk of climate change inundation (Chapters 4 and 5). It 
proposes the recognition of a legal principle of self-determination, which requires that, 
wherever the collective autonomy and independence of a people faces some grave 
external threat, any response takes into account the ‘free and genuine expression of the 
will of the peoples concerned’.136 This principle is supplemented by a set of legal rules 
that identify those ‘peoples’ with a right to self-determination, including the 
populations of existing states.  
Building on this broad theoretical foundation, Chapter 6 proposes a collective decision-
making framework through which atoll island peoples can identify their preferred 
form of political organisation, should climate change inundation render their territory 
uninhabitable. This decision-making framework reflects a creative interpretation of 
existing legal rules and principles. It draws inspiration from the General Assembly’s 
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
(‘Declaration on Friendly Relations’), according to which non-self-governing peoples 
may choose from three options in exercising their self-determination: ‘[t]he 
establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration 
with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely 
determined by a people’.137 Under the proposed decision-making framework, atoll 
island peoples would choose from a similar set of options in order to secure their 
ongoing self-determination. 
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The first option is the ‘[re-]establishment of a sovereign and independent State’ with 
jurisdiction over a defined territory. An atoll island state must therefore acquire land 
from another state on which to resettle its population, preferably via a treaty of cession 
that transfers full territorial sovereignty (Chapter 6). The second option is ‘the 
emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people’. In this case, 
an atoll island state could pursue an alternative form of statehood by severing its link 
with a defined territory and permanent population and transitioning to a so-called 
‘deterritorialized state’ or ‘state-in-exile’ (Chapter 7).138 The third option is to enter into 
‘free association or integration with an independent State’, a choice that would protect 
the collective political status of a people but abandon any claim to statehood or 
exclusive territorial jurisdiction. An atoll island state might seek free association, 
federation or integration with another state, with a corresponding guarantee of 
political autonomy within that state (Chapter 8). 
These final chapters critically assess the institution of statehood by unpacking its 
constitutive elements — territory, autonomy, independence and jurisdiction — and 
examining the role that each plays in constructing a framework that can best protect 
the human rights and collective autonomy of atoll island peoples. They also recognise 
that a people’s capacity for self-determination is typically, but not necessarily, pursued 
through the framework of the state. While Chapters 6 and 7 take statehood as a starting 
assumption, Chapter 8 foregrounds future research into the question of whether or not 
climate change inundation calls for an alternative understanding of self-determination 
that is decoupled from the framework of the state. 
If the self-determination of islanders is so important, shouldn’t this research be 
conducted with or by islanders?  
A third concern is that, by indulging in ‘premature’ speculation about the untimely 
demise of atoll island states, we tell a story in which islanders are the vulnerable, 
voiceless victims of an inevitable disaster,139 and in which climate change is accepted 
uncritically as a ‘profound denier of freedom of action and a source of 
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disempowerment’.140 And, in the telling and retelling,141 this story is internalised by 
islanders themselves, who, believing that their land is destined to end up under water, 
begin to worry less about the sustainable use of resources or their own capacities for 
autonomy, adaptation and renewal.142 The concern here is (at least partly) that, despite 
being ‘ostensibly at the heart of the crisis discourse’,143 the voices of those most at risk 
of climate change end up being marginalised by both the relentless machinery of 
international negotiation and their own internalisation of the narrative of 
powerlessness.144 As a result, there is ‘a real danger that the migration response will be 
formulated by nation states and the international community’ rather than by islanders 
themselves.145 
This concern is relevant to this research project, which draws on extensive empirical 
research with and by islanders146 but is itself largely theoretical. However, its aim is to 
construct a conceptual framework within which a conversation about islanders’ 
autonomy, independence and self-determination can take place. It responds to a call 
from atoll island leaders for ‘a greater focus on educating [their] people on what’s 
coming and what the options are for them, which means some input into clarifying and 
looking at ways of providing those options’.147 It does so by setting out a collective 
decision-making framework within which the ‘free and genuine expression of the will’ 
of atoll island peoples can be given meaning. It is, in this sense, a theoretical precursor 
to consultations with island populations. While Chapters 6, 7 and 8 provide some 
analysis of the legal and political viability of each option of the proposed decision-
making framework, they make no attempt to proscribe or prescribe any particular 
                                                
140 UNDP, supra note 3, at 31. 
141 On media references to island states as ‘disappearing’ or ‘sinking’, see Barnett and Campbell, supra 
note 12, at 168; Chambers and Chambers, ‘Five Takes on Climate and Cultural Change in Tuvalu’, 19 
Contemporary Pacific (2007) 294; Farbotko, ‘Tuvalu and Climate Change: Constructions of Environmental 
Displacement in the Sydney Morning Herald’, 87 Geografiska Annaler, Series B (2005) 279. 
142 Barnett and Adger, supra note 17; Barnett and Campbell, supra note 12, at 170; Gemenne and Shen, 
supra note 101, at 17. 
143 Farbotko and Lazrus, supra note 25, at 383. 
144 However, this concern is too simplistic in its portrayal of islanders’ roles in perpetuating the ‘climate 
refugee’ discourse. The former President of the Maldives, Mohamed Nasheed, used this discourse to draw 
the world’s attention to the plight of his people. See Limon, interviewed on Carrick, supra note 100; BBC 
News, ‘Maldives Cabinet Makes a Splash’ (17 October 2009); Nasheed, ‘Address by President Mohamed 
Nasheed to the UN General Assembly’ (24 September 2009); Schmidle, ‘Wanted: A New Home for My 
Country’, The New York Times (10 May 2009). 
145 Hugo, supra note 12, at 31. Compare Ilan Kelman, cited in Reed, ‘Understanding the Islanders: Climate 
Migration in Context’, Acclimatise (1 September 2014). 
146 Indeed, ‘researcher fatigue’ is already an issue in Funafuti, Tuvalu. Mortreux and Barnett, supra note 
32, at 107–108. Compare Gemenne and Shen, supra note 101, at 26. 
147 Cited in Wiseman, ‘UN to Help Pacific Nations Build Capacity for Possible Climate Migration’, Radio 
New Zealand International (14 November 2013). 
     
 
    
32 
outcome; after all, the principle of self-determination demands that we listen to the 
peoples concerned. As one Pacific island representative recently observed, ‘the 
international community can help to provide the ingredients, but not the recipe’.148  
By placing self-determination at the heart of its research, the thesis takes concerns 
about the marginalisation of islanders seriously. An emphasis on autonomy and 
independence allows us to move away from the popular story of islanders as ‘refugees 
without capacity for sovereign self-determination’ towards ‘narratives other than those 
of annihilation’149 — narratives of dynamism, resilience and mobility, in which the 
collective political autonomy of atoll island peoples is valued and sustained. The hope 
is that this thesis lays some of the groundwork for a conversation in which the ‘voices 
of the displaced or those threatened with displacement [are] heard and taken into 
account’, as are the voices of those who will potentially receive them.150 
It would be useful here to make three further observations about the chosen 
methodology. First, taking its cue from Nansen Principle VII — which insists that, in 
addressing climate change-related displacement, the ‘existing norms of international 
law should be fully utilised, and normative gaps addressed’151 — this thesis explores 
ways in which the contemporary international legal framework might help or hinder 
the protection of atoll island populations. Rather than argue for the adoption of new 
legal norms,152 it considers the extent to which existing legal rules and principles — 
specifically those relating to human rights and self-determination — might be modified 
or expanded to assist those at risk. It also applies a functional or purposive approach to 
international law. Where international legal rules or principles fail to fulfil their 
underlying purpose in the face of changing environmental conditions, the onus is on 
the legal community to creatively reinterpret their scope and content in order to 
address this failure.153 
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Second, along with a handful of other legal scholars working in this area154 — as well 
as the IPCC itself155 — this thesis recognises that the complex and unprecedented 
nature of climate change inundation calls for an interdisciplinary approach. As Nansen 
Principle VII implies, climate change-related displacement highlights the ‘normative 
gaps’ in international law. These gaps are difficult to address if we rely solely on the 
resources of legal doctrine and practice. While some turn to economics, migration 
theory or empirical research to supplement law, this thesis turns to legal and political 
theory. Drawing on the work of Charles Beitz,156 Chapter 2 develops a functional 
account of human rights as norms that provide states with reasons for acting to protect 
important human interests against foreseeable threats, both within and across state 
borders. This interdisciplinary account provides additional resources for determining 
the role, content and scope of human rights in areas in which specific legal rules have 
not yet emerged or crystallised. While the focus of the thesis remains primarily on the 
capacity of international law to respond to climate change inundation, it recognises the 
role that theory plays in clarifying the scope and content of international human rights 
law, and in rendering it ‘normatively rich’.157 
Third, while it examines the potential re-interpretation and modification of 
international law with respect to one case study — that of climate change inundation 
— the approach taken and the lessons learned throughout the thesis can be applied 
more widely. As Crawford suggests with regard to the law on statehood and self-
determination, ‘international law is enriched by connection with the complexities of 
individual situations’.158 In this case, the application of the legal principle of self-
determination to the issue of climate change inundation provides a unique insight into 
the ways in which an unsettled area of law might develop in response to new and 
emerging issues.  
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Why should other states care?  
A fourth concern is that climate change inundation does not easily fit within the 
traditional model of human rights protection, in which a state is primarily responsible 
for the rights of its citizens. Nor does it neatly correspond with the mainstream 
understanding of self-determination, which envisages a relatively straightforward 
binary relationship between oppressor state and oppressed people. In the case of 
climate change inundation, there is no clear causal relationship between the actions or 
omissions of one state and a specific climate change impact, leading to a specific 
human rights violation, in another. Given this, why should other states shoulder the 
burdens associated with hosting or otherwise assisting displaced atoll island 
populations, particularly where this interferes with their own territorial integrity or 
their own people’s self-determination? 
The difficult question of identifying those with reasons for assisting displaced atoll 
island populations is first addressed in Chapter 2, which introduces four sets of 
reasons for acting that are developed further throughout the thesis. ‘Reasons for acting’ 
is used as a general term in recognition of the fact that, while some of the reasons 
developed throughout the thesis are formally recognised as legal obligations, others 
are not, although they remain grounded in existing international law. Even where they 
are recognised as legal obligations, they may not impose perfect duties on external 
actors. Existing legal doctrine may fail to explicitly identify those responsible for 
acting, clarify the actions that they are required to take or impose obligations with ‘the 
peremptory character of a duty’.159  Nevertheless, international human rights law 
provides a legal basis for (at least) defeasible — or, in Beitz’s terms, pro tanto — reasons 
for taking remedial or corrective action to address failures of human rights protection, 
where these reasons carry considerable, though not always absolute, legal weight. 
The four sets of reasons for acting developed throughout the thesis are primarily 
grounded in international law but also draw on insights from moral and political 
philosophy. This interdisciplinary approach provides a wider set of conceptual and 
normative resources for assessing the reasons that states may have for — or against — 
acting to address manifest failures of human rights protection elsewhere. 
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First, there are ‘reasons of peremptory force’ — general reasons arising from the 
fundamental importance of the interest at stake. The recognition of self-determination 
as a peremptory norm of general international law that gives rise to obligations erga 
omnes, for example, demonstrates its status as an ‘essential principle’ of international 
law160 and a ‘concern of all states’.161 The threat posed by climate change inundation to 
the self-determination of atoll island peoples therefore generates strong normative 
reasons for acting that apply to the international community as a whole.  
Second, ‘reasons of international cooperation’ are derived from obligations of 
international assistance and cooperation under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the UN Charter and other legal 
instruments. While states have considerable discretion in deciding where to direct their 
assistance and cooperation, specific obligations may arise where they have previously 
made an explicit legal or political commitment to another state though bilateral aid or 
migration agreements. 
Third, ‘reasons of contribution’ pick out those actors that have contributed to the 
problem of climate change inundation, using their greenhouse gas emissions per capita 
since 1990 as a rough proxy. These reasons do not rely on any strict causal connection 
between the emissions of one state and a specific climate change harm in another. 
Instead, they reflect the fact that a failure to adequately regulate greenhouse gas 
emissions generates strong reasons for acting for industrialised states, drawing on 
evidence from the IPCC’s latest report and the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities under the UNFCCC. 
Fourth, ‘reasons of capacity’ look forward to each state’s capacity to assist atoll island 
populations. Where states are able to act more effectively (on the basis of proximity or 
cultural ties, for example) or more readily absorb the burdens of acting (on the basis of 
their existing natural, financial, human or technological resources), they have stronger 
reasons for acting. 
As the thesis progresses, it becomes clear that certain states bear a greater 
responsibility for assisting atoll island populations than others, arising from the 
cumulative weight of these different reasons for acting. It also becomes clear that 
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states’ reasons for and against acting differ according to the option under 
consideration: the expansion of existing migration pathways (Chapter 3), the cession of 
territory (Chapter 6), the recognition of a deterritorialized atoll island state (Chapter 7) 
or the merger of two or more states (Chapter 8). 
1.5 The scope and limits of the thesis 
One of the central claims of the thesis is that the legal norm of self-determination is 
applicable outside of the narrow contexts in which it is traditionally thought to apply. 
In any situation in which a people faces some grave external threat to its autonomy and 
independence — including, in this case, climate change inundation — the legal 
principle of self-determination requires that we act with regard to the freely expressed 
will of the people concerned. Other states, in turn, have reasons for contributing to the 
people’s preferred outcome, arising from their contribution to the problem, their 
capacity to assist, their commitment to international norms of jus cogens and erga omnes 
status and their general obligations of international cooperation. 
This thesis focuses on those areas in which it can make an original contribution: 
assessing the applicability of the legal norm of self-determination to the emerging issue 
of climate change inundation; proposing a collective decision-making framework 
through which atoll island populations can have their say in determining which steps 
are taken in response to climate change inundation; questioning the traditional legal 
narrative linking statehood, self-determination and territorial sovereignty; and setting 
out an interdisciplinary theoretical framework for the application of an unsettled area 
of law to new and unprecedented challenges.  
It is important, however, to be clear about the limits of the thesis. It is not concerned 
with climate change-related displacement in general, but with one specific instance. Its 
primary concern is not the impact of climate change inundation on individual human 
rights (although Chapters 2 and 3 use the right to health to develop the theoretical 
framework of the thesis), but on collective rights to self-determination. It is not 
concerned with statelessness or the associated loss of the ‘right to have rights’, but with 
the prevention of this loss. It is not concerned with practical questions about 
resettlement — relating to securing funding, finding available land, building housing 
and infrastructure, relocating islanders and so on — but with the legal framework 
within which decisions about such resettlement might occur. And finally, in proposing 
an alternative account of self-determination, the thesis does not seek to engage in the 
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ongoing debate about rights to independence and secession. For the purpose of this 
thesis, at least, this debate is bracketed off by defining self-determining ‘peoples’ as the 
populations of existing states. 
Its aim, instead, is to direct our attention towards an issue that challenges 
contemporary assumptions about statehood, sovereignty and self-determination, 
whose ramifications are likely to extend far beyond the populations of atoll island 
states. As the Malé Declaration adopted by the Climate Vulnerable Forum observes, 
‘the fate of the most vulnerable will be the fate of the world’.162 It is crucial here that we 
take advantage of the dynamic, responsive character of international law in order to 
ensure that it remains relevant and continues to ‘make a difference’.163 Chapter 2 begins 
this process by setting out an interdisciplinary theoretical framework on which the rest 
of the thesis builds, drawing on Charles Beitz’s ‘practical’ account of human rights as 
norms that guide the behaviour of domestic and international actors. 
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II. Human Rights and Climate Change Inundation  
2. Climate Change Inundation and Human Rights: A Functional Account  
2.1 Introduction 
2.1.1 Why human rights? 
The decision to approach climate change inundation from the perspective of human 
rights law and theory is a pragmatic one, reflecting the unique roles that human rights 
play in a world characterised by interdependence, inequality and upheaval.164 First, 
human rights law provides a flexible, responsive framework for addressing emerging 
challenges like climate change inundation. While it is important that human rights 
standards retain their integrity and credibility, these standards must also be able to 
‘respond to the emergence of new threats to human dignity and well-being’.165 By 
focusing on the protection of the fundamental interests of those at risk in any situation, 
international human rights law has the capacity to adapt to new threats in ways that 
other international legal regimes do not.166 The Office of the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), for example, has made clear that those displaced by the 
impacts of climate change do not come under its remit, arguing instead that the 
international human rights regime provides a more suitable, flexible basis for 
addressing their protection needs.167 The OHCHR agrees, describing the need to 
address climate change-related harms as ‘a critical human rights concern and 
obligation under international law’.168 
Second, human rights transcend national borders. While human rights law and 
practice traditionally emphasise the role of the domestic state in promoting and 
                                                
164 For an alternative perspective — ‘why not human rights?’ — see Tully, ‘Like Oil and Water: A 
Sceptical Appraisal of Climate Change and Human Rights’, 15 AILJ (2008) 213. See also International 
Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP), Climate Change and Human Rights: A Rough Guide (2008), at 4 
and 64; McInerney-Lankford, Darrow and Rajamani, supra note 95, at 39–40; McInerney-Lankford, 
‘Human Rights and Climate Change: Reflections on International Legal Issues and Potential Policy 
Relevance’, in Gerrard and Wannier (eds), supra note 68, 195, at 231–233. 
165 Alston, ‘Conjuring up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control’, 78 AJIL (1984) 607, at 609. 
166 Kälin and Schrepfer, supra note 73, at 24–44. 
167 Gorethy, ‘UNHCR Backs off on Climate Refugees’, Post Courier (8 January 2009). Compare OHCHR, 
supra note 13, at para.58. For an overview of the ‘climate’ or ‘environmental refugee’ debate, see Black, 
‘Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality?’, New Issues in Refugee Research: Working Paper 34 (2001); 
McAdam, ‘Refusing “Refuge” in the Pacific: (De)Constructing Climate-Induced Displacement in 
International Law’, in É. Piguet, A. Pécoud and P. de Guchteneire (eds), Migration and Climate Change (2011) 
102, at 117–119. 
168 OHCHR, supra note 13, at para.96 (see also para.71). 
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protecting the human rights of those within its territory, this ‘territorial framing of 
rights is a paradigm under strain’.169 On the one hand, states are not hermetically 
sealed but increasingly interdependent, and transnational factors like international 
trade agreements, joint military operations, atmospheric pollution and climate change 
play a significant role in the non-realisation of human rights.170 On the other hand, 
there is a growing acknowledgement — or ‘rediscovery’171 — that human rights and 
responsibilities do not always stop at territorial borders,172 and that international 
cooperation is necessary ‘in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights’.173 
This extraterritorial aspect174 is particularly crucial in the context of climate change 
inundation, the causes and consequences of which are not tied to any one state.  
Third, rights in general — and human rights in particular — differ from values or goals 
insofar as they each have a right-holder, one or more duty-bearers or addressees, and a 
relatively well-defined scope that requires its addressees to act (or refrain from acting) 
in a certain way.175 They therefore draw our attention to the actions that others are 
required to take to protect important human interests. Together with the 
extraterritorial aspect of human rights protection, this highlights the fact that states 
may have legal obligations or reasons for acting to address manifest failures of human 
rights protection — including failures arising from climate change inundation — in 
other states. 
                                                
169 Langford et al., ‘Introduction: An Emerging Field’, in M. Langford et al. (eds), Global Justice, State Duties 
(2013) 3, at 3. 
170 Nollkaemper and Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Conceptual Framework’, 34 
Michigan Journal of International Law (2013) 359, at 370–372; O. O’Neill, Bounds of Justice (2000), at 196–197; 
Young, ‘Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model’, 23 Social Philosophy and Policy 
(2006) 102. 
171 Langford et al., supra note 169, at 8. 
172 See contributions to Langford et al. (eds), supra note 169; M. Gibney and S. Skogly (eds), Universal 
Human Rights and Extraterritorial Obligations (2010); M. Salomon, Global Responsibility for Human Rights 
(2007); S. Skogly, Beyond National Borders: States’ Human Rights Obligations in International Cooperation 
(2006). 
173 Article 1(3), Charter of the United Nations, UNCIO XV, 335; amendments by General Assembly 
Resolution in UNTS 557, 143/638, 308/892, 119. 
174 This term is chosen for its widespread use in international human rights legal doctrine and practice 
(see Gibney, ‘On Terminology: Extraterritorial Obligations’, in Langford et al. (eds), supra note 169, 32, at 
38–45) and is used throughout the thesis to capture the variety of ways in which human rights and 
associated obligations transcend political and territorial boundaries. However, it is not unproblematic, 
implying in certain cases that ‘human rights are in principle territorial and only exceptionally apply 
outside a state’s borders’. Langford et al., supra note 169, at 12. 
175 ‘[I]t is essential to a right that it is a demand upon others, however difficult it is to specify exactly 
which others’ are required to act in which ways. H. Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign 
Policy (1996), at 16. 
     
 
    
40 
Finally, human rights not only provide conceptual tools and legal mechanisms for 
grappling with the problems at hand, but also ‘remind us that climate change is about 
suffering — about the human misery that results directly from the damage we are 
doing to nature’.176 They bring the human face of climate change inundation into focus, 
urging us to pay particular attention to those who are already marginalised by poverty, 
powerlessness or environmental degradation. Human rights also require that affected 
populations — whether relocating or receiving — are ‘informed, consulted and able to 
participate actively in relevant decisions and their implementation’,177 a demand that is 
central to the thesis from Chapter 4 onwards. 
Today, it may well be a ‘trite observation’ to note that climate change has implications 
for the fulfilment of human rights.178 However, this has not always been the case. The 
recognition of the OHCHR and Human Rights Council of the ‘direct and indirect’ 
impacts of climate change on a range of human rights marks a newfound boldness 
among states.179 In his analysis of the Council’s two resolutions on human rights and 
climate change,180 Marc Limon observes a ‘remarkable transformation of opinion’ from 
one resolution to the next.181 In 2008, many states had rejected any legal connection 
between human rights and climate change. By 2009, however, even developed states 
were prepared to recognise the ‘significant threat posed by climate change to human 
rights’.182 
This shift in opinion is due, in no small part, to the agitation of atoll island states, 
several of which have recently formed a Coalition of Atoll Island Nations on Climate 
Change to bolster their negotiating power.183 In the 2007 Malé Declaration, island states 
called on the international community to recognise that ‘climate change has clear and 
immediate implications for the full enjoyment of human rights’. 184  In doing so, 
islanders deliberately invoked the ‘common language’ of human rights to draw 
                                                
176 Mary Robinson, cited in ICHRP, supra note 164, at iii. Compare Knox, ‘Climate Change and Human 
Rights Law’, 50 Virginia Journal of International Law (2009) 163, at 214. 
177 Nansen Initiative, supra note 96, at 5. Compare UNHCR, supra note 75, at para.4. 
178 McAdam, supra note 90, at 52. 
179 Human Rights Council Res. 10/4, supra note 132; OHCHR, supra note 13, at paras.20–41. 
180 Human Rights Council Res. 7/23, 28 March 2008; Human Rights Council Res. 10/4, supra note 132. 
181 Limon, ‘Human Rights Obligations and Accountability in the Face of Climate Change’, 38 Georgia 
Journal of International and Comparative Law (2010) 543, at 567. 
182 See statements by the First Secretary of the Australian Permanent Mission to the UN at Geneva and the 
First Secretary of the Delegation of the US before the Human Rights Council, cited in ibid, at 569. 
183 ABC News, supra note 94. 
184 Malé Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change (14 November 2007). 
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attention to the impacts of climate change on their basic human interests.185 While they 
initially encountered ‘widespread opposition to the idea that there were any linkages 
whatsoever between human rights law and climate change law’, atoll island states 
have more recently observed an emerging ‘consensus on the nature and potential 
operationalisation of the linkage between human rights and climate change’.186 The 
past few years have seen the UNFCCC explicitly acknowledge the human rights 
implications of climate change,187 the Human Rights Council adopt the aforementioned 
resolutions and the OHCHR engage in widespread research into the impact of climate 
change on human rights,188 indicating a growing recognition of the contribution of 
human rights theory, doctrine and practice to climate change-related issues. 
2.1.2 What are human rights? 
Before we can talk meaningfully about the role of human rights in the context of 
climate change inundation, however, we must have a clear idea of what we mean by 
‘human rights’. The conceptual breadth of recent work in this field reflects the 
multidimensional, cross-disciplinary nature of human rights. Some scholars are 
concerned with human rights as moral tools that protect our basic human interests in 
achieving wellbeing or pursuing a worthwhile life.189 Others define human rights as 
political tools that place limits on state sovereignty and provide reasons for external 
intervention or secession.190 Still others understand human rights as legal tools that 
have influenced and developed through the practice of states, international judicial and 
                                                
185 Limon, interviewed on Carrick, supra note 100. 
186 Iruthisham Adam, speaking at an OHCHR Seminar to Address the Adverse Impacts of Climate 
Change on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights (23–24 February 2012). For a timeline of links between 
human rights and climate change, see McAdam, supra note 90, at 220–235; McInerney-Lankford, supra note 
164, at 200–204. 
187 Preamble and Article 8, Cancun Agreements, Decision 1/CP.16, Report of the Conference of the Parties 
on its Sixteenth Session, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (2010). 
188 OHCHR, supra note 13. See further Knox, ‘Linking Human Rights and Climate Change at the United 
Nations’, 33 Harvard Environmental Law Review (2009) 477. A petition before the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights has invoked international human rights law. S. Watt-Cloutier and Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference, Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Seeking Relief from 
Violations Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States (2005). The 
Commission chose not to hear the petition but held an oral hearing to which petitioners were invited. 
McInerney-Lankford, supra note 164, at 200. 
189 J. Griffin, On Human Rights (2008); J. Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights (2007); Tasioulas, ‘Are 
Human Rights Essentially Triggers for Intervention?’, 4 Philosophy Compass (2009) 938. 
190 Beitz, supra note 156; A. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for 
International Law (2004); J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1999); Raz, ‘Human Rights Without Foundations’, in 
S. Besson and J. Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of International Law (2010) 321. 
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monitoring mechanisms, and non-state actors.191 Some argue that there ‘is no one truth 
to find’;192 others that a theory of human rights should capture all of the concept’s 
salient dimensions — moral, political and legal.193 This thesis cannot do justice to the 
diversity of ideas explored in this body of literature. Instead, it adopts the most 
promising theory for the purpose of understanding the content and development of 
international human rights law, and proceeds from there.  
This thesis is concerned with the role human rights play in providing states194 — acting 
alone or together through multilateral agreements or coordinating institutions — with 
reasons for acting to address the impacts of climate change inundation both within and 
across territorial borders. Drawing on Charles Beitz’s ‘practical’ or functional account, 
it understands human rights as norms that provide states with reasons to address a 
manifest failure to protect important human interests elsewhere.195 Beitz’s account of 
human rights is chosen because of the attention it pays to this central function, as well 
as to the roles identified above: the responsive legal and conceptual framework that 
human rights provide, the emphasis they place on extraterritorial interaction, 
cooperation and responsibility, and the reasons they provide for remedial and 
preventive action.  
Following a brief discussion of the impacts of climate change inundation on the human 
right to health in section 2.2, section 2.3 provides an overview of Beitz’s account, which 
is keenly attuned to the implications of human rights protection not only for those 
whose rights are threatened but also for those who act to address this threat. According 
to Beitz, in order to be protected by a human right, an interest must (a) be recognisable 
as sufficiently important by most individuals, (b) face some grave, foreseeable and 
                                                
191 P. Alston (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (2005); Gibney and Skogly (eds), supra note 172; W. 
Kälin and J. Künzli, The Law of International Human Rights Protection (2010); D. Shelton and P. Carozza, 
Regional Protection of Human Rights (2013); C. Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Realism and Idealism 
(2008). 
192 Griffin, ‘Human Rights: Questions of Aim and Approach’, 120 Ethics (2010) 741, at 751. 
193 Besson, supra note 157, at 215 and 211, note 1. 
194 The thesis focuses on states for several reasons. First, they are the primary right-holders and duty-
bearers under international law. Second, they can act together through international organisations or 
multilateral agreements in a way that individuals and corporations are currently unable or unwilling to 
do. Third, while states do not directly cause all harmful emissions, they are responsible for regulating the 
greenhouse gas emitting activities of those within their jurisdiction. Fourth, emissions are more easily 
disaggregated at state than individual level. Fifth, states (usually) persist over time and space in a way that 
individuals and corporations do not. For an alternative perspective, see Caney, ‘Environmental 
Degradation, Reparations, and the Moral Significance of History’, 37 Journal of Social Philosophy (2006) 464, 
at 467–470. 
195 While human rights have other important functions (for example, protecting individuals against the 
abuse of state power), these are not the focus of this thesis. 
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remediable threat and (c) enjoy some effective means of protection that does not 
impose unreasonable burdens on those who act. In the event of a manifest failure to 
protect human rights domestically, it must also (d) be amenable to — and provide 
reasons for — corrective or remedial action by actors outside the state. 
It is this fourth criterion that is of primary concern for this thesis. Using the example of 
the human right to health, section 2.3.3 introduces four sets of reasons for acting to 
address a manifest failure of human rights protection in another state. These are 
inspired by Beitz’s account yet also depart from it, to the extent that they explicitly 
draw on international legal doctrine and practice. The first two sets (reasons of 
peremptory force and international cooperation) are general, applying to all or most 
members of the international community. They primarily provide normative weight 
rather than substantive content and must therefore be supplemented by additional 
reasons that narrow down the field of candidates who have reasons for acting. The 
third set (reasons of contribution) is primarily backward-looking, arising from states’ 
contributions to the problem of climate change inundation, while the fourth set 
(reasons of capacity) is primarily forward-looking, addressing states’ capacities to 
respond to this problem. While these reasons are considered in the abstract here, they 
reappear throughout the thesis in more concrete terms in relation to the different 
actions that states might take in response to climate change inundation, including 
modifying existing migration pathways (Chapter 3), ceding territory (Chapter 6), 
hosting a deterritorialized atoll island state (Chapter 7) or merging with an atoll island 
people (Chapter 8). 
This chapter therefore outlines the legal and theoretical framework within which 
subsequent chapters operate. It provides a model for the creative application of a 
dynamic or unsettled area of law (in this case, human rights and self-determination) to 
an emerging and unprecedented issue (climate change inundation). While this model is 
primarily grounded in law, human rights theory provides additional resources for 
determining the role, content and scope of human rights in areas in which legal rules 
have not yet emerged or crystallised. This complementary relationship between law 
and theory is evident — but insufficiently developed196 — in several recent papers on 
this issue, which invoke principles of justice, fairness and equality or draw attention to 
the underlying purpose and objective of legal rules and principles in their attempts to 
                                                
196 Willcox, ‘Michael B. Gerrard and Gregory E. Wannier (eds), Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications 
of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate’, 25 EJIL (2014) 343, at 347–348. 
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address the problem of climate change inundation.197 
2.2 Climate change inundation and the human right to health 
While acknowledging that ‘global warming will potentially have implications for the 
full range of human rights’,198 this chapter restricts its analysis to the human right to 
health,199 one of a handful of human rights recognised by the OHCHR and Human 
Rights Council as facing the ‘direct and indirect’ impacts of climate change.200 Both the 
IPCC and UNFCCC warn that climate change will have ‘significant deleterious effects 
… on human health and welfare’,201 particularly among those who live in coastal or 
subsistence farming communities,202 while the World Health Organisation (WHO) has 
argued that the basic determinants of health — including access to safe working 
conditions and adequate food, shelter, drinking water and sanitation facilities203 — are 
threatened by climate change.204 
Climate change inundation is already affecting the realisation of the human right to 
health in atoll island states. 205 As discussed in Chapter 1, unpredictable rainfall 
patterns and the saltwater contamination of the freshwater lens and agricultural land 
on which islanders depend will exacerbate malnutrition and diarrhoeal diseases. 
Increasingly severe storms and sea surges will cause injuries and hinder access to 
                                                
197 For example, Burkett, supra note 90; Rayfuse, supra note 68; Stoutenburg, supra note 90; Wyman, supra 
note 90. 
198 OHCHR, supra note 13, at para.20. For a comprehensive summary, see Republic of the Maldives, supra 
note 21, at 18. 
199 Articles 7(b), 10(3) and 12, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
993 UNTS 3 (1966). See also Article 5(e)(iv), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD), 660 UNTS 195 (1965); Articles 12 and 14(2)(b), Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 1249 UNTS 13 (1979); Article 24, Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC), 1577 UNTS 3 (1989); Articles 16(4), 22(2) and 25, Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), A/RES/61/106 (2007); Articles 28, 43(1)(e), 45(1)(c) and 70, 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
(CRMW), A/RES/45/158 (1990). 
200 Others include rights to life, an adequate standard of living and self-determination. Human Rights 
Council Res. 10/4, supra note 132; OHCHR, supra note 13, at paras.20–41. 
201 Article 1(1), UNFCCC, supra note 102. 
202 Confalonieri et al., ‘Human Health’, in Parry et al. (eds), supra note 11, 391, at 393. 
203
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), ‘General Comment 14 (Article 12): The 
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health’, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000), at paras.4 and 11–12; 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘General Recommendation 24 (Article 
12): Women and Health’, UN Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1 (1999); P. Hunt, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/2003/58 (2003), at paras.10–36. 
204 WHO, Protecting Human Health from Climate Change (2009). Compare P. Hunt, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental 
Health, UN Doc. A/62/214 (2007), at para.102. 
205 Nurse et al., supra note 11, at 1624–1625. 
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health services by destroying healthcare and transport infrastructure. Higher 
temperatures may also prompt an increase in food- and vector-borne diseases.  
The impacts of climate change inundation also threaten the realisation of other human 
rights with which the right to health is ‘inextricably related’,206 including rights to 
freedom from hunger207 and access to a safe and adequate water supply.208 Extreme 
weather events and flooding threaten the availability and distribution of food, coastal 
erosion, salinization and changing rainfall patterns threaten subsistence agricultural 
production, and changes in sea temperatures threaten local fish stocks.209 Many atoll 
island states also have a limited freshwater supply, which is ‘likely to be seriously 
compromised’ by the cumulative effects of climate change inundation.210 Extreme 
weather events will temporarily disrupt water supplies by damaging storage tanks or 
desalination plants, while sea level rise and saltwater contamination will reduce the 
capacity of the freshwater lens, threatening islanders’ long-term access to water.211 
Atoll island states — all of which are developing or least developed states — are 
required to take ‘deliberate, concrete and targeted steps’ towards the full realisation of 
the human right to health, ‘even where the available resources are demonstrably 
inadequate’ for reasons of poverty and inequality.212 This requires them to (at least) 
create and maintain a basic public healthcare system and ensure equitable access to 
essential medicines and adequate food, water, shelter, and sanitation.213 However, as 
observed in Chapter 1, island states’ capacity to meet even this minimum level of 
provision in the face of climate change inundation is hampered by two additional 
constraints. First, ‘the effects and risk of climate change are significantly higher in low-
                                                
206 CESCR, supra note 203, at para.3. 
207 Article 11(2), ICESCR, supra note 199. See also Article 24(2)(c), CRC, supra note 199; Articles 25(f) and 
28(1), CRPD, supra note 199; CESCR, ‘General Comment 12 (Article 11): The Right to Adequate Food’, UN 
Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (1999), at paras.6–13. 
208 GA Res. 64/292, 3 August 2010; Article 14(2)(h), CEDAW, supra note 199; Article 24(2)(c), CRC, supra 
note 199; Article 28(2)(a), CRPD, supra note 199; CESCR, supra note 203, at paras.4 and 11–12; CESCR, 
‘General Comment 15 (Articles 11 and 12): The Right to Water’, UN Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (2003), at 
paras.20–29. 
209 Mimura et al., supra note 16, at 689; Republic of the Maldives, supra note 21, at 49; Tuvalu Ministry 
supra note 20, at 21, 24 and 27–28. 
210 Mimura et al., supra note 16, at 692. 
211 Republic of the Maldives, supra note 21, at 55. 
212 CESCR, supra note 203, at paras.11 and 30. Compare OHCHR, supra note 13, paras.77–78. Regarding 
additional steps taken in response to the impacts of climate change inundation on the right to health, see 
Republic of the Maldives Ministry of Health, Quality Health Care: Bridging the Gaps. Health Master Plan 
2006-2015 (2006); Republic of the Maldives, supra note 21, at 53–54. 
213 CESCR, supra note 203, at para.43.  
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income countries’,214 particularly those with a substantial proportion of low-lying 
coastal territory. Second, existing disadvantages like poverty, isolation and resource 
scarcity place constraints on islanders’ adaptive capacities. As Stephen Humphreys 
observes, a ‘vicious circle links precarious access to natural resources, poor physical 
infrastructure, weak rights protections and vulnerability to climate-related harms’.215  
As climate change inundation places ‘an additional burden on the resources available 
to states, economic and social rights are likely to suffer’.216 Many of the long-term 
measures required to adapt to rising sea levels, saltwater contamination and coastal 
erosion will be out of the reach of atoll island states, for whom ‘the cost of adopting 
and implementing adaptation options is likely to be prohibitive’.217 Nor, given their 
relative size and capacity, can they effectively contribute to climate change 
mitigation.218 As Chapter 1 made clear, atoll island states also ‘face the prospect of loss 
of significant amounts of territory to sea-level rise and inundation, and some face the 
prospect of complete submersion’,219 raising the question of whether in-situ adaptation 
is even possible in the long term. Should the territory of an atoll island state become 
uninhabitable, its capacity to fulfil its citizens’ human right to health will be severely 
compromised.  
Building on the example of the human right to health, the following sections of this 
chapter set out a functional account of human rights as legal norms that provide states 
with reasons to respond to a manifest failure to protect important human interests at 
the domestic level, including as a result of climate change inundation. 
2.3 A functional account of human rights  
2.3.1 The extraterritorial dimension of human rights protection 
This thesis is concerned with the role that human rights play in providing states with 
reasons for acting to address the impacts of climate change inundation. It adopts — 
                                                
214 OHCHR, supra note 13, at para.84. 
215 Humphreys, ‘Introduction’, in S. Humphreys (ed.), Human Rights and Climate Change (2010) 1, at 1–2. 
216 OHCHR, supra note 13, at para.75. 
217 Mimura et al., supra note 16, at 706. Compare Nurse et al., supra note 11, at 1638. Even where they are 
affordable, many adaptation strategies will redirect resources away from existing public services and 
infrastructure. Republic of the Maldives, supra note 21, at 59–60. 
218 Atoll island states ‘can’t develop a feedback mechanism on their own that effectively reduces the 
emissions that cause the problem’. Barnett and Campbell, supra note 12, at 109. Compare Nurse et al., supra 
note 11, at 1641. 
219 UN Secretary-General, supra note 74, at para.71. 
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with some modifications — Charles Beitz’s ‘practical’ or functional account of ‘human 
rights as they actually operate in the world today’.220 For Beitz, human rights are ‘a 
distinctive class of norms’ that regulate the behaviour of states and others by providing 
pro tanto reasons for remedial or preventive action at both domestic and international 
levels.221 Their role is to ‘protect urgent individual interests against [the] predictable 
dangers’ (or, in Henry Shue’s terms, ‘standard threats’)222 that arise in a state-centric 
world.223 
According to Beitz, in order to earn the protected status of a human right, a human 
interest must satisfy a series of normative and empirical tests that speak to both the 
‘demand side’ (the beneficiary) and the ‘supply side’ (the actor(s) with reasons to 
respond).224 It must (a) be recognisable as sufficiently important or urgent within a 
wide range of normal lives; (b) face some grave and reasonably foreseeable threat;225 
and (c) enjoy some effective, permissible means of social, political or legal protection 
that does not impose unreasonable burdens on those who act.226  
Thinking back to the previous section, the human right to health satisfies each of these 
criteria. Its inclusion in a wide range of international legal instruments demonstrates its 
importance to human life across the world. An effective means of institutional 
protection — usually in the form of an accessible health system and basic public 
infrastructure — has been designed and implemented across many states.227 And the 
impacts of climate change inundation pose a grave, foreseeable threat to the enjoyment 
of the human right to health in atoll island states. 
However, as also observed above, atoll island states may themselves lack the resources 
to address the threat posed by climate change inundation to islanders’ human rights. 
Beitz therefore includes an additional criterion: in the event of a manifest failure of 
                                                
220 Beitz, supra note 156, at 38. On the development of international human rights law and practice, see 
Kälin and Künzli, supra note 191, at chs.1–2; Tomuschat, supra note 191, at chs.1–2. 
221 Beitz, supra note 156, at 9. 
222 Shue, supra note 175, at ch.1. Compare Nickel, supra note 189, at 70–74. 
223 Beitz, supra note 156, at 109. Compare J. Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (2013), 
at 86–87 and 97–99. 
224 Beitz, supra note 156, at 65. 
225 From a legal perspective, this criterion might be understood in terms of an obligation of due diligence 
requirement, which requires that the relevant actors ‘knew or ought to have known at the time of the 
existence of a real and immediate risk’ to the enjoyment of some right. Osman v. UK, ECHR (1998), at 
para.116. Compare Corfu Channel, ICJ Reports (1949) 4, at 18. 
226 Beitz, supra note 156, at 110–111. Compare Nickel’s six-part schema and Raz’s three-part schema for 
justifying specific human rights. Nickel, supra note 189, at ch.5; Raz, supra note 190, at 336. 
227 On national implementation of the human right to health, see CESCR, supra note 203, at paras.53–62. 
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human rights protection at the domestic level, an interest must (d) be amenable to — 
and provide reasons for — corrective or remedial action by actors outside of the 
state.228  
This idea of a ‘manifest failure’ of human rights protection is not Beitz’s but is used 
throughout the thesis to avoid the often futile attempt to establish intention or liability 
on the part of the domestic state.229 After all, ‘the applicability of extraterritorial 
obligations of fulfilment should not be conditioned on the reasons for non-compliance 
by the domestic state’.230 The effect of an act or omission on the enjoyment of human 
rights is just as relevant in triggering states’ extraterritorial reasons for acting as the 
intent behind it.231 
This two-tiered model of human rights protection is reflected in state practice, legal 
doctrine and the infrastructure of the human rights system itself.232 As is widely 
accepted by lawyers and theorists alike, primary responsibilities for ensuring the 
realisation of human rights lie with the domestic institutions of states. 233  State 
institutions are required to respect human rights, protect them against non-state actors 
within their jurisdiction and control, and ensure their fulfilment where necessary.234 
However, complementary responsibilities also fall on actors outside the state.235 These 
                                                
228 Beitz, supra note 156, at 140–141. 
229 The term comes from the 2005 World Summit Outcome document, in which the international 
community recognises a responsibility to take collective action ‘where national authorities are manifestly 
failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity’. GA Res. 60/1, 24 October 2005, at para.139 (emphasis added). 
230 Vandenhole and Benedek, ‘Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations and the North-South Divide’, in 
Langford et al. (eds), supra note 169, 332, at 339. On the possibility that external states may become the ‘de 
facto primary duty-bearers’, see 339–340. Compare Wenar, ‘Responsibility and Severe Poverty’, in T. Pogge 
(ed.), Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right (2007) 255, at 265 and 272. 
231 Salomon, supra note 172, at 183. Compare Article 1, CEDAW and Article 1(1), CERD, both supra note 
199. 
232 See Kälin and Künzli, supra note 191, at ch.6. One area in which domestic and extraterritorial 
responsibilities have been elaborated on is that of the ‘responsibility to protect’. See International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect (2001); GA Res. 
60/1, supra note 229, at paras.138–139; UN Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 
A/63/677 (2009). 
233 This is accepted even among those who advocate the recognition of ‘extraterritorial’ obligations. See 
generally Langford et al., supra note 169, at 22–23. Compare Article 14(4), Optional Protocol to the ICESCR, 
UN Doc. A/RES/63/117 (2008). 
234 See generally M. Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (2003), at ch.5. See also Eide, ‘Universalisation of Human Rights versus 
Globalisation of Economic Power’, in F. Coomans et al. (eds), Rendering Justice to the Vulnerable (2000) 99; 
Shue, supra note 175, at ch.2; CESCR, supra note 207, at para.15; CESCR, supra note 203, at paras.33–37. In 
the context of climate change inundation, see McInerney-Lankford, supra note 164, at 209–228. 
235 Vandenhole and Benedek describe the obligations of external states as ‘complementary’ rather than 
‘secondary’, arguing that ‘a state’s extraterritorial obligations are always present’. Vandenhole and 
Benedek, supra note 230, at 335–336. Others divide responsibilities into ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’. M. 
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external actors are required to hold each state accountable for meeting its domestic 
responsibilities, assist it in meeting these responsibilities where it lacks the necessary 
capacity or resources, and protect the human rights of its inhabitants where there is a 
manifest failure to do so. Thus, rather than halting at the boundaries of a community, 
human rights are recognised as ‘appropriate objects of international action and 
concern’.236  
This is particularly evident with regard to those legal norms characterised as jus cogens 
or erga omnes, which reach beyond territorial boundaries to address issues that are ‘the 
concern of all States’.237 It is also applicable in the case of human rights more generally. 
States parties’ obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) extend to those individuals ‘within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction’,238 including those ‘within the power or effective control of that state party, 
even if not situated within [its] territory’.239 States parties to the ICESCR, which does 
not include any jurisdictional limitations, 240  are also required to ‘take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and cooperation’, towards the full 
realisation of the rights set out in the Covenant.241 These extraterritorial obligations are 
reinforced by the authoritative interpretation of human rights treaty bodies and UN 
Special Rapporteurs.242 
                                                                                                                                          
Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1995), at 144; J. Ziegler, Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/47 (2005), at paras.56–59. 
236 Nickel, supra note 189, at 13–14. On human rights as matters of international concern, see L. Henkin, 
International Law: Politics, Values and Functions (1989), at 215; H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Hunan 
Rights (1950), at 61–72. 
237 Barcelona Traction, supra note 161, at para.33. 
238 Article 2(1), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 999 UNTS 171 (1966).  
239 Human Rights Committee (HRC), ‘General Comment 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation on 
States Parties to the Covenant’, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004), at para.10. Knox argues that 
the ‘effective control’ test is satisfied in the case of atoll island populations displaced by climate change 
inundation. Knox, supra note 176, at 201–206. 
240 ‘[A]bsent a jurisdictional clause, human rights treaty obligations may generally be regarded as 
extending to all acts of state irrespective of where they may be taken as having effect’. Craven, ‘Human 
Rights in the Realm of Order: Sanctions and Extraterritoriality’, in F. Coomans and M. Kamminga (eds), 
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (2004) 233, at 251. Craven cites Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and 
Montenegro), ICJ Reports (1996) 595, at para.31. 
241 Article 2(1), ICESCR, supra note 199.  
242 CESCR, ‘General Comment 3 (Article 2(1)): The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations’, UN Doc. 
E/1991/23 (1990), at paras.13–14; CESCR, supra note 207, at para.36; CESCR, supra note 203, at para.30; 
HRC, supra note 239, at para.10; P. Hunt, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the 
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, UN Doc. A/HRC/7/11 (2008), at 
paras.59–62; Ziegler, supra note 235, at paras.44–59. 
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These complementary levels of responsibility are echoed in the context of climate 
change law and policy. According to the Nansen Principles on Climate Change and 
Displacement, ‘states have a primary duty to protect their populations’ through 
legislative and policy-based mechanisms.243 However, ‘[w]hen national capacity is 
limited, regional frameworks and international cooperation should support action at 
[the] national level … [by] assisting and protecting people and communities affected 
by such displacement’.244 Similarly, the OHCHR observes that, while ‘individuals rely 
first and foremost on their own states for the protection of their human rights’, 
‘[c]limate change can only be effectively addressed through cooperation of all members 
of the international community’.245 
It is this element of extraterritorial concern and responsibility — reflected in Beitz’s 
fourth criterion — that is ‘perhaps the most distinctive feature’ of contemporary 
human rights law and practice246 and the most significant in addressing global issues 
such as climate change inundation. It is therefore the primary focus of this chapter and 
of the thesis itself.  
2.3.2 Reasons to act, not just permission to intervene 
A second reason for adopting Beitz’s account of human rights is his understanding of 
these extraterritorial reasons for acting as not just entitlements to intervene — as John 
Rawls and Joseph Raz have argued247 — but also as positive demands for action. For 
Rawls, for example, respect for basic human rights (alongside other requirements) 
guarantees a society membership ‘in good standing in a reasonably just Society of 
Peoples’, free from ‘justified and forceful intervention’.248 This functional account of 
human rights as constraints on sovereignty is echoed in their use in justifying 
international humanitarian intervention,249 which implies that, ‘where human rights 
are concerned, state sovereignty provides no right of exclusivity’.250 
                                                
243 Nansen Principle II, Norwegian Refugee Council, supra note 78, at 5. 
244 Nansen Principle IV, ibid. 
245 OHCHR, supra note 13, at paras.72 and 84. The OHCHR therefore makes clear that ‘states’ duties 
concerning climate change … are not limited territorially.’ Knox, supra note 188, at 478. 
246 Beitz, supra note 156, at 115. 
247 See, for example, Rawls, supra note 190; Raz, supra note 190. 
248
 Rawls, supra note 190, at 79–80. 
249 See, for example, ICISS and UN Secretary-General, both supra note 232. 
250 Salomon, supra note 172, at 70. 
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However, while the decision to conceptualise human rights in terms of their function is 
instructive, this narrow understanding of the function of human rights — as standards 
that define the boundary between reasonable pluralism and justified intervention — 
overlooks many of the roles that human rights actually play in international law and 
practice.251 As Raz himself admits,252 a failure to protect human rights may invite or 
demand a range of responses, depending on its nature and severity. These are not 
limited to coercive military intervention or economic sanctions but also include 
holding states to account through human rights treaty body mechanisms,253 providing 
financial or technical assistance, regulating the behaviour of transnational corporations 
and reforming those external policies and institutions that obstruct a state’s capacity to 
protect and fulfil the human rights of its citizens, in order to create a ‘social and 
international order in which the rights and freedoms’ set out in international human 
rights law can be realised.254 Human rights are not merely concerned with coercive 
intervention or regulation but with motivating legal, political and social change. They 
‘stand for a certain ambition about how the world might be’.255  
Moreover, in the case of climate change inundation, there is no barrier of reasonable 
toleration or state sovereignty to dismantle, undermining the assumptions often made 
in human rights theory, doctrine and practice. Developed states are not ‘saviours’ 
intervening to protect the voiceless victims of a ‘savage’ dictator, but are themselves 
responsible (at least in part) for the threat posed by climate change inundation to the 
populations of atoll island states.256 The central question, therefore, is not, ‘On what 
basis is the international community justified in intervening to rectify domestic human 
rights abuse?’ It is, rather, ‘What reasons does the international community have for 
proactively responding to the threat posed by climate change inundation to the human 
rights of atoll island populations?’ As the Maldives explains in its submission to the 
Human Rights Council: 
                                                
251 Beitz, supra note 156, at 100–102; Beitz, ‘Human Rights and the Law of Peoples’, in D. Chatterjee (ed.), 
The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy (2004) 193, at 203; Griffin, supra note 189, at 22–24. 
252 Raz, supra note 190, at 328. 
253 In the context of climate change inundation, see McInerney-Lankford, supra note 164, at 201–202. 
254 Article 28, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), GA Res. 217A (III), 10 December 1948. 
255 Beitz, supra note 156, at 40. As these examples show, ‘it is simply untrue to say that [human rights] are 
mainly about intervention using force and coercion’. Nickel, supra note 189, at 101. 
256 Yamamoto and Esteban apply Mutua’s allegory to the case of climate change inundation. Mutua, 
‘Savages, Victims and Saviours: A Metaphor of Human Rights’, 42 Harvard International Law Journal (2001) 
201; Yamamoto and Esteban, supra note 26, at 242–244. 
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‘The conclusion that climate change undermines … human rights in the Maldives 
and in all other vulnerable countries around the world; and the related fact that the 
global character of the problem makes it impossible for individual states like the 
Maldives to promote and protect threatened rights on their own; in turn raises the 
question of what actions the international community should take to respond.’257 
For these reasons, a broader functional account of human rights, like Beitz’s, that 
recognises their role in creating an entitlement to intervene and providing reasons to 
act is essential.258 Beitz, taking a ‘broader protective and restorative’ approach than 
either Rawls or Raz, understands a failure to protect human rights as not just a trigger 
for intervention but as ‘a cause for international concern’,259 providing external states 
with reasons to act in a range of different ways. This broad functional account provides 
both a more accurate reflection of existing human rights doctrine and practice and a 
more useful set of tools for addressing the issue of climate change inundation.  
2.3.3 Reasons for and against acting 
A third reason for adopting Beitz’s account lies in his insistence that we pay attention 
to the needs and interests of not only those whose human rights are under threat but 
also those who respond to this threat. This is particularly important when applying 
human rights law to an issue to which it has not previously been applied, thereby 
generating new and potentially burdensome demands on those who act. As James 
Nickel argues, any justification for a human right must ‘look in two directions: 
backward to the most fundamental interests of persons as the source of claims to 
restraint, protection and assistance; and forward to institutions, costs and resources’.260 
In the event of a domestic failure to protect human rights from the impacts of climate 
change inundation, are there other states with ‘sufficient reason to act’, given that the 
measures they are required to take may be more or less burdensome?261 
                                                
257 Republic of the Maldives, supra note 21, at 83–84. 
258 For an even stronger statement of this argument, see Buchanan, supra note 190, at 267. 
259 Besson, ‘Human Rights qua Normative Practice: Sui Generis or Legal?’, 1 Transnational Legal Theory 
(2010) 127, at 128. Compare Henkin, supra note 236, at 215; Lauterpacht, supra note 236, at 61–72. 
260 Nickel, supra note 189, at 68. 
261 Beitz, supra note 156, at 197. Compare Raz, ‘Human Rights in the Emerging World Order’, 1 
Transnational Legal Theory (2010) 31, at 36. 
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In the event of such a failure, identifying others with reasons to act is difficult.262 
International human rights law offers no consistent method for identifying and 
allocating international responsibilities for responding to a manifest failure to protect 
human rights elsewhere.263 Yet this is not to say that human rights cannot be action 
guiding.264 Even where international law does not provide a clear basis for determining 
which actors have which reasons for taking which actions in all cases, this does not 
prove that such an allocation is unfeasible due to (for example) resource constraints, 
nor that specific roles for specific actors cannot be identified on the facts of a given 
case.265 Indeed, we must attempt such an allocation if we are to avoid a situation in 
which everyone’s concern becomes no one’s responsibility. As David Miller points out, 
‘an undistributed duty … to which everybody is subject is likely to be discharged by 
nobody’.266 What is required are relatively ‘specific assignments of responsibility, not 
diffuse ones’.267 In order to achieve this, we must begin to identify (a) reasons for acting 
and (b) the actors to which they apply. 
Beitz’s is a pluralist account: ‘we have no reason,’ he argues, ‘to assume ex ante that 
human rights protect a single value (on the demand side) or that they count in favour 
of action for a single typical reason (on the supply side)’.268 States may have legal, 
financial or moral reasons for acting that relate to the urgency of the interest at risk, the 
likelihood, nature and cause of the foreseeable threat, the cost of the actions that must 
be taken, their available resources or their contribution to the problem.269 Conversely, 
                                                
262 Beitz, supra note 156, at 163–167; Beitz, supra note 251, at 208–209. 
263 De Schutter et al., ‘Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in 
the area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, 43 HRQ (2012) 1084, at 1149. However, de Schutter et al. 
provide examples of burden-sharing mechanisms in other areas of international law, including Article 
11(2), Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, 37 ILM 22 (1998). 
264 However, see M. Cranston, What are Human Rights? (1973), at ch.8; O’Neill, supra note 170, at 101–105; 
O’Neill, ‘The Dark Side of Human Rights’, 82 International Affairs (2005) 427, at 428 and 430. 
265 Beitz, supra note 156, at 165–166. 
266 D. Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (2007), at 98–99. O’Neill puts this in stronger terms. 
‘We normally regard claims or entitlements that nobody is obligated to respect and honour as null or 
void’. O’Neill, supra note 264, at 430. 
267 Miller, ‘Distributing Responsibilities’, 9 Journal of Political Philosophy (2001) 453, at 457, note 5. 
268
 Beitz, supra note 156, at 160. In defence of a pluralist account of human rights and responsibilities, see 
ibid; Nickel, supra note 189, at 53–54; Tasioulas, ‘Taking Rights out of Human Rights’, 120 Ethics (2010) 647, 
at 663–664. For similar pluralist schemas, see Beitz and Goodin, ‘Introduction’, in C. Beitz and R. Goodin 
(eds), Global Basic Rights (2009) 1, at 16–17; R. Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable (1985), at 117–135; Salomon, 
supra note 172, at 193; Vandenhole and Benedek, supra note 230, at 339–346; Young, supra note 170, at 127–
130. In the context of climate change, see Caney, ‘Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility and Global Climate 
Change’, Leiden Journal of International Law 18 (2005) 747, at 769–772; D. Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice 
(2001), at 97–100; Shue, ‘Global Environment and International Inequality’, 75 International Affairs (1999) 
531. 
269 Beitz, supra note 156, at 140 and 198; Beitz, supra note 251, at 208; Nickel, supra note 189, at ch.4; Shue, 
‘Mediating Duties’, 98 Ethics (1988) 687, at 700. 
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states might have reasons for not acting to address the non-realisation of human rights 
where taking effective action would be unfeasible, impermissible or impose 
unreasonably high burdens on those they represent.270 Scarcity of resources or conflicts 
between human rights, for example, may constrain the scope and nature of the actions 
that others are required to take. After all, ‘we should not forget that for the duty-
bearers too this is the only life they will live’.271  
This section outlines the legal and moral foundations for four sets of reasons for acting 
that reappear throughout the thesis, using the example of the human right to health to 
illustrate their application. It takes inspiration yet departs from Beitz’s account insofar 
as the reasons it identifies are primarily grounded in law, thereby eschewing Beitz’s 
scepticism about law’s deliberative and generative capacities.272 One of the recurring 
claims of the thesis is that international law — particularly when understood in terms 
of not only strict legal rules but also broad guiding principles that seek to achieve 
underlying aims of fundamental importance 273  — has the capacity to evolve in 
response to emerging challenges. However, legal doctrine and practice often lacks 
clarity or specificity, particularly when it comes to identifying states’ obligations to 
respond to manifest failures of human rights protection elsewhere. Thus, while the 
reasons for acting introduced below and developed throughout the thesis are 
grounded in law, the conceptual and analytical tools of human rights theory may 
provide further clarity where existing legal rules and principles are vague or 
ambiguous. 
Reasons of peremptory force 
First, all states have reasons for acting that are grounded in peremptory norms of 
general international law, many of which are closely tied to human rights doctrine. 
Certain norms — including the right to self-determination and prohibitions against 
aggression, slavery, genocide and racial discrimination — have been recognised both 
                                                
270 Nickel, supra note 189, at 62. On the burdens that fall on the populations of responsible states, see 
Crawford and Watkins, ‘International Responsibility’ in Besson and Tasioulas (eds), supra note 190, 283; 
Miller, ‘Holding Nations Responsible’, 114 Ethics (2004) 240; Murphy, ‘International Responsibility’, in 
Besson and Tasioulas (eds), supra note 190, 299, at 301–303; Stilz, ‘Collective Responsibility and the State’, 
19 Journal of Political Philosophy (2011) 190. 
271 Shue, supra note 175, at 165. Compare Pogge, ‘Shue on Rights and Duties’, in Beitz and Goodin (eds), 
supra note 268, 113, at 125–130. 
272 Beitz refers to law briefly and with suspicion, arguing that legal rules cannot provide adequate ‘space 
for reasonable disagreement’ about the duties that human rights impose. Beitz, supra note 156, at 209–210. 
However, see Beitz, supra note 251, at 193. 
273 See O. Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (1991), at 21. 
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as jus cogens or peremptory norms of international law274 and as generating obligations 
erga omnes.275 They are therefore ‘the concern of all States’ and a source of ‘obligations 
… towards the international community as a whole’, regardless of any prior legal, 
political or economic ties between actors.276 This first set of reasons therefore derives 
from a general recognition that a grave breach of certain norms of fundamental 
importance277 to the international community might ‘entail different principles of 
responsibility’ to those that would otherwise arise.278  
However, these reasons apply only where a legal norm with jus cogens or erga omnes 
status is implicated and are therefore not applicable in the case of individual human 
rights to health or an adequate standard of living. And, while they carry substantial 
legal and moral weight, they fail to identify those with particular reasons for acting. 
Without some further consideration of other, more specific reasons for acting, it is 
unlikely that reasons arising from the importance of the interest alone — even where it 
is recognised as a legal norm with jus cogens or erga omnes status — will provide 
sufficient grounds for action or for identifying those who should act. 
Reasons of international cooperation 
The second set of reasons for acting is grounded in the obligations of international 
assistance and cooperation that fall on UN member states279 and states parties to the 
ICESCR280 and other relevant treaties.281 According to the Maastricht Principles on 
                                                
274 Articles 53 and 64, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331 (1969); ILC, ‘Draft 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’, II Yearbook of the ILC (2001) 26, 
at 85, para.5; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), ICJ Reports (1986) 14, at para.190. 
275 Barcelona Traction, supra note 161, at paras.33–34; East Timor, supra note 160, at para.29; Genocide, supra 
note 240, at para.31. On the relationship between jus cogens and erga omnes norms, see C. Tams, Enforcing 
Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005), at 139–151. 
276 Barcelona Traction, supra note 161, at para.33. 
277 According to the ICJ, a principle of law is recognised as being of erga omnes character in virtue of ‘the 
importance of the rights involved’. Ibid, at para.33. 
278 Nollkaemper and Jacobs, supra note 170, at 372–373 (see also 416–417). 
279 Articles 1(3), 55 and 56, UN Charter, supra note 173. For the argument that Articles 55 and 56 of the 
Charter impose a binding legal obligation on states, see CESCR, supra note 242, at para.14; I. Brownlie, 
Principles of Public International Law (2008), at 296–297; Lauterpacht, supra note 236, at 147–148. See also 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), 
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, ICJ Reports (1971) 16, at paras.129 and 131. Contrast with 
H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (1950), at 99–100; P. Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to 
International Law (1997), at 212; Wolfrum, ‘Article 56’, in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A 
Commentary (2002) 941, at 942–944. 
280 Article 2(1) (see also Articles 11(1), 11(2), 15(4), 22 and 23), ICESCR, supra note 199. See further CESCR, 
supra note 207, at para.37; CESCR, supra note 203, at para.39. There are 162 states parties to the ICESCR. 
While the US, a major carbon emitter, has not ratified the ICESCR, it is a signatory and must therefore 
‘refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Covenant’. Article 18, Vienna 
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Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (‘Maastricht Principles’), wherever a state ‘is in a position to exercise decisive 
influence or to take measures to realise economic, social and cultural rights 
extraterritorially’, it is required to do so.282 Obligations of international cooperation 
extend beyond the ‘extraterritorial’ scope of a state’s jurisdiction,283 both spatially and 
temporally, requiring states to take proactive steps towards the full realisation of 
economic, social and cultural rights internationally. For this reason, they have been 
described as ‘obligations of a global character’.284 
Judge Weeramantry has observed that, in recognising the right to health set out in the 
ICSECR, states have ‘recognise[d] the right of “everyone” and not merely of their own 
subjects’.285 States that are in a position to assist should, where resources are available, 
‘facilitate access to essential health facilities, goods and services in other countries’.286 
In addition to providing direct assistance, states should also take the right to health 
into consideration in drafting and implementing legal instruments, shaping the policies 
of international financial institutions and imposing sanctions.287 
However, while each state party to the ICESCR is required to engage in international 
cooperation ‘to the maximum of its available resources’,288 it remains unclear what this 
means in practice.289 States also tend to have ‘significant discretion’ in deciding where 
to direct their assistance and cooperation.290 There is no binding obligation on state A 
                                                                                                                                          
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 274. On international cooperation, see Langford, Coomans 
and Gómez Isa, ‘Extraterritorial Duties in International Law’, in Langford et al. (eds), supra note 169, 51; 
Salomon, supra note 172, at ch.2; Skogly, supra note 172, at 70–71 and 152.  
281 For example, Articles 23(4) and 28(3), CRC, supra note 199; Articles 22 and 28, UDHR, supra note 254. 
282 Principle 9(c), Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (28 September 2011). 
283 Typically understood as the sphere in which it exercises ‘effective control’. See, for example, HRC, 
supra note 239, at para.10; Nicaragua, supra note 274, at paras.110–115. 
284 Principle 8(b), Maastricht Principles, supra note 282. 
285 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, ICJ Reports (1996) 66, Judge 
Weeramantry (Diss. Op.), at 144. 
286 CESCR, supra note 203, at paras.39 and 45. 
287 Ibid, at paras.39 and 41. 
288 Article 2(1), ICESCR, supra note 199. Compare CESCR, supra note 242, at para.13. 
289 Some suggest that we might appeal to states’ commitments to meeting a minimum threshold of 0.7% 
GNP in official development assistance. Vandenhole and Benedek, supra note 230, at 342–349 and 364. See 
also Salomon, ‘Deprivation, Causation and the Law of International Cooperation’, in Langford et al. (eds), 
supra note 169, 259, at 285–286. 
290 Khalfan, ‘Division of Responsibility Amongst States’, in Langford et al. (eds), supra note 169, 299, at 
321–322. See also CESCR, ‘An Evaluation of the Obligation to Take Steps to the “Maximum of Available 
Resources” Under an Optional Protocol to the Covenant’, UN Doc. E/C.12/2007/1 (2007), at paras.11–12; 
Vandenhole and Benedek, supra note 230, at 346. 
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to provide specific assistance to state B, nor to provide assistance to all right-holders.291 
In a world in which deprivation and injustice are frighteningly common, states will 
inevitably have some freedom in deciding which harms to prioritise. Yet the idea that 
the requirement to cooperate internationally is ‘at best, a generic one that attaches to 
the international community’292 is not sufficient in this context; it cannot help us to 
solve the problem of allocation identified earlier. If we are to narrow down the field of 
candidates with reasons to act to address the harms of climate change inundation, we 
must look further. 
Reasons of contribution 
A third set of reasons derives from a state’s contribution to the problem at hand.293 
Even where direct causal responsibility is not easily established, evidence of prior 
environmental, economic, legal or political interaction may enable us to identify those 
with reasons for acting in a given situation. Where states A and B establish a 
relationship in which B ends up significantly worse off, this may provide reasons for 
state A to act to address failures of human rights protection in state B.294 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) ‘recognises the 
formidable structural and other obstacles resulting from international and other factors 
… that impede the full realisation’ of the human right to health in many states.295 In 
identifying extraterritorial reasons for addressing a failure to protect the human right 
to health, we might therefore consider contributing factors like the role of state A in 
sustaining an international system of intellectual property rights that impacts upon the 
affordability of medicines for diseases of poverty in state B, or the decision of state C to 
impose embargoes that restrict the availability of medical supplies in state D.296 In the 
                                                
291 The drafting history of the ICESCR indicates that certain developed states were reluctant to recognise a 
legal obligation to provide financial assistance to all or any specific states. Craven, ‘The Violence of 
Dispossession: Extra-Territoriality and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights’, in M. Baderin and R. 
McCorquodale (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Action (2007) 71, at 77. Compare Alston, ‘Ships 
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the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals’, 27 HRQ (2005) 755, at 777. 
292 Alston, supra note 291, at 777. 
293 L. May, Shared Responsibility (1996), at 118; Miller, supra note 267, at 456; Nollkaemper and Jacobs, supra 
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case of climate change inundation, we might take into account each state’s contribution 
to overall greenhouse gas emissions, noting the correlation between high atmospheric 
concentrations of carbon dioxide and climate change-related harms like rising sea 
levels, changing rainfall patterns and extreme weather events, all of which adversely 
affect the health and wellbeing of atoll island populations. 
Reasons of capacity 
However, in concentrating on the question of ‘Who is responsible for bringing this bad 
situation about?’, we fail to ask, ‘Who is best placed to put it right?’297 The fourth set of 
reasons therefore derives from a state’s capacity to effectively respond to human rights 
harms elsewhere.298 The CESCR has consistently emphasised reasons of capacity. It 
insists that, while all states have obligations of international cooperation, a ‘special 
responsibility’ to provide international assistance and cooperation is ‘particularly 
incumbent on states parties and other actors in a position to assist’. 299  This 
responsibility depends on the ‘availability of resources’,300 whether financial, technical, 
natural, human or information-related. This final set of reasons — alongside the 
reasons of contribution identified above — goes some way to explaining why it is that 
one particular actor should direct its resources towards one particular harm and not 
another.301 
Reasons of capacity can be divided into two kinds.302 The first has to do with one 
actor’s capacity to respond to a situation more effectively than another actor, due to 
                                                
297 Miller, supra note 267, at 460. 
298 Beitz and Goodin, supra note 268, at 17; May, supra note 293, at 118–119; Miller, supra note 267, at 460–
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(for example) its proximity to a particular harm303 or its relative degree of influence 
over a particular institution.304 In this case, the costs of acting are reduced because a 
state is able to act more effectively in the first place.305 The second relates to one actor’s 
capacity to absorb the costs of acting more easily than another because of its access to 
greater financial, natural or technological resources. In this case, the costs of acting are 
not reduced but become more reasonable when imposed on those actors that are ‘able 
to adapt to changed circumstances without suffering serious deprivation’.306 In the 
context of health, those states that have a greater degree of influence on negotiations 
relating to the international intellectual property rights regime or greater access to 
medical supplies or trained medical staff might therefore have stronger reasons for 
acting to address a failure to ensure access to basic healthcare in a developing state. 
However, as with the other sets of reasons discussed above, reasons of capacity are 
often insufficient on their own to identify which states have reasons for acting. While 
reasons arising from a state’s contribution to — or failure to prevent — a problem are 
overly fixated on the past, reasons from capacity do ‘not take the past seriously 
enough’.307 They appear to require those with readily available resources to make an 
open-ended commitment to assist those with fewer resources, regardless of how they 
came by their resources or whether or not they contributed to the inequitable 
distribution of resources in the first place.  
Yet the pluralist account of reasons for acting proposed here means that we need not 
rely on reasons arising from one source alone. Instead, we can invoke whichever 
reason is of most relevance in a given scenario, or factor in the cumulative weight of 
overlapping or complementary reasons for acting. Often, states with a greater capacity 
to assist will have also made a significant contribution to the problem at hand. A 
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balanced assessment of the four sets of reasons outlined in this section will allow us to 
begin to identify those states with reasons for taking particular steps to address climate 
change inundation. 
A problem arises, however, when different sets of reasons point towards different 
actors. In the context of climate change inundation, state A might have reasons to act 
arising from its proximity to an atoll island state, while state B has reasons arising from 
its contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions. Rather than attempt to address this 
problem here in the abstract, it will be postponed until Chapter 3, which begins to 
examine states’ reasons for acting to address the problem of climate change 
inundation. For now, it is enough to note, as Margaret Moore does, that ‘this represents 
a different (and, it would seem, politically better) sort of problem, compared to the 
problem of being unable to specify anyone’ with reasons for acting.308 
2.3.4 Reasons for establishing coordinating institutions 
States’ reasons for acting are closely tied to the actions that they are expected to take. 
Relatively arduous or costly actions typically require stronger reasons for acting. In 
subsequent chapters, the content and strength of reasons for action are considered 
alongside the actions that states might take in response to climate change inundation. 
In the abstract, however, this process is complicated by the fact that the actions 
required by peremptory norms of international law or obligations of international 
assistance and cooperation are not clearly specified, and may differ from one actor or 
situation to another. This uncertainty is exacerbated by the fact that the scope and 
content of human rights is not static but fluctuates in response to changing social, 
technological, economic and environmental conditions.309 What counts as a serious, 
predictable and remediable threat is likely to change over time, and with it the content 
of relevant human rights and associated reasons for acting.310  
One proposal for clarifying the actions that states, organisations and others are 
required to take involves establishing institutions with the capacity to solve the 
collective action or ‘many hands’ problem that arises when obligations are not clearly 
                                                
308 Moore, ‘Global Justice, Climate Change and Miller's Theory of Responsibility’, 11 Critical Review of 
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specified or allocated. Within the category of ‘duties to protect against deprivation’, 
Shue includes a general obligation to ‘create, if they do not exist, or, if they do, to 
preserve effective institutions for the enjoyment of what people have rights to enjoy’.311 
In theory, these institutions mediate between human rights and corresponding duties 
and duty-bearers. By designing policies that protect against human rights abuses and 
allocating obligations for implementing these policies among specific actors, they 
‘transform “imperfect” duties into “perfect” ones’.312 A similar procedural obligation is 
outlined in Principle 30 of the Maastricht Principles, which calls on states to ‘coordinate 
with each other, including in the allocation of responsibilities, in order to cooperate 
effectively in the universal fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights’.313  
Until such institutions are established, however, it may fall to states, acting 
individually or in coalitions, to recognise their reasons for acting and decide how to 
act.314 We can refer back to the reasons identified above in determining which states 
might play which role in addressing the implications of climate change inundation for 
the enjoyment of human rights in atoll island states. As the Maastricht Principles 
emphasise, a lack of effective coordinating institutions ‘does not exonerate a state from 
giving effect to its separate extraterritorial obligations’.315 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has laid the theoretical groundwork for the ideas to come. Drawing on, 
yet departing somewhat from, Beitz’s functional account of human rights, it has set out 
four categories of reasons for acting to address the impact of climate change 
inundation on the human rights of atoll islanders. Chapter 3 begins to examine these 
reasons for acting with reference to the specific context of climate change inundation. 
In the event that an atoll island state fails to protect its residents’ access to healthcare 
and the basic determinants of health from the cumulative effects of climate change 
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17 and 21–23; Crawford, ‘No Borders, No Bystanders: Developing Individual and Institutional Capacities 
for Global Moral Responsibility’, in Beitz and Goodin (eds), supra note 268, 131; Moore, supra note 308, at 
512–514; Raz, supra note 261, at 43; I. M. Young, Inclusion and Democracy (2000), at 250. In the context of 
climate change, see Bell, ‘Does Anthropogenic Climate Change Violate Human Rights?’, 14 Critical Review 
of International Social and Political Philosophy (2011) 99, at 111 and 114. 
312 Beitz and Goodin, supra note 268, at 15. This institutional framework should ‘aggregat[e] the various 
reasons [for acting] … into a single coherent set of policies’, thereby answering the question, ‘why me?’ 
Beitz and Goodin, supra note 268, at 17. 
313 Principle 30, Maastricht Principles, supra note 282. See also commentary in de Schutter et al., supra note 
263, at 1149–1150. 
314 Beitz, supra note 156, at 172–173. 
315 Principle 30, Maastricht Principles, supra note 282. 
     
 
    
62 
inundation, does this provide reasons for corrective or remedial action by external 
actors? 
The CESCR would argue that it does; after all, the ICESCR is premised on the idea that, 
‘in the absence of an active programme of international assistance and cooperation on 
the part of all those States that are in a position to undertake one, the full realisation of 
economic, social and cultural rights will remain an unfulfilled aspiration in many 
countries’.316 This ‘programme of international assistance and cooperation’ will vary 
from one case to the next, but encompasses a range of actions that states might take to 
address the non-fulfilment of islanders’ right to health in the context of climate change 
inundation. These include training local medical staff to address climate-specific 
diseases, installing water treatment and storage facilities, rebuilding healthcare 
infrastructure using flood-resistant techniques and building sea defence measures to 
slow down coastal erosion and loss of infrastructure and territory. 
However, in the face of gradual displacement from atoll island states, other measures 
may also be necessary, including training and resettlement schemes that provide 
migrants with access to healthcare, shelter, sanitation facilities and subsistence goods 
in a host state. Without international assistance and expertise, it ‘seems unlikely’ that 
atoll island states ‘will have the necessary resources to plan and implement 
resettlement plans that uphold the rights of communities’.317 Chapter 3 assesses one 
possible course of action in detail, examining the reasons that states may have for 
expanding or modifying existing migration pathways to allow atoll islanders to 
migrate and secure citizenship elsewhere. It also begins to identify those states with 
extraterritorial reasons for acting — arising from general obligations of international 
assistance and cooperation as well as their particular capacity and contribution to the 
problem of climate change — to address the impacts of climate change inundation on 
the human right to health in atoll island states.   
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3. Planned Migration: A Viable Solution to Climate Change Inundation? 
3.1 Introduction 
In the event that an atoll island state fails to protect its inhabitants’ rights to adequate 
healthcare, food, water and sanitation from the impacts of climate change inundation, 
does this provide reasons for external states to take corrective or remedial action? Is the 
UN Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights correct in arguing that states 
elsewhere have reasons to ‘prevent and address some of the direst consequences that 
climate change may reap on human rights’? 318  This chapter argues that she is, 
identifying some of the reasons that states have for implementing a ‘planned 
migration’ solution to the problem of climate change inundation. This solution requires 
states to modify existing bilateral migration agreements to offer permanent 
resettlement options for atoll islanders, thereby ensuring that their human rights to 
health and an adequate standard of living continue to be realised once their territory 
becomes uninhabitable (section 3.2). 
Using the schema developed in Chapter 2, sections 3.3 and 3.4 examine various reasons 
for — and against — adopting a planned migration approach, ranging from general 
reasons arising from obligations of international cooperation to more specific reasons 
relating to each state’s relative contribution to and capacity to address the problem of 
climate change inundation. While different reasons point towards different actors, this 
problem is not insoluble. If we take into account the cumulative weight of each set of 
reasons for acting in the Pacific region, at least, Australia and New Zealand are clearly 
identifiable as having primary responsibility for implementing a planned migration 
strategy in response to climate change inundation (section 3.5). 
The planned migration proposal is chosen here — and by many scholars and 
practitioners in this field — for its pragmatism and feasibility. It relies on existing 
domestic law and bilateral migration agreements, which can ‘more swiftly and 
effectively provide targeted outcomes’ than a new multilateral treaty.319 Its scope is 
narrow and specific rather than broad and abstract, drawing on specialised bilateral 
and regional migration schemes rather than universal treaties addressing climate 
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change-related movement more generally, and restricting its focus to the human rights 
of individual migrants to health, food, shelter and so on. It has also been championed 
by atoll island states themselves. Kiribati President Anote Tong, for example, calls for 
I-Kiribati to ‘migrate with dignity’ via preferential visa categories for skilled island 
migrants.320 The planned migration proposal therefore looks both backwards (to the 
human rights of islanders) and forwards (to the demands placed on those who act). 
However, while this planned migration approach appears to offer a plausible response 
to the harms of climate change inundation, it falls short of what is necessary (section 
3.6). Among other shortcomings, it fails to recognise much of what is at stake in the 
context of climate change inundation. By focusing on individual human rights, it 
overlooks the threat posed to collective rights to political, legal and cultural identity, 
sovereignty and self-determination. In doing so, it fails to capture what is unique about 
the threat faced by atoll island populations: the potential loss of a self-determining 
community with its own constitution and social and political institutions, the capacity 
to pursue distinctive collective goals, and the status that comes with membership in 
the international community of states. 
Yet this is far from being a wasted exercise. The planned migration proposal provides a 
relatively straightforward case study around which we can begin to flesh out the 
reasons for acting introduced in Chapter 2. It allows us to test the waters by identifying 
which actors might be required to bear which burdens — and assessing the 
reasonableness of these burdens — before diving into the more complex material on 
self-determination addressed in subsequent chapters. It also highlights some 
considerations that should be central to any approach to climate change inundation: 
the use of existing legal rules and principles; the importance of international 
cooperation; and the need for community participation in decisions about when, where 
and how to move.  
3.2 The planned migration proposal 
As explained in Chapter 1, this thesis starts from the assumption that the territory of 
atoll island states will eventually become uninhabitable, given the long-term impact of 
current atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and the failure of states to 
implement effective mitigation schemes. Without adequate fresh water supplies or 
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habitable land on which to build housing or health and sanitation facilities, atoll 
islanders will no longer be able to access even basic healthcare services and the 
underlying determinants of health. ‘Land is, in this sense, a fundamental precursor to 
the enjoyment of all [human] rights.’321 While installing desalination plants or building 
health facilities may enable islanders to enjoy access to basic healthcare and clean 
water for longer than they would otherwise,322 these measures will eventually fall short 
of what is required. 
Numerous proposals have been put forward to address the eventual displacement of 
atoll island populations.323 While these proposals recognise that ‘existing institutions 
do not, and indeed cannot, provide a perfectly tailored solution’ to the issue of climate 
change inundation,324 each offers a different response to this normative gap. Some 
draw on existing law, arguing for the expansion or reinterpretation of existing human 
rights, 325  refugee, 326  maritime 327  or climate change law. 328  Some argue for the 
recognition of a new international visa category or migration scheme329 or a new set of 
soft law guidelines, perhaps drawing on the Guiding Principles on Internal 
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Displacement.330 Others call for the adoption of a new binding legal instrument 
specifically designed to address this issue.331  
An increasingly vocal group of scholars, policymakers and state representatives calls 
for the recognition of islanders as resilient actors rather than passive victims, and of 
planned migration from atoll island states as a ‘rational adaptation strategy to climate 
change processes’.332 They argue that states and other members of the international 
community should ‘proactively anticipate and plan for migration as part of their 
adaptation strategies’.333 Indeed, in 2010, states parties to the UNFCCC were urged to 
‘enhance action on adaptation’ by undertaking ‘[m]easures to enhance understanding, 
coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, 
migration and planned relocation’.334 A year later, the Global Migration Group called 
on states to ‘revisit their immigration policies … and consider opening new 
opportunities for legal migration’. 335  And, in late 2013, the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), UN Development Programme (UNDP) and UN Economic and 
Social Commission for the Asia-Pacific (UNESCAP) launched a joint initiative to 
prepare Pacific islanders for the possibility of migrating in response to climate change 
inundation.336 
Within this discourse of ‘migration as adaptation’, one set of proposals envisages the 
modification and expansion of existing migration pathways to allow for the permanent 
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resettlement of islanders displaced by climate change inundation.337 The model set out 
here draws primarily on Katrina Wyman’s recent account.338 Perhaps taking her cue 
from the Nansen Principles — according to which the ‘existing norms of international 
law should be fully utilised’ in responding to climate change-related displacement339 — 
Wyman examines the potential for existing migration law to accommodate climate 
change-related movement, using current legal frameworks and empirical evidence to 
identify ‘likely destination countries’ for island migrants.340  
For Wyman, destination countries are initially selected on the basis of (a) existing 
migration pathways from atoll island states, which could be modified if necessary. 
These might take the form of traditional migration schemes or ad hoc domestic 
mechanisms that provide some form of temporary humanitarian status to those fleeing 
disaster.341 They must also (b) have the capacity to admit a sufficient number of 
islanders, although no one state need absorb all migrants at once. Migration may be 
staggered over time and shared between host countries.342 And they must (c) facilitate 
permanent resettlement, where this may require establishing new visa categories, 
modifying bilateral migration schemes, or providing pathways to permanent residence 
for those who have already migrated.343 Of concern here are those who will be 
permanently displaced by climate change inundation, 344  for whom ‘it would be 
preferable to circumvent the political charade of temporary protection and instead 
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develop policies that can facilitate more permanent movement’.345 Finally, host states 
should also (d) guarantee migrants access to healthcare, education and social 
services346 and (e) ensure that migration pathways are embedded in a durable legal 
framework capable of resisting changes in popular opinion.347  
In addition to its pragmatism, this approach is also chosen for its capacity to respond 
to the demands of atoll island states.348 In 2007, the Pacific Conference of Churches 
called for ‘a regional immigration policy giving citizens of countries most affected by 
climate change … rights to resettlement in other Pacific island nations’. 349 More 
recently, at the first regional consultation of the Nansen Initiative on climate change-
related displacement, island participants urged states to ‘review their admission and 
immigration policies to enable voluntary migration at an early stage’.350 
The government of Kiribati is perhaps the most vocal advocate of a planned migration 
approach, and is developing a transitional ‘merits-based’ migration strategy for its 
citizens that will ensure ‘migration with dignity’.351 The government aims to position I-
Kiribati as skilled migrants who can fill labour market gaps in the Asia-Pacific 
region,352 and is seeking preferential visa categories for islanders who want to become 
                                                
345 McAdam, supra note 90, at 118. McAdam and others argue for temporary migration alongside 
permanent resettlement, where the former grants migrants some autonomy over when to move, 
encourages the flow of remittances, alleviates pressure on overcrowded resources in atoll island states, 
and provides time for host communities to adjust to new members. Bedford and Bedford, supra note 92, at 
125; McAdam, supra note 167, at 126; McAdam, supra note 90, at 203–205; Park, supra note 5, at 21; Wyman, 
supra note 319, at 345, 348, 361–362. 
346 Barnett and Webber, supra note 28, at 46; McAdam, supra note 90, at 202; Park, supra note 5, at 19. This 
is, however, a very minimal threshold. Other factors such as collective identity and autonomy are 
discussed in later chapters. 
347 For example, a bilateral agreement such as the Compact of Free Association between the US and the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands (although this is open to unilateral modification or termination by the 
US). Dema, supra note 337, at 186–189 and 199–201; Wyman, supra note 319, at 348–350. 
348 It also builds on a history of labour migration in the Pacific. R. Bedford, New Hebridean Mobility: A 
Study of Circular Migration (1973); Campbell, ‘Climate Induced Community Relocation in the Pacific: The 
Meaning and Importance of Land’, in McAdam (ed.), supra note 12, 57, at 63–78; Shen and Gemenne, 
‘Contrasted Views on Environmental Change and Migration: The Case of Tuvaluan Migration to New 
Zealand’, 49 International Migration (2011) 224, at 228–230. 
349 Pacific Conference of Churches, ‘Statement from the 9th Assembly of the Pacific Conference of 
Churches on Climate Change’ (9 September 2007). 
350 McAdam, supra note 148. 
351 McAdam supra note 90, at 202; ABC News, supra note 117; Office of the President of Kiribati, supra note 
93. Compare the proposal put forward by Bangladeshi MP Saber Chowdery, interviewed on Carrick, supra 
note 100. 
352 Lambourne, interviewed on Carrick, supra note 71. Recent training and migration schemes include the 
Kiribati Australia Nursing Initiative and the New Zealand-backed Marine Training School. See Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Kiribati Australia Nursing Initiative’, accessible at 
http://aid.dfat.gov.au/Publications/Pages/kiribati-australia-nursing-initiative-independent-report.aspx; 
Bedford and Bedford, supra note 92, at 95–96. 
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active, valued members of a new community.353 This emphasis on dignity reflects the 
importance of recognising and maintaining islanders’ autonomy in the face of climate 
change inundation. ‘I prefer to leave now’, says one Tuvaluan migrant, ‘before I have 
no choice’.354 
From a human rights perspective, a planned migration solution also facilitates access to 
the resources that underpin islanders’ enjoyment of the right to health. First, migrants 
gain access to a host state in which they enjoy a permanent legal status and associated 
socio-economic entitlements, including access to healthcare, sanitation, and adequate 
food and drinking water. Second, by sending remittances home, migrants provide 
financial support for local adaptation initiatives that can, for example, improve water 
storage capacity or maintain healthcare facilities. Third, migrants ease the pressures 
associated with overcrowding, facilitating a more sustainable use of resources and 
infrastructure by those who remain. From the demand side of human rights protection, 
at least, migration should therefore be reconceptualised as ‘part of the solution rather 
than an inherent problem’.355 
3.3 Reasons for acting to support planned migration 
The functional account of human rights set out in Chapter 2 directs our attention not 
only to the threat posed by climate change inundation to the human rights of atoll 
islanders, but also to the reasons that others have for and against acting to address this 
threat. This section examines the reasons that states might have for implementing a 
planned migration strategy to ensure that the human rights of atoll islanders are 
protected from the threat of climate change inundation. As explained earlier, this 
strategy is chosen for its pragmatic approach to human rights protection. It recognises 
the urgent interests at stake but also caps the costs imposed upon those who assist 
displaced islanders by requiring them to act only within existing legal frameworks and 
only in response to severe threats to individual human rights. As recognised by 
participants in a recent expert roundtable discussion, ‘the needs and interests of host 
communities need to be respected and carefully balanced in this process’.356 
                                                
353 Aedy, ‘Do Climate Refugees Exist?’, ABC Radio National Life Matters (27 July 2011); Loughry and 
McAdam, ‘Kiribati: Relocation and Adaptation’, 31 Forced Migration Review (2008) 51. 
354 Shen and Gemenne, supra note 348, at 234. 
355 Farbotko and Lazrus, supra note 25, at 283. 
356 UNHCR, supra note 75, at para.32. 
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Building on the schema introduced in Chapter 2, this section considers three sets of 
reasons for acting to implement a planned migration approach.357 These include 
general reasons arising from legal obligations of international assistance and 
cooperation as well as specific reasons arising from states’ contributions to the problem 
and capacity to expand or modify existing migration pathways. The fourth set of 
reasons for acting outlined in Chapter 2 — i.e. those arising from peremptory legal 
norms that generate obligations erga omnes — do not arise in the case of human rights 
to health or an adequate standard of living. The aim here is not to provide an 
exhaustive account of all relevant factors, nor to repeat the legal sources for these 
reasons set out in the previous chapter, but to offer an initial indication of how the 
functional account of human rights developed in Chapter 2 might be fleshed out in 
practice. 
Reasons of international cooperation 
As discussed in Chapter 2, states have reasons to seek and provide international 
assistance and cooperation in ensuring the full realisation of human rights. This is 
particularly relevant in the context of transnational issues like climate change, whose 
causes and consequences transcend state boundaries. As the IPCC insists in its latest 
report, ‘[i]nternational cooperation is necessary to significantly mitigate climate 
change’.358 Where there is a manifest failure to protect human rights from the impacts 
of climate change inundation at the domestic level, other states may therefore have 
reasons to act arising from their general obligations of international cooperation.  
These reasons are two-fold. The obligation to take steps ‘to the maximum of its 
available resources’ 359  requires developing states, where necessary, to seek 
international assistance and cooperation.360 Atoll island states have been at pains to 
demonstrate their inability to respond to the threat of climate change inundation alone, 
                                                
357 Compare Byravan and Rajan, supra note 123, at 253–254. 
358 Stavins et al., supra note 107, at 1008. Compare IPCC, ‘Summary for Policymakers’, in Edenhofer et al. 
(eds), supra note 107, 1, at 5; OHCHR, supra note 13, at paras.69–74. According to Knox, ‘international 
cooperation must take the primary, rather than the secondary, role’. Knox, supra note 176, at 213 (see 
generally 212–218). 
359 Article 2(1), ICESCR, supra note 199. 
360 CESCR, supra note 242, at para.13; Principle 34, Maastricht Principles, supra note 282; OHCHR, supra 
note 13, at para.85. 
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and have been vocal in calling for support from the international community.361 A 
corresponding responsibility to cooperate to ensure the full realisation of economic, 
social and cultural rights is ‘particularly incumbent’ on those states that are in a 
position to assist.362 While some developed states insist that human rights protection in 
the context of climate change remains the ‘primary responsibility of states’ acting 
within their own borders, 363  others recognise that ‘international cooperation and 
solidarity should be enhanced in order to minimise the effects of climate change on the 
full enjoyment of human rights’.364 
These obligations are echoed in the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities under the UNFCCC, according to which developed states parties are 
required to assist developing states parties to meet the costs of adaptation.365 As the 
OHCHR points out, international human rights law and the UNFCCC complement 
each other: both emphasise that ‘international cooperation is not only expedient but 
also a human rights obligation’.366 Its importance is reiterated in the context of climate 
change displacement: international cooperation is referred to in two out of 10 Nansen 
Principles367 and forms a ‘core pillar’ of the Nansen Initiative on Disaster-Induced 
Cross-Border Displacement, whose recommendations will be published in 2015.368 
However, the content of this obligation remains somewhat vague. International human 
rights law provides little guidance in identifying which states have particular reasons 
to cooperate to address the impacts of climate change inundation on the enjoyment of 
human rights. In fact, as observed in Chapter 2, states appear to have considerable 
discretion in deciding where to direct their support. There is, however, an exception to 
this rule: where one state has made an explicit legal or political commitment to another 
state through domestic development policies, aid agreements or, in this case, bilateral 
                                                
361 See, for example, Sattar, ‘Statement on Behalf of Twelve Small Island Developing States to the Panel on 
Human Rights and Climate Change’, 11th Session of the Human Rights Council (15 June 2009); Republic of 
the Maldives, supra note 21, at 70 and 78. 
362 CESCR, supra note 242, at para.14. 
363 See the statements of the Canadian and German representatives before the Human Rights Council 
cited in Limon, supra note 181, at 562–563 and 574. 
364 See the statements of the Slovenian, New Zealand and Monacan representatives before the Human 
Rights Council, cited in ibid, at 580–581. 
365 Article 3(1), UNFCCC, supra note 102. Compare Article 1(c)(i), Bali Action Plan, supra note 14. 
366 OHCHR, supra note 13, at para.99. 
367 Nansen Principles I and IV, Norwegian Refugee Council, supra note 78, at 5. 
368 Nansen Initiative, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’, accessible at http://62.50.76.173/faqs. Compare 
Riera, supra note 335; UNHCR, supra note 75, at paras.42–43. 
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migration agreements, this may provide the basis for a specific obligation of 
international cooperation.369  
In arguing for a planned migration approach, Wyman begins by identifying those 
states with existing migration pathways for atoll island states that could be modified to 
accommodate more migrants and incorporate permanent as well as temporary 
migration.370 New Zealand, for example, has established the Pacific Access Category 
(PAC) scheme, which grants up to 75 citizens from Tuvalu and Kiribati permanent 
residence each year.371 While Australia does not currently offer permanent migration 
pathways for islanders, it does grant temporary work permits to Tuvaluans and I-
Kiribati under the Seasonal Work Program.372 This provides a first indication of those 
states with reasons for responding to a manifest failure to protect human rights in the 
face of climate change inundation in the Pacific region.373 However, other, more 
specific reasons for acting will help us to clarify and flesh out this initial account. 
Reasons of contribution 
No attempt is made here to establish direct causation of, or legal responsibility for, the 
harms of climate change inundation. 374  Legally, the process of establishing state 
responsibility for a wrongful act is highly complex, particularly in multilateral, 
transnational contexts.375 And, while ‘[e]stablishing responsibility through causality is 
                                                
369 Vandenhole and Benedek, supra note 230, 332, at 346 and 362. The aim here is not to disincentivise 
such commitments. Reasons arising from formal commitments of international cooperation and assistance 
will be weighed against other reasons for acting — including reasons of contribution and capacity — to 
ascertain which states have the strongest overall reasons for acting. Existing commitments will also be 
taken into account in future deliberations about which states have reasons for acting. A state that has 
already accepted a significant number of atoll islanders may have less capacity and therefore less reason to 
act in the future. 
370 Wyman, supra note 319, at 339. 
371  Immigration New Zealand, ‘Pacific Access Category’ (2013), accessible at www.immigration. 
govt.nz/migrant/stream/live/pacificaccess/. McAdam notes that New Zealand has ‘long had special 
concessionary schemes for citizenship or permanent residence’ for Pacific islanders, ostensibly to promote 
economic development in the region. McAdam, supra note 90, at 205. See detailed history in R. Appleyard 
and C. Stahl, South Pacific Migration: New Zealand Experience and Implications for Australia (1995). 
372 Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection, ‘Special Program Visa (subclass 416) for 
the Seasonal Worker Program’, accessible at www.immi.gov.au/Visas/Pages/416-SWP.aspx. 
373 As there are currently no formal migration pathways for citizens of the Maldives, the rest of this 
chapter focuses on Kiribati and Tuvalu. 
374 For an introduction to the literature on moral and legal responsibility for climate change, see, for 
example, Caney, supra note 268; R. Lord et al. (eds), Climate Change Liability: Transnational Law and Practice 
(2011); Shue, supra note 268; S. Vanderheiden, Atmospheric Justice: A Political Theory of Climate Change 
(2008), at ch.5; R. Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law: Prevention Duties and State 
Responsibility (2005). 
375 J. Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility (2002), at 204–205; Skogly, 
‘Causality and Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations’, in Langford et al. (eds), supra note 169, 233. 
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truly a difficult task’,376 this task becomes even more complex in the context of climate 
change, where the attribution of legal responsibility requires that a causal connection 
be drawn between the greenhouse gas emissions of one state and a specific climate 
change impact in another,377 and where ‘determining whether a specific, single extreme 
event is due to a specific cause, such as increasing greenhouse gases, is difficult, if not 
impossible’. 378 In any case, as Chapter 1 explained, islanders are unlikely to be 
displaced by one climate event. Instead, as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
observes, ‘an accumulation of factors leads to a tipping point at which people’s lives 
and livelihoods come under such serious threat that they have no choice but to leave 
their homes.’379 In light of these factors, even atoll island states themselves avoid 
calling for admissions of liability, ‘seeing the “blame game” as futile and 
unproductive’.380 
However, this does not preclude us from talking about responsibility or reasons for 
acting. After all, responsibility is a many-headed beast381 and ‘need not be limited to 
the establishment of a direct causal relationship’ between act or omission and harm.382 
‘Being directly the cause of a result may be paradigmatic for being responsible for it, 
but it is not,’ May argues, ‘a necessary condition for being responsible for it’.383 
In the context of climate change inundation, there are two claims that can be made 
with certainty. First, climate change is attributable to the activities of people like us. 
The rising sea levels, higher storm surges and changing rainfall patterns associated 
with climate change inundation are not ‘unaccountable natural disasters’ but evidence 
of ‘systemic processes’ to which we are contributing.384 As the IPCC has concluded, ‘it 
                                                
376 Skogly, supra note 375, at 258. 
377 On the difficulties of establishing a causal link between climate change and movement — including 
attributing (a) environmental harms to the process of climate change, (b) harmful greenhouse gas 
emissions to any one state and (c) decisions to move to climate change-related impacts— see Kälin and 
Schrepfer, supra note 73, at 6–10; McAdam, supra note 90, at 23–24; OHCHR, supra note 13, at para.70; 
Wyman, ‘Responses to Climate Migration’, 37 Harvard Environmental Law Review (2013) 167, at 193–194. 
378 Hegerl et al., ‘Understanding and Attributing Climate Change’, in S. Solomon et al. (eds), Climate 
Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
IPCC (2007) 665, at 696. ‘Climate change’ does not refer to a single event but to statistical changes in the 
‘average of many weather events over a span of years’. D. Huber and J. Gulledge, Extreme Weather and 
Climate Change: Understanding the Link and Managing the Risk (2011), at 2. 
379 Guterres, supra note 330, at 2. 
380 McAdam supra note 90, at 201.  
381 For Hart’s well-known discussion, see H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (1968), at 210–237. 
382 Salomon, supra note 172, at 186. 
383 May, supra note 293, at 52. 
384 Kolers, supra note 91, at 334. Compare Wyman, supra note 123, at 193–197. 
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is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed 
warming since the mid-20th century’.385 States’ relative ‘emissions can [therefore] help 
determine … responsibility for climate change’.386 This line of argument is echoed in 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, which highlights states’ 
‘different contributions’ to climate change and environmental degradation.387 Second, 
in the case of atoll island states — unlike that of environmentally driven movement 
more generally388 — most decisions to move will be clearly attributable to these climate 
change-related impacts. 389  A correlation between high levels of greenhouse gas 
emissions and a general pattern of events leading to climate change inundation is 
therefore identifiable, even if a clear causal chain between the emissions of one state 
and a particular climate change harm in another is not.390 
While it may be difficult to disentangle the relative contributions of states to the 
problem of climate change, it is not impossible.391 As recognised in the Preamble to the 
UNFCCC, ‘the largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse 
gases has originated in developed countries’.392 As a rough proxy, therefore, we might 
look to the lists of Annex I and II parties set out in the UNFCCC, which account for 
around 20% of the world’s population and 46.4% of the world’s greenhouse gas 
emissions.393 These states could be said to have reasons for acting that arise in 
proportion to their contribution to the problem, perhaps measured in terms of their 
                                                
385 IPCC, supra note 6, at 17. 
386 Kolstad et al., supra note 155, at 215. Compare Fleurbaey et al., ‘Sustainable Development and Equity’, 
in Edenhofer et al. (eds), supra note 107, 283, at 318. 
387
 Principle 7, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/6/Rev.1 
(1992); Article 3(1), UNFCCC, supra note 102. Compare with the ‘polluter pays’ principle found in regional 
and international environmental law, including Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration; Council Directive 
2004/35/EC, OJ 2004 L 143/56. 
388 Foresight, Migration and Global Environmental Change (2011), at 43. 
389 Zetter, supra note 80, at 140. 
390 Compare Caney’s distinction between ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ versions of the polluter pays principle, 
where the latter requires merely an indirect link between a group of high-emitting states and an increase 
in climate change-related harms. Caney, supra note 268, at 753–754. 
391 On some of the difficulties, see Banuri et al., ‘Setting the Stage: Climate Change and Sustainable 
Development’, in McCarthy et al. (eds), supra note 47, 74, at 90 (Box 1.1). See also Höhne et al., 
‘Contributions of Individual Countries’ Emissions to Climate Change and Their Uncertainty’, 106 Climatic 
Change (2011) 359. 
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 UNFCCC, supra note 102. 
393 Rogner et al., ‘Introduction’, in B. Metz et al. (eds), Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of 
Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC (2007) 96, at 106. Compare M. Ammer et al., 
Time to Act: How the EU Can Lead on Climate Change and Migration (2014), at 26 and 38; IPCC, supra note 85, 
at 37–39. 
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greenhouse gas emissions per capita from a certain date onwards.394 Australia and 
New Zealand — identified earlier as having entered into bilateral migration 
agreements with Tuvalu and Kiribati — are both Annex I and Annex II parties to the 
UNFCCC. As Annex II parties, they have obligations to ‘take the lead in combating 
climate change and the adverse effects thereof’ and ‘assist the developing country 
Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in 
meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects’.395  
We need not look beyond the Pacific region for a case in which states have recognised 
reasons for acting arising from their contribution to environmental degradation 
elsewhere. Since the mid-20th century, the Nauruan people have faced potential 
displacement as a result of the environmental devastation and economic instability 
caused by decades of phosphate mining.396 The Nauruans are said to have a ‘strong 
moral and legal claim’ against Australia, New Zealand and the UK arising, at least in 
part, from their contribution to this degradation under the auspices of the British 
Phosphate Commission.397 In 1962, former Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies 
recognised that Australia, New Zealand and the UK have a ‘clear obligation … to 
provide a satisfactory future for the Nauruans’ arising from their past and present 
interaction.398 While this case is one in which there is a clear pre-existing colonial and 
economic relationship between a handful of states,399 it nevertheless indicates that, 
where states have contributed to environmental degradation elsewhere, they have 
reasons for assisting those displaced as a result.  
Taken alone, however, reasons arising from the greenhouse gas emissions of 
industrialised states — particularly given that only a small proportion of these can be 
                                                
394
 From a legal perspective, only a certain proportion of past emissions can be taken into account in 
allocating responsibility: (a) those whose consequences are reasonably foreseeable (usually understood as 
those emitted after 1990), and (b) those that violate legal standards under the UNFCCC and associated 
protocols. See, for example, Kälin and Schrepfer, supra note 73, at 8–10; Kolstad et al., supra note 155, at 
218–219; Werksman, ‘Could a Small Island State Successfully Sue a Big Emitter? Pursuing a Legal Theory 
and a Venue for Climate Justice’, in Gerrard and Wannier (eds), supra note 68, 409. From a moral 
perspective, see also Bradley, supra note 306, at 153–154; Caney, supra note 268, at 761–762; Wyman, supra 
note 123, at 196–197. 
395 Articles 3(1), 4(3) and 4(4), UNFCCC, supra note 102. See also Fleurbaey et al., supra note 386, at 317. In 
the context of climate change inundation, compare Wyett, supra note 337, at 178. 
396 Anghie, ‘“The Heart of My Home”: Colonialism, Environmental Damage and the Nauru Case’, 34 
Harvard International Law Journal (1993) 445; Tabucanon and Opeskin, ‘The Resettlement of Nauruans in 
Australia: An Early Case of Failed Environmental Migration’, 46 Journal of Pacific History (2011) 337; C. 
Weeramantry, Nauru: Environmental Damage Under International Trusteeship (1992). 
397 Tabucanon and Opeskin, supra note 396, at 354–355. 
398 Cited in ibid, at 355. 
399 Not all states ‘have the benefit of these connections’. Ibid, at 355. 
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taken into account in allocating reasons for acting400 — may not be strong enough to 
require high-emitting states to shoulder all the burdens of climate change inundation, 
leaving us with a potential gap between past emissions and future harms.401 They also 
fail to tell us which states, if any, have the capacity to act effectively and ‘at a 
reasonable cost’ to themselves and their populations.402 
Reasons of capacity 
This leads us to a third set of reasons: those relating to the capacity to act effectively 
and to absorb the burdens associated with acting. Unlike reasons of contribution, these 
reasons are neutral with respect to the causes of climate change.403 Rather than looking 
backwards to a state’s greenhouse gas emissions, they look forward to its capacity to 
assist atoll islanders.404 The CESCR and UNFCCC both insist that those states ‘in a 
position to assist’ — or with the relevant ‘capabilities’ to act — have a particular 
responsibility to do so and should therefore ‘take the lead in combating climate change 
and the adverse effects thereof’.405 As with reasons of contribution, reasons of capacity 
also find support in the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, which 
takes into account the differing ‘technologies and financial resources [states] 
command’.406 
But how are we to identify those states ‘in a position to assist’? Chapter 2 introduced 
two types of reasons of capacity. The first relates to one actor’s capacity to respond to a 
particular harm more effectively than another, thus reducing the costs of acting; the 
second to one actor’s capacity to absorb the costs of acting more readily than another, 
thus rendering those costs more reasonable. 
                                                
400 See references supra note 394. 
401 Caney, supra note 268, at 761–762; Wyman, supra note 90, at 460. 
402 Kolstad et al., supra note 155, at 218. On these and other objections to relying solely on reasons of 
contribution, see also Caney, supra note 268; Caney, supra note 194. 
403 Caney, supra note 268, at 768. 
404 On the need to take into account both contribution and capacity-related reasons for acting, see ibid, at 
763; Mayer, ‘The International Legal Challenges of Climate-Induced Migration: Proposal for an 
International Legal Framework’, 22 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy (2011) 357, 
at 412. 
405 CESCR, supra note 203, at para.45 (see also paras.39–40); Article 3(1), UNFCCC, supra note 102. 
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Included in the first category are reasons of proximity.407 Shorter distances and existing 
regional networks of assistance and cooperation can facilitate the movement of people, 
thereby reducing the costs of migration, which will ‘rise exponentially with increasing 
distance from the original home of the community’.408 A recent report observes that 
‘countries neighbouring [atoll island states] in danger’, particularly Australia and New 
Zealand, ‘are often called to provide assistance when disasters strike’.409 These states 
have particular obligations to atoll island populations arising from ‘proximity and 
neighbourhood’, which apply ‘over and above the obligations that might exist in a total 
global context’.410 In fact, in 2008, the former Australian government recognised ‘a 
shared interest in the prosperity, growth and stability of the Pacific region’, arguing 
that Australia has both ‘the capacity to assist’ and ‘a responsibility to do so’.411 
Similar reasons also arise from cultural or family ties. States with substantial atoll 
island populations are likely to absorb migration flows from these islands more 
effectively, as islanders make use of existing cultural infrastructure and draw on family 
and community networks to find accommodation, secure employment offers and learn 
the language. 412  New Zealand, for example, has ‘unique Polynesian cultural 
connections’,413 including one of the largest Tuvaluan communities outside Tuvalu.414 
Of a number of Tuvaluan migrants interviewed in New Zealand, 72% already had 
family members living in New Zealand.415 New Zealand is also supportive of existing 
                                                
407 Docherty and Giannini, supra note 331, at 358; Hodgkinson and Young, supra note 133, at 325. 
408 Ferris, Cernea and Petz, supra note 16, at 19. 
409 G. Kostakos et al., Climate Security and Justice for Small Island Developing States (2014), at 12. 
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at 1198. 
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Tuvaluan communities, subsidising cultural events and bilingual education.416 New 
Zealand may therefore have specific reasons for acting to assist Tuvaluan migrants 
because it can do so more effectively than other states.  
The second set of capacity-related reasons speaks to the reasonableness of the burdens 
imposed on those who act, where these burdens will fall more easily on actors with 
greater resources. 417  Wyman suggests three criteria for assessing the capacity of 
potential destination countries to absorb new migrants: population density (which 
indicates the availability of land), GDP (which indicates total wealth) and GDP per 
capita (which indicates average wealth).418 On the basis of these three criteria, the US, 
Canada and Australia hold the strongest reasons for acting, while New Zealand, with 
its smaller national economy, is 17th in the list.419 New Zealand may therefore have 
stronger reasons arising from its capacity to act effectively (measured in terms of its 
proximity and cultural ties) but less weighty reasons arising from its capacity to absorb 
the burdens associated with acting. The US, on the other hand, may have stronger 
reasons for acting arising from its capacity to absorb these burdens but less weighty 
reasons arising from its ability to act effectively (based on its relative physical and 
cultural distance from Pacific atoll island states). 
In the case of Nauru, discussed above, the Australian, New Zealand and British 
governments acknowledged that their reasons for assisting Nauruans arose not only 
from their contribution to the destruction of Nauruan territory but also from their 
capacity to rehabilitate the island or to resettle its occupants elsewhere.420 Australia’s 
proposal to establish an autonomous Nauruan community on Curtis Island, for 
example, demonstrates that it has the capacity and resources to assist at least some 
atoll islanders displaced by environmental degradation.421 
                                                
416 Gemenne and Shen, supra note 101, at 21. 
417 As with progressive taxation, ‘the more one can afford to contribute, the more one should’. Fleurbaey 
et al., supra note 386, at 319. On an ‘ability to pay’ principle in the context of climate change, see Caney, 
supra note 268, at 769–770. 
418 Wyman, supra note 90, at 461–463. Compare Risse, supra note 91. 
419 Wyman, supra note 90, at 461–462. On the capacity of Australia and New Zealand to receive island 
migrants, see also Wyett, supra note 337, at 177–180. 
420 Tabucanon and Opeskin, supra note 396, at 354–355. 
421 Ibid, at 346–347. 
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3.4 Reasons against acting 
Where the expansion or modification of existing migration pathways would impose 
unreasonable burdens on their governments or citizens, states may also have legitimate 
reasons against acting. One set of reasons relates to the socio-economic costs associated 
with the resettlement of atoll islanders, particularly where the enjoyment of human 
rights is at stake.422 Where actions taken to address the non-fulfilment of islanders’ 
human rights end up depriving other individuals of their human rights — for example, 
if a sudden mass influx of islanders overwhelms the capacity of a host state to ensure 
the availability of adequate clean water, sanitation or healthcare — this may count as a 
reason against acting.423  
These reasons might be relevant in the case of poorer neighbouring states like Fiji, East 
Timor or Papua New Guinea, where existing resources and infrastructure are already 
overburdened and public order is relatively fragile. However, in the case of affluent 
multicultural states like Australia and New Zealand, the socio-economic burdens 
imposed by atoll island migrants are likely to be minimal and unlikely to interfere with 
the enjoyment of the host population’s human rights or threaten public order.  
The combined population of Kiribati and Tuvalu, for example, is around 115,000424 or 
just over half the annual intake of permanent residents in Australia and New 
Zealand.425 Particularly if it was staggered over decades, the financial burden imposed 
by incoming atoll islanders should therefore be a ‘manageable proposition’.426 It would 
not be weighty enough to deny existing residents access to accommodation, healthcare, 
                                                
422 On the potential impact on the human rights of host communities, see Gromilova, ‘Revisiting Planned 
Relocation as a Climate Change Adaptation Strategy: The Added Value of a Human Rights-Based 
Approach’, 10 Utrecht Law Review (2014) 74. 
423 Johnson, ‘Governing Climate Displacement: The Ethics and Politics of Human Resettlement’, 21 
Environmental Politics (2012) 308, at 322. For a similar reason against acting in the context of international 
refugee law, see Article 3(2), Declaration on Territorial Asylum, GA Res. 2312 (XXII), 14 December 1967; 
Article 32, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 150 (1951). See discussion in R. 
Jennings and A. Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law (2008), at 891–892. 
424 As of July 2014, the population of Tuvalu is estimated at 10,782 and Kiribati at 104,488. CIA, supra note 
3. 
425 In 2011, Australia accepted 127,460 permanent residents and New Zealand accepted 84,000. Australian 
Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Fact Sheet 2: Key Facts about Immigration (2013); Labour 
and Immigration Research Centre, Permanent and Long Term Migration: The Big Picture (2012), at 3. For 
detailed migration scenarios, see Bedford and Bedford, supra note 92, at 114–122; Wyett, supra note 337. 
426 Wyman, supra note 319, at 341. Compare Crépeau, cited in UN News Service, supra note 337; Kostakos 
et al., supra note 409, at 8; Wyman, supra note 123, at 208. Even those who adopt a security perspective 
agree. Maas and Carius, ‘Territorial Integrity and Sovereignty: Climate Change and Security in the Pacific 
and Beyond’, in J. Scheffran et al. (eds), Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict (2012) 651, at 
656. 
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employment, education or other basic goods and services, or to change their spending 
habits or lifestyle choices. Nor would it require host states to adopt wide-ranging 
immigration laws, establish new systems of governance or commit to a policy of open 
borders. It is plausible, then, to assume that this burden would not be seen as 
unreasonable by those who would bear it.427 As Bedford observes, ‘there’s absolutely 
no way Australia and New Zealand will have great difficulty accommodating the 
numbers that will be involved’.428  
A second set of reasons against acting arises from the political or cultural costs that 
host communities may bear should a large number of island migrants be admitted, 
including the dilution of a particular way of life or the weakening of protections for 
collective identity.429 Should these costs be considered unreasonable by those expected 
to bear them, states may have reasons for refusing to accommodate atoll island 
migrants, regardless of the severity of the threat they face. However, this reason 
against acting is relevant only where a potential host state has a way of life within 
which migrants have little or no place. As Michael Blake argues, where migrants are 
‘part and parcel of the life we actually share’, as is the case in multicultural states like 
Australia and New Zealand — and the number of additional migrants is not 
unreasonable, as discussed above — this makes it difficult ‘to coherently use that very 
way of life as justification for their exclusion’.430 
One further point of clarification is useful here. States are typically understood to have 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, both domestically and abroad.431 
Obligations to respect and protect are generally seen as implementable quickly and 
without great cost; obligations to fulfil as costly, progressive and ‘subsidiary’.432 
                                                
427 However, if immigration quotas are not increased but simply re-allocated to atoll islanders, a 
significant burden will be placed on potential migrants from other states whose immigration quotas are 
restricted. This is particularly problematic where these migrants are also fleeing vulnerability or harm. 
See, for example, Betts, supra note 121. This objection does not apply to the collective resettlement options 
considered in Chapter 6 onwards, which do not rely on existing migration quotas. 
428 Bedford, interviewed on Carrick, supra note 71. Bedford and Bedford argue that New Zealand could 
absorb all of the Tuvaluan population without significantly changing its immigration policy. Bedford and 
Bedford, supra note 92, at 115 and 127. 
429 On the role of states’ rights to border control in protecting collective identity, see M. Walzer, Spheres of 
Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (1983), at 31–63. On the burdens that large migration flows might 
impose on receiving states, see Miller, ‘Border Regimes and Human Rights’, 7 Law and Ethics of Human 
Rights (2013) 1, at 7. 
430 Blake, ‘Immigration, Causality and Complicity’, in S. Ben-Porath and R. Smith (eds), Varieties of 
Sovereignty and Citizenship (2013) 111, at 122. Blake is talking about undocumented migrants, but the 
argument is applicable here. Compare Heyward and Ödalen, supra note 123, at 17. 
431 See generally Sepúlveda, supra note 234, at ch.5. 
432 Langford et al., supra note 169, at 19; Vandenhole and Benedek, supra note 230, at 336–338. 
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However, here, as in Chapter 2, the traditional assumptions of human rights doctrine 
and theory are undermined. In the context of climate change inundation, meeting an 
extraterritorial obligation to respect human rights — that is, committing to effective 
climate change mitigation by restricting energy use and switching to non-polluting 
renewable energy sources — will require a significant investment from every member 
of the international community. In many cases, extraterritorial obligations to fulfil — 
by, for example, expanding existing migration pathways in order to accommodate 
those who are permanently displaced — will be less financially costly to meet (in the 
short term, at least).433 
The point here is not to advocate this kind of cost-benefit analysis, which fails to take 
into account either the social, cultural and environmental costs incurred by a global 
strategy of migration and adaptation, or the legal and moral reasons that states have 
for acting to address climate change inundation. The aim instead is to undermine the 
common assumption that obligations to fulfil human rights elsewhere are too costly 
and should therefore be understood as less imperative. If industrialised states are 
reluctant to commit to effective mitigation strategies because of the financial burdens 
involved, then, by their own reasoning, they should prioritise those less costly 
adaptation strategies — including assisting atoll island populations displaced by 
climate change inundation — that ensure the ongoing realisation of the human rights 
of individuals elsewhere in the face of climate change-related harms. 
3.5 Which actors have reasons for acting? 
This section considers whether it is possible to identify one or more states with reasons 
for acting to address the threat posed by climate change inundation to islanders’ 
human rights. Here, we must address the fact that different sets of reasons for acting 
may apply to different actors.434 On the one hand, affluent Annex II states with existing 
atoll island populations — including Canada, the US, the UK, France and Germany435 
— may have reasons for acting that arise from their contribution to the problem of 
climate change and their capacity to act effectively. However, these states have not 
                                                
433 See Brian Fisher, former Executive Director of the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics, who argued for the resettlement of island populations on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis. 
Cited in Bita, ‘Island Evacuation a Greenhouse Solution’, The Weekend Australian (8–9 June 1996). 
434 Compare Caney, supra note 194, at 472. 
435 R. Bedford and G. Hugo, Population Movement in the Pacific (2012), at vii–viii and 63–64. All of these 
appear in the top 11 states in Wyman’s capacity-based list. Wyman, supra note 90, at 461. This list is 
indicative, not exhaustive. 
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established formal migration pathways from Kiribati or Tuvalu, nor do they share the 
same reasons of proximity as countries in the Asia-Pacific region. 
On the other hand, neighbouring states may have reasons for acting arising from 
proximity and, in some cases, cultural ties, but are also some of the poorest and most 
war-torn states in the world. Fiji, for example, has formally committed to resettling 
islanders fleeing climate change inundation, citing reasons of neighbourliness,436 and 
already has a large Melanesian population. However, Fiji is also a developing state 
whose capacity to respond effectively to the displacement of atoll islanders is 
hampered by its political and socio-economic circumstances, and — like other 
developing neighbours including Nauru, East Timor, Papua New Guinea and Sri 
Lanka — should not be expected to shoulder the burden of resettling displaced atoll 
islanders on the basis of proximity alone.437 
While there is no fixed rule about which reasons for acting take priority in this pluralist 
account, it is important to attempt to balance all available reasons in order to identify 
those actors with the strongest reasons for acting in a given situation.438 Where several 
sets of reasons point towards the same actor(s), their cumulative strength may indicate 
that these actor(s) hold primary responsibility for addressing the situation at hand. 
However, where other actors also have one or more reasons for acting, this may 
indicate a secondary — rather than a competing — responsibility to support those with 
primary responsibility by, for example, contributing financial or other resources. 
If we retain our focus on Kiribati and Tuvalu, each of the four sets of reasons points 
towards (a) the developed states of the Pacific region, Australia and New Zealand. 
These states have reasons for acting arising from obligations of international 
cooperation, both in general and, where the legal commitments set out in existing 
                                                
436 See Fijian President Ratu Epelia Nailatikau, cited in Weiss, ‘The Making of a Climate Refugee’, Foreign 
Policy (28 January 2015). See also Bedford, interviewed on Carrick, supra note 71; Bedford and Bedford, 
supra note 92, at 90–95. Kiribati has already bought 6,000 acres of land in Fiji (although this is primarily for 
agriculture rather than collective resettlement). Fiji World News, ‘Kiribati Purchases 6,000 Acres of Land 
in Vanua Levu’ (8 July 2013); Lagan, ‘Kiribati: A Nation Going Under’, The Global Mail (15 April 2013). 
Kiribati has also had a positive response from the government of East Timor. McAdam, supra note 90, at 
116–117. 
437 Bradley, supra note 306, at 152–153; Gibney, ‘Asylum and the Principle of Proximity’, 3 Ethics, Place and 
Environment (2000) 313, at 315–316; Oliver, ‘A New Challenge to International Law: The Disappearance of 
the Entire Territory of a State’, 16 International Journal of Minority and Group Rights (2009) 209, at 241. 
438 Miller, supra note 267, at 469–471. However, Caney suggests that reasons of contribution should take 
priority over reasons of capacity. Caney, supra note 268, at 769–770; Caney, ‘Human Rights, 
Responsibilities, and Climate Change’, in Beitz and Goodin (eds), supra note 268, 227, at 241. However, see 
Caney, supra note 194, at 472. 
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bilateral migration agreements are taken into account, in particular. As Annex I and II 
states parties to the UNFCCC, they also have reasons arising from their contribution to 
— and failure to regulate — the greenhouse gas emissions that exacerbate climate 
change inundation. And they have reasons arising from their capacity to act, 
understood in terms of their ability to act effectively (on the basis of their proximity 
and cultural ties to Tuvalu and Kiribati) and to absorb the burdens of acting (on the 
basis of their available land, infrastructure and financial resources). The cumulative 
weight of these reasons suggests that Australia and New Zealand can and should bear 
primary responsibility for assisting atoll islanders in the Pacific region, at least. 
Thus far, neither state has made a formal commitment to resettle atoll islanders. 
Instead, both have adopted a ‘wait and see’ approach.439 ‘Should the worst happen, I 
guess we’d send a boat to get them’, suggests one New Zealand official. ‘It’s clear that 
we won’t let them drown.’440 While Australia’s position has also been somewhat 
ambivalent,441 its decision to join the steering group behind the Nansen Initiative on 
climate change displacement indicates an ongoing interest in this area.442 
However, the reasons for acting discussed above also point to (b) more distant affluent 
states like Canada, the US, Germany, France and the UK (on the basis of reasons 
arising from their contribution to the problem of climate change inundation, their 
existing cultural ties to atoll island states and their access to resources) and (c) less 
affluent neighbouring states like Fiji, Papua New Guinea or East Timor (on the basis of 
reasons arising from proximity and cultural ties). These states might be seen as holding 
secondary responsibility for addressing the harms of climate change inundation by, for 
example, providing financial resources (in the case of (b)) or hosting islanders on a 
short-term basis while a more permanent solution is finalised (in the case of (c)). What 
may initially appear to be contradictory or conflicting reasons for acting may therefore 
simply require different sets of actors to contribute different but complementary skills 
or resources to support the process of collective resettlement. 
This speaks to the importance of cooperation and burden-sharing, initially discussed in 
Chapter 2. The duty to cooperate requires that burdens are shared between those 
                                                
439 Gemenne and Shen, supra note 101, at 28. 
440 Don Will (NZ Aid), cited in ibid, at 21. 
441 Collett, supra note 410. 
442  McAdam, ‘Australia Joins Climate Displacement Group’, SBS News (26 April 2013). Compare 
Government of Australia, Submission to the OHCHR under Human Rights Council Resolution 7/23 (2008), at 1. 
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actors that have both reason and resources to act, ensuring that the burden does not 
weigh too heavily on any one actor. Even where states do not offer permanent 
residence to island migrants, they may nevertheless have reasons for contributing 
financial, technological, human or other resources to support the migration and 
resettlement process.  
In the context of climate change inundation, international experts advocate the 
development of regional ‘burden- and responsibility-sharing arrangements’443 that 
would coordinate the resettlement of atoll islanders, taking into account reasons 
arising from capacity, proximity, contribution to the problem and so on. These 
arrangements could be coordinated by an intergovernmental organisation with 
expertise and a mandate in this area.444 It has been suggested that the UNHCR, 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) or ILO might be well placed to 
facilitate the negotiation and expansion of bilateral and regional migration 
programmes.445 In fact, the UNHCR has already made it clear that it ‘would be pleased 
to support efforts by States to devise appropriate solutions for potentially affected 
populations’. 446  Another option would be to establish a regional framework for 
coordinating cross-border migration. The Australian Labor Party, for example, 
envisaged an ‘international coalition’ of Pacific Rim countries ‘to accept climate change 
refugees when a country becomes uninhabitable because of rising sea levels’.447  
3.6 Learning from the planned migration proposal  
Having used planned migration as an initial case study for examining the reasons that 
states may have for, and against, acting to assist displaced atoll islanders, this final 
section considers several objections to this approach,448 before concluding with some of 
                                                
443 UNHCR, supra note 75, at paras.16 and 42–43. Compare McAdam, supra note 90, at 236 and 254; 
Nowak, ‘Welcome Address’, ClimMig Conference on Human Rights, Environmental Change, Migration 
and Displacement (20 September 2012); Zetter, supra note 80, at 149. On burden-sharing in the context of 
climate change more generally, see Fleurbaey et al., supra note 386, at 294–295 and 317–319. 
444 McAdam, supra note 90, at ch.8. 
445 Park, supra note 5, at 24; UNHCR, supra note 75, at paras.34–38; Wiseman, supra note 147. Others 
suggest that the UNDP and World Bank might play a role. Biermann and Boas, ‘Protecting Climate 
Refugees: The Case for a Global Protocol’, Environment (2008) 8. 
446 UNHCR, IOM and Norwegian Refugee Council, supra note 95, at 3. 
447 Sercombe and Albanese, supra note 411, at 3. 
448 Other objections not addressed here include the fact that state practice in this area is ‘inconsistent and 
unpredictable’ in terms of which legal status is granted to migrants, which may lead to a ‘considerable 
erosion’ of their rights. McAdam, supra note 90, at 10; Park, supra note 5, at 14. Another is the fact that 
many islanders do not see migration as an adaptation measure but as a last resort. Mortreux and Barnett, 
supra note 32, at 110–111. Barnett and Webber admit that, where islanders are ‘to some degree forced to 
move’ by climate-related changes, migration should not be seen as an adaptation strategy but as an impact 
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its strengths. First, any solution that relies on re-purposing existing migration channels 
— and is therefore premised on the idea of migration as a discretionary privilege 
granted to the able-bodied and meritorious rather than as a right for all — cannot 
adequately protect all those affected by climate change inundation. By leaving intact 
the immigration requirements imposed by potential host states, it excludes the most 
vulnerable and marginalised: those who are poor, elderly, unwell, disabled or 
unskilled, or do not meet the requirements of ‘good character’.449 However, human 
rights protection should not be premised on a person’s good behaviour, employability, 
wealth or virtue. 
Those who advocate a planned migration approach often recognise its potential to 
exclude the most vulnerable but appear willing to accept this outcome. Wyman, for 
example, admits that ‘many Pacific islanders lack the skills necessary to migrate as 
skilled labour’,450 yet incentivises the expansion of existing migration pathways by 
suggesting that islanders can fill labour shortages caused by an ageing population451 — 
a line of reasoning that only exacerbates the exclusion of those who are unable to work. 
Others acknowledge that ‘those who are unable to leave may be particularly 
vulnerable’ yet fail to explain how a planned migration approach can, in the long term, 
‘support both those who leave’ and those who are unable to.452 While a planned 
migration approach may protect the human rights of some, it may also increase the 
vulnerability of others, thereby becoming migration as maladaptation rather than 
adaptation.453 
                                                                                                                                          
of climate change. Barnett and Webber, supra note 28, at 50. Compare Biermann and Boas, supra note 328, 
at 78; Kälin and Schrepfer, supra note 73, at 20. Another relates to islanders’ lack of autonomy: they may 
have some choice over when to move but little choice about where. Heyward and Ödalen, supra note 123, 
at 10. 
449 To qualify for the PAC scheme, migrants must be aged 18–45, have an acceptable offer of employment, 
be of ‘good character’ and meet minimum language, income and health requirements. Immigration New 
Zealand, supra note 371. Similar requirements apply under the Australian Seasonal Worker Program. 
Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship, supra note 372. Islanders have reported difficulties 
in paying the application fee and securing a suitable job offer. Bedford and Bedford, supra note 92, at 107 
and 126; McAdam, supra note 167, at 123. See also Brown, supra note 332, at 40; Ferris, supra note 317, at 7–
8; Kälin and Schrepfer, supra note 73, at 20. 
450 Wyman, supra note 319, at 346. Wyman considers modifying PAC to make it easier to secure a job offer 
but does not address issues of ill health, disability, age, and so on. Wyman, supra note 319, at 353–354. 
451 Ibid, at 362–363. 
452 UNHCR, supra note 75, at para.40. On the idea of ‘trapped populations’, see Black and Collyer, 
‘Populations “Trapped” at Times of Crisis’, 45 Forced Migration Review (2014) 52; Foresight, supra note 388, 
at 13–14. Nansen Principle X insists on the importance of not ‘neglecting those who may choose to remain’, 
but does not mention those who are unable to leave. Norwegian Refugee Council, supra note 78, at 5. See 
also Barnett and Webber, supra note 28, at 38, 41 and 50; Bradley, supra note 306, at 148; Ferris, Cernea and 
Petz, supra note 16, at 17; Martin, supra note 337, at 12; McAdam, supra note 90, at 37. 
453 ‘Maladaptation’ refers to ‘an adaptation that does not succeed in reducing vulnerability but increases it 
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The UNHCR suggests a solution to this dilemma: ‘a waiver may be required for formal 
[immigration] requirements … which might be difficult to fulfil for affected 
populations’.454 However, this solution takes us away from a traditional migration 
pathways approach, which is premised on the idea that states have the right to control 
their borders — a right that is subject to few exceptions.455 
This points to a second problem with a planned migration approach. Particularly 
strong reasons are required to override the priority granted to states’ rights of 
territorial sovereignty and border control. ‘A state normally has the right to refuse 
entry into its territory to any alien,’ Jennings and Watts observe, even if she is ‘in 
practice unable to go to any other country’.456 In the absence of the significant legal 
weight attached to reasons arising from jus cogens and erga omnes norms of 
international law, do the reasons of international cooperation, contribution and 
capacity discussed above carry sufficient weight to override what is traditionally 
considered ‘a matter of national sovereignty, to be determined according to national 
priorities and criteria’?457 And, even where this test is satisfied, why should islanders 
take priority over those who are fleeing other forms of deprivation or environmental 
degradation?458 It appears that, on its own, the planned migration proposal may not 
provide strong enough reasons for expanding existing migration pathways, nor for 
assisting atoll islanders at the expense of those displaced by other factors. 
This brings us to a third and related flaw — one that is particularly important from the 
perspective of this thesis. In their efforts to address the challenges faced by those 
displaced by climate change-related harms — including uncertainty, loss of home, 
shelter and livelihood, and a lack of legal rights and correlative obligations — planned 
migration proposals lose sight of the unique set of problems faced by atoll islanders. 
While they are indeed facing the devastating impacts of climate change inundation on 
                                                                                                                                          
instead’. McCarthy et al. (eds), supra note 47, at 990. Compare Barnett and O’Neill, ‘Maladaptation’, 20 
Global Environmental Change (2011) 211, at 211. On the potential for migration to become maladaptation, 
see Adger et al., supra note 63, at 767–768; Noble et al., ‘Adaptation Needs and Options’, in Field et al., supra 
note 11, 833, at 858. 
454 UNHCR, IOM and Norwegian Refugee Council, supra note 95, at 3. Compare Heyward and Ödalen’s 
proposal for a Nansen Passport for the Territorially Dispossessed. Heyward and Ödalen, supra note 123. 
See also Park, supra note 5, at 19. 
455
 Including refugees, stateless persons and those entitled to complementary protection. On the barriers 
erected by states, see, for example, Blitz, ‘Statelessness and Environmental-Induced Displacement: Future 
Scenarios of Deterritorialization, Rescue and Recovery Examined’, 6 Mobilities (2011) 433, at 436; Guterres, 
supra note 330; OHCHR, supra note 13, at para.58; UNHCR, supra note 75, at para.39. 
456 Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 891. 
457 Solomon and Warner, supra note 331, 243, at 249. 
458 An objection discussed in Chapter 1. See also Betts, supra note 121. 
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their individual human rights to life, health, education and an adequate standard of 
living, atoll islanders also face an unprecedented threat to the territory of their state 
and the subsequent loss of collective rights to political autonomy, sovereignty and self-
determination.  
While some hold that permanent resettlement within a democratic, rights-protecting 
state replaces everything of value that would be lost with the disappearance of a state’s 
territory,459 this overlooks the fact that ‘islanders have lost something of value in the 
loss of their unique self-determining status, even if they are granted immigration into a 
state that treats them justly’.460 Self-determination is not an individual right to political 
participation but a collective right of peoples to autonomy and independence, as 
indicated by its sui generis status in the ICCPR461 and the jurisprudence of the Human 
Rights Committee.462 And, in the case of climate change inundation, there is something 
worth preserving that is not captured by planned migration proposals: a constitution 
and set of political institutions that have been shaped over time to reflect shared values 
and pursue distinctive collective goals; a unique political entity recognised as a 
member of the international community; and the capacity to be self-determining as 
Tuvaluans or as I-Kiribati, rather than as the newest members of the democratic state of 
New Zealand.463  
In Avery Kolers’ words: 
‘When the state as a whole disappears, the individual’s political identity, political 
community, status in that community, currency, civil-society institutions, and 
perhaps even her language of political participation and culture disappear as well. 
In short, the entire structure of the self-determining life of a political community, 
                                                
459 Lister, supra note 130, at 627. See also, more generally, Buchanan, supra note 190; T. Meisels, Territorial 
Rights (2009).  
460 Nine, supra note 91, at 363. 
461 Self-determination appears in Article 1, while rights to political participation are set out in Article 25. 
ICCPR, supra note 238. 
462 The Committee has declined to hear communications regarding the violation of the right to self-
determination on the grounds that the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR ‘provides a procedure under which 
individuals can claim that their individual rights have been violated’, thereby implying that self-
determination is not an individual right. E. P. et al. v Colombia, Communication No.318/1988, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/39/D/318/1988 (1990), at para.8.2 (emphasis added). Compare Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake 
Band v Canada, Communication No.167/1984, UN Doc. CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984 (1990), at paras.3.13–
3.15 and 13.3. 
463
 Nine, supra note 91, at 366–367. On the importance of a political identity tied to ‘specific constitutional 
traditions or to particular institutions’, see Banai, ‘Political Self-Determination and Global Egalitarianism: 
Towards an Intermediate Position’, 39 Social Theory and Practice (2013) 45, at 53 (also 50 and 59). 
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including not just its distinctive goals but also its distinctive ways of pursuing 
universal goals … are washed away.’464 
Even those who advocate a planned migration approach acknowledge — albeit in 
passing — that ‘[a]ny relocation plans need to ensure the enjoyment of the full range of 
relevant rights’, including the right to self-determination.465 Jane McAdam, discussing 
the legal migration pathway available to Marshall Islanders under the Compact of Free 
Association with the US, insists that, on its own, ‘the option to move does not resolve 
underlying and fundamental questions relating to identity, culture and self-
determination’.466 Wyman herself recognises that, without adequate consideration of 
these fundamental questions of collective identity and self-determination, a planned 
migration proposal remains a ‘second-best response’.467 
In fact, without some prior measures in place, a planned migration approach may 
undermine the self-determination of an atoll island population by gradually eroding 
the legal status of its state. As individuals migrate, secure citizenship and form 
attachments elsewhere, there ‘will be a slow process of whole nations dying in the 
social sense in addition to the geographical sense’.468 ‘[I]f you’re scattering your people 
in different parts of the globe,’ asks Kiribati President Anote Tong, ‘how do you retain 
national unity?’469 
However, at least three elements of the planned migration approach are valuable and 
are retained throughout the thesis. First, the use of existing legal rules and principles. 
Rather than diverting valuable resources towards the negotiation, ratification and 
implementation of a new international legal treaty, attention is best focused on the 
                                                
464 Kolers, supra note 91, at 334. 
465 UNHCR, supra note 75, at paras.31–32. Compare ibid, at 333–334; Bradley, supra note 306, at 157, note 1; 
Campbell, supra note 348, at 67 and 78; Ferris, Cernea and Petz, supra note 16, at 32; Guterres, supra note 
330; Heyward and Ödalen, supra note 123, at 1–2 and 9; Hodgkinson and Young, supra note 133, at 326–
328; Hampson, supra note 89, at para.17; Holthus et al., supra note 93, at 83; Kelman, ‘Island Evacuation’, 31 
Forced Migration Review (2008) 20, at 20; Mayer, supra note 404, at 391–393; McAdam, supra note 167, at 106 
and 117; OHCHR, supra note 13, at paras.39–41; Ödalen, supra note 91; Oliver, supra note 437, at 237 and 
241; Park, supra note 5, at 20, esp. note 141; Republic of the Maldives, supra note 21, at 7–8, 39–41, 74–75; 
Republic of the Marshall Islands, supra note 131; Sercombe and Albanese, supra note 411, at 3 and 11; Vidas, 
supra note 97; Wong, supra note 90, at 45. 
466 ‘It is therefore important not to view policy options that allow for migration or relocation as complete 
“solutions”.’ McAdam, supra note 90, at 36 (see also 51, 157, 199 and 255). 
467 Wyman, supra note 90, at 441. 
468 Kälin, cited in Morris, ‘What Happens When Your Country Drowns?’, Mother Jones (2009). See also 
Campbell, supra note 348, at 67 and 78; Campbell, Goldsmith and Koshy, supra note 114, at 28; Mayer, 
supra note 404, at 391–392; Gemenne and Shen, supra note 101, at 17; McAdam, supra note 90, at 159; 
Stoutenburg, supra note 90, at 68. 
469 Cited in McAdam, supra note 90, at 153. 
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ways in which existing law might be repurposed to address the challenge of climate 
change inundation. Second, the need for international cooperation and assistance. 
Climate change inundation is a global problem requiring solutions that transcend 
political and territorial boundaries. And third, the idea of movement as driven and 
defined by islanders, which underpins the discourse of migration as adaptation. This 
emphasis on the wishes of atoll island populations is central to the remainder of this 
thesis, which understands the right to self-determination in terms of the ‘the need to 
pay regard to the freely expressed will of peoples’.470 
The following chapters lay the groundwork for an alternative or complementary 
proposal:471 the planned resettlement of atoll island populations.472 This retains the 
positive features of the proposal for planned migration — its emphasis on community 
consultation, participation and decision-making about when, where and how to move, 
its incorporation of local forms of knowledge and local patterns of movement, its 
rejection of the ‘refugee’ label, and its resistance to proposals for a new multilateral 
treaty — but seeks to address its shortcomings. Crucially, it takes into account the 
unique challenges faced by the inhabitants of atoll island states: loss of cultural 
identity, political autonomy, territorial sovereignty and statehood. It does so by 
considering the role of self-determination in responding to climate change inundation, 
a right whose legal implications in this context have not yet been explored in detail 
elsewhere.  
                                                
470 Western Sahara, supra note 136, at para.32. 
471 Bedford and Bedford call for a ‘mix of strategies’, including both individual migration and collective 
resettlement. Bedford and Bedford, supra note 92, at 93 (see also 126). See also references supra note 345. 
472 See, for example, Campbell, Goldsmith and Koshy, supra note 114; Gromilova, supra note 422. 
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III. Self-Determination and Climate Change Inundation 
4. Two Accounts of Self-Determination 
4.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters identified some of the current and predicted impacts of climate 
change on the inhabitants of low-lying atoll island states. Chapter 1 defined ‘climate 
change inundation’ as a process in which climate change-related impacts exacerbate 
existing socio-economic and political vulnerabilities. The cumulative effect of these 
factors threatens to undermine the habitability of islanders’ territory and, as a 
consequence, the legal, political and cultural foundations of their state. Chapter 2 
developed a functional account of human rights as norms that provide states with 
reasons to take action to address a manifest failure to protect fundamental human 
interests elsewhere, while Chapter 3 examined the reasons that states might have for 
implementing the popular planned migration proposal. However, while this proposal 
provides a useful case study for identifying those states with reasons for acting to 
address climate change inundation, it fails to protect islanders’ political autonomy or 
independence in the event of the loss of their state. In light of this lacuna, Chapters 4 
and 5 shift their focus from the protection of individual human rights to the realisation 
of collective rights — in particular, the right of peoples to self-determination. 
Some might wonder about the value of focusing on a right that has been described as 
‘entirely indefinable’ and ‘intractable as a legal principle’;473 a right that prompted 
former US Secretary of State Robert Lansing to exclaim, ‘What a calamity that the 
phrase was ever uttered! What misery it will cause!’474 Yet, despite its shortcomings, it 
is important not to underestimate the historical relevance or future significance of self-
determination.  
Looking back, self-determination played a pivotal role in ‘contribut[ing] to the 
emergence of new trends in the world community’, including the shift towards a ‘“UN 
Charter model” of international relations’, in which states are — in theory at least — 
increasingly held accountable to both their citizens and the international community.475 
Looking forward, self-determination remains crucial in situations in which a threat to 
                                                
473 J. Verzijl, International Law in Historical Perspective (1968), at 321 and 323. 
474 R. Lansing, The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative (1921), at 97. 
475 A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (1995), at 325. 
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collective identity and autonomy – such as climate change inundation – is so grave that 
claimants’ demands cannot be addressed by recourse to individual human rights 
alone. As a claim to the protection of fundamental collective interests, self-
determination adds significant value to the individual human rights regime, which 
might otherwise be ‘greatly impoverished’ and ‘ill-equipped to deal with some of the 
major challenges that are certain to confront it in the years ahead’.476  
One of the main tasks of this thesis is to explore the potential of the legal norm of self-
determination to evolve in response to grave challenges such as climate change 
inundation. This requires us to develop a broader, more responsive account of self-
determination that moves beyond the narrow context in which it has so far been 
applied in law, while retaining its underlying purpose: to take into account the freely 
expressed wishes of a people in responding to some grave threat to its collective 
autonomy. It also requires us to pursue a consistent normative understanding of self-
determination that clarifies the interests at stake and the most appropriate mechanisms 
for their protection. After all, without some ‘conceptual foundations or solid 
precedents’ on which to ground its development, self-determination may attract ever 
more rhetorical appeals while ‘becom[ing] ever less relevant in practice’.477 
This chapter provides the legal and conceptual tools for this process of expansion and 
consolidation. It begins by examining the development of self-determination as a legal 
and normative principle and assessing some of its strengths and limitations (section 
4.2). Having established that the dominant ‘categorisation’ account of self-
determination is unable to account for its wide-ranging, mutable nature (section 4.3), it 
offers an alternative purposive account of self-determination as both a basic guiding 
principle and a set of specific legal rules (section 4.4). Where the principle sets out the 
purpose of self-determination (to ensure that a people’s wishes are respected wherever 
its ‘destiny’ or autonomy is at risk) (section 4.6), the rules identify its subject (the 
peoples that hold a right to self-determination). For the purposes of this thesis, 
‘peoples’ are understood as the populations of existing states, whose members share a 
history of participation under common political institutions (section 4.5). This 
definition builds on legal precedent but also seeks to explain the significance of the 
unique self-determining status of each people. 
                                                
476 Alston, ‘Peoples’ Rights: Their Rise and Fall’, in P. Alston (ed.), Peoples’ Rights (2001) 259, at 292. 
477 Ibid, at 291–292. 
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Chapter 5 then returns to the issue of climate change inundation. It considers whether 
the populations of atoll island states might be recognised as peoples with a right to 
self-determination and, if so, which states have reasons for acting to address the threat 
posed by climate change inundation to their capacity for self-determination. Chapters 4 
and 5 therefore lay the groundwork for what follows in the final part of the thesis 
(which examines the potential scope and content of a right to self-determination of in 
the face of climate change inundation) by establishing that the emergence of such a 
right is both possible and foreseeable. 
4.2 Self-determination in international law 
From its early origins in the philosophy of Locke478 and the political exhortations of the 
French and American Revolutions,479 the idea of self-determination has become firmly 
entrenched in the popular imagination. Even its most vehement critics recognise its 
intuitive moral and political appeal.480 Yet, as a legal concept, it remains somewhat 
ambiguous, malleable, perhaps even ‘radically uncertain and obscure’.481 While its 
application in the context of decolonisation is largely accepted as lex lata (a precisely 
determined, formally settled principle of international law), its application in the post-
colonial era remains, in the eyes of many, lex obscura (contentious and conceptually 
incomplete).482 
Nevertheless, there is widespread agreement that self-determination remains a 
functioning legal concept. In comparison with other collective human rights to 
development, peace or a healthy environment, it is relatively well established, with a 
                                                
478 J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, P. Laslett (ed.) (1967). 
479 See, for example, Cassese, supra note 475, at 11. 
480 ‘Even if, as a legal right, “self-determination” cannot really swim, as a moral right or political 
desideratum, it will not, and in the opinion of most people should not, sink.’ M. Pomerance, Self-
Determination in Law and Practice (1982), at 73. Compare Fitzmaurice, ‘The Future of Public International 
Law and the International Legal System in the Circumstances of Today’, in Livre du Centenaire de l'Institut 
de Droit International 1873-1973 (1973) 196, at 233; R. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International 
Law (1963), at 79. Even those who question the normative significance of political boundaries recognise the 
relevance of self-determination or political autonomy. See, for example, C. Beitz, Political Theory and 
International Relations (1999), at 104; S. Caney, Justice Beyond Borders (2005), at 173; Moellendorf, supra note 
268, at 128–148; Young, supra note 311, at 237. 
481 Crawford, ‘The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and Future’, in 
Alston (ed.), supra note 476, 7, at 10. 
482 Irving, ‘Self-Determination and Colonial Enclaves: The Success of Singapore and the Failure of 
Theory’, 12 Singapore Yearbook of International Law (2008) 97, at 97. Irving cites ibid, at 38. 
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clear legal history and substantive legal content. Despite its detractors, 483  self-
determination commands significant academic484 and jurisprudential support as a 
fundamental principle of international law.485 Its dynamic, responsive nature is well 
suited to a global context characterised by rapid environmental, social and political 
change. As Crawford observes, ‘the continuing vitality and potential for expansion of 
the principle of self-determination … should not be underestimated’.486 Indeed, self-
determination has already achieved several milestones in international law, including 
a significant redistribution of political power and the widespread recognition of 
collective rights to identity and autonomy. In doing so, it has ‘introduced a highly 
dynamic factor of change that deeply undermine[s] the status quo’.487 
Before exploring the potential of self-determination to evolve in response to the threat 
posed by climate change inundation, a brief history will provide a clearer 
understanding of its current legal content.488 Self-determination re-emerged in the early 
20th century from two different ideological perspectives: Lenin championed self-
determination as a form of emancipation from oppression,489 and Woodrow Wilson 
argued for the right to self-government and popular sovereignty.490 While there was 
some recognition of self-determination as a political principle during the League of 
Nations era,491 it was not until 1945 that it found formal recognition as one of the UN’s 
                                                
483 Examples include Fitzmaurice, supra note 480; Blum, ‘Reflections on the Changing Concept of Self-
Determination’, 10 Israel Law Review (1975) 509; Emerson, ‘Self-Determination’, 65 AJIL (1971) 459; Verzijl, 
supra note 473, at 323–324. 
484 See, for example, J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (2012), at 646–647; R. 
Higgins, The Development of International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations (1964), at 90–
106; Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 712–715; Oeter, ‘Self-Determination’, in B. Simma et al. (eds), 
The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2012) 313, at 315; A. Rigo Sureda, The Evolution of the Right 
of Self-Determination: A Study of United Nations Practice (1973), at 25–27; Thürer and Burri, ‘Self-
Determination’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2008), at paras.26–
32. 
485 Namibia, supra note 279, at paras.52–53; Western Sahara, supra note 136, at paras.54–59; East Timor, supra 
note 160, at para.29. 
486 Crawford, supra note 481, at 65. 
487 Cassese, supra note 475, at 316. 
488 For one of many historical overviews, see Thürer and Burri, supra note 484, at paras.1–11. 
489 Lenin, ‘The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to Self-Determination’, in G. Hanna (ed.), 
Collected Works, Volume 22 (1964) 143. See further Cassese, supra note 475, at 14–19. 
490
 W. Wilson, President Wilson’s Fourteen Points (18 January 1918); W. Wilson, President Wilson’s Address to 
Congress: Analysing German and Austrian Peace Utterances (11 February 1918). See generally Cassese, supra 
note 475, at 19–23. 
491 International Committee of Jurists, ‘Report of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the 
Council of the League of Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of 
the Aaland Islands Question’, Official Journal of the League of Nations, Special Supplement 3 (1920), at 5. See 
further Cassese, supra note 475, at 25–34; Crawford, supra note 481, at 13–15. 
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central tenets,492 becoming ‘a legally binding norm for all member states’.493 Although 
at this stage self-determination remained a relatively general guiding principle rather 
than a clearly defined right,494 its inclusion in the Charter marked an important step 
towards its recognition as a binding rule of international law. 
In the second half of the 20th century, recognition of self-determination as a right of 
peoples became more widespread. While this was initially limited to the context of 
decolonisation,495 by 1970, self-determination had been prominently enshrined as a 
legal right of ‘all peoples’ in common Article 1 of the two international human rights 
covenants496 and the Declaration on Friendly Relations.497 More recently, the adoption 
of the Helsinki Final Act 498  and Vienna Declaration, 499  alongside authoritative 
commentary from the Human Rights Committee500 and state representatives,501 has 
reinforced the claim that ‘self-determination is articulated as a right, and that it is of 
general application’. 502  Indeed, self-determination continues to evolve to address 
additional threats to the autonomy of peoples. In the past decade or two, it has been 
applied in the context of non-colonial foreign occupation,503 indigenous rights504 and 
the dissolution of states,505 none of which fit neatly within the mould of ‘saltwater’ 
colonialism. 
                                                
492 Article 1(2) (see also Article 55 and Chapters XI–XIII), UN Charter, supra note 173. 
493 Oeter, supra note 484, at 316. 
494 Ibid, at 319. 
495 GA Res. 1514 (XV), 14 December 1960; GA Res. 1541 (XV), 15 December 1960. 
496 Article 1, ICCPR (supra note 238) and ICESCR (supra note 199). 
497 GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137. 
498 Article VIII, Chapter I, Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki 
Final Act), 14 ILM 1292 (1975). 
499 Article 2, Chapter I, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, A/Conf.157/23 (1993). 
500 Describing self-determination as an ‘inalienable right of all peoples’. HRC, ‘General Comment 12 
(Article 1): The Right to Self-Determination of Peoples’, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (1984), at para.2. 
501 For example, the Netherlands, France and Germany have insisted on the universal nature of self-
determination as a right of all peoples. HRC, ‘Reservations, Declarations, Notifications and Objectives 
Relating to the ICCPR and the Optional Protocols Thereto’, UN Doc. CCPR/C/2/Rev.4 (1994).  
502 Crawford, supra note 481, at 31–32. 
503 Including the Palestinian people in Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories (‘Israeli Wall’), ICJ Reports (2004) 136, at paras.118 and 123. Compare GA Res. 68/154, 
18 December 2013. 
504 Articles 3–4, UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), UN Doc. A/RES/61/295 
(2007). 
505 For example, in the case of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and USSR. See 
discussion in Craven, ‘Statehood, Self-Determination and Recognition’, in M. Evans (ed.), International Law 
(2010) 203, at 234–235. 
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Today, the legal principle of self-determination is typically understood as two-
faceted.506 Internal self-determination requires that a people be governed by a political 
institution that represents each of its members, regardless of their racial or national 
origin.507 Peoples are entitled, through this representative institution, to ‘pursue freely 
their economic, social and cultural development without outside interference’. 508 
External self-determination entitles peoples ‘to determine freely their political status 
and their place in the international community’, free from foreign subjugation, 
domination or exploitation.509 They may do this by means of ‘[t]he establishment of a 
sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an 
independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by 
a people’.510 
Self-determination is widely recognised as a jus cogens norm of customary international 
law,511 which, in its external dimension at least, places extraterritorial obligations on 
states.512 The Human Rights Committee, for example, has explicitly recognised that 
Article 1(3) of the ICCPR ‘imposes specific obligations on States parties, not only in 
relation to their own peoples, but vis-à-vis all peoples which have not been able to 
exercise or have been deprived of the possibility of exercising their right to self-
determination’.513 These obligations include both a negative duty to ‘respect’ the right 
to external self-determination and a positive duty to ‘promote’ its realisation,514 where 
                                                
506 Cassese attributes the distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ self-determination to Wengler, ‘Le 
Droit Á La Libre Disposition Des Peuples Comme Principe De Droit International,’ 10 Revue Hellenique de 
Droit International (1957) 26, at 27. For a critique of this dichotomy, see Summers, ‘The Internal and 
External Aspects of Self-Determination Reconsidered’, in French (ed.), supra note 158, 229. 
507 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), ‘General Recommendation 21: Right 
to Self-Determination’, UN Doc. A/48/18 (1996), at para.4. See also the ‘safeguard clause’ in GA Res. 2625 
(XXV), supra note 137. 
508
 CERD, supra note 507, at para.4. Compare Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217, at para.126. 
509 CERD, supra note 507, at para.4. Compare Article 1, GA Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 495; Principle 5, GA 
Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137; Article 5, GA Res. 60/1, supra note 229. 
510 Per GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137. 
511 ILC, supra note 274, at 85, para.5. See also discussion in Cassese, supra note 475, at 140; Crawford, supra 
note 484, at 596; H. G. Espiell, The Right to Self-Determination: Implementation of United Nations Resolutions, 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.1 (1980), at 11–13; L. Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in 
International Law (1988), at 357–424; Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 8; Oeter, supra note 484, at 316; 
D. Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (2002), at 218–219; M. Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa 
(1986), at 91. For those who deny that self-determination has jus cogens status, see Arangio-Ruiz, ‘Human 
Rights and Non-Intervention in the Helsinki Final Act’, 157 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of 
International Law (1977) 195, at 231; B. Driessen, A Concept of Nation in International Law (1992), at 60–61; 
Pomerance, supra note 480, at 70–72. 
512  See, for example, Espiell, ‘Introduction: Community Oriented Rights’, in M. Bedjaoui (ed.), 
International Law: Achievements and Prospects (1991) 1167. 
513 HRC, supra note 500, at para.6. See, similarly, Cassese, supra note 475, at 144. 
514 HRC, supra note 500, at para.6; GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137. 
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the latter may require states to take diplomatic or other non-military measures against 
those who violate a people’s right to self-determination.515 Indeed, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) has observed that self-determination is of erga omnes character,516 
acknowledging its significance as one of the ‘essential principle[s]’517 or ‘basic tenets of 
modern international law’.518 As an erga omnes norm, self-determination is recognised 
as ‘the concern of all States’ and a source of ‘obligations … towards the international 
community as a whole’.519 
In its internal dimension, self-determination also enjoys a unique relationship with the 
human rights regime more generally. The Human Rights Committee has emphasised 
that the ‘right of self-determination is of particular importance because its realisation is 
an essential condition for the effective guarantee and observance of human rights’.520 
Its prominent inclusion ‘apart from and before all of the other rights’ in each 
Covenant 521  implies a relationship of reciprocity between self-determination and 
human rights, such that ‘rights of individuals and rights of peoples buttress and 
sustain each other’.522 As Chapter 3 concluded, therefore, it is not enough to explore the 
implications of climate change inundation for individual human rights; the significance 
of the loss of territory for the self-determination of populations at risk must also be 
recognised and addressed. 
As this brief overview indicates, self-determination is significant because of its legal 
weight and its dynamic, malleable character. Over its short lifespan, it has been 
applied not just in the context of decolonisation but also, more recently, in the areas of 
foreign occupation and indigenous peoples’ rights, suggesting its continuing 
expansion in response to social and geopolitical circumstances. While it has a core area 
                                                
515 Including withholding aid or legal recognition from a state that impedes the exercise of a people’s 
right to self-determination. See Israeli Wall, supra note 503, at paras.159–160; Cassese, supra note 475, at 
155–158; Schachter, supra note 273, at 184–201; S. Joseph, J. Schultz and M. Castan, The ICCPR: Cases, 
Materials and Commentary (2005), at 106. 
516 East Timor, supra note 160, at para.29; Israeli Wall, supra note 503, at paras.88, 155–156.  
517 East Timor, supra note 160, at para.29. 
518 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), ICJ 
Reports (1984) 169, Diss. Op. Schwebel, at 198. Compare Barcelona Traction, supra note 167, at para.33. 
519 Barcelona Traction, supra note 161, at para.33. 
520 HRC, supra note 500, at para.1. See also CERD, supra note 507, at para.3. 
521 HRC, supra note 500, at para.1. 
522 Thornberry, ‘The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with Some Remarks on 
Federalism’, in C. Tomuschat (ed.), Modern Law of Self-Determination (1993) 101, at 137. On the 
interrelationship between human rights and self-determination, see also Cassese, supra note 475, at 52–54 
and 337; CERD, supra note 507, at para.3; Hannum, ‘Self-Determination as a Human Right’, in R. Claude 
and B. Weston (eds), Human Rights in the World Community: Issues and Action (1992) 175; ibid, at para.1; 
Joseph, Schultz and Castan, supra note 515, at 99. 
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of application, it also has a fluidity that enables it to continue to fulfil its purpose — i.e. 
recognising and offering protection for the collective autonomy of peoples — in the 
face of new or newly recognised threats. In order to better understand the capacity of 
self-determination to evolve to address unprecedented threats like that of climate 
change inundation, we therefore need a theory of self-determination that is broad, 
forward-looking, context-sensitive and conceptually coherent. 
4.3 The dominant legal account 
However, if the narrative of self-determination outlined so far has been one of 
progressive development, the mainstream legal account of self-determination is often 
one of reluctant conservatism. The fear is that, if left unchecked, a far-reaching right to 
self-determination will ‘breed discontent, disorder and rebellion’,523 ushering in an era 
of violent regression in which smaller, less sustainable majorities oppress ever more 
marginalised minorities.524 In response to this concern, international law is said to have 
created a patchwork of rights to self-determination by identifying a series of distinct 
legal categories to which the rules of self-determination apply. While recent attempts 
have been made to reconstruct self-determination in the context of a right to 
democracy,525 women’s rights,526 indigenous rights527 and minority rights,528 it is — in 
its external form, at least — predominantly understood as a right associated with the 
foreign occupation or oppression of a people,529 of which colonialism is a paradigmatic 
example.530 
Some argue that the right to external self-determination should extend no further than 
                                                
523 Lansing, supra note 474, at 96. 
524 Oeter, supra note 484, at 326–328; UN Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, 
Peace-Making and Peace-Keeping, UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (1992), at para.17; Verzijl, supra note 473, at 
335. On the potential ‘demonstration’ effect of self-determination, see Moore, ‘Introduction: The Self-
Determination Principle and the Ethics of Secession’, in M. Moore (ed.), National Self-Determination and 
Secession (1998) 1. 
525 For example, Thornberry, supra note 522; Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance’ 86 
AJIL (1992) 46. 
526 For example, H. Charlesworth and C. Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law (2000), at 151–164 
and 231–244.  
527 For example, S. J. Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law (2004). 
528 For example, Thornberry, ‘Images of Autonomy and Individual and Collective Rights on International 
Instruments on the Rights of Minorities’, in M. Suksi (ed.), Autonomy: Applications and Implications (1998) 
97. 
529 GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137; Group of 77, ‘Declaration of the South Summit and Havana 
Programme of Action’, UN Doc. A/55/74 (2000); GA Res. 55/2, 8 September 2000; GA Res. 60/1, supra 
note 229. 
530 Per GA Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 495. 
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the borders of the colonial territory,531 a position that the early jurisprudence of the ICJ 
seems to affirm.532 According to this line of argument, any attempt to apply the right to 
self-determination beyond the context in which it was first applied serves only to 
undermine its legal coherence and normative force. 
Today, however, there is a consensus that the legal right to self-determination is 
applicable beyond the context of decolonisation.533 Recent scholarship points to the 
normative arbitrariness of restricting a broadly defined right to self-determination to 
cases of saltwater decolonisation. After all, ‘[w]hy should the populations of overseas 
colonies be the only groups entitled to choose their political status?’534 There is 
significant agreement that, while its exact content remains unclear, self-determination 
‘is not confined to a right to be enjoyed by formerly colonised peoples’, nor is it ‘a right 
to be enjoyed once only and then lost’.535 Instead, it has been recognised as a right of 
‘general and permanent’ character,536 a claim that still holds true today.  
Following the recognition of a right to self-determination for ‘all peoples’ in common 
article 1 of the two human rights Covenants, the General Assembly adopted the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations and other resolutions that expand the legal norm of 
self-determination to encompass non-colonial and indigenous peoples. 537  More 
recently, the ICJ has cast off its earlier reluctance and recognised the right of the 
                                                
531 For example, Castellino, ‘Order and Justice: National Minorities and the Right to Secession’, 6 
International Journal of Minority and Group Rights (1999) 389; T. Franck et al., ‘The Territorial Integrity of 
Quebec in the Event of the Attainment of Sovereignty’, in A. Bayefsky (ed.), Self-Determination in 
International Law: Quebec and Lessons Learned (2000) 241; M. Halperin, D. Scheffer and P. Small, Self-
Determination in the New World Order (1992), at 16–25, 53; Quane, ‘The United Nations and the Evolving 
Right to Self-Determination’, 47 ICLQ (1998) 537, at 571. 
532 Crawford, ‘The General Assembly, the International Court and Self-Determination’, in V. Lowe and M. 
Fitzmaurice (eds), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice (1996) 585, at 598–601. Crawford cites 
Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), ICJ Reports (1963) 15; Nicaragua, supra note 274. 
533 Arangio-Ruiz, supra note 511, at 225–227; Cassese, supra note 475, at 90–100 and 159; Crawford, supra 
note 481, at 31–32; Oeter, supra note 484, at 322; Thornberry, supra note 522, at 119. Elsewhere, Crawford 
describes decolonisation as the ‘first generation’ of self-determination. Crawford, supra note 158, at xv. 
534 K. Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law (2002), at 68. Compare Anaya, supra note 
527, at 100; Buchanan, supra note 190, at 339; A. Cristescu, The Right to Self-Determination (1981), at 39; 
Craven, supra note 505, at 232–233; J. Duursma, Fragmentation and the International Relations of Micro-States 
(1996), at 38; Falk, ‘The Right of Self-Determination under International Law: The Coherence of Doctrine 
Versus the Incoherence of Experience’, in W. Danspeckgruber (ed.), The Self-Determination of Peoples (2002) 
33, at 34. 
535 UNESCO, ‘Statement to the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/6 (1992), at para.3(b). 
536 Cristescu, supra note 534, at 22. 
537 For example, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137; GA Res. 3236 (XXIX), 22 November 1974; GA Res. 
31/34, 30 November 1976; UNDRIP, supra note 504. 
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Palestinian people to self-determination.538 The International Law Commission (ILC) 
has also described the principle of self-determination as being ‘of universal 
application’, arguing that, by ‘not tying it exclusively to colonial contexts, it could be 
applied much more widely’.539 Similarly, the Human Rights Committee stipulates that 
the right to self-determination set out in Article 1 of the ICCPR ‘applies to all peoples 
and not merely to colonised peoples’.540 ‘[I]t is too late’, Falk concludes, ‘to put the 
genie of self-determination back in its colonialist bottle … too large a meaning has been 
invested in the language of self-determination’.541 
Nevertheless, this consensus only takes us so far. If we cannot narrow the scope of self-
determination by tying it to the context of decolonisation, then how are we to address 
the question of limits? According to the dominant legal account of self-determination, 
there is no ‘one size fits all’ definition of the peoples that hold a right to self-
determination. Instead, we must look to legal doctrine to identify the categories in 
which it applies. Beyond that of colonialism, there are two further categories in which 
the right is said to apply. A right of external self-determination is thought to apply in 
the context of the alien domination, subjugation or exploitation of the people of a 
state,542 while a right of internal self-determination is thought to apply where an ethnic 
minority is denied fair access to the political institutions of the state in which it 
resides.543  
Despite some uncertainty about the exact scope of each category that it identifies, this 
‘categorisation’ approach 544  does place some constraints on the right to self-
determination, and thus provides one answer to the question of limits raised by 
                                                
538 Israeli Wall, supra note 503, at para.118. 
539 ILC, ‘Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind’, II Yearbook of the ILC (1988) 55, 
at 64, para.266. 
540  HRC, ‘Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Azerbaijan’, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/79/Add.38 (1994), at section 4. For states’ emphasis on the universal application of self-
determination, see also HRC, supra note 500; Duursma, supra note 534, at 21–23. 
541 Falk, supra note 534, at 38. 
542 GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137; Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, ICJ Reports (2010) 403, at para.79; sources supra note 529. 
543 As per the so-called ‘safeguard clause’ in GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137, which identifies states 
that are ‘possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or colour’ as those that are ‘conducting themselves in compliance with the 
principle of the equal rights and self-determination of peoples’. See also Cassese, supra note 475, at 101–
114. 
544 This term is adopted from Knop, supra note 534, at 50–65. Anaya labels this the ‘restrictive approach’. 
Anaya, supra note 527, at 100. For other proponents of the restrictive or categorisation approach, see 
Doehring, ‘Self-Determination’, in Simma (ed.), supra note 279, 47, at 63–64; R. Higgins, Problems and 
Process: International Law and How We Use It (1994), at 115–116; Oeter, supra note 484, at 321.  
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Lansing, Verzijl and others. However, this answer fails to deliver the certainty it 
promises. While it insists that we look to existing legal doctrine to determine which 
peoples facing which grave external threats enjoy a right to self-determination, there is 
no such concisely delimited legal definition of the peoples that hold a right to self-
determination. Even proponents of the categorisation approach disagree on the 
categories in which the legal rules apply. The deliberately vague language of legal 
provisions relating to self-determination, together with the expansion of its scope to 
include non-colonial and indigenous peoples, demonstrate the ‘impossibility of 
pinning down the acceptable limits of a plausible legal claim’ to self-determination.545 
This is not to say that the categories of right-holders identified by this approach are 
false or unhelpful; however, taken alone, they fail to provide an adequate account of 
self-determination as a broad, flexible legal concept.  
The categorisation approach also struggles to provide any indication of the direction in 
which self-determination might evolve in response to future threats. Without some 
further reference to its underlying purpose or aim, it is unable to explain why the scope 
of self-determination has expanded to include non-colonial peoples facing foreign 
oppression, or indigenous peoples seeking greater recognition of their autonomy. Nor 
can it explain the work that self-determination does once it has been applied to these 
novel situations, particularly where these situations do not map neatly onto the 
‘blueprint’ of saltwater decolonisation.  
Climate change inundation, for example, raises unprecedented challenges in fulfilling 
the right to self-determination. It is not the outcome of a simple binary relationship 
between oppressor and oppressed states but, rather, a multilateral, causally complex 
situation in which the international community as a whole is both responsible for, and 
subject to, the harms of climate change. It involves a gradual, almost imperceptible 
journey towards future displacement rather than a history of sudden, typically violent, 
invasion and oppression. And, perhaps most importantly, the struggle at hand is one 
in which the vehicle for self-determination — the territorial state — faces an existential 
threat. Climate change inundation therefore requires us to rethink our legal 
understanding of self-determination as an exclusive, territorially bounded, one-off 
right to freedom from violent oppression. 
                                                
545 Falk, supra note 534, at 46. 
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The following sections of this chapter begin to develop an alternative account of self-
determination; one that does not cling to an ‘always fragile, somewhat arbitrary, 
doctrinal clarity’546 but is contextual and responsive to changing environmental, social 
and political demands.547 The aim of this approach is to provide a coherent account of 
the ways in which self-determination might evolve in response to grave new threats to 
the autonomy of a people, with regard to basic principles of international law and the 
‘exigencies of contemporary life’.548 
4.4 An alternative account of self-determination: Principle and rules 
This alternative account of self-determination builds on the work of those, like Cassese, 
who adopt an ‘open-textured’549 account of self-determination as both a basic principle 
of international law and a set of specific legal rules. While there is little consensus on 
the criteria for identifying such principles of international law,550 there is widespread 
agreement that they include the principle of self-determination.551 In East Timor, for 
example, the ICJ recognised self-determination as ‘one of the essential principles of 
contemporary international law’, 552  echoing its recognition as one of ‘the basic 
principles of international law’ in the Declaration on Friendly Relations. 553  This 
recognition of self-determination as one of the ‘basic’ or ‘essential’ principles of 
international law indicates its status as a widely applicable legal norm of fundamental 
importance to the international community.554 
Basic principles of this sort, Cassese argues, are of use in ‘those areas where deep 
political and ideological disagreements prevail, but which need, however, some sort of 
                                                
546 Ibid, at 34. 
547 Compare Higgins, supra note 544, at 4. 
548 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, ICJ Reports (1949) 174, Ind. Op. 
Alvarez, at 190. 
549 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (1994), at 123. See also Klabbers, ‘The Right to be Taken Seriously: 
Self-Determination in International Law’, 28 HRQ (2006) 186; Schachter, supra note 273, at 20. 
550 Alongside self-determination, Cassese also includes the sovereign equality of states, prohibition of the 
threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-intervention in the affairs of states, respect for 
human rights, international cooperation and good faith. A. Cassese, International Law in a Divided World 
(1986), at 126–163. Note that Cassese himself does not use the term ‘basic principle’, preferring ‘general’ or 
‘fundamental principle’. 
551 See sources supra notes 484–485. 
552 East Timor, supra note 160, at para.29. For further discussion of the ICJ’s work in identifying self-
determination as an ‘open-textured principle’, see Klabbers, supra note 549, at 199 and 195–196. 
553 GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137. 
554 Indeed, Cassese’s category of basic principles overlaps with those of jus cogens and erga omnes norms of 
international law. Cassese, supra note 550, at 158. 
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legal regulation’.555 This arguably applies in the case of climate change inundation, 
which represents a complex and unprecedented challenge to the territory and self-
determination of a people but falls outside the scope of existing international legal 
rules. 
But what is the content and function of this principle? For Cassese, it provides a ‘basic, 
overarching guideline’ that identifies ‘the essence of self-determination’. 556  When 
‘confronted with problems concerning the destiny of a people’, it ‘sets out a general 
and fundamental standard of behaviour’ for all members of the international 
community:557 they must act with regard to the ‘free and genuine expression of the will 
of the peoples concerned’.558  
Cassese draws inspiration from the ICJ’s decision in Western Sahara, in which it 
identified ‘the very essence of the principle of self-determination’:559 ‘the need to pay 
regard to the freely expressed will of peoples’.560 Other sources echo this formulation, 
emphasising the importance of taking into account the preferences of a self-
determining people when making decisions about fundamental matters such as the 
position of territorial boundaries or the design of political institutions. The Atlantic 
Charter of 1941, for example, calls for the prohibition of ‘territorial changes that do not 
accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned’, as well as respect 
for ‘the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will 
live’.561 While the UN Charter does not explicitly refer to self-determination in Chapter 
XII, it insists on the ‘progressive development [of trust territories] towards self-
government or independence as may be appropriate to … the freely expressed wishes 
of the peoples concerned’.562 The General Assembly has also adopted a series of 
resolutions which make clear that, while the outcome or ‘mode’ of self-determination 
                                                
555 Cassese, supra note 475, at 319–320. In the context of decolonisation, compare Western Sahara, supra 
note 136, Sep. Op. Petrén, at 110. 
556 Cassese, supra note 475, at 319. 
557 Ibid, at 128–129. Compare Cassese, supra note 550, at 126. 
558 Western Sahara, supra note 136, at paras.55 and 162. See also Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 288. 
559 Cassese, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination’, in Lowe 
and Fitzmaurice (eds), supra note 532, 351, at 358. Compare Crawford, supra note 484, at 647. 
560 Western Sahara, supra note 136, at para.32. Judge Vereschetin has argued elsewhere that the right of the 
Timorese to self-determination, ‘by definition, requires that the wishes of the people concerned at least be 
ascertained and taken into account by the Court’. East Timor, supra note 160, Sep. Op. Vereschetin, at 135. 
561 Principles 2 and 3 of the Declaration of Principles (Atlantic Charter), 204 LNTS 381 (1941); reaffirmed 
in the Joint Declaration of the United Nations on Cooperation for Victory (1 January 1942). 
562 Article 76(b), UN Charter, supra note 173. See also Article 73. 
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may vary, the method by which it is applied — ‘a free and voluntary choice by the 
peoples of the territory concerned’ — should not.563 
In addition to this basic principle, there is a set of treaty and customary rules, which 
specify — though not exhaustively — the contexts in which the principle is to be 
applied. Where the principle sets out the purpose of self-determination (to protect the 
‘destiny’ of a people by respecting its freely expressed choice of political organisation), 
the rules specify its subject (the people that holds a right to self-determination) and 
content (the possible outcomes of this right).564 Thus, given the scarcity of clear legal 
rules identifying right-holders, the principle of self-determination ‘applies as of right 
… only to a restricted category of cases’.565 As discussed earlier with regard to the 
categorisation approach, these include the populations of trust, mandate, non-self-
governing and foreign-occupied territories, as well as racial minorities within a state 
that lack access to its political institutions.566 
Where the rules provide specific legal content, the principle offers context-sensitive 
guidance that remains open to interpretation. Ideally, rules and principle therefore 
complement each other.567 Legal principles are ‘applicable to an indeterminate series of 
events that extend outward from a “core meaning”’, which is given shape by the 
specific legal rules.568 In cases where the legal rules are ‘unclear or ambiguous’ or do 
not yet apply — including, for example, the cession of territory569 or the problem of 
climate change inundation — the principle clarifies the application of the legal norm of 
self-determination. This multilayered account provides space for flexible modes of 
                                                
563 GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137; GA Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 495, at Principles VII–IX. Note, 
however, the Court’s ambiguous observation that ‘[t]he validity of the principle of self-determination, 
defined as the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of the people, is not affected by the fact that 
in certain cases the General Assembly has dispensed with the requirement of consulting the inhabitants of 
a given territory’. Western Sahara, supra note 136, at para.59. See discussion in Knop, supra note 534, at 164. 
564 Cassese, supra note 475, at 129 and 320; J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (2006), at 
124–125; Higgins, supra note 484, at 104. 
565 Crawford, supra note 484, at 149. See also Crawford, supra note 564, at 127. 
566 Cassese, supra note 475, at 130–131; Crawford, supra note 564, at 126–127. 
567 On the relationship between principles and rules, see, for example, Hart, supra note 549, at 127–131. In 
the case of self-determination, see French, supra note 163, at xvii–xviii. 
568 Schachter, ‘The Relation of Law, Politics and Action in the United Nations’, 109 Hague Recueil (1963) 
169, at 191–192. Compare Schachter, supra note 273, at 20. Hart describes this relationship in terms of a 
‘core of certainty and a penumbra of doubt’. Hart, supra note 549, at 123. Compare Crawford, supra note 
564, at 124. 
569 Cassese, supra note 475, at 132–133. Another example might be Crawford’s proposed category of 
peoples subject to carence de souveraineté. Crawford, supra note 564, at 111, 126 and 142. See also Cassese, 
supra note 550, at 126; Thürer and Burri, supra note 484, at paras.28–32. 
     
 
    
104 
reasoning that draw on both legal doctrine and political, moral, social and other 
considerations.570 
In the case of self-determination, this purposive approach is preferable to the 
categorisation approach outlined above. First, it provides a consistent normative 
account of self-determination with explanatory power. Unlike the mainstream legal 
approach, which identifies the categories in which self-determination applies and the 
mechanisms through which it should be realised on the basis of legal precedent rather 
than any underlying purpose or objective, the basic principle clarifies when and how 
self-determination should apply. In any situation in which the ‘destiny’ of a people is 
at stake, we must act with regard to the ‘free and genuine expression of the will of the 
peoples concerned’, where this includes but is not limited to the situations identified 
by the categorisation approach. It is precisely because of the ambiguity that surrounds 
the legal concept of self-determination that this purposive approach, which relies on 
the underlying purpose set out in the basic principle of self-determination to guide its 
application in emerging contexts, is useful and relevant. 
Second, as a result, it guides the application of a right to self-determination beyond the 
limited contexts in which it is typically applied, making space for the development of a 
concept that more accurately reflects emerging threats to self-determination. Rather 
than remaining tied to the context of decolonisation or foreign occupation, the legal 
principle of self-determination applies whenever the ‘destiny’ of a people faces some 
grave threat. As Alston argues, an approach to self-determination that focuses solely 
on foreign oppression and occupation fails ‘to give an accurate representation of the 
threats that exist to the enjoyment of the right to self-determination’.571  
Third, and relatedly, it is instrumentally valuable to the extent that it applies to any 
situation in which the autonomy of a people faces some grave external threat, 
including that of climate change inundation. At the time of the ICJ’s decision in 
Western Sahara, there was no ‘sufficiently developed body of rules and practice to cover 
all the situations which may give rise to problems’ of self-determination.572 Arguably, 
this holds true today, particularly in the case of climate change inundation, which 
poses a clear threat to the ‘destiny’ of atoll island peoples by undermining their claims 
                                                
570 Knop, supra note 534, at 43. See further Falk, supra note 534; Higgins, supra note 544, at 2–12. 
571 Alston, supra note 476, at 272. 
572 Western Sahara, supra note 136, Sep. Op. Petrén, at 110. Judge Petrén was referring specifically to the 
‘law of decolonisation’ but the same diagnosis applies to self-determination more generally. 
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to territorial sovereignty and political autonomy but does not sit comfortably within 
the categories of alien domination or foreign occupation. The broader principle of self-
determination can, however, guide behaviour in situations that fall outside of these 
narrow categories. 
4.5 The determining self 
This chapter tells a tale of two theories: the first, a doctrinal account of self-
determination as a fixed set of rules or categories, and the second, a broader, 
theoretically grounded account of self-determination as an ‘open-textured’, context-
sensitive body of law. Where the former finds it difficult to account for the ambiguous, 
mutable nature of self-determination, the latter leaves ‘more room for its interpretation 
to evolve’.573 However, those who prioritise purpose or function over categorisation 
inevitably struggle with the question of limits raised earlier in this chapter. By insisting 
that a legal principle of self-determination must apply in all situations in which the 
‘destiny’ or autonomy of a people is at stake, the purposive account raises the spectre 
of widespread secession and fragmentation.  
However, the basic principle of self-determination identified above need not open a 
Pandora’s box of unilateral claims to secession. Much of the fear associated with a 
broader application of the right to self-determination stems from a failure to 
adequately specify the right-holders or content of the right. By constructing a relatively 
narrow understanding of ‘peoples’, this section addresses the question of limits by 
placing at least one constraint on the right to self-determination.  
The first task in identifying a right-holder is to distinguish between ‘people’ and ‘state’, 
and clarify the relation in which each stands to the principle of self-determination. 
There is sufficient doctrinal evidence to indicate that self-determination is ‘a right of 
peoples and not of governments’.574 This reflects the fact that part of the significance of 
the doctrine of self-determination is its willingness to recognise a role for collective 
entities other than the state within international law. Any theory that subsumes the 
                                                
573 Knop, supra note 534, at 32. 
574 As observed by the UK before the Third Committee of the General Assembly. Cited in Crawford, supra 
note 481, at 29. See, for example, Article 1(2), UN Charter, supra note 173; Article 1(1), ICCPR (supra note 
238) and ICESCR (supra note 199); Articles 19 and 20, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(Banjul Charter), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 (1982); GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137; Article 
VIII, Chapter I, Helsinki Final Act, supra note 498; Article 2, Chapter I, Vienna Declaration, supra note 499. 
‘“[P]eoples” refers to groups of human beings who may, or may not, comprise states or nations’. Report of 
Committee I/1, CO/156, XVII UNCIO (1945), at 658. Cited in Duursma, supra note 534, at 14. 
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right of a self-determining group wholly within the structure of the state is unable to 
explain the paradigm case of self-determination (that is, the right to self-determination 
held by a non-self-governing population within a colonial state), nor the normative 
value of self-determination as a human right. 
Instead, the state must be understood as ‘the plenipotentiary or international 
dimension of peoples’.575 It facilitates the realisation of a right to self-determination by 
providing the political infrastructure and international legal personality through which 
the members of a people may claim and exercise their collective right, but it does not 
hold the right itself. The state is, therefore, a means to an end, not an end in itself.576 In 
the context of climate change inundation, this distinction between state and people is 
significant. If a right to self-determination is to endure in the absence of a defined 
territory, an effective government and perhaps even a state, there must be some 
identifiable people to which the right can be ascribed. This becomes particularly 
important in Chapter 8, which considers the possibility that an atoll island people 
might continue to exercise its capacity for self-determination while, at the same time, 
relinquishing its claim to statehood. 
How, then, do we define ‘peoples’? Cassese’s own account is not particularly helpful. 
In addition to those groups that are the subject of a clear legal rule of self-
determination,577 Cassese defines peoples as ‘conglomerates of individuals whose 
wishes and aspirations must be taken into account and given as much legal force as 
possible’.578 Reading between the lines, Cassese implies that those ‘conglomerates of 
individuals’ must be ‘collectively organised’, whether as a state or non-state entity,579 
but fails to elaborate. Further development of the concept of peoples is therefore 
required. 
One option is to comb through international law for a definition of the ‘peoples’ that 
hold a right to self-determination. However, thus far, ‘no permanent, universally 
                                                
575 Obiora, ‘Beyond the Rhetoric of a Right to Development’, 18 Law and Policy (1996) 355, at 370. Compare 
Mbaye, ‘Introduction: Human Rights and the Rights of Peoples’, in Bedjaoui (ed.), supra note 512, 1041, at 
1049. Obiora and Mbaye are concerned with the right to development but their comments are relevant to 
other collective rights, including that of self-determination. See also Salomon, supra note 172, at 113–119. 
576 ‘[T]he state is created for individuals rather than vice versa.’ A. Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights 
(2013), at 102. 
577 Cassese, supra note 559, at 352. 
578 Ibid, at 361. 
579 See Cassese’s discussion of the Court’s reasoning in Western Sahara. Ibid. 
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acceptable list of criteria for a “people” exists’.580 The closest attempt is that made by an 
International Meeting of Experts convened by UNESCO in 1989. In order to be 
identified as a people, they argued, a group must share some form of collective identity 
(a common history, race or ethnicity, language, culture, religion, ideology, attachment 
to land or economic life); meet some minimum population requirement; hold some 
collective will or consciousness as a people; and share institutions that express some 
form of collective identity.581 However, this definition becomes unwieldy in practice. 
Its vague formulation could apply to groups that we would intuitively exclude from 
any discussion of self-determination (Liverpool Football Club fans or members of the 
British National Party, for example). It is also unhelpful in determining whether or not 
borderline groups count as peoples with legitimate claims to self-determination. It 
therefore does little to answer the question of limits raised above. 
A second option is the categorisation approach discussed earlier. On this account, 
‘peoples’ are defined according to widely recognised legal rules of self-determination, 
which thus far apply to (a) the populations of trust or non-self-governing territories, (b) 
populations that are subject to foreign occupation or subjugation, and (c) racial 
minority groups that are denied fair access to political institutions. ‘Peoples’ are 
therefore those groups facing one of a handful of threats identified in international law 
as warranting the protection of a right to self-determination. However, without some 
coherent account of the underlying objective of self-determination (as discussed further 
in section 4.6), it is unclear what it is about these particular threats that deserves such 
protection. For the purposes of this thesis, at least — which seeks to understand the 
ways in which the principle of self-determination might apply in unprecedented 
situations like that of climate change inundation — this account is unsatisfactory. 
                                                
580 Joseph, Schultz and Castan, supra note 515, at 100–101. See discussion in Duursma, supra note 534, at 
30–33. 
581 UNESCO, ‘International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Concept of the Rights of Peoples’, 
UN Doc. SHS89/CONF.602/7 (1989), at paras.22–23. Compare the definition proposed in Greco-Bulgarian 
‘Communities’, 1930 PCIJ Series B, No.17, at para.30. These definitions combine both objective or ascriptive 
and subjective criteria. For ascriptivist or nationalist accounts of self-determination, see, for example, Barry, 
‘Self-Government Revisited’, in D. Miller and L. Siedentop (eds), The Nature of Political Theory (1985) 156; 
Margalit and Raz, ‘National Self-Determination’, 87 Journal of Philosophy (1990) 439; D. Miller, On 
Nationality (1995); M. Moore, The Ethics of Nationalism (2001); Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (1993). For 
subjective or democratic accounts, see Franck, supra note 525; Mill, ‘Considerations on Representative 
Government’, in J. S. Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays (1991) 205; Philpott, ‘In Defence of Self-
Determination’, 105 Ethics (1995) 352; Renan, ‘What is a Nation?’, in H. Bhabba (ed.), Nation and Narration 
(1990) 8; Turp, ‘Quebec’s Democratic Right to Self-Determination: A Critical and Legal Reflection’, in S. 
Hartt et al. (eds), Tangled Web: Legal Aspects of Deconfederation (1992) 99. 
     
 
    
108 
Instead, this thesis understands ‘peoples’ as the populations of existing states.582 This 
definition is narrower and more conceptually precise than the UNESCO definition, yet 
broader and more normatively coherent than the categorisation approach. At the same 
time, it answers the question of limits raised above. It draws on legal scholarship583 but 
also offers a normatively richer explanation for the significance of state populations in 
the context of self-determination. 
More specifically, this thesis defines a ‘people’ as a collective entity constituted by a 
history of mutual cooperation in the shared political institutions of a state, drawing on 
Anna Stilz’s Kantian account of territorial rights. According to Stilz, over time, an 
‘initially unconnected group of citizens may be made into a “people” by cooperating 
together in [the] shared institutions’ that constitute the government of a state.584 This 
account finds support in legal doctrine and practice. In Western Sahara, for example, the 
ICJ identified cooperation within ‘common institutions or organs’ as a determining 
factor in deciding whether or not questions of sovereignty and self-determination are 
relevant in a given situation.585  
However, according to Stilz, not just any state counts. A state must meet certain 
criteria, including maintaining an effective system of law that ‘rules in the name of the 
people’ and is ‘responsive to the[ir] values’; acting in the interests of its citizens; 
protecting basic rights; and having a legitimate claim to occupy its territory.586 Nor 
does any form of participation count. The members of a people should engage in 
                                                
582 This does not rule out the extension of this definition to non-state groups that participate in shared 
governing institutions that do not correspond with those of a state government. It is important that a 
comprehensive account of self-determination includes entities other than those that correspond directly to 
existing states, in order to address the unjust annexation of non-state groups, and to avoid privileging 
Western notions of statehood and sovereignty. Compare Anaya, supra note 527, at 100–101; Banai, ‘The 
Territorial Rights of Legitimate States: A Pluralist Interpretation’, 6 International Theory (2014) 140, at 145–
146. Moore provides a similar account to the one stated here but argues that non-state groups satisfying 
certain conditions should also be recognised as self-determining peoples. Moore, ‘The Territorial 
Dimension of Self-Determination’, in Moore (ed.), supra note 524, 134. However, this question is set aside 
for the future development of a broader account of self-determination. 
583 On the recognition of the whole populations of states as ‘peoples’, see Cassese, supra note 475, at 59–61; 
Crawford, supra note 564, at 126–127; Doehring, supra note 544, at 63–64; Duursma, supra note 534, at 22–26 
and 36–38; Hannikainen, ‘Self-Determination and Autonomy in International Law’, in Suksi (ed.), supra 
note 528, 79, at 84; Higgins, supra note 544, at 12–25; Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 121; Oeter, supra 
note 484, at 327; Quane, supra note 531, at 571; Thürer and Burri, supra note 484, at para.17. 
584 Stilz, ‘Nations, States and Territories’, 3 Ethics (2011) 572, at 579–580. Compare Jennings and Watts, 
who describe the emergence of ‘a community organised as a political unit (polis)’. Jennings and Watts, 
supra note 423, at 122. 
585 Western Sahara, supra note 136, at 55, para.149. See also discussion in Duursma, supra note 534, at 75. 
586 Stilz, supra note 584, at 578, 587–589. For Stilz, a state need not be democratic, provided that it is 
responsive to the wishes and values of its people. Compare Beitz, supra note 156, at 181–186; Cohen, ‘Is 
there a Human Right to Democracy?’, in C. Synowich (ed.), The Egalitarian Conscience (2006) 226, at 233–
234. 
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shaping and sustaining their common institutions of statehood (for example, by paying 
taxes or obeying laws), and in producing the laws they are bound by (for example, by 
voting, forming political associations, engaging in public deliberation, or joining social 
movements). 587  Similarly, the Administrative Court of Cologne has defined a 
population as not merely an association for tax or commercial purposes but a dynamic, 
flourishing community with shared institutions and a common life or ‘destiny’.588 
This history of cooperation in shared political institutions is important for at least two 
reasons. First, it demonstrates that a people ‘can sustain a political authority in 
common’, thereby satisfying what Stilz calls the ‘political capacity condition’.589 It has 
the institutional knowledge, political and legal capacity, and collective will to establish 
and maintain common institutions of government. Second, it demonstrates that a 
people has developed a ‘valuable political relationship’, thereby satisfying what Stilz 
calls the ‘political history condition’.590 This political relationship requires those inside 
the group ‘to sustain and value their association’ and those outside the group ‘to 
refrain from dissolving it’.591 
But here a question arises. How can we define peoples as the populations of states and 
yet argue that only certain states count for the purposes of defining a people? Are the 
populations of totalitarian regimes like North Korea or Saudi Arabia — in which 
widespread participation in the design of laws and institutions is arguably impossible 
— to be excluded from the category of right-holders? One response would be to argue 
that the populations of truly authoritarian regimes should not be recognised as self-
determining peoples, having not had the opportunity to participate in shaping any 
shared political goals or institutions. In the event of the loss of an effective government, 
territory or statehood, perhaps the population of North Korea should be given the 
chance to start again, rather than to rebuild their existing political institutions.592 
Another response would be to adopt a modified version of Stilz’s account that leaves 
space for ‘provisional’ peoples: the populations of totalitarian regimes that live under 
                                                
587 Stilz, supra note 584, at 592. See also Stilz, ‘Why Does the State Matter Morally?’, in Ben-Porath and 
Smith (eds), supra note 430, 244, at 259–261. 
588 In re Duchy of Sealand, 80 ILR 683 (1989), at 686–688. 
589 Stilz, supra note 584, at 591 and 594. Compare Duursma, supra note 534, at 76. 
590 Stilz, supra note 584, at 592. Compare Moore, ‘Which People and What Land? Territorial Right-Holders 
and Attachment to Territory’, 6 International Theory (2014) 121, at 127–128 and 130–132. 
591 Stilz, supra note 584, at 592. 
592 Stilz appears happy to bite this bullet. Stilz, supra note 587, at 262, note 32. 
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and sustain — but do not yet participate in shaping — shared political institutions. 
Such peoples might be thought to share valuable political bonds — of solidarity or 
resistance, perhaps — arising from their history of survival under common institutions 
of government, even if these institutions do not currently reflect their shared values 
and interests. Such ‘provisional’ peoples may have a capacity for collective autonomy 
that lies dormant — or ‘in abeyance’593 — which they may exercise in future under an 
alternative political system. While Stilz may not endorse such a modification,594 she 
does recognise that ‘people share political bonds even when their history is 
undemocratic’.595 
With this slight adjustment, Stilz’s account is worth drawing on for its role in clarifying 
the ways in which the members of a people demonstrate a collective interest in, and 
capacity for, autonomy and independence. Peoples with a history of cooperation under 
common political institutions have, in Cassese’s terms, a collective ‘destiny’ as a 
people, which they have constructed and continue to shape by participating in the 
shared political institutions of their state. It is this destiny — the ways in which the 
members of a people come together in common institutions, free from undue external 
interference, to form and pursue their own ideas about what makes life worth living — 
that is to be respected by paying attention to the ‘freely expressed wishes’ of a people. 
And it is this destiny that the planned migration proposal discussed in Chapter 3 fails 
to acknowledge or protect. 
But what relevance does this account have if, as in situations of foreign occupation or 
subjugation — or climate change inundation — a people’s government and state face 
some grave external threat? Stilz argues that, if a state is annexed or dissolved, its 
people may continue to hold a ‘residual’ right to self-determination for a certain time. 
As Stilz argues, a ‘people’s history of political cooperation through their state creates 
morally salient bonds between them that will persist even when their state temporarily 
falls away’. 596  Moreover, these bonds justify a people’s right to a unique self-
                                                
593 A term that has been applied to the sovereignty of non-self-governing peoples. See, for example, 
Berman, ‘Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and International Law’, 7 Wisconsin International 
Law Journal (1988) 53; International Status of South West Africa, ICJ Reports (1950) 128, Sep. Op. McNair, at 
150. 
594 See discussion of Somalia in Stilz, supra note 584, at 598. 
595 Stilz, supra note 587, at 260. On her recognition of non-democratic states as ‘reforming’, see also Stilz, 
‘Why Do States have Territorial Rights?’, 1 International Theory (2009) 185, at 209; Stilz, supra note 584, at 
588. 
596 Stilz, supra note 584, at 591. 
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determining status, which underpins a claim ‘not just to any legitimate institutions, but 
to the ones they have created together through their political history’.597 
This understanding of the ‘peoples’ that hold a right to self-determination is significant 
for the purposes of this thesis for three reasons. First, drawing on legal precedent, it 
offers a conceptually coherent answer to the question of limits: the right of self-
determination is restricted to those peoples who have emerged through participation 
in the shared political institutions of a state.598  
Second, it explains why the planned migration solution discussed in Chapter 3 is 
inadequate: it disregards the value of the shared ‘destiny’ of a self-determining people. 
While Tuvaluan migrants granted citizenship in New Zealand may secure protection 
for their basic individual human rights within a new state, they have lost something 
fundamentally valuable: respect for their shared interests as members of an 
autonomous, independent Tuvaluan people. What is important here is the idea of 
attachment to a particular people, not just membership in any self-determining 
community. As Moore argues, ‘“peoplehood” does not simply involve creating rules of 
justice, but doing so with particular others, with whom there is an ongoing 
commitment and a shared collective identity’.599 
And third, it explains why a people whose state is threatened by the loss of its 
habitable territory or the dispersal of its population continues to hold a ‘residual’ right 
to self-determination. On the basis of this residual right, and in the absence of its 
original territory, it is entitled to reconstitute its shared political institutions elsewhere. 
It is the task of Chapters 6, 7 and 8 to examine where, when and how it might do so — 
and, in doing so, to provide a legal and conceptual framework within which an atoll 
island people whose state is threatened by climate change inundation can freely 
express its wishes concerning its continued existence as a people. 
                                                
597 Ibid, at 595. Compare Banai, supra note 463, at 50, 53 and 59. 
598 It also allows room for the recognition of non-state ‘peoples’ if the theory were to be expanded through 
future research (see supra note 582). 
599 Moore, ‘Theories of Territory and the Attachment Problem’, LSE Political Theory Workshop (6 
February 2014). See also Moore, supra note 590, at 128–129. Craven captures a similar distinction, in the 
context of statehood, between state personality (i.e. the attributes or competences that all states have in 
common) and state identity (i.e. the particular features that differentiate one state from another), where the 
latter points to a ‘sense of “self”, “singularity”, and “community”’. Craven, ‘The Problem of State 
Succession and the Identity of States under International Law’, 9 EJIL (1998) 142, at 160 and 162. 
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4.6 The aims of self-determination  
According to the purposive account proposed above, the principle of self-
determination requires that, in any situation in which the ‘destiny of a people’ is at 
stake, we act with regard to the ‘free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples 
concerned’, while the rules of self-determination identify those peoples that qualify as 
right-holders. On this account, the primary aim or purpose of self-determination is to 
protect the ‘destiny’ of a people by recognising its freely chosen form of political 
organisation.600 Given that Cassese himself fails to provide a detailed explanation of 
this aim, this section develops it further, laying the groundwork for subsequent 
chapters. 
International law suggests several potential aims for the principle of self-
determination. Without going into a full refutation of these alternative aims, this 
section briefly indicates why each is inadequate as the primary purpose of self-
determination (although they may nevertheless be recognised as secondary or 
derivative aims), before moving on to discuss the meaning of the ‘destiny’ of a people. 
First, at the height of decolonisation, self-determination was often referred to as a 
means of ‘bring[ing] a speedy end to colonialism’.601 However, as previously argued, 
any attempt to narrow the principle of self-determination to the context of 
decolonisation is both normatively arbitrary and a poor reflection of international law 
as it currently stands. While the aim of the specific rule of self-determination that 
identifies trust, mandate and non-self-governing territories as right-holding peoples 
may well be to end colonial oppression, the aim of the broader principle of self-
determination cannot be reduced to such a narrow scope. 
Second, as a guiding principle of the UN, self-determination is associated with the 
maintenance of international peace, stability and security. Article 1(2) of the Charter 
identifies ‘respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’ as 
one of a range of ‘appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace’,602 while the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations requires states to foster self-determination in order 
                                                
600 On the underlying ‘aims’ or ‘purposes’ that legal rules and principles are intended to realise, see 
Schachter, supra note 273, at 21. Cassese refers to the ‘essence’ rather than the aim of self-determination. 
Cassese, supra note 475, at 319. 
601 GA Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 495. Compare GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137; Western Sahara, supra 
note 136, at para.31. 
602 See also Article 55, UN Charter, supra note 173. 
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to ‘promote friendly relations and cooperation among states’. 603  Former Special 
Rapporteur Aureliu Cristescu concludes that self-determination is ‘the most important 
of the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation 
among states’.604  
While this reading of self-determination is broader in scope than the first, it too proves 
inadequate. First, it relies on an empirical claim that is difficult to prove. Self-
determining peoples may indeed be less likely to disturb international peace and 
security, but this is not obviously true.605 Second, even if it were true, this would only 
be in virtue of the role of self-determination in protecting some more fundamental 
human interest worth fighting for in the first place. By respecting and protecting this 
fundamental interest, we remove peoples’ reasons for disrupting friendly relations 
between (or within) states and disincentivise those who would violently suppress such 
peoples, thereby securing international peace and security indirectly, if at all. And 
third, in promoting the more general aim of international peace and security, this 
reading is — like the planned migration approach discussed in Chapter 3 — unable to 
explain the value of a particular claim to self-determination. It cares only about the 
capacity for self-determination of peoples in general, not the capacity for self-
determination of the I-Kiribati or Tuvaluan people in particular. For these reasons, 
peace and security, like decolonisation, may be a useful secondary aim of the principle 
of self-determination but cannot be its primary purpose.606 
Third, some understand self-determination as a means of achieving corrective justice, 
typically in the event of the wrongful acquisition of territory. On this account, ‘the 
right to self-determination can be seen as restoring power or territory to the rightful 
sovereign, just as private law requires the restoration of wrongfully taken property to 
                                                
603 GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137. 
604 Cristescu, supra note 534, at 25. Compare L. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination 
(1978); R. Müllerson, International Law, Rights and Politics (1994), at 72; Oeter, supra note 484, at 315–316; 
Thürer and Burri, supra note 484, at para.45. 
605 The people of Saudi Arabia, referred to above, arguably do not enjoy a right to (internal) self-
determination but neither do they engage in international conflict. 
606 It is problematic for another reason as well. In a non-ideal world in which there is no coherent legal 
framework for adjudicating or enforcing rights of self-determination, the notion of effectiveness 
determines which groups are recognised as international legal actors and the value of self-determination is 
only recognised when there is a threat to international peace and security, groups seeking self-
determination are left with little option other than to threaten or resort to force. 
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its owner’.607 However, this proposed aim is also inadequate on several counts. In a 
world that has ‘always involved the movement of peoples and the corresponding 
displacement of others’,608 it struggles to provide a satisfactory account of how far back 
we must go in identifying the ‘injustice’ that is to be rectified, and how much weight is 
to be given to the status quo. It fails to account for peoples that find themselves in 
conflict over the same territory, peoples that have never had access to a defined 
territory, or peoples whose territory has become uninhabitable, for whom there can be 
no restitution (and hence no self-determination). It also assumes that the principle of 
territorial integrity necessarily trumps — even subsumes — that of self-
determination.609 And, taken on its own terms, it cannot explain what it is about 
territory that is necessary for a people to be self-determining. Instead, it must resort to 
an additional story about the role that territory plays in protecting some collective 
interest of fundamental importance to a people.  
Fourth, others suggest that self-determination has a corrective or remedial function of a 
different kind: responding to grave violations of the human rights of the members of a 
distinct group, particularly those relating to political participation. 610  Remedial 
secession is often proposed as a solution to this widespread violation of human 
rights.611 In this case, however, the self-determination of a people becomes a means to 
an end rather than an end in itself. The primary aim here is to protect individual 
human rights to political participation, freedom of association, belief and expression, 
and so on, and the recognition of a minority group as an independent, self-determining 
entity is one means of achieving this where all others have failed. However, those who 
understand self-determination as valuable primarily because it protects the members 
                                                
607 Knop, supra note 534, at 69. See, for example, Brilmayer, ‘Secession and Self-Determination: A 
Territorial Interpretation’, 16 Yale Journal of International Law (1991) 177; Buchanan, supra note 190, at 355–
357. 
608 Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 687, note 4. 
609 This conflict between self-determination and territorial integrity is far from being easily resolved, 
contrary to Brilmayer’s argument, and will be returned to in Chapter 6. 
610 For example, the concurring opinion of Judge Wildhaber, joined by Judge Ryssdal in Loizidou v Turkey, 
40/1993/435/514, ECHR (1997). Compare the so-called ‘safeguard clause’ in GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra 
note 137; Article 2, Chapter I, Vienna Declaration, supra note 499; CERD, supra note 507, at para.6. See 
further discussion in Duursma, supra note 534, at 75–76 and 92–93. 
611 For example, Buchanan’s ‘Remedial Right Only’ theory of secession. Buchanan, supra note 190, at ch.8. 
See also Doehring, supra note 544, at 64–69; A. Eide, Possible Ways and Means of Facilitating the Peaceful and 
Constructive Solution of Problems Involving Minorities (1993), at 16–19; Schachter, ‘Sovereignty: Then and 
Now’, in R. Macdonald (ed.), Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya (1993) 671, at 684. For an alternative 
perspective, see Del Mar, ‘The Myth of Remedial Secession’, in French (ed.), supra note 158, 79. For those 
who understand self-determination in terms of individual human rights (especially rights to political 
participation), see also Franck, supra note 525; McCorquodale, ‘Self-Determination: A Human Rights 
Approach’, 43 ICLQ (1994) 857. 
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of a group from danger or political oppression tend to overlook the significance of a 
unique self-determining status. As Chapter 3 concluded, a people’s right to self-
determination holds some value of its own that is not reducible to an individual’s 
‘right to have rights’ in any rights-protecting state. The principle of self-determination 
does not merely protect the right to participate in any political institutions, but also the 
right to participate in those institutions that are shaped by and valuable to the 
members of a people.  
Thus far, this section has examined — and found wanting — four alternative aims for 
the principle of self-determination. These proposals are unable to explain what it is 
about a unique right to self-determination that is of fundamental importance to a 
people, without reference to some other, more basic aim or purpose. Self-
determination may indeed be valuable as a means of facilitating decolonisation, 
ensuring international peace and stability, correcting past injustices or protecting 
vulnerable minorities from oppression, but these cannot be understood as its primary 
aim.  
This leads us back to Cassese’s account of self-determination, which requires us to act 
with regard to the ‘free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples concerned’ in 
any situation in which the ‘destiny’ of a people is at stake. As noted earlier, this 
account finds support in numerous sources of international law. In the same breath 
with which they identify one of the aims of self-determination as bringing colonialism 
to a ‘speedy end’, for example, both General Assembly resolutions insist that 
international actors must have ‘due regard to the freely expressed will of the peoples 
concerned’.612  
It is unclear, however, what Cassese means by the ‘destiny’ of a people. Perhaps he 
refers to the Administrative Court of Cologne’s claim that the state has a duty to 
uphold a ‘form of communal life in the sense of sharing a common destiny’.613 Perhaps 
he invokes Judge Dillard’s well-known assertion that ‘[i]t is for the people to determine 
the destiny of the territory, and not the territory the destiny of the people’.614 The term 
‘destiny’ has also been invoked by the Nauruan people in the face of forced 
displacement from their territory as a result of the environmental degradation wrought 
                                                
612 GA Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 495; GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137. 
613 In re Duchy of Sealand, supra note 588, at 687. 
614 Western Sahara, supra note 136, Sep. Op. Dillard, at 122. 
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by decades of phosphate mining. ‘No matter how small they were and how 
unimportant they may be to others,’ the Nauruans sought ‘to preserve themselves as a 
distinct people and nation. They wanted to shape their own destiny.’615  
But what does the term ‘destiny’ capture? The widespread emphasis on the ‘freely 
expressed will’ of a people and its capacity to ‘freely determine’ its ‘political status’ and 
‘economic, social and cultural development’ 616  indicates that there is something 
fundamentally valuable about a people’s capacity to create and maintain its own 
political, legal and socio-economic institutions, free from undue external interference. 
In order to be self-determining, therefore, it seems that a people must enjoy 
‘independent and determinate political control over some important aspects of its 
members’ common life’.617 With respect to these aspects, ‘it must wield political power 
in its own right, rather than merely power delegated by a higher political unit and 
subject to being overridden or revoked by the latter’.618 
In other words, a self-determining people must enjoy, to a certain degree, both 
autonomy (the capacity to make, legislate and enforce its own laws) and independence 
(freedom from undue external control over its autonomy).619 These carve out a space in 
which a group of individuals can identify and cultivate the ‘common interests’ and 
‘communal life’ that are necessary ‘for the recognition of a “people” within the 
meaning of international law’.620 
This thesis therefore understands self-determination as a basic principle of 
international law whose underlying purpose is to protect peoples’ collective interests 
in autonomy and independence against grave external threats over which they have 
little control, although other derivative aims — decolonisation, peace and stability, 
restitution for past wrongs and so on — might also be realised in the process. Unlike 
nationalist or ascriptive theories of self-determination, then, the account of self-
determination that this thesis develops is grounded in the value of autonomy: the way 
in which individuals, and the communities they constitute, form and pursue their own 
                                                
615 According to a report by the UN Trusteeship Council. Cited in Weeramantry, supra note 396, at 287. 
Anaya also refers to the right to ‘control their own destinies’ in his work on indigenous self-determination. 
Anaya, supra note 527, at 98. 
616 Article 1, ICCPR (supra note 238) and ICESCR (supra note 199). 
617 Nine, supra note 91, at 363. 
618 Buchanan, supra note 190, at 333. 
619 On autonomy, see the contributions to Suksi (ed.), supra note 528. On independence (in the context of 
statehood), see Crawford, supra note 564, at 62–88; Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 338–482.  
620 In re Duchy of Sealand, supra note 588, at 687–688. 
     
 
    
117 
ideas about what is valuable.621 Each member of a people has an interest in the 
collective good of self-determination — in living in an autonomous, independent 
community in which she shapes the laws she is bound by and participates in common 
political, social and cultural institutions — arising from her membership of that 
people.622 
This understanding of self-determination does not specify the policies, laws or 
institutions required for a people to enjoy autonomy and independence — that is, to be 
self-determining. It leaves open the types of institutions through which a people 
exercises control, the practices and institutions over which it has control, and the extent 
of its control over these.623 This deliberately broad, flexible framework leaves sufficient 
space to explore, in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, the different modes through which the self-
determination of the peoples of atoll island states might best be protected. In 
particular, unlike other political accounts of self-determination,624 it leaves open the 
question of whether a self-determining people necessarily requires independent 
statehood or exclusive jurisdiction over a particular territory. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has set out the bones of an alternative account of self-determination: one 
that understands the principle of self-determination as a broad, context-sensitive 
source of guidance for the application of associated legal rules. It has identified the 
underlying purpose of self-determination (respect for the ‘destiny’ or autonomy of 
peoples, as freely expressed through their choice of political organisation), as well as 
the peoples that hold a right to self-determination (the populations of existing states, 
who collectively sustain and shape the political institutions of their state). Self-
determination, on this account, ensures that all peoples ‘are able to be secure in the 
                                                
621 For other political accounts of autonomy or self-determination, see, for example, Banai, supra note 463; 
C. Wellman, A Theory of Secession: The Case for Political Self-Determination (2005); Waldron, ‘Moral 
Autonomy and Personal Autonomy’, in J. Christman and J. Anderson (eds), Autonomy and the Challenges to 
Liberalism (2005) 307. 
622 On the idea that collective legal rights protect some interest held by the members of a group in virtue 
of their membership in that group, see, for example, Beitz, supra note 156, at 112–113; Raz, supra note 159, 
at 207–209; Waldron, ‘Two Conceptions of Self-Determination’, in Besson and Tasioulas (eds), supra note 
190, 397, at 408. 
623 Buchanan, supra note 190, at 333. 
624 Examples include Banai, supra note 463; Moore, supra note 590, at 131; Stilz, supra note 584, at 591. 
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knowledge that their interests, opinions and desires for actions are taken into 
account’625 whenever they face some grave external threat to their collective autonomy. 
This purposive account of self-determination is preferable to the mainstream 
categorisation approach, both in general and in the specific context of climate change 
inundation. It provides a consistent normative account that explains when, how and 
why self-determination should apply. It is therefore better able to guide us in applying 
an often ambiguous or unsettled area of law to problems in the world today. As a 
consequence, it is also instrumentally valuable in addressing emerging threats to the 
autonomy or ‘destiny’ of a people, including that of climate change inundation. 
Chapter 5 further develops this theoretical account of self-determination by applying it 
to the specific case of climate change inundation. In doing so, it answers key questions 
about its application in concrete circumstances. On what grounds might we identify 
the populations of atoll island states as peoples with a right to self-determination? Is 
the principle of self-determination broad enough to recognise climate change 
inundation as a grave, foreseeable threat to the autonomy of a people? If so, what 
reasons might other states have for acting to protect or promote the self-determination 
of atoll island peoples in the face of climate change inundation? This lays the 
groundwork for Part IV of the thesis, which considers the ways in which an atoll island 
people might exercise its right to self-determination in the face of climate change 
inundation. 
  
                                                
625 Young, ‘Two Concepts of Self-Determination’, in S. May, T. Modood and J. Squires (eds), Ethnicity, 
Nationalism and Minority Rights (2004) 176, at 185. 
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5. Climate Change Inundation and Self-Determination 
5.1 Introduction  
The international law of self-determination remains unsettled. Setting out its opinion 
on the right of the Serbian populations in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to self-
determination, the Arbitration Commission established by the Conference of 
Yugoslavia observed that ‘international law as it currently stands does not spell out all 
the consequences of the right to self-determination’.626 Nor has this changed since the 
Commission was established in the early 1990s. Questions about the normative value 
that is protected by self-determination, the identity of the determining self and the 
threats against which it is to be protected have yet to be definitively answered. 
One of the aims of this thesis is to develop a broader account of self-determination 
with the normative and conceptual resources to begin to address these questions. 
When it first emerged as a guiding principle of the international community in the UN 
Charter, it was generally agreed that self-determination lacked the specificity or 
content of a legal norm; instead, ‘it primarily possesse[d] a very strong moral and 
political force’.627 Since 1945, the law of self-determination has developed specific legal 
content, which capitalises on its earlier moral potency. It is important, however, not to 
lose sight of this normative potential, as the mainstream ‘categorisation’ approach 
threatens to do. Instead, as the purposive account proposed in Chapter 4 recognises, 
the basic principle of self-determination provides flexible guidance for the 
interpretation and application of the law in alternative and unprecedented cases, acting 
as a ‘template for the translation of moral or political arguments into international 
law’.628 
The previous chapter examined two ways in which the legal concept of self-
determination might be supplemented by moral reasoning: in terms of (a) the 
underlying aim of self-determination (to pay due regard to the freely expressed wishes 
of the people in any situation in which its ‘destiny’ or autonomy is at stake), and (b) the 
identity of the self-determining ‘peoples’ (in this case, the populations of states that 
participate in, and sustain, shared institutions of government). 629  This chapter 
                                                
626 Conference of Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, ‘Opinion No.2’, 31 ILM 1497 (1992), at 1498. 
627 Thürer and Burri, supra note 484, at para.8. 
628 Knop, supra note 534, at 24. 
629 Compare ibid. 
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considers how these two strands of reasoning might facilitate the expansion of the legal 
principle of self-determination to encompass the populations of atoll island states. If 
climate change inundation interferes with the ‘destiny’ or autonomy of atoll island 
peoples, to what extent can they claim to have a say in what happens next? Can the 
principle of self-determination ensure that legal solutions ‘tak[e] account of the desires 
of affected communities’ in determining when, where and how to move?630   
This chapter is a stepping-stone between the functional account of human rights 
developed in Chapters 2 and 3, the purposive account of self-determination set out in 
Chapter 4 and the exploration of a potential right to self-determination for atoll island 
peoples in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. Section 5.2 considers several reasons for recognising the 
populations of atoll island states as peoples with a right to self-determination. Section 
5.3 identifies climate change inundation as a grave external threat to the autonomy or 
‘destiny’ of atoll island peoples. Section 5.4 examines the ways in which a legal rule to 
this effect might emerge and solidify, drawing on an emerging body of expert evidence 
and state practice. Finally, building on the functional account of human rights 
developed in Chapters 2 and 3, section 5.5 considers the reasons that states might have 
for acting to address the impact of climate change inundation on the self-determination 
of atoll island peoples. This lays the groundwork for a substantive analysis of the 
actions that these states might be required to take in subsequent chapters. 
5.2 Recognising atoll island ‘peoples’ 
The first task of this chapter is to examine the grounds on which the populations of 
atoll island states at risk of climate change inundation might be recognised as peoples 
with a right to self-determination. As explained earlier, this thesis adopts a pluralist 
approach, drawing on the cumulative weight of multiple overlapping reasons to 
bolster its arguments. In this pluralist spirit, this section considers four potential 
grounds for the recognition of atoll island populations as self-determining peoples. The 
first three grounds are inadequate in isolation but nevertheless add to the balance of 
arguments in favour of recognition. The fourth and most significant draws on the 
account set out in Chapter 4, which defined self-determining peoples as the 
populations of existing states with a history of cooperation under shared political 
institutions. 
                                                
630 McAdam, supra note 90, at 5. 
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First, those states with which this thesis is concerned — Tuvalu, Kiribati, and the 
Maldives — have previously been identified as non-self-governing peoples with a right 
to self-determination.631 The Maldives was a British protectorate (from 1887) and 
protected state (from 1948), while Tuvalu and Kiribati together formed the British 
colony of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands (from 1916).632  
The populations of mandate, trust and non-self-governing territories are almost 
universally acknowledged as peoples with a right to self-determination. They are ‘the 
firm ground on which the right to self-determination was applied’.633 While the UN 
Charter does not explicitly refer to the principle of self-determination in Chapters XI 
and XII on trust and non-self-governing territories, the ICJ has argued that ‘the 
subsequent development of international law in regard to non-self-governing 
territories … made the principle of self-determination applicable to all of them’.634 
According to the mainstream categorisation account discussed in Chapter 4, the 
peoples of Tuvalu, Kiribati and the Maldives therefore held a legal right to self-
determination: the right to determine their collective ‘destiny’ by having a say in 
establishing their own political institutions. Between 1965 and 1979, each chose to 
exercise this right to self-determination by achieving independence.635  
It would seem somewhat contradictory to accept this, however, while denying that the 
fundamental interest this right originally protected — the ‘destiny’ or autonomy of a 
people — is no longer deserving of the same legal protection now or in the future. In 
fact, there is substantial legal evidence to support the claim that self-determination is 
not a fleeting act but a right of ‘general and permanent character’.636 The language and 
preparatory work of Article 1 of the two human rights covenants, for example, 
indicates the broad temporal scope of the right to self-determination. The phrase ‘all 
                                                
631  See UN, ‘Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories (1945-1999)’, accessible at 
www.un.org/en/decolonization/nonselfgov.shtml. While the Maldives is not included on this list, its 
status as a British protectorate and protected state also precluded it from attaining a ‘full measure of self-
government’ prior to 1965. 
632 On the political history of these states, see further I. Campbell, A History of the Pacific Islands (1989); S. 
Fischer, A History of the Pacific Islands (2002); K. Howe, R. Kiste and B. Lala, Tides of History: The Pacific 
Islands in the Twentieth Century (1994); H. Metz, Maldives: A Country Study (1994); U. Phadnis and E. Luithui, 
Maldives: Winds of Change in an Atoll State (1985). 
633 Thürer and Burri, supra note 484, at para.34. 
634 Namibia, supra note 279, at para.52–53. The ICJ is referring to General Assembly resolutions concerning 
the application of a right of self-determination in the context of decolonisation, including GA Res. 1514 
(XV), supra note 495; GA Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 495; GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137. 
635 The Maldives gained independence from the UK on 26 July 1965, Tuvalu on 1 October 1978 and 
Kiribati on 12 July 1979. 
636 Cristescu, supra note 534, at 22. 
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peoples have the right of self-determination’637 — echoed in the Helsinki Final Act’s 
insistence that ‘all peoples always have the right’ to self-determination638 — indicates 
not only the universal application of the right but also its duration over time. The word 
‘have’ was chosen to ‘emphasise the fact that the right referred to is a permanent 
one’.639 As the UK has observed, ‘[s]elf-determination is not a single event, but a 
continuous process’.640  
There is therefore considerable evidence to suggest — for those peoples that have 
previously exercised a right to self-determination, at least — that ‘self-determination is 
a continuing, and not a once-and-for-all right’.641 Having exercised their right to 
‘constitutive’ self-determination, the peoples of Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Maldives do 
not forfeit their status as right-holders but continue to hold an ‘ongoing’ right as self-
determining peoples.642 From the perspective of the mainstream categorisation account 
of self-determination, these peoples therefore have a right to self-determination that 
has not been exhausted but ‘continues to be vested in the people’.643 This right entitles 
them to sustain the institutions of government they established as part of their 
constitutive act of self-determination. 
This first ground for recognising atoll island populations as self-determining peoples is 
useful insofar as it reminds us that self-determination is not a one-off but a continuing 
right. The value of collective autonomy does not diminish simply because a people has, 
in this case, established itself as an independent state. And, by drawing on legal 
doctrine and practice that decisively identifies non-self-governing populations as 
peoples with a right to self-determination, it may also convince proponents of the 
categorisation approach that a right to self-determination does indeed apply in the 
context of climate change inundation, thereby gaining wider support for the arguments 
developed in subsequent chapters.  
However, it also highlights the normative arbitrariness of the categorisation account of 
self-determination. Why should the populations of former non-self-governing 
                                                
637 Article 1(1), ICCPR (supra note 238) and ICESCR (supra note 199) (emphasis added). 
638 Article VIII, Chapter I, Helsinki Final Act, supra note 498 (emphasis added). Compare Duursma, supra 
note 534, at 36; Malanczuk, supra note 279, at 335. 
639 According to the Chairman of the Working Party of the Third Committee, cited in UN Doc. 
A/C.3/SR.668, at para.3 and Cassese, supra note 475, at 54. 
640 Cited in Crawford, supra note 481, at 29. 
641 Crawford, supra note 564, at 126. 
642 Anaya, supra note 527, at 105. 
643 Thürer and Burri, supra note 484, at para.22. 
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territories — and not those of the Netherlands, Belgium, Vietnam, or other low-lying 
states that have not previously been colonised — be the only groups to hold a right to 
self-determination in the face of climate change inundation? Some broader account of 
the grounds on which atoll island populations might be recognised as peoples with a 
right to self-determination is therefore needed; one that better reflects the law as it 
currently stands.644  
Second, as Chapter 4 observed, the populations of atoll island states might be 
identified as peoples on the basis of common ascriptive characteristics like race, 
language, culture, religion or attachment to land.645 Atoll island populations meet 
many of these ascriptive criteria. The constitution of the Maldives, for example, sets out 
a centralised system of government based on a common religious foundation (the 
teachings of Islam and Shari’ah law), while the emergence of Tuvalu and Kiribati as 
two separate states from the one colony is attributed to tensions between their different 
ethnic populations, one predominantly Polynesian and the other Micronesian. Often, 
islanders also express an attachment to land that is tied to their shared cultural 
identity. When asked what they would miss most if they were forced to leave their 
island, for example, many Tuvaluans nominated ‘a distinct identity, a feeling of 
belonging … lifestyle, family connections, and culture, all of which seemed to be 
irrevocably tied to place’.646  
Again, however, while this ascriptive account may support the recognition of atoll 
island populations as peoples with a right to self-determination, it is inadequate in 
isolation.647 It finds it difficult to account for those heterogeneous populations whose 
right to maintain independent institutions of government is taken for granted 
(including Canada, Australia and the US), or those multiracial non-self-governing 
populations granted a right to self-determination on the basis of colonial borders rather 
than shared cultural, linguistic or ethnic characteristics. Nor can it explain why some 
homogeneous groups are entitled to create and sustain independent political 
institutions and others are not. 
                                                
644 That is, as a body of law that is inclusive of entities other than the populations of non-self-governing, 
trust or mandate territories. See the application of self-determination outside of the context of 
decolonisation in GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137; Article 1, ICCPR (supra note 238) and ICESCR (supra 
note 199); Israeli Wall, supra note 503, at para.118. 
645 See, for example, the definitions provided in UNESCO, supra note 581, at paras.22–23; Greco-Bulgarian 
‘Communities’, supra note 581, at para.30. Compare Brownlie, ‘The Rights of Peoples in Modern 
International Law’, in J. Crawford (ed.), The Rights of Peoples (1988) 1, at 5.  
646 Mortreux and Barnett, supra note 32, at 110. 
647 See Buchanan, supra note 190, at 384–393. 
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Third, the populations of atoll island states might be recognised as peoples with a right 
to self-determination on the basis that they have claimed recognition as peoples with a 
right to self-determination, regardless of whether or not they share any ascriptive 
characteristics. According to a subjective account of self-determination, the self is 
‘constituted primarily by the aspirations and efforts of a people to achieve self-
determination’.648 Again, the populations of atoll island states qualify as peoples with a 
right to self-determination. Each has expressed a claim to self-determination in the face 
of climate change inundation through its elected representatives. The Maldives has, for 
example, made explicit the links between climate change, loss of territory, and the 
realisation of rights to self-determination and sovereignty over natural resources.649 
And, speaking before the General Assembly, former Tuvaluan Prime Minister Apisai 
Ielemia observed that, ‘[t]he survival and security, along with fundamental human 
rights, and the cultural identity of our entire nation is under threat’.650 ‘We want to 
survive as a people and as a nation’, he argues. ‘And we will survive: it is our 
fundamental right.’651 
The persistent claims made to self-determination by atoll island populations 
demonstrate that, for those whose interests in autonomy and independence are at 
stake, self-determination is indeed ‘a value worth preserving’.652 However, while this 
approach emphasises the capacity and willingness of populations to communicate 
their wishes as peoples, any account that recognises ‘peoples’ on the basis of subjective 
claims alone is at risk of substituting legal reasoning and (relative) political stability for 
normative incoherence and potential chaos, ‘rais[ing] the spectre of uncontrollable 
secession’ unmediated by legal principles or rules.653  
While recognising the valuable insights and cumulative weight of these three accounts 
of the determining self, this thesis ultimately understands self-determining peoples as 
the populations of existing states with a history of collective cooperation in shared 
                                                
648 Berman, supra note 593, at 90. 
649 Republic of the Maldives, supra note 21, at 21. 
650 Ielemia, speaking at the 63rd Session of the UN General Assembly (26 September 2008), accessible at 
www.un.org/en/ga/63/generaldebate/tuvalu.shtml. 
651 Ielemia, supra note 131. On similar claims made by the leaders of Kiribati and the Marshall Islands, see 
also Blair and Beck, supra note 131; Republic of the Marshall Islands, supra note 131. 
652 In response to Ödalen’s concern that it ‘might be seen as a controversial assumption that self-
determination is a value worth preserving’ in this context. Ödalen, supra note 91, at 225, note 3. 
653 Berman, supra note 593, at 92. Also see Buchanan, supra note 190, at 373–379. 
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political institutions.654 The populations of the Maldives, Kiribati and Tuvalu share not 
only a common cultural life, language, ethnicity, attachment to land, colonial history 
and collective identification as a people, but also a history of participation in the 
political institutions of their state. Each is a republic or parliamentary democracy with 
universal adult suffrage and equal rights to political participation for all members of its 
population. The citizens of each population vote in regular elections, participate in 
referendums to determine the shape of their governing institutions,655 join social 
movements656 and form political parties or interest groups.657 While the Maldives in 
particular has had a chequered political history, its constitution has recently been 
revised to more accurately reflect the wishes and demands of its population.658  
The citizens of the Maldives, Tuvalu and Kiribati are thus engaged in producing the 
laws they are bound by and sustaining their common political institutions. Each 
population therefore satisfies both the political capacity and political history 
requirements outlined in Chapter 4: each has the knowledge and skills to establish and 
maintain legitimate institutions of government and each represents a valuable political 
association that is sustained by members and respected by non-members.659 Each 
therefore has a collective autonomy or ‘destiny’ that it continues to shape and sustain 
by participating in the common political institutions of its state. As the populations of 
existing states with a history of cooperation under shared political institutions, as well 
as former non-self-governing territories, communities with common ascriptive 
characteristics, and self-identifying peoples, the populations of Kiribati, Tuvalu and the 
Maldives should therefore be recognised as peoples with a right to self-determination. 
                                                
654 As noted in Chapter 4, while this thesis does not rule out the expansion of this definition to include 
those non-state groups that participate in shared political institutions of different types that do not 
correspond with those of a state government, this question is set aside for future research into a broader 
account of self-determination. 
655 In 1974, for example, 92% of the population of what is now Tuvalu voted to separate from Kiribati 
(then the Gilbert Islands) and form an independent colony. In 1968, around 93% of Maldivians voted to 
abolish the existing Sultanate and establish a Republic. See sources supra note 632. 
656 For example, the popular civic movement led by the Maldivian Democratic Party from 2003, which 
saw the legalisation of political parties and the ratification of a new constitution. 
657 Tuvalu and Kiribati do not have formally organised political parties but informal political factions or 
interest groups. See CIA, supra note 3. 
658 A new constitution was ratified on 7 August 2008, which calls for direct, multi-party elections for the 
President and members of the Majlis (parliament). However, in 2012, the Maldives’ first democratically 
elected President was removed in an alleged coup. For a brief overview, see BBC News, ‘Maldives Profile: 
Timeline’, accessible at www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12653969  
659 Per Stilz, supra note 584, at 592. 
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5.3 Climate change inundation: A threat to self-determination  
Having argued for the recognition of atoll island populations as peoples with a right to 
self-determination, there is another obstacle to address. According to the functional 
account proposed in Chapter 2, one of the primary roles of human rights is to ‘elevate 
certain threats to urgent interests to a level of international concern’660 by providing 
states with reasons to respond to the impact of these threats on the enjoyment of 
human rights at the domestic level. The question of which threats attain this status is a 
‘largely empirical’ one, the answer to which may change over time in response to 
emerging socio-economic, geopolitical or environmental conditions. 661  An open-
textured approach — like the purposive account of self-determination proposed in 
Chapter 4 — allows space for legal rules and principles to emerge and evolve in 
response to new threats.662 However, in virtue of its flexible, responsive nature, it 
provides no definitive answer to the question of which threats trigger an international 
response.  
According to the categorisation approach identified in the previous chapter, there is 
one non-colonial threat that triggers a right to external self-determination: the foreign 
domination, subjugation or exploitation of a people.663 However, any attempt to 
reconceptualise climate change inundation as a form of alien domination or 
exploitation is both unhelpful and unnecessary. On the one hand, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, climate change inundation does not involve a straightforward binary 
relationship between oppressed people and oppressor state but a complex, 
multilateral, multi-causal web of past events and future harms. On the other hand, as 
emphasised in the preceding section, all peoples of existing states always have a right 
to self-determination. ‘No preceding alien subjugation, domination, exploitation or 
other form of oppression is required.’664 
Chapter 4, drawing on Cassese’s emphasis on the ‘destiny of a people’,665 defined the 
primary aim of self-determination as the protection of a people’s collective interests in 
autonomy (the capacity to create, legislate and enforce its own laws) and independence 
                                                
660 Beitz, supra note 156, at 189. 
661 Shue, supra note 175, at 32–33. In the context of climate change, see Bell, supra note 311, at 111 and 113. 
662 Hart, supra note 549, at 128–130. 
663 See, for example, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137. 
664 Duursma, supra note 534, at 36 (see also 22–26). 
665 Cassese, supra note 475, at 129. 
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(freedom from undue external control over its autonomy) against grave external 
threats over which it has little control.666 Building on this account, this section argues 
for the recognition of climate change inundation as a grave, unprecedented and 
foreseeable external threat to the self-determination of atoll island peoples. 
This idea of a grave external threat is reflected in the widespread emphasis on the role 
of self-determination in protecting peoples against external interference.667 Crawford, 
for example, argues that, outside of the context of decolonisation, self-determination is 
‘primarily a process by which the peoples of the various states determine their future 
through constitutional processes without external interference’.668 The Atlantic Charter 
insists that ‘sovereign rights and self-government [be] restored to those who have been 
forcibly deprived of them’ by some external power.669 The Helsinki Final Act insists 
that all peoples have the right ‘to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and 
external political status, without external interference’. 670  And, according to the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, peoples are entitled to ‘pursue 
freely their economic, social and cultural development without outside interference’.671 
While many of these sources have in mind the type of ‘interference’ envisaged by 
proponents of the categorisation approach — that is, the domination or subjugation of 
a people by another state — this narrow understanding of the external threats that exist 
to a people’s autonomy is inadequate in the face of rapidly changing environmental, 
socio-economic, geopolitical and other factors. To focus solely on foreign domination is 
to fail ‘to give an accurate representation of the threats that exist to the enjoyment of 
the right to self-determination’.672  
                                                
666 On the role of the underlying aim of a legal principle in determining whether or not a particular case is 
relevantly similar to the core or ideal case, see Hart, supra note 549, at 127–130. 
667  Self-determination is often cited alongside principles designed to protect states from external 
interference, including those relating to the equality of states, non-interference and territorial integrity. 
See, for example, Crawford, ‘State Practice and International Law in Relation to Unilateral Secession 
(Expert Report for Canadian Federal Government)’, in Bayefsky (ed.), supra note 531, 31, at paras.61 and 
71; Thürer and Burri, supra note 484, at para.17. 
668 Crawford, supra note 667, at para.60. Elsewhere, Crawford notes that, ‘[w]here a self-determination 
unit is a state, the principle of self-determination is represented by the rule against intervention in the 
internal affairs of that state, and in particular the choice of the form of government of the state’. Crawford, 
supra note 564, at 128. Compare Doehring, supra note 544, at 57. 
669 Principle 3, Atlantic Charter, supra note 561. 
670 Article VIII, Chapter I, Helsinki Final Act, supra note 498. 
671
 CERD, supra note 507, at para.4. See also Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 508, at para.126. 
672 Alston, supra note 476, at 272. 
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Interestingly, while its decisions are often cited in support of the narrow categorisation 
account, the jurisprudence of the ICJ on obligations erga omnes points to a broader 
understanding of the threats that exist to a people’s self-determination. In Barcelona 
Traction, the Court indicated that principles of law — including that of self-
determination673 — are recognised as being of erga omnes character in virtue of ‘the 
importance of the rights involved’,674 not the way in which those rights are threatened 
or breached. And, in East Timor, the Court specifically emphasised the importance of 
the right to self-determination, rather than the nature of any potential threats.675 This 
indicates that it is the importance of the right (and the interests it protects) rather than 
the way in which it is breached that is significant, at least for the purposes of engaging 
the interests of the international community. According to Tams, ‘an obligation thus 
acquires erga omnes status because it protects important rights, not because — or if — it 
is violated in a particularly serious way’676 — or, indeed, in any particular way at all. In 
other words, if the populations of atoll island states are recognised as peoples with a 
right to self-determination, then it is the mere fact that this right is threatened that 
counts, not the fact that it is threatened in some specific way.677 
However, what the categorisation account does capture successfully is the idea that, for 
something to count as a threat to a people’s self-determination, it must have some 
source that is external to and outside of the control of that people, and it must 
fundamentally interfere with its capacity for autonomy — variously understood in 
terms of its constitutional processes (Crawford), its capacity for self-government 
(Atlantic Charter), its internal and external political status (Helsinki Final Act), or its 
economic, social and cultural development (Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination). This thesis therefore proposes a broader, more responsive 
understanding of the potential threats a self-determining people might face. In order to 
qualify as a threat to a people’s right to self-determination, something must represent 
(a) a grave, foreseeable, external threat678 (b) over which a people has little control to (c) 
                                                
673 East Timor, supra note 160, at para.29; Israeli Wall, supra note 503, at paras.88 and 155–156.  
674 Barcelona Traction, supra note 161, at para.33. For an alternative account of erga omnes norms as those 
that are non-bilateral or non-reciprocal, see Tams, supra note 275, at 129–135. 
675 East Timor, supra note 160, at para.29. 
676 Tams, supra note 275, at 137. But see, for example, Oellers-Frahm, ‘Comment: The Erga Omnes 
Applicability of Human Rights’, 30 Archiv des Völkerrechts (1992) 28, at 35. 
677 Beitz makes a similar point with regard to the human rights of women. Beitz, supra note 156, at 189–
192. 
678 On the requirement of foreseeability, see ibid, at 109 and 139; Shue, supra note 175, at ch.1. From a legal 
perspective, this might be understood in terms of the due diligence requirement that the relevant actors 
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the ‘destiny’ or autonomy of that people. (As argued in Chapter 2, in the event of a 
manifest failure of protection domestically, it must also be (d) amenable to some form 
of political or legal protection at the international level.679 This fourth criterion will be 
addressed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.) 
Climate change inundation clearly satisfies these first three criteria. First, as Chapter 1 
made clear, a substantial body of evidence indicates that the eventual inundation of 
coral atolls is cause for significant alarm. Atoll island states have themselves drawn 
international attention to their plight for over two decades,680 joined more recently by a 
growing body of international experts, including the IPCC itself.681 While the threat 
posed by climate change inundation to the self-determination of island peoples may be 
unprecedented, it is both grave and reasonably foreseeable. Second, climate change is a 
complex global process whose causes lie beyond the reach of developing atoll island 
states, which contribute, on average, just 1.5% of the greenhouse gas emissions of 
industrialised states, yet are ‘likely to suffer most from its adverse effects’.682 And third, 
the cumulative impacts of climate change are ‘threatening the habitability and, in the 
longer term, the territorial existence of a number of low-lying island states’.683 Without 
a habitable territory within which it can establish and maintain autonomous political 
institutions, the ongoing self-determination of an atoll island people becomes 
increasingly uncertain. 
If we accept that the underlying aim of the principle of self-determination is to protect 
the ‘destiny’ or autonomy of a people from grave external threats over which it has 
little control, and we seek to give meaning to this purpose, then we must also recognise 
climate change inundation as one of these threats. 684  If the legal norm of self-
determination cannot evolve to address emerging threats to the autonomy of a people 
that fulfil these criteria, then it will fail to fulfil its primary purpose. The alternative to 
                                                                                                                                          
‘knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk’ to the enjoyment 
of some right. Osman v. UK, supra note 225, at para.116. 
679 Beitz, supra note 156, at 139–141. 
680 See, for example, the speech made by the former President of the Maldives, Maumoon Abdul 
Gayyoom, at the Small States Conference on Sea Level Rise in Malé in 1989. Cited in Republic of the 
Maldives, supra note 20, at 1. 
681 See, for example, Adger et al., supra note 115, at 733; ILA, supra note 97; Nansen Initiative, supra note 
96, at 20; Nurse et al., supra note 11, at 1618, 1620 and 1639–1640; OHCHR, supra note 13, at para.40. 
682 UNFCCC Secretariat, supra note 11, at 2 and 9. 
683 OHCHR, supra note 13, at para.40.  
684 As, for example, Hestetune does: ‘the involuntary extinction of a state almost certainly profoundly 
interferes with the right of a people to self-determination’. Hestetune, ‘The Invading Waters: Climate 
Change Dispossession, State Extinction, and International Law’, California Western School of Law (2010), 
at 57. 
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this open-textured approach, Hart argues, is a kind of formalism that removes 
uncertainty at the expense of flexibility and responsiveness, leaving us with a fixed set 
of legal rules that may struggle to give effect to the underlying aim of self-
determination in the face of changing environmental conditions.685 
5.4 The emergence of a new legal rule identifying atoll island populations as 
peoples with a right of self-determination 
So far, this chapter has made two claims about the application of self-determination to 
the context of climate change inundation: first, that the populations of atoll island 
states should be recognised as self-determining peoples; and second, that climate 
change inundation should be recognised as a grave external threat to the autonomy 
and independence — and, therefore, the self-determination — of these peoples. The 
principle of self-determination identified in Chapter 4 provides guidance as to how the 
self-determination of atoll island peoples might best be protected in the context of 
climate change inundation. Recognising that the ‘destiny’ or autonomy of a people is at 
stake, we should act with regard to the freely expressed wishes of that people.  
However, in the absence of a clear rule specifying the application of self-determination 
in this area, atoll island peoples may be left with no clear justiciable right to self-
determination.686 After all, as Crawford reminds us, if self-determination is primarily 
understood as a legal principle, then it ‘applies as a matter of right only after the unit 
of self-determination has been determined’ by applying the relevant legal rules.687 This 
section therefore examines whether and how a legal rule identifying the populations of 
atoll island states as peoples with a right to self-determination might emerge, drawing 
                                                
685 Hart, supra note 549, at 129–130. 
686 On concerns about the justiciability of the right to self-determination more generally, see Cassese, 
supra note 475, at 142–143. In the context of internal self-determination, the Human Rights Committee has 
been reluctant to elaborate on or consider communications regarding the right of self-determination. See, 
for example, Kitok v Sweden, Communication No. 197/1985, UN Doc. CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985 (1988), at 
para.6.3; Ominayak, supra note 462, at paras.3.13–3.15 and 13.3; Marshall v Canada, Communication No. 
205/1986, UN Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/205/1986 (1991), at para.5.1. See also discussion in Scheinin, ‘The 
Right to Self-Determination Under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, in P. Aikio and M. Scheinin 
(eds), Operationalising the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination (2000) 179. The CESCR’s approach 
remains to be seen following the entry into force of the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR in May 2013. In 
the case of external self-determination, mechanisms of complaint are limited to the ICJ and inter-state 
complaints procedure provided for under Article 41 of the ICCPR (supra note 238), both of which are 
available only to states. 
687 Crawford, supra note 564, at 127. 
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on evidence from state representatives, intergovernmental organisations, academics 
and legal experts.688 
The two main forums in which legal norms of self-determination have developed are 
the ICJ and the General Assembly (though other ad hoc and regional forums have also 
contributed to its content). 689  The ICJ has made a notable contribution to the 
development of the legal content, scope and function of self-determination, including it 
among those legal norms that give rise to obligations erga omnes,690 recognising non-
colonial groups as peoples with a right to self-determination,691 and acknowledging the 
relevance of self-determination in cases in which all parties agree that it is an 
‘appropriate solution’.692 However, it can only elaborate upon the cases brought before 
it,693 and can only exercise jurisdiction in contentious proceedings with the consent of 
all parties694 (even in the case of a breach of a legal norm of erga omnes character like 
self-determination). 695  And only states can be parties 696  or interveners 697  in a 
contentious case,698 thereby potentially excluding those peoples whose state faces some 
grave existential threat ‘from participating directly in the adjudication of their right to 
self-determination’.699  
                                                
688 On the emergence of a new legal framework more generally, see Mayer, supra note 404, at 400–415. 
689 See, for example, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Charter of Paris for a New 
Europe (1990); Conference of Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, supra note 626; Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned 
(2000). See also treaty body commentary including CERD, supra note 507; HRC, supra note 500. 
690 East Timor supra note 160, at para.29; Israeli Wall, supra note 503, at paras.88 and 155–156. 
691 For example, Israeli Wall, supra note 503, at para.118. 
692 Crawford, supra note 564, at 127. For example, in East Timor the Court took into account the parties’ 
agreement that ‘East Timor remains a non-self-governing territory and its people has the right to self-
determination’. East Timor, supra note 160, at paras.31 and 37. 
693 With the exception of isolated dicta like that concerning obligations erga omnes in Barcelona Traction, 
supra note 161, at paras.33–34. 
694 Article 36, Statute of the International Court of Justice, 33 UNTS 993 (1945). 
695 Having established that ‘the erga omnes character of a norm and the rule of consent to jurisdiction are 
two different things’. East Timor, supra note 160, at para.29. 
696 Article 34(1), ICJ Statute, supra note 694. 
697 Articles 62–63, ibid. 
698 Although the Court may receive information from ‘international organisations’. Article 34(2), ibid. 
699 Knop, supra note 534, at 193. But Crawford argues that ‘there is no difficulty in principle with a legal 
system vesting in third parties the right to bring proceedings to vindicate the rights of another, especially 
where those rights cannot be asserted directly by the other’. Crawford, ‘The Rights of Peoples: Some 
Conclusions’, in Crawford (ed.), supra note 645, 159, at 164. In the South West Africa cases, for example, 
Ethiopia and Liberia took up the cause of the Namibian people’s right to self-determination. South West 
Africa (Liberia v. South Africa and Ethiopia v. South Africa), ICJ Reports (1966) 6. See also Shelton, ‘The 
Participation of Non-Governmental Organisations in International Judicial Proceedings’, 88 AJIL (1994) 
611. 
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In any case, given the difficulty of identifying a causal link between the actions of one 
state and the threat that climate change poses to human rights in another state (as 
discussed in Chapter 3), it is difficult to see how — and against which states — 
proceedings might be brought.700 It is also questionable whether the ICJ does (or 
should) have the capacity to rule on the continuation or extinction of an atoll island 
state facing climate change inundation. 701  And finally, as the reasons for acting 
discussed below make clear, a contentious case may target — and potentially alienate 
— those states with the strongest reasons for acting: often, ‘the states “responsible” for 
the island state’s plight are also the ones that can most assist it’.702 
The General Assembly, on the other hand, has a broader remit than the ICJ, and has 
adopted numerous resolutions regarding the right to self-determination since the mid-
20th century. 703  While its role is not generally one of law-making — with few 
exceptions, its resolutions are recommendatory rather than binding — it nevertheless 
provides a forum for state practice and the elaboration of law.704 In fact, the ICJ 
explicitly relies on the ‘subsequent development of international law’ through the 
application of legal norms by political bodies like the General Assembly.705 In Western 
Sahara, for example, the Court held that, in relation to a given territory, the legal 
content of self-determination is to be found, where possible, in ‘the different ways in 
which the General Assembly resolutions … dealt with’ the territory concerned.706 
                                                
700 Another option would be to request an Advisory Opinion from the ICJ. See, for example, Werksman, 
supra note 394, at 428–429. In 2011, Palau proposed that the General Assembly request an Advisory 
Opinion on states’ legal responsibilities relating to the cross-border harms caused by greenhouse gas 
emissions within their jurisdiction. No such request has yet been made, apparently because of a lack of 
consensus about the appropriate wording. See further R. Bavishi and S. Barakat, Procedural Issues Related to 
the ICJ's Advisory Jurisdiction (2012); Boom, ‘See You in Court: The Rising Tide of International Climate 
Litigation’, The Conversation (28 September 2011); Korman and Barcia, ‘Rethinking Climate Change: 
Towards an International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion’, 37 Yale Journal of International Law (2012) 35. 
701 In the context of climate change inundation, see Wong, supra note 90, at 44. See also, more generally, 
Klabbers, supra note 549, at 191. 
702 Wong, supra note 90, at 44. 
703 The most significant include GA Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 495; GA Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 495; GA 
Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137. See also those recognising the right to self-determination of non-colonial 
and indigenous populations, including GA Res. 3236 (XXIX), supra note 537; GA Res. 31/34, supra note 
537; UNDRIP, supra note 504. On the role of the General Assembly in disputes regarding territory and self-
determination, see further Jennings, supra note 480, at 79–87. 
704 See, for example, Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), ICJ Reports (1974) 3, at para.58. ‘State 
practice is just as much state practice when it occurs in the context of the General Assembly as in bilateral 
forms.’ Crawford, supra note 564, at 114. See further Jennings, supra note 480, at 83–86; Schachter, ‘United 
Nations Law’, 88 AJIL (1994) 1, at 3; Simma and Alston, ‘The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus 
Cogens and General Principles’, 12 AYIL (1988) 92; Sloan, ‘General Assembly Resolutions Revisited (Forty 
Years Later)’, 58 BYIL (1987) 39. 
705 Namibia, supra note 279, at para.52. In doing so, Cassese argues, ‘[t]he Court authoritatively confirmed 
this legal evolution by endorsement with its formal seal’. Cassese, supra note 559, at 354. 
706 Western Sahara, supra note 136, at para.60 (see also paras.59 and 71). 
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Crawford argues that the Court has played a ‘secondary’ or ‘administrative’ part — 
rather than the role of ‘lead agency’ — in the context of self-determination, often 
supporting its interpretation and implementation by the General Assembly.707  
Could the General Assembly thus provide an initial forum for the recognition of a legal 
rule specifying a right to self-determination for the peoples of atoll island states at risk 
of climate change inundation? Could it use its recommendatory capacity to encourage 
states to act?708 Given sufficient state pressure, it may follow its adoption of earlier 
resolutions — including those recognising the ‘possible security implications’ of 
climate change,709 the particular vulnerability of small island developing states to the 
‘serious risks and challenges’ posed by climate change 710  and the right to self-
determination of non-colonial peoples711 — by adopting a further resolution on self-
determination and climate change inundation.712 
While there may not yet be sufficient state pressure to achieve such an outcome, the 
increasingly widespread recognition of the relevance of self-determination in the 
context of climate change inundation indicates a significant level of support. In 2008, 
the Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 7/23, which calls on the OHCHR to 
examine the relationship between human rights and climate change.713 The subsequent 
report explicitly recognises climate change inundation as a threat to the self-
determination of the populations of atoll island states.714 Following its publication, the 
Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 10/4,715 which is notable for its boldness in 
acknowledging that climate change has a range of ‘direct and indirect’ implications for 
the enjoyment of human rights, including the right to self-determination.716 
                                                
707 Crawford, supra note 532, at 592. Compare Klabbers, supra note 549, at 205. 
708 Article 14, UN Charter, supra note 173. 
709 GA Res. 63/281, 11 June 2009. 
710 GA Res. 63/32, 3 April 2009, at para.9. 
711 For example, GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137; GA Res. 3236 (XXIX), supra note 537; GA Res. 31/34, 
supra note 537; UNDRIP, supra note 504. 
712 On the relative merits and weaknesses of a soft law approach, see Kälin and Schrepfer, supra note 73, at 
69–72; Mayer, supra note 404, at 408–409; McAdam, supra note 90, at 238–239. For a recent critical 
perspective on the role of the General Assembly (alongside the Security Council and ICJ) in the context of 
self-determination, see Almqvist, ‘The Politics of Recognition: The Question about the Final Status of 
Kosovo’, in French (ed.), supra note 158, 165. 
713 Human Rights Council Res. 7/23, supra note 180. 
714
 OHCHR, supra note 13, at para.41. 
715 Human Rights Council Res. 10/4, supra note 132. 
716 Ibid, at preambular para.7. See discussion in Limon, supra note 181; McAdam, supra note 90, at 222. 
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Resolution 10/4 marked a turning point in the recognition of the implications of 
climate change inundation for self-determination. In 2011, the World Bank published a 
report recognising the threat posed by climate change inundation to the self-
determination and ‘very existence’ of atoll island peoples.717 That same year, at a 
round-table meeting convened by the UNHCR, a group of international legal experts, 
intergovernmental organisations, and state representatives met to discuss the 
relationship between climate change and displacement. ‘Any relocation plans’, they 
concluded, ‘need to ensure the enjoyment of the full range of relevant rights’, including 
rights ‘to life, dignity, liberty, security, and self-determination’.718 And, in 2014, the ILA 
established a Committee on International Law and Sea Level Rise to study the 
‘implications under international law of the partial and complete inundation of state 
territory’,719 including the question of whether atoll island peoples have ‘a right to 
resettle as a community’ or, indeed, a right to self-determination.720 
In academia, there has been a growing shift towards the recognition of the importance 
of both individual and collective human rights in this context, led by political 
theorists.721 Although reluctant to examine its implications in detail, legal scholars are 
also beginning to acknowledge the relevance of self-determination to the issue of 
climate change inundation. Katrina Wyman, for example, admits that, without some 
protection of the right to self-determination, ‘the recognition of an individual right to 
resettle would be a second-best response’.722 David Hodgkinson, in his body of work 
advocating the adoption of a new treaty for persons displaced by climate change, 
argues for the use of self-determination as a ‘guiding principle that could inform 
resettlement’.723 Maxine Burkett, Jane McAdam, Rosemary Rayfuse and others have 
                                                
717 McInerney-Lankford, Darrow and Rajamani, supra note 95, at 18 (see also 35–36). 
718 UNHCR, supra note 75, at para.32 (see also para.31). A full list of participants is accessible at 
www.unhcr.org/4da2b5899.html. Compare Nansen Initiative, supra note 96, at 20. 
719
 ILA, supra note 97. 
720
 Vidas, supra note 97. Compare Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights Institutions, Human 
Rights and the Environment: Final Report and Recommendations (2007), at 12; FIELD, Submission to the OHCHR 
under Human Rights Council Resolution 7/23 (2008), at 1–2; Nansen Initiative, supra note 96, at 20. 
721 Kolers, supra note 91; Nine, supra note 91; Ödalen, supra note 91; Schuppert, supra note 134. Other 
theorists refer to but do not examine self-determination or collective resettlement in detail, including 
Bradley, supra note 306, at 157, fn.1; Risse, supra note 91. 
722 Wyman, supra note 90, at 441. 
723 Hodgkinson and Young, supra note 133, at 326. 
     
 
    
135 
also begun to make reference to the relevance of self-determination in assessing the 
options available to atoll island populations.724 
Intriguingly — unlike an earlier version of this chapter in which self-determination is 
mentioned only as a passing footnote 725  — McAdam’s updated chapter on 
‘disappearing states’ examines the relevance of the legal norm of self-determination for 
the populations of atoll island states,726 indicating a newfound recognition of self-
determination as one of the ‘underlying and fundamental questions’ that arise in this 
context.727 Yet McAdam, like the OHCHR, Wyman, Rayfuse, Burkett, Hodgkinson and 
others, does not herself provide a detailed analysis of the application of self-
determination to the issue of climate change inundation, choosing merely to indicate 
that this is a fruitful avenue of research. 
In response to this growing pressure from international organisations, state 
representatives and legal scholars, a legal rule identifying the populations of atoll 
island states as peoples with a right to self-determination may therefore be recognised. 
In the interests of exploring the scope and content of this emerging right, the rest of the 
thesis proceeds on an ‘as if’ basis. That is, it examines the method by which atoll 
islanders might continue to exercise their right to self-determination, the possible 
modes or outcomes of this right and the reasons that other states might have for 
supporting these outcomes, as if atoll island populations were already recognised as 
peoples with a right to self-determination in international law. 
5.5 Reasons for protecting the self-determination of atoll island peoples 
As Raz observes, we may know that a right exists and we may understand the interests 
it protects without knowing precisely which actors are required to ensure its 
realisation or which actions they are expected to take.728 This is particularly relevant 
                                                
724 Burkett, supra note 90, at 363 and 366; McAdam, supra note 90, at 36, 147–149 and 157–158; Rayfuse, 
supra note 133, at 8–9 and 11. See also Gromilova, supra note 422, at 87; Hestetune, supra note 684, at 49–58; 
Kälin and Schrepfer, supra note 73, at 39–40; Knox, supra note 176, at 188, 192 and 194; R. Lefeber, Global 
Warming: An Inconvenient Responsibility (2009); Mayer, supra note 404, at 391–393; McInerney-Lankford, 
supra note 164, at 199; Oliver, supra note 437, at 223–224; Park, supra note 5, at 16, note 113 and 20, note 141; 
Söderbergh, supra note 326, at 15–16 and 26; Stahl, ‘Unprotected Ground: The Plight of Vanishing Nations’, 
23 New York International Law Review (2010) 1, at 31 and 50; Stoutenburg, supra note 90, at 76–77; Wong, 
supra note 90, at 45–46; Yamamoto and Esteban, supra note 26, at 180–182. 
725 McAdam, ‘“Disappearing States”, Statelessness and the Boundaries of International Law’, in McAdam 
(ed.), supra note 12, 105. 
726 McAdam, supra note 90, at ch.5. 
727
 Ibid, at 36. 
728 Raz, supra note 159, at 184–186. 
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where the right in question faces some unprecedented threat that does not conform to 
previously observed patterns. So far, Chapters 4 and 5 have identified the underlying 
aim of self-determination and identified atoll island populations as peoples with a 
potential right to self-determination. However, they have not yet fully established the 
implications of this right for the actions of others. As Raz suggests, ‘it is reflection on 
the right …, its point and the reasons for it, which helps, together with other premises, 
to establish such implications’.729 
According to the functional account set out in Chapter 2, human rights provide states 
with reasons to respond to a manifest failure to protect important human interests 
against a grave, foreseeable threat elsewhere. Building on this, Chapter 3 identified 
some of the reasons that states might have for implementing a planned migration 
response to the threat posed by climate change inundation to the individual human 
rights of atoll islanders. However, as Chapter 3 concluded, an individual rights-based 
approach is insufficient. It fails to address what has been described as the ‘biggest 
challenge’ in this context: ‘how to ensure that populations of affected small island 
states can continue to retain their identities as communities … even after the loss of 
most or even all of their territory’.730 
This section revisits the reasons for acting identified in Chapters 2 and 3, asking which 
states have which reasons for responding to the threat posed by climate change 
inundation to the self-determination of atoll island peoples. While Chapters 4 and 5 
have so far established that all states are required to take the freely expressed wishes of 
a people into consideration in deciding which steps to take in any situation in which its 
collective autonomy is at stake, more work is needed to determine the implications of 
this in the context of climate change inundation. If states are required to act with 
regard to the freely expressed wishes of a displaced atoll island people as a matter of 
right, what does this require of them in practice? The reasons discussed below and in 
subsequent chapters relate to the steps that states might take in implementing various 
solutions to the problem of climate change inundation. 
In order to avoid repeating material covered elsewhere in the thesis, this section 
addresses only those reasons that are directly applicable to the threat posed by climate 
change inundation to islanders’ self-determination, and only in relation to those states 
                                                
729 Ibid, at 185. 
730 Kälin and Schrepfer, supra note 73, at 39–40. 
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identified as having primary or secondary responsibility in Chapter 3 (including 
Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, the UK, the US, Canada, Germany and France). This 
provides the basis for a more detailed analysis of the reasons that states have for (and 
against) implementing specific solutions in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
Reasons of peremptory force 
The first set of reasons arises from the importance of the right at stake and its 
peremptory legal force. Self-determination is recognised as a jus cogens or peremptory 
norm of customary international law731 and as a source of obligations erga omnes.732 It 
is, in other words, ‘the concern of all States’ and a source of ‘obligations … towards the 
international community as a whole’.733 As observed earlier, the ICJ has stipulated that 
obligations erga omnes are triggered by ‘the importance of the rights involved’,734 a 
point reinforced by its recognition that obligations erga omnes derive from the ‘essential 
principle[s]’735 or ‘basic tenets of modern international law’.736 More specifically, it is 
those legal norms ‘concerning the basic rights of the human person’ that qualify as erga 
omnes. 737  And, as a jus cogens norm of international law, self-determination is 
recognised as one of those ‘substantive rules of conduct that prohibit what has come to 
be seen as intolerable because of the threat it presents to the survival of states and their 
peoples and the most basic human values’.738 
It is this aspect of self-determination — its fundamental importance to the protection of 
basic human values; the survival of states; perhaps even ‘the very basis of the still 
fragile international community’739 — that triggers the interests of the international 
community more broadly. As a peremptory norm of general international law and 
source of obligations erga omnes, self-determination is therefore associated with 
weightier reasons for acting than those identified in Chapters 2 and 3 with respect to 
                                                
731 ILC, supra note 274, at 85, para.5. See also references supra note 511. 
732 For example, East Timor, supra note 160, at para.29; Israeli Wall, supra note 503, at paras.88, 155–156. The 
ILC has held that, while ‘all jus cogens norms were by definition erga omnes, not all erga omnes norms were 
necessarily imperative’. ILC, ‘Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its 
Fiftieth Session’, II Yearbook of the ILC (1998) 1, at 69, para.279. See further Tams, supra note 275, at 149–152. 
733 Barcelona Traction, supra note 161, at para.33. The ICJ holds that obligations erga omnes are ‘not 
territorially limited’. Genocide, supra note 240, at para.31. See further Tams, supra note 275, at 111–112. 
734 Barcelona Traction, supra note 161, at para.33. 
735 East Timor, supra note 160, at para.29. 
736 Nicaragua, supra note 518, Diss. Op. Schwebel, at 198. 
737 Alongside obligations relating to ‘the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide’. Barcelona 
Traction, supra note 161, at para.34. 
738 ILC, supra note 274, at 112, para.3. 
739 Pellet, ‘Can a State Commit a Crime? Definitely, Yes!’, 10 EJIL (1999) 425, at 427. 
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the impacts of climate change inundation on individual rights to health and an 
adequate standard of living. It is precisely in virtue of its fundamental importance that, 
‘insofar as climate change poses a threat to the right of peoples to self-determination, 
states have a duty to take positive action, individually and jointly, to address and avert 
this threat’.740  
It remains unclear, however, which steps states are required to take in response to such 
a threat. While a breach of an obligation erga omnes entitles any state to (for example) 
take countermeasures 741  or institute proceedings before the ICJ, 742  the difficulties 
associated with identifying those states that are legally responsible for the specific 
harms of climate change inundation mean that these approaches are unlikely to be 
successful. In Israeli Wall, however, the ICJ provides the basis for a more general set of 
reasons for taking positive action.743 Here, the Court cites the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations, according to which ‘[e]very state has the duty to promote, through joint and 
separate action’, the self-determination of peoples.744 In this particular case, states are 
required not only to refrain from recognising or supporting the ‘illegal situation’ 
arising from the construction of the wall, but also to ‘see to it that any impediment … 
to the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination is brought to 
an end’.745 All states would therefore appear to have reasons for taking positive steps, 
through ‘joint and separate action’ (perhaps through some collective institution 
established under the auspices of the UN),746 to promote the right to self-determination 
where it faces some grave external threat. 
There is also some disagreement about whether jus cogens and erga omnes status 
extends to the basic principle of self-determination — including its application in the 
context of climate change inundation — or merely to the specific legal rules identified 
by the categorisation approach outlined in Chapter 4.747 According to former Special 
Rapporteur Andrés Rigo Sureda, the peremptory status of self-determination applies 
                                                
740 OHCHR, supra note 13, at para.41. 
741 See Tams, supra note 275, at ch.6. 
742 Ibid, at ch.5. 
743 Israeli Wall, supra note 503, at para.156. 
744 GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137. 
745 Israeli Wall, supra note 503, at para.159. 
746 ibid. 
747 See, for example, discussion in Crawford, supra note 484, at 596; Espiell, ‘Self-Determination and Jus 
Cogens’, in A. Cassese (ed.), United Nations. Fundamental Rights (1979) 167; Espiell, supra note 511, at 11–13; 
Hannikainen, supra note 511, at 357–424; Shaw, supra note 511, at 91. 
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only to its application in the context of decolonisation.748 For Cassese, however, ‘the 
whole cluster of legal standards’ should be regarded as jus cogens.749 Others equivocate: 
the ILC, for example, refers to both the ‘principle’ and the ‘right’ of self-determination 
as a jus cogens norm,750 while Crawford describes self-determination as a peremptory 
norm ‘at least in its application to colonial countries and peoples under alien 
domination’, implying that its peremptory status might well extend further.751 
Duursma offers one solution to this disagreement — a solution that also provides some 
indication of which steps states are required to take in response to climate change 
inundation. She argues that self-determination is recognised as a jus cogens norm only 
where it does not conflict with the territorial integrity of an existing state.752 ‘If the right 
of self-determination is used to disrupt the territorial integrity of a state’, she argues, ‘it 
will not have the status of jus cogens, but that of an ordinary norm of international law’ 
from which states can derogate, if they wish.753 The implications of this will become 
clearer in subsequent chapters, which discuss several options for preserving the 
collective autonomy of atoll island peoples. Where a people’s preferred solution risks 
interfering with the territorial integrity of state A — for example, the cession of 
territory (Chapter 6) — the reasons that state A has for implementing this solution may 
not carry the weight of a peremptory norm of international law. State A may therefore 
have stronger reasons for implementing alternative solutions that do not disrupt its 
territorial integrity — for example, the recognition of a ‘deterritorialized’ state (Chapter 
7) or the merger of two states (Chapter 8) — where these reasons do carry the 
significant weight associated with a peremptory legal norm. 
Reasons of international cooperation 
A second set of reasons, arising from the obligations of international assistance and 
cooperation imposed on states by the UN Charter and ICESCR, are particularly 
relevant in the context of climate change, which ‘can only be effectively addressed 
                                                
748 Rigo Sureda, supra note 484, at 353. 
749 Cassese, supra note 475, at 140. 
750 ILC, ‘Law of Treaties’, II Yearbook of the ILC (1963) 188, at 199; ILC, supra note 274, at 85, para.5. 
751 Crawford, supra note 484, at 596 (emphasis added). Compare Espiell, supra note 511, at 10. 
752 Duursma, supra note 534, at 103. 
753 Ibid. Various legal instruments insist that a people’s self-determination must not ‘dismember or impair, 
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states’. GA Res. 
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through cooperation of all members of the international community’.754 Experts at a 
UNHCR round-table meeting have, for example, called for ‘collaborative approaches 
… based on principles of international cooperation and burden- and responsibility-
sharing’ to address climate change-related displacement.755 
In the case of self-determination, these reasons of international cooperation are 
reinforced by the Declaration on Friendly Relations, which calls on all states to 
promote the principle of self-determination ‘through joint and separate action’.756 In 
fact, the right to self-determination appears to be free from any jurisdictional 
limitation.757 Common Article 1 of the human rights covenants is unencumbered by 
any jurisdictional clause,758 and the Human Rights Committee has made it clear that 
Article 1(3) ‘imposes specific obligations on states parties, not only in relation to their 
own peoples but vis-à-vis all peoples which have not been able to exercise or have been 
deprived of the possibility of exercising their right to self-determination’.759 Indeed, 
where the self-determining people is the population of a state, its right to self-
determination must give rise to reasons for acting on the part of other states in order 
for it to be meaningful.760 ‘It is abundantly clear’, Langford argues, ‘that these rights [to 
self-determination] are against the world’.761 
However, like the reasons of peremptory force identified above, reasons of 
international cooperation add legal weight to the requirement on states to act but are 
general in nature, allowing states considerable discretion in deciding where to direct 
their resources. One exception to this rule arises where state A has made some prior 
legal or political commitment to state B, which provides the basis for a specific 
obligation of international cooperation between the two. Here, as suggested in Chapter 
3, we might single out Australia and New Zealand (which have established bilateral 
migration agreements with Tuvalu and Kiribati) or Fiji (which has formally committed 
to resettling Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati in the face of climate change inundation) as 
                                                
754 OHCHR, supra note 13, at para.84. 
755 UNHCR, supra note 75, at para.43. Compare McAdam, supra note 152, at 22; McAdam, supra note 90, at 
260. 
756 GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137. 
757 Knox, supra note 176, at 205. 
758 The ICSECR (supra note 207) has no jurisdictional clause. In the ICCPR (supra note 238), Article 1 is 
included prior to the jurisdictional clause set out in Article 2. 
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having particular reasons for cooperating in response to the threat posed by climate 
change inundation to the self-determination of atoll island peoples. 
Obligations of international cooperation may also require these and other states to 
coordinate with each other in responding to the threat posed by climate change 
inundation to the self-determination of atoll islanders, perhaps through some 
institutional framework with the capacity to address the ambiguities of self-
determination.762 In addition to the institutional actors identified in Chapter 3 — 
including the UNHCR and IOM — a concern with the right to self-determination 
indicates that UN institutions like the General Assembly might also have a role to 
play.763 
Reasons of contribution 
A third set of reasons derives from any acts or omissions of a state that ‘bring about 
foreseeable effects on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, whether 
within or outside its territory’. 764  Those Annex II states with particularly high 
greenhouse gas emissions per capita since the 1990s — including Australia (26.65 
tonnes per capita in 2011), Canada (24.67), the US (19.69) and New Zealand (11.97)765 — 
may therefore have stronger reasons for acting to address the impact of climate change 
inundation on the self-determination of atoll island peoples. However, while these 
reasons add legal weight to the requirement on high-emitting states to act, they tell us 
little about their capacity to do so or the actions they are required to take. 
Reasons of capacity 
We must therefore also consider a fourth set of reasons arising from states’ capacity to 
act. Attention must be given not only to the prior actions of states, but also their 
‘available resources’, their ‘economic, technical and technological capacities’ and their 
                                                
762 Rigo Sureda, supra note 484, at 28 and 101.  
763 See, for example, Israeli Wall, supra note 503, at para.160. 
764 Principle 9(b), Maastricht Principles, supra note 282. See also Principle 13. The Maastricht Principles are 
primarily concerned with economic, social and cultural rights but also refer to the right to self-
determination. 
765 Non-Annex I or II states with significantly high per capita greenhouse gas emissions include Kuwait 
(62.62), Brunei (59.26), Belize (45.00) and Qatar (43.72). World Resources Institute, ‘CAIT 2.0: WRI’s 
Climate Data Explorer’, accessible at http://cait2.wri.org. 
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‘influence in international decision-making processes’.766 Such reasons of capacity 
speak to the reasonableness (or otherwise) of the burdens imposed on those who act.  
The type of capacity that is relevant here will depend on the type of action that states 
are required to take. If states are required to recognise and accommodate alternative 
state-like entities — perhaps a ‘deterritorialized’ or federal state — then factors like the 
capacity to influence international negotiation and decision-making processes will be 
important. If they are required to provide space for the collective resettlement of atoll 
island peoples, a key criterion will be the capacity of a state to absorb new residents, 
perhaps assessed in terms of the availability of habitable land.767 The idea that those 
with greater resources — in this case, habitable land — may have reasons for acting 
where others do not has precedence in the work of classical legal theorists. Grotius, for 
example, suggests that states have reasons for providing land to ‘strangers’ only where 
there is some ‘waste or barren Land’ available.768 Availability of land cannot be the sole 
criterion, however, as some states have vast tracts of land but limited infrastructure or 
economic resources, while others have little land but substantial natural, financial or 
technological resources.769 We might therefore look to other criteria relating to a state’s 
wealth or the quality of life of its citizens,770 as well as its geographic proximity to an 
atoll island people.  
Reasons against taking action 
Questions of capacity can also be reframed as questions about the burdens that one 
actor can be expected to bear in order to assist others. A state may have reasons for not 
acting where this would impose ‘unacceptably high costs’ on its own citizens.771 
Chapter 3 identified several potential impacts of a ‘planned migration’ solution, 
including the socio-economic costs of absorbing the populations of atoll island states, 
the legal and political costs of modifying existing migration legislation, and the risk 
that a sudden influx of islanders may undermine the collective autonomy or shared 
way of life of the population of a host state. While all of these concerns remain relevant 
                                                
766 Principle 31, Maastricht Principles, supra note 282. See also Principles 9(c) and 33. 
767 Wyman, supra note 90, at 461. 
768 H. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace (2005 [1625]), at §II.2.17. Compare S. Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae 
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where the issue at stake is the collective right to self-determination rather than the 
individual right to health, the last is of particular relevance. Where the capacity to 
control the flow of people across its borders is thought to be central to the collective 
autonomy and self-determination of the people of a state, this may provide it with 
good reasons for limiting the number of islanders it assists.772 
Here, we encounter an issue that is explored further in subsequent chapters. The 
political autonomy, independence and self-determination of atoll island peoples are 
threatened by the impacts of climate change inundation. However, given the lack of 
available, habitable territory in today’s world, islanders will find it difficult to resettle 
elsewhere as a self-determining people. In their search for new territory, atoll island 
peoples will inevitably encounter other peoples exercising their own rights to self-
determination and territorial integrity, where these rights provide strong reasons 
against assisting islanders by ceding territory or hosting a deterritorialized state. A 
paradox therefore emerges. It is precisely because self-determination, independence 
and territorial integrity are seen as such important values across the international 
community that islanders will find it difficult to obtain new territory on which to 
resettle as independent, self-determining peoples. The reasons against acting arising 
from this conflict between competing claims to self-determination are discussed 
further in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.  
5.6 Conclusion 
Chapters 4 and 5 have provided detailed arguments for the recognition of a right to 
self-determination for atoll island peoples and identified possible reasons for acting to 
protect this right in the face of climate change inundation. In doing so, they have built 
on the tentative steps of those who acknowledge the relevance of self-determination in 
this context but shy away from arguing for the recognition of a legal right to self-
determination for atoll island peoples or assessing the reasons that others might have 
for protecting or promoting this right.773 They have also acknowledged, but departed 
from, those who recognise the importance of self-determination or statehood but fail to 
                                                
772 For example, for Walzer, ‘[a]dmission and exclusion are at the core of communal independence. They 
suggest the meaning of self-determination.’ Walzer, supra note 429, at 62. From a legal perspective, 
Solomon and Warner observe that ‘[s]tates continue to regard the admission of foreign nationals to their 
territories as a matter of national sovereignty, to be determined according to national priorities and 
criteria’. Solomon and Warner, supra note 331, at 249. Compare Kälin and Schrepfer, supra note 73, at 67. 
773 Including Hestetune, supra note 684, at 57; Knox, supra note 176, at 210; Wyman, supra note 90, at 441; 
Wyman, supra note 123, at 190, note 16; Wong, supra note 90, at 45–46. 
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recognise the value of the particular political institutions and collective goals shaped 
by the peoples of Tuvalu, Kiribati and the Maldives over time.774 
Chapter 4 identified a basic principle of self-determination whose underlying aim is to 
provide space for the collective autonomy or ‘destiny’ of a people in any situation in 
which it faces some grave external threat. It also defined ‘peoples’ as the populations of 
existing states with a shared history of cooperation under the institutions of 
government that they have helped to sustain and shape. Chapter 5, building on this 
theoretical account, identified atoll island populations as self-determining peoples and 
identified climate change inundation as a grave external threat to the self-
determination of these peoples. It also examined several reasons for — and against — 
acting to address the threat posed by climate change inundation to the self-
determination of atoll island peoples, which will be explored in more detail in 
subsequent chapters. 
However, many questions remain unanswered. Even if the populations of atoll island 
states are recognised as having a legal right to self-determination, it is unclear what 
this entitles them to. The final chapters of the thesis seek to address these questions by 
elaborating on the scope and content of a right to self-determination in the context of 
climate change inundation. Chapter 6 sets out a collective decision-making framework 
through which atoll island peoples can express their preferred response to climate 
change inundation. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 flesh out this decision-making framework, 
assessing the extent to which each of its three options — finding new territory 
elsewhere on which to resettle, transitioning to a deterritorialized state or joining in 
free association or federation with another state — can protect the collective autonomy 
and independence of an atoll island people, and identifying the reasons that other 
states might have for (or against) supporting their implementation.  
                                                
774 Including Lister, supra note 130; Wyman, supra note 123. 
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IV. A Right of Self-Determination for Atoll Island Peoples 
6. Self-Determination, Statehood and Territory 
6.1 Introduction 
The focus of this final part of the thesis is on the planned resettlement of atoll island 
peoples. Such collective resettlement involves the ‘permanent (or long-term) 
movement of a community (or a significant part of it) from one location to another, in 
which important characteristics of the original community, including its … legal and 
political systems … are retained’.775 Collective resettlement is not an alternative but a 
complement to other solutions, including planned migration (for those who wish to 
migrate earlier, temporarily or elsewhere) and in-situ adaptation (for those who wish to 
remain as long as possible).776 Richard and Charlotte Bedford, for example, call for a 
‘mix of strategies’, including both individual migration and planned collective 
resettlement.777 
Planned resettlement is far from ideal, from the perspective of both atoll island and 
host populations — in fact, for many, it is their ‘least preferred option’.778 And, as 
history tells us, collective resettlement — particularly across international borders — is 
fraught with complications.779 ‘The longer the distance of the move’, Barnett and 
Campbell warn, the higher the costs and ‘the greater … the chances of failure’.780 
Nevertheless, many islanders recognise that resettlement may be ‘inevitable as a last 
resort’ and perhaps even ‘preferable to holding off until the full effects of climate 
change [come] to bear on them’.781 
While the possibility of becoming stateless, landless and homeless — of being cast 
adrift in the world — is brought into sharp relief by climate change inundation, it is not 
a new experience for island communities. ‘For centuries’, McAdam observes, ‘islanders 
                                                
775 Campbell, supra note 348, at 58–59. On the distinction between collective resettlement and migration, 
see Campbell, Goldsmith and Koshy, supra note 114, at 12; McAdam, supra note 90, at 138. 
776 After all, some ‘may have important reasons to prefer to be immigrants’. Nine, supra note 91, at 372, 
note 34. 
777 Bedford and Bedford, supra note 92, at 93 (see also 126). Compare McAdam, supra note 90, at 247–248. 
778 Nansen Initiative, supra note 96, at 14. 
779 Campbell, Goldsmith and Koshy, supra note 114, at 41. Compare Blitz, supra note 455, at 444–446; 
Ferris, supra note 317, at 15–18; ibid, at 14–15 and 20. 
780 Barnett and Campbell, supra note 12, at 173. Compare Bedford and Bedford, supra note 92, at 126; 
Campbell, Goldsmith and Koshy, supra note 114, at 4; Ferris, Cernea and Petz, supra note 16, at 19.  
781 Ferris, Cernea and Petz, supra note 16, at 20. Compare Nansen Initiative, supra note 96, at 19–20; 
McAdam, supra note 148. 
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have moved in response to changing environmental, political or social conditions’.782 In 
1945, for example, the inhabitants of Banaba Island (now part of Kiribati) were 
resettled on Rabi Island (Fiji) to escape the environmental degradation caused by the 
mining operations of the British Phosphate Commission.783 The extent to which the 
Banabans consented to this resettlement remains unclear. While some were keen to 
move in search of arable land and an adequate freshwater supply, many voiced 
concerns about loss of sovereignty over Banaba.784 Official records reveal that the 
colonial authorities decided to move the population to Rabi ‘whether they were 
agreeable or not’.785 In any case, ‘the founding myth of Rabi’ is primarily one of loss: 
‘loss of control over their own territory and resources’, over ‘land, rights, sovereignty 
and power — the power to shape one’s destiny’.786 ‘At its heart’, McAdam argues, ‘it is 
about the loss of self-determination’.787 
In any situation involving the collective resettlement of a population, questions of 
autonomy, sovereignty and self-determination should therefore be addressed. After all, 
‘sovereignty, self-determination, cultural identity and territorial rights are of primary 
concern’ not just to the Banabans but also to atoll island peoples today.788 However, the 
case of climate change inundation is more complex than this example suggests. The 
Banaban resettlement occurred within the administrative framework of British colonial 
rule and did not face the obstacles of border control, state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity that any contemporary process of collective resettlement will face.789 These 
obstacles speak to the dominance of the state in the international sphere and the legal 
principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political unity and non-
intervention that preserve its status.790 International law works to create and sustain a 
                                                
782 McAdam, ‘Caught Between Two Homelands’, Inside Story (13 March 2013). See further Bedford, supra 
note 348; Campbell, supra note 348, at 63–65; Campbell, Goldsmith and Koshy, supra note 114, at 20–25 and 
37–38; J. Connell (ed.), Migration and Development in the South Pacific (2000); Fischer, supra note 632; M. 
Lieber (ed.), Exiles and Migrants in Oceania (1977); McAdam, supra note 90, at 143. 
783 See further Bedford and Bedford, supra note 92, at 90–91; Campbell, supra note 348, at 71–78; McAdam, 
supra note 782; Ferris, Cernea and Petz, supra note 16, at 26; M. Silverman, Disconcerting Issue: Meaning and 
Struggle in a Resettled Pacific Community (1971). 
784 Campbell, supra note 348, at 74; McAdam, supra note 782; Silverman, supra note 783, at 148. 
785 Cited in McAdam, supra note 782. 
786 Ibid. 
787 Ibid. 
788 J. Campbell and O. Warrick, Climate Change and Migration Issues in the Pacific (2014), at 10. Compare 
UNHCR, Planned Relocations, Disasters and Climate Change (2014), at 17, para.47. 
789 Campbell, supra note 348, at 77; Campbell, Goldsmith and Koshy, supra note 114, at 35; McAdam, supra 
note 90, at 143; Silverman, supra note 783, at 2–4. 
790 On the dominance of the state, see A. Cassese, International Law (2005), at 71; Craven, supra note 505, at 
203; Crawford, supra note 484, at 115–116; Grant, ‘Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its 
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state system that operates as a ‘radical monopoly’;791 a system in which (in theory at 
least) states alone exercise territorial jurisdiction, and all land is under the jurisdiction 
of some state, and in which the state is ‘the principal maker and subject of international 
law’. 792  To the exclusion of other entities, states provide the legal and political 
infrastructure through which laws are enforced, treaties are negotiated, UN 
membership is exercised and individual and collective human rights are protected. As 
Crawford observes, ‘it still makes a great difference whether an entity is a state or 
not’.793 
Yet climate change inundation threatens the territory, autonomy, independence — 
and, therefore, statehood — of atoll islanders. Here, statehood becomes both the 
solution and the problem. In a world in which land is a finite resource794 and there is 
little or no territory left unclaimed by states,795 ‘the legal (and sometimes physical) 
barriers to entry imposed by states today considerably restrict freedom of 
movement’.796 This is true enough with regard to individual migration but is even 
more apposite when it is the population of a state that must resettle elsewhere. Atoll 
island populations face a future in which their territory becomes increasingly 
uninhabitable, their statehood increasingly uncertain and their escape route blocked by 
the intransigence of other states. In order to justify the continuing monopoly of states, 
it would seem that the onus is on international law to find some way of resolving this 
dilemma.797 
                                                                                                                                          
Discontents’, 37 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1999) 403, at 407–408; Jennings and Watts, supra note 
423, at 16; Knop, ‘Statehood: Territory, People, Government’, in J. Crawford and M. Koskenniemi (eds), 
The Cambridge Companion to International Law (2012) 95, at 95. For a more critical account of the state in 
international law, see, for example, A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law 
(2005); M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia (2006); G. Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States (2004).  
791 Kolers, supra note 91, at 334. Kolers cites Simmons, ‘On the Territorial Rights of States’, 11 Philosophical 
Issues (2001) 300, at 304. On the state system as a monopoly, see also Crawford, ‘Sovereignty as a Legal 
Value’, in Crawford and Koskenniemi (eds), supra note 790, 117, at 121. A handful of exceptions to this 
monopoly are discussed in Chapter 7. 
792 Lachs, ‘The Development and General Trends of International Law in Our Time’, 169 Recueil des Cours 
(1980) 32, at 32. 
793 Crawford, supra note 564, at 31. Compare Craven, supra note 505, at 220. 
794 But see Avery Kolers’ ‘positive sum’ account of territory. Kolers, supra note 91. 
795 Aside from some uninhabitable rocks and a small portion of Antarctica where sovereignty cannot be 
claimed under the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. Crawford, supra note 484, at 220 and 241–242. 
796 McAdam, supra note 90, at 13. 
797 Given this monopoly, ‘it is illogical that international law should permit a condition of statelessness’. 
Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 887. From a philosophical perspective, ‘the moral legitimacy of the 
state system depends on the provision of some safe state membership to everyone’. Carens, ‘States and 
Refugees: A Normative Analysis’, in H. Adelman (ed.), Refugee Policy: Canada and the United States (1991) 
18, at 21 (see also 21–25). Compare Wyman, supra note 123, at 202–208. 
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In a recent interview about a new joint initiative with the ILO and UNDP to prepare 
Pacific island populations for climate change-related movement, the head of 
UNESCAP explained that Pacific leaders have called for ‘a greater focus on educating 
[their] people on what’s coming and what the options are for them, which means some 
input into clarifying and looking at ways of providing those options’.798 The final 
chapters of this thesis aim to do precisely that: to offer ‘some input into clarifying and 
looking at ways of providing those options’. The intention is neither to proscribe nor 
prescribe any solutions; after all, the principle of self-determination demands that we 
listen to the peoples concerned. Instead, it is to set out a possible decision-making 
framework within which the ‘free and genuine expression of the will’799 of atoll island 
peoples can be given meaning. 
The decision-making framework proposed here is not reflected in hard law;800 nor does 
it propose the recognition of new legal norms. 801  Instead, it reflects a creative 
interpretation of existing legal rules and principles, guided by the normative account 
of self-determination discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. As recognised at an Expert 
Meeting convened by the UNHCR, climate change inundation ‘is unprecedented and 
may necessitate [the] progressive development of international law to deal with the 
preservation of the identity of the communities affected’.802 This final part of the thesis 
is an exercise in imagining what this progressive development might look like, 
grounded in the international legal norm of self-determination. As explained in 
Chapter 5, it proceeds on an ‘as if’ basis, examining the means by which atoll island 
peoples might continue to exercise their right to self-determination as if they were 
already recognised as right-holders in international law. 
This chapter introduces the structure for the final part of the thesis, proposing a 
collective decision-making framework for atoll island peoples threatened by climate 
change inundation that draws inspiration from the General Assembly’s Declaration on 
Friendly Relations (section 6.2). The remainder of the chapter examines option one of 
                                                
798 Cited in Wiseman, supra note 147. Compare Campbell, Goldsmith and Koshy, supra note 114, at 10; 
Kälin and Schrepfer, supra note 73, at 62; Park, supra note 5, at 21. 
799 Western Sahara, supra note 136, at paras.55 and 162. 
800 Compare Vandenhole and Benedek, supra note 230, at 342. After all, ‘existing [legal] institutions … 
cannot provide a perfectly tailored solution’ to the problem of climate change inundation. Wannier and 
Gerrard, supra note 324, at 10. 
801 For objections to doing so, see McAdam, supra note 152. 
802 UNHCR Expert Meeting, ‘The Concept of Stateless Persons under International Law: Summary 
Conclusions’ (27–28 May 2010), at para.I.C.27. Compare ILA, supra note 97; McAdam, supra note 90, at 7. 
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this decision-making framework: finding new territory on which an atoll island people 
can re-establish itself as a ‘sovereign and independent state’. While territory might be 
necessary for statehood and self-determination in a general sense, section 6.3 argues 
that it is attachment to a specific people and its shared governing institutions — rather 
than attachment to a particular territory — that should be preserved here. This paves 
the way for a discussion of the reasons that other states have for and against ceding 
territory to an atoll island people fleeing climate change inundation (section 6.4). The 
chapter concludes by suggesting that the account of territory, statehood and self-
determination set out thus far is somewhat simplistic. Options two and three of the 
proposed decision-making framework — considered in Chapters 7 and 8 — provide 
room for more creative solutions to climate change inundation that detach self-
determination from territory and/or statehood. 
6.2 A collective decision-making framework 
In light of high-level calls for a ‘global guiding framework’ for cross-border climate 
change-related displacement, 803  this section proposes a collective decision-making 
framework that provides atoll island peoples with a set of options to choose from in 
responding to climate change inundation.804 Chapters 6, 7 and 8 examine these options 
in more detail, constructing a moral, political and legal account of the strengths and 
weaknesses of each. In doing so, they provide some content for the right of atoll island 
peoples to self-determination, understood as the right to have their wishes heard and 
taken seriously in determining the steps that are taken in response to climate change 
inundation. 
This decision-making framework draws inspiration from the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations, which sets out various principles of international law, including that of self-
determination.805 According to the Declaration, non-self-governing peoples have three 
options in exercising what James Anaya calls ‘constitutive’ self-determination:806 ‘[t]he 
establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration 
with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely 
                                                
803 Guterres, supra note 330. Compare Nansen Principle IX, Norwegian Refugee Council, supra note 78, at 
5; UNHCR, supra note 75, at 1 and para.12. 
804 On the need for guiding frameworks to address self-determination, see also Hodgkinson and Young, 
supra note 133, at 326–327; Kälin and Schrepfer, supra note 73, at 39–40; McAdam, supra note 90, at 199 and 
255; OHCHR, supra note 13, at para.41; Vidas, supra note 97; Wong, supra note 90, at 45. 
805 GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137. See also Principle VI, GA Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 495; Western 
Sahara, supra note 136, at para.57. 
806 Anaya, supra note 527, at 104–105. 
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determined by a people’.807 Extrapolating from this, this thesis proposes that atoll 
island peoples be granted a similar set of options in continuing to exercise their 
‘ongoing’ self-determination in the face of climate change inundation.808 
The first option — and the subject of this chapter — is the creation (or, in this case, the 
re-establishment) ‘of a sovereign and independent State’ with jurisdiction over a 
defined territory. In choosing this option, an atoll island state must acquire land from 
another state on which to resettle its population, preferably via a treaty of cession that 
transfers full territorial sovereignty from one state to another. From the perspective of 
ideal legal theory, this option is the most straightforward. The territory of the state at 
risk would change, but its population, government and sovereignty would, in theory at 
least, remain intact. In a less-than-ideal world, of course, states will have strong 
reasons both for and against ceding territory, as discussed in section 6.4 below. 
A second option, discussed in Chapter 7, is ‘the emergence into any other political 
status freely determined by a people’. In this case, an atoll island state could pursue an 
alternative form of statehood, perhaps by severing its link with a defined territory and 
permanent population. It might, for example, transition to a so-called ‘deterritorialized 
state’,809 establish a permanent government in exile, or maintain a small outpost on its 
remaining territory from which to govern its dispersed citizens. These options may 
allow an atoll island state to retain its international legal status while abandoning any 
exclusive rights to territory. However, they also require a creative reinterpretation of 
existing legal doctrine and practice on the nature and recognition of states; one that 
leans heavily on what Chapter 7 describes as the ‘ratchet effect’ of statehood. 
The third option, considered in Chapter 8, is to enter into ‘free association or 
integration with an independent State’, a choice that would preserve the collective 
political status of a people but abandon any claim to statehood or exclusive territorial 
jurisdiction. An atoll island people might seek free association, federation or 
integration with another state, with a corresponding guarantee of political autonomy 
within that state. 
While each atoll island state emphasises the importance of collective identity, 
autonomy and sovereignty, they each propose different solutions. The Tuvaluan 
                                                
807 GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137. 
808 Anaya, supra note 527, at 105. 
809 Burkett, supra note 90. 
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government, for example, insists on retaining its sovereign status within its own 
territory,810 while the former President of the Maldives initially announced high-profile 
plans to purchase a new ‘homeland’ within which to resettle the Maldivian 
population. 811  Acknowledging this diversity, the IPCC admits to having ‘low 
confidence in the success of wholesale transfer of adaptation … options when the local 
lenses through which they are viewed differ from one island state to the next’.812 This 
diversity of opinion is reflected in — indeed encouraged by — the decision-making 
framework proposed here. The principle of self-determination does not prescribe one 
fixed outcome; instead, it calls for the recognition of the freely expressed will of the 
peoples concerned. 813  As one Pacific island representative observed at a recent 
consultation on climate change displacement, ‘the international community can help to 
provide the ingredients, but not the recipe’.814 
In emphasising this process of collective decision-making, we move away from the 
story of displaced islanders as ‘refugees without capacity for sovereign self-
determination’ towards the stories told by islanders themselves based on ‘narratives 
other than those of annihilation’815 — narratives of dynamism, mobility and autonomy. 
However, this sense of autonomy and control over the process of resettlement is 
important not only for those who move but also for those who will receive atoll island 
populations.816 As Beitz reminds us, when assessing the protection of human rights 
against new and emerging threats, it is important to consider not only the interests of 
those at risk but also the burdens imposed on those who act. 
This decision-making framework therefore raises significant questions and problems, 
which will need to be addressed in more detail. Which, if any, of these solutions can 
adequately protect the collective autonomy of island peoples? Is territory necessary for 
statehood or self-determination? And, crucially, what reasons do other states have for 
and against contributing to each of these solutions? 
                                                
810 Aedy, supra note 353; Mortreux and Barnett, supra note 32, at 111. 
811 Ramesh, ‘Paradise Almost Lost: Maldives Seek to Buy a New Homeland’, The Guardian (10 November 
2008); Schmidle, supra note 144. 
812 Nurse et al., supra note 11, at 1616. 
813 Contrast with Kälin and Schrepfer’s claim that this diversity of opinion means that it is not yet possible 
to put forward solutions for the resettlement of islanders, implying that some universal solution must first 
be identified. Kälin and Schrepfer, supra note 73, at 62. 
814 Cited in McAdam, supra note 148.  
815 Stratford, Farbotko and Lazrus, supra note 25, at 72. 
816 UNHCR, supra note 788, at 17, para.47. 
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6.3 Self-determination, statehood and territory  
The remainder of this chapter considers the first option in the decision-making 
framework outlined above: finding new territory over which atoll island states can 
exercise territorial sovereignty. Section 6.4 examines the mechanics of this process, as 
well as the reasons that other states might have for — and against — contributing to its 
implementation. First, however, this section explores the dominant legal narrative that 
links people, state and territory in a ‘paradigmatic’ relationship towards which self-
determination aims. 
Legally and politically, independent statehood has long been seen as not only the 
‘central organising idea’817 of the international system but also the pinnacle of self-
determination. As Nathaniel Berman points out, UN practice indicates a ‘strong 
presumption that independence is the preferred result once a legitimate claim [to self-
determination] has been established’.818 Others understand self-determination as ‘a 
principle concerned with the right to be a state’.819 Statehood, after all, provides the 
armour that shields a people from external interference, and the mouthpiece through 
which it speaks internationally.820 
According to the standard narrative of international law, however, states require a 
‘defined territory’:821 a parcel of land within which they can exercise their ‘supreme, 
and normally exclusive, authority’, subject only to the obligations imposed by 
international law.822 The same story that places states at the heart of international law 
therefore also ties statehood firmly to territory. ‘[O]ne cannot’, Philip Jessup has 
argued, ‘contemplate a state as a kind of disembodied spirit … there must be some 
                                                
817 Knop, supra note 790, at 95. 
818 Berman, supra note 593, at 69 (see also 55). Compare H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-
Determination (1996), at 39; Klabbers, supra note 549, at 192. 
819 Crawford, supra note 564, at 107; Crawford, supra note 484, at 141. From a philosophical perspective, 
compare Copp, ‘Democracy and Communal Self-Determination’, in R. McKim and J. McMahan (eds), The 
Morality of Nationalism (1997) 277, at 278; Walzer, ‘The Moral Standing of States’, 9 Philosophy and Public 
Affairs (1980) 209, at 210. 
820 Knop, supra note 790, at 95. 
821 Article 1, Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 165 LNTS 19 (1933). 
822 Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 563. On sovereignty as ‘exclusive authority over territory’, see 
Crawford, supra note 791, at 131; Lachs, supra note 792, at 36; V. Lowe, International Law (2007), at 138; C. 
de Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International Law (1957), at 197. 
     
 
    
153 
portion of the earth’s surface which its people inhabit and over which its government 
exercises authority’.823 
This idea of states as territorial creatures plays several roles in international law. First, 
it demarcates the boundaries within which states exercise jurisdiction.824 While a state 
may exercise personal jurisdiction over its citizens while they are abroad — it may, for 
example, tax their foreign income or try them in absentia — it can enforce these 
decisions only within its own territory.825 Second, it allows us to map out a relatively 
stable set of boundaries between peoples, creating a ‘jigsaw puzzle of solid colour 
pieces fitting neatly together’.826 One state assumes legal responsibility for each jigsaw 
piece, enforcing laws within its boundaries and accepting binding international legal 
obligations without. The stability and integrity of these territorial pieces is bolstered by 
those ‘basic principles of international law’ that protect the sovereign equality, political 
independence and territorial integrity of each state.827 This stability, in turn, is thought 
to underpin international peace and security.828 Third, it carves out a space — a ‘sphere 
of self-government’829 — in which the members of a self-determining people can shape 
and sustain legal and political institutions that reflect their own ideas about what is 
valuable, free from the undue interference of others.830 Territory, in this sense, provides 
                                                
823 Official Records of the 383rd Meeting of the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.383 (2 December 
1948), at 11. Cited in Crawford, supra note 564, at 44. Compare Conference of Yugoslavia Arbitration 
Commission, ‘Opinion No.1’, 31 ILM 1494 (1992), at 1495; Fitzmaurice, ‘Law of Treaties’, II Yearbook of the 
ILC (1956) 104, at 107; Jennings, supra note 480, at 7; Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 563; H. 
Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (1947), at 30; Malanczuk, supra note 279, at 75; American Law 
Institute, Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the US (1987), at §201; S. Sharma, Territorial 
Acquisition, Disputes and International Law (1997), at 2; Shaw, supra note 511, at 1. On the development of the 
idea of states as territorial entities in international law, see Khan, ‘Territory and Boundaries’, in B. 
Fassbender and A. Peters (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (2012) 225. 
824 ‘Territoriality is the primary basis for jurisdiction.’ Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 458. Compare 
Crawford, supra note 791, at 131; Lachs, supra note 792, at 36; Lowe, supra note 822, at 138; de Visscher, 
supra note 822, at 197.  
825 That is, against any assets within its territory, or against the citizen once he or she returns. Jennings 
and Watts, supra note 423, at 462–463. 
826 Knop, supra note 790, at 95. Compare Berman, supra note 593, at 53. 
827 GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137; GA Res. 3281 (XXIX), 12 December 1974; Article 2(4), UN Charter, 
supra note 173. ‘[B]etween independent states, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation 
of international relations.’ Corfu Channel, supra note 225, at 35. 
828 Brownlie, ‘Rebirth of Statehood’, in M. Evans (ed.), Aspects of Statehood and Institutionalism in 
Contemporary Europe (1997) 5, at 6; Jennings, supra note 480, at 70. 
829 Banai, supra note 463, at 49. Moore describes territory as a ‘locus of self-determination’. Moore, supra 
note 599. 
830 Sharma, supra note 823, at 4. 
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‘the physical basis that ensures that people can live together as organised 
communities’831 with a capacity for autonomy and independence.  
Those who theorise about territorial rights are often concerned with the ‘attachment 
problem’,832 going beyond the legal principle of territorial integrity to consider whether 
there is something that attaches specific states or peoples to specific parcels of land in a 
normatively significant way.833 Perhaps, however, it is not attachment to territory that 
is important, but attachment to people.834 The purpose of self-determination, as defined 
in Chapters 4 and 5, is to direct our attention towards the collective autonomy and 
independence of a people, its history of cooperation in shaping and sustaining shared 
political institutions, and its freely expressed wishes in any situation in which these 
come under threat. These are, in Kolers’ terms, juridical rather than terrestrial aims — 
they speak to the shape of political institutions, the content of the law, the protection of 
human rights and so on, rather than to practices of cultivation and systems of land 
tenure.835 While ‘legal jurisdiction over land is useful and perhaps indispensable’ for 
the achievement of these aims, they ‘can, in principle, be achieved anywhere’.836 
This alternative emphasis on people rather than territory is supported not only by 
necessity — after all, if atoll island peoples are to continue to exercise their collective 
autonomy and independence, self-determination must be understood as detachable 
from the specific territory that a people inhabits — but also by legal practice. In Western 
Sahara, for example, the Court found that ‘legal ties’ of sovereignty ‘are normally 
established in relation to people’, not (only) in relation to territory.837 ‘If states are 
                                                
831 Stoutenburg, supra note 90, at 61. Compare Crawford, supra note 791, at 128; Crawford, supra note 484, 
at 204. 
832 Moore, supra note 599; Moore, supra note 590. See also Kolers, ‘Attachment to Territory: Status or 
Achievement?’, 42 Canadian Journal of Philosophy (2012) 101. 
833 From a legal perspective, see, for example, Duursma, supra note 534, at 80; Sharma, supra note 823, at 4. 
From a nationalist perspective, see Miller, supra note 581; Miller, supra note 266, at ch.8; Meisels, ‘Liberal 
Nationalism and Territorial Rights’, 20 Journal of Applied Philosophy (2003) 31. From a Lockean perspective, 
see Nine, ‘A Lockean Theory of Territory’, 56 Political Studies (2008) 148; Simmons, supra note 791. From a 
Kantian perspective, see Buchanan, ‘The Making and Unmaking of Boundaries: What Liberalism has to 
Say’, in A. Buchanan and M. Moore (eds), States, Nations and Borders (2003) 231; Stilz, supra note 584. 
834 Moore herself suggests that our primary attachments are to ‘our projects and to the people who share 
the space with us, to our family and friends and the community which forms the background context in 
which we live our lives’. Moore, ‘Place-Related Attachments and Global Distributive Justice’, 9 Journal of 
Global Ethics (2013) 215, at 217. See also Nine, supra note 91, at 362–363 and 376. 
835 Kolers, supra note 832, at 119. 
836 Ibid. 
837 Western Sahara, supra note 136, at para.85. Compare Kosovo, supra note 542, Sep. Op. Cançado Trindade, 
at 553, para.77. 
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territorial entities’, Crawford observes, ‘then they are also aggregates of individuals’,838 
a point reinforced by the Montevideo Convention, which lists a ‘permanent 
population’ as its first criterion of statehood.839  
This emphasis on the people of a state is also supported by evidence that attachments 
between people and land are robust but not static. History teaches us that there is no 
permanent, unproblematic connection between territory, community and identity: ties 
to land may be severed in one place and recreated elsewhere, and often hold different 
meanings for different people. There is, for example, a growing lack of awareness 
among younger Banabans about the story of relocation from Banaba to Rabi, 
suggesting that its ‘poignancy … fades with time’.840 And Reverend Sumalie of the 
Tuvaluan Church explains that, in New Zealand, where a significant proportion of 
Tuvaluans have already migrated, ‘[w]e teach the Sunday School children the 
language, to make sure that our culture, our language, our identity as Tuvaluan 
[remains], even if Tuvalu disappears in 50 years … we want to maintain our identity as 
Tuvaluans, wherever we travel.’841 
Finally, this emphasis is echoed in the account of the self-determining people 
developed throughout the thesis. Chapter 4 defined a people as the population of a 
state with a history of cooperation in shared political institutions. What is valuable 
here is the relationship — or ‘morally salient bond’842 — between the members of a 
people and their specific governing institutions that arises out of this history, rather 
than the physical space that this people occupies. 
What is called into question here is not the territorial nature of self-determination or 
statehood but the claim that self-determining peoples are necessarily tied to one 
territory in particular. This means that the collective resettlement of a state’s 
population to a new territory need not entail the loss of its international legal status or 
personality. In fact, experts in this field have been at pains to emphasise the continuity 
of states under international law, arguing that ‘the notion and language that such states 
will “disappear” (i.e., lose their international legal personality) or “sink” ought to be 
                                                
838 Crawford, supra note 564, at 52. 
839 Article 1, Montevideo Convention, supra note 821. 
840 McAdam, supra note 782. 
841 Interviewed in Panos Pictures, Tuvalu: Islands on the Frontline of Climate Change (2009). 
842 Stilz, supra note 584, at 591. ‘Respecting a people’s self-determination is a way of honouring this 
relationship.’ Stilz, supra note 587, at 262. 
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avoided’.843 As is discussed further in Chapter 7, states are resilient. ‘A state remains 
one and the same International Person’, Lauterpacht has argued, ‘in spite of changes in 
its headship, in its dynasty, in its form, in its rank and title, and in its territory’.844  
Atoll islanders have also emphasised the importance of retaining their statehood, 
sovereignty and self-determination during the process of collective resettlement. For 
many, independence is a recent achievement and one that is unlikely to be surrendered 
gladly.845 The Foreign Minister of the Marshall Islands has explained that, for the 
Marshallese, ‘the wholesale abandonment of their nationhood is no more acceptable to 
them than it would be to any member state of the UN’.846 The Marshallese government 
therefore insists that ‘a guarantee of sovereignty would be necessary before they would 
wilfully relocate to a foreign nation’.847  
Other atoll island states have proposed finding new territory on which to resettle as 
sovereign states. While Kiribati actively promotes a policy of individual ‘migration 
with dignity’, its government has also recently purchased 6,000 acres of land in Fiji.848 
‘We would hope not to put everyone on [this] one piece of land’, President Anote Tong 
explains, ‘but if it became absolutely necessary, yes, we could do it’.849 And, as Michael 
Gerrard observes, if ‘Fiji were to cede the land … and say it’s no longer within their 
jurisdiction’, then it could become ‘the new Kiribati’.850 Tuvalu has also put forward a 
proposal to resettle the population of Tuvalu in Australia as a ‘state within a state’.851 
Under this proposal, Tuvaluans would retain their citizenship, UN membership and 
economic exclusion zone, in the hope of eventually returning to their homeland. 
However, as is the case with secessionist minority groups, such claims to self-
determination inevitably intersect with the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
                                                
843 UNHCR, supra note 75, at 2 and para.30. Compare McAdam, supra note 90, at 120. 
844 H. Lauterpacht, Oppenheim’s International Law (1955), at 153. This position is still authoritative. See, for 
example, Crawford, supra note 564, at 700. 
845 McAdam, supra note 90, at 156. 
846 John Silk, Foreign Minister of the Marshall Islands, cited in Columbia Law School, ‘Consolidated 
Notes’, Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate (23–25 May 
2011). 
847 Holthus et al., supra note 93, at 73. Compare Nauru’s insistence on recognition as an independent state 
after resettling in Australia. Tabucanon and Opeskin, supra note 396, at 347. 
848 Fiji World News, supra note 436; Lagan, supra note 436. 
849 Cited in Dizard, ‘Plagued by Sea-Level Rise, Kiribati Buys Land in Fiji’, Al-Jazeera (1 July 2014). On 
Tong’s recent emphasis on community resettlement, see ABC News, supra note 117. 
850 Cited in Ward, ‘Planning to Sink: What Happens if Kiribati Drowns?’, PBS Newshour (27 July 2014). 
851 Boom and Lederwasch, ‘Human Rights or Climate Wrongs: Is Tuvalu the Canary in the Coal Mine?’, 
The Conversation (18 October 2011); Crouch, supra note 70; McAdam, supra note 90, at 144–145. 
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political unity of existing states. Cassese goes so far as to describe self-determination as 
‘radically at odds’ with state sovereignty, where the former tends to challenge the 
status quo set by the latter.852 The difference here is that atoll island peoples are already 
recognised as the populations of states: their plight simultaneously challenges and 
seeks to maintain the status quo. 
Atoll island states themselves recognise this difficulty. They typically refer to 
purchasing land rather than ceding territory, thereby leaving the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of host states intact. 853  But is collective resettlement to land 
purchased within the territory of another state a solution that can adequately protect 
the self-determination and statehood of atoll island peoples? The answer is no: 
sovereignty over territory is not straightforwardly analogous to ownership of land or 
property; it ‘is not ownership of but governing power with respect to territory’.854 In 
purchasing land, states engage in a private property transaction, which does not 
transfer sovereignty over land, grant the freedom to exercise extensive autonomy 
within its borders, or even guarantee individual rights to immigration, citizenship or 
the goods these entail.855 Only by securing lawful title to territory elsewhere can an 
atoll island state continue to exercise territorial sovereignty over the land on which its 
people lives. 
How might this be possible? One proposal involves constructing artificial islands on 
which an atoll island population could resettle.856 Several thousand Maldivians have 
already relocated to the artificial island of Hulhumalé, which has been built to house 
up to 150,000 people by piling sand and crushed coral onto a naturally occurring 
reef.857 Hulhumalé has been described as a ‘modern Noah’s Ark’ — a means of 
ensuring that the Maldives maintains its status as a state with sovereignty over its 
population and territory even as climate change inundation renders its original 
                                                
852 Cassese, supra note 475, at 333–335. Compare Berman, supra note 593, at 53; Sharma, supra note 823, at 
8–10, 212 and 219–223. 
853 See, for example, the Maldives’ plans to purchase a new ‘homeland’. Ramesh, supra note 811; 
Schmidle, supra note 144. 
854 Crawford, supra note 564, at 56 (see also 717). Compare Crawford, supra note 484, at 204; Jennings, 
supra note 480, at 2–3. 
855 See discussion in McAdam, supra note 90, at 147–149. 
856 See Yamamoto and Esteban, supra note 26, at 159–170. 
857 Barta, ‘Apathy Sinks Maldives Island’, The Australian (12 January 2008); Gagain, ‘Climate Change, Sea 
Level Rise and Artificial Islands: Saving the Maldives’ Statehood and Maritime Claims through the 
“Constitution of the Ocean”’, 23 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy (2012) 77; 
Joffe-Walt, ‘Future of the Maldives Emerges from the Waves’, Sunday Telegraph (22 August 2004). 
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territory uninhabitable.858 However, with sea levels rising, Hulhumalé is predicted to 
‘buy the islanders perhaps another 50 years’ survival time’, at best.859 Even if it were 
technologically possible to build fully sustainable islands, this solution would be out of 
the financial reach of most atoll island states.860 It is also doubtful whether an artificial 
island built upon a reef like Hulhumalé — let alone an artificial installation like the 
‘floating islands’ proposed by Japan861 — would count for the purposes of territory 
under international law.862  
6.4 Reasons for and against ceding territory 
Another solution — one considered briefly by many but in detail by none863 — requires 
the formal transfer of territory to an atoll island state via a treaty of cession, with the 
agreement of the international community that it constitutes the same state in a new 
location.864 Cession is recognised as one of a handful of traditional modes of territorial 
acquisition, alongside effective occupation, prescription, subjugation and accretion.865 
It involves the transfer of territorial sovereignty from one state to another, by means of 
a bilateral treaty.866 The treaty must make clear that the intention is to cede sovereignty 
over territory; 867  the transfer of (even exclusive) governmental authority is not 
                                                
858 Barta, supra note 857; Gagain, supra note 857, at 82. 
859 Joffe-Walt, supra note 857. 
860 Even the relatively low-tech Hulhumalé has cost over US$60 million so far. Ibid. This is roughly one 
and a half times the GDP of Tuvalu. CIA, supra note 3. 
861 Discussed in Carrick, supra note 71. 
862 Article 60(8), UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1833 UNTS 3, 21 ILM 1261 (1982). See 
also In re. Duchy of Sealand, supra note 588, at 685, and discussion in Rayfuse, supra note 68, at 175–176; 
Schofield and Freestone, ‘Options to Protect Coastlines and Secure Maritime Jurisdictional Claims in the 
Face of Global Sea Level Rise’, in Gerrard and Wannier (eds), supra note 68, 141, at 157. However, see 
Stoutenburg, supra note 90, at 62–63. 
863 Bradley, supra note 306, at 151; Burkett, supra note 90, at 355, note 53; Campbell, supra note 348, at 67; 
Crawford and Rayfuse, supra note 123, at 249–250; Mayer, supra note 404, at 392; Oliver, supra note 437, at 
214 and 238–239; Park, supra note 5, at 18–19; Rayfuse, ‘International Law and Disappearing States: 
Utilising Maritime Entitlements to Overcome the Statehood Dilemma’, UNSW Faculty of Law Research 
Series No.52 (2010), at 8–9; Rayfuse, supra note 68, at 178; Soons, supra note 89, at 230; Stoutenburg, supra 
note 90, at 61; UNHCR, IOM and Norwegian Refugee Council, supra note 95, at 2–3; Wong, supra note 90, 
at 38–39. For exceptions to this, see Kolers, supra note 91; McAdam, supra note 90, at 147–149; Nine, supra 
note 91, at 360. While Yamamoto and Esteban also discuss it in some detail, they repeatedly conflate 
purchase with cession of territory. Yamamoto and Esteban, supra note 26, at 180–198. 
864 Park, supra note 5, at 18; UNHCR, IOM and Norwegian Refugee Council, supra note 95, at 2. 
865 Most of which are no longer considered lawful. Crawford, supra note 484, at 220–236; Jennings, supra 
note 480, at chs.1–2; Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 679–708; Sharma, supra note 823, at ch.2. 
866 Crawford, supra note 484, at 226–227; Dörr, ‘Cession’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
International Law (2006); Jennings, supra note 480, at 6 and 16–18; Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 
679–686; Sharma, supra note 823, at 136–141.  
867 By referring to cession ‘in perpetuity’ or ‘in perpetual sovereignty’. Right of Passage over Indian Territory 
(Portugal v India), ICJ Reports (1960) 6, at 38. 
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sufficient.868 Cession may occur by way of a gift or ‘gratuitous transfer’, in which one 
state voluntarily (or otherwise) gives a portion of its territory to another; the sale of a 
portion of territory from one state to another; or a ‘mutual transfer’, in which one 
portion of territory is exchanged for another.869 Without any territory to trade and 
relatively little money to spend, atoll island states will need to rely on the gratuitous 
cession of territory from another state.870 
Legal scholars roundly applaud this option, describing it as ‘the most straightforward 
and appealing solution’.871 Following the conclusion of a treaty of cession, there is 
‘nothing in international law that would prevent the reconstitution of a state such as 
Kiribati or Tuvalu within an existing state’.872 Yet these same scholars are also briefly 
and unanimously dismissive of it, typically on the grounds of a lack of political will. 
Rayfuse, for example, observes that the ‘political, social and economic ramifications of 
ceding valued and/or inhabited territory may simply exceed the capacities — and 
courage — of existing governments’,873 while McAdam suggests that ‘the political 
likelihood of this happening is remote’.874 
However, while the obstacle of political will is undoubtedly a significant one,875 their 
reluctance to consider states’ reasons for or against ceding territory makes for 
somewhat uninteresting analysis. By examining moral and legal reasons for and 
against ceding territory, this section offers an insight into not only the possibility of the 
cession of territory, but also the feasibility of alternative solutions. If states have good 
reasons for refusing to cede territory to an atoll island people — perhaps because it 
interferes unjustly with their territorial integrity or the self-determination of their 
people — does this mean that they have stronger reasons for ensuring the ongoing 
                                                
868 Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 680. 
869 Ibid, at 679–682; Verzijl, supra note 473, at 366–378; Sharma, supra note 823, at 137–138. The first type 
generally occurs under compulsion via a peace treaty, although the transfer of Venice from Austria to 
France then France to Italy in 1866 is an exception. Examples of cession by sale include the transfer of 
Alaska by Russia to the US for $7,200,000 in 1867, and of the Philippines by Spain to the US for $20,000,000 
in 1898. 
870 Unless some international fund is established to contribute to the purchase of territory. See, for 
example, Biermann and Boas, supra note 328; Hodgkinson and Young, supra note 133, at 317–319; Mayer, 
supra note 404, at 413; Oliver, supra note 437, at 238–240. 
871 Rayfuse, supra note 68, at 178. Compare Oliver, supra note 437, at 214 and 242; Wong, supra note 90, at 
38. 
872 McAdam, supra note 90, at 147. 
873 Rayfuse, supra note 68, at 178. Compare Crawford and Rayfuse, supra note 123, at 249–250. 
874 McAdam, supra note 90, at 147. Compare Bradley, supra note 306, at 151; Campbell, supra note 348, at 
67; Wong, supra note 90, at 38; Yamamoto and Esteban, supra note 26, at 188–190 and 195–195. 
875 See further Kälin and Schrepfer, supra note 73, at 68–69; McAdam, supra note 90, at 197–199; 
McAnaney, supra note 90, at 1201–1204; Wyman, supra note 319, at 365–367. 
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recognition of atoll island states as ‘deterritorialized’ entities (Chapter 7) or agreeing to 
merge with an atoll island state in federation or free association (Chapter 8)?  
Responding to the cynicism of others, this section begins with reasons against acting, 
before moving on to consider whether the reasons for acting outlined in previous 
chapters provide a convincing response. 
6.4.1 Reasons against acting 
Alongside other guiding principles of international law,876 self-determination ‘can be 
fundamental to the law of territorial acquisition’.877 Indeed, ‘there can be no doubt that 
so lively a legal principle has a part to play in the determination of territorial 
sovereignty’.878 But what role does or should it play in the context of climate change 
inundation? 
Here, the question of the relationship between self-determination and territorial 
integrity arises again — a question to which international law provides an ambiguous 
answer.879 Is self-determination, as Cassese suggests, a precocious upstart whose aim is 
to challenge the status quo protected by the latter? Or is it a tool of the establishment; a 
right granted only to ‘historically pre-constituted political entities with a specific 
territory’, 880  which must be exercised ‘consistently with the maintenance of the 
territorial integrity of states’?881 Unlike the secessionist groups around which this case 
law has developed, atoll island peoples are themselves ‘historically pre-constituted 
political entities with a specific territory’ — and yet, in the face of climate change 
inundation, they may seek territory elsewhere within which to reconstitute themselves 
as territorially sovereign entities.  
Today, however, there is little or no territory that is left unclaimed by states, and 
international law provides strong protections for the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
                                                
876 Including uti possidetis, equity, contiguity and historical continuity. Crawford, supra note 484, at 237–
240; Jennings, supra note 480, at 74–78; Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 716; Sharma, supra note 823, 
at ch.2. 
877 Sharma, supra note 823, at 213 (see also 166–167 and 221–249). 
878 Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 713.  
879 For one notable attempt to answer this question in the case of decolonisation, see Berman, supra note 
593. 
880 Oeter, supra note 484, at 326.  
881 Reference re Secession of Quebec, supra note 508, at paras.122 and 126. Compare Conference of Yugoslavia 
Arbitration Commission, supra note 626. 
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and political unity of these states.882 In seeking new territory within which the people 
of an atoll island state can re-establish itself as a self-determining community, 
therefore, we inevitably encounter other peoples exercising their own rights to self-
determination and territorial integrity. However, this perversely reaffirms the claim 
made in Chapters 4 and 5: that the right to self-determination protects a human interest 
that is widely recognised as important, and should therefore be taken into account in 
addressing the problem of climate change inundation. A paradox thus emerges: it is 
precisely because self-determination is seen as such an important value (and is so 
closely tied to territory and statehood) that islanders will find it difficult to obtain new 
territory within which to resettle as self-determining peoples. As Pomerance observes, 
claims to self-determination are typically put forward ‘in opposition to other self-
determination claims, and not to non-self-determination, or anti-self-determination, 
claims’.883  
A similar point was made earlier with respect to the ‘radical monopoly’ of the state 
system. In order to retain access to the benefits of statehood, atoll island peoples must 
continue to be recognised as states, where this is thought to require sovereignty over 
territory — yet their path is blocked by the monopoly that states hold over the earth’s 
surface.884 Again, it is precisely because statehood is seen as such an important status 
(and is so closely tied to territorial sovereignty) that states arguably have strong 
reasons against ceding territory to atoll island peoples. Statehood thus becomes both 
the telos of self-determination and ‘concomitantly a constraint thereon’.885  
One reason against ceding territory to an atoll island people therefore arises from the 
territorial integrity and political unity of existing states. Principles of sovereignty and 
territorial integrity are thought to underpin peace and stability both within and 
                                                
882
 GA Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 495, at paras.4, 6 and 7; GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137; GA Res. 
3281 (XXIX), supra note 827, at ch.1; Article 2(4), UN Charter, supra note 173. The ‘inviolability of a state’s 
territory is now … firmly and peremptorily established’. Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 416. 
Compare Hannum, ‘Self-Determination in the Twenty-First Century’, in E. Babbit and H. Hannum (eds), 
Negotiating Self-Determination (2006) 61, at 76. The permanence of existing territorial boundaries is 
reinforced by the principle of uti possidetis. See Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), ICJ Reports 
(1986) 554, at paras.23–24; Conference of Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, supra note 626. 
883 Pomerance, supra note 480, at 73. Compare Hannum, supra note 818, at 31; Klabbers, supra note 549, at 
188–190. 
884 The ‘self-determination of any group whose territory is destroyed, or made unusable … is threatened 
with extinction because of the group’s lack of access to the territories of others’. Nine, supra note 91, at 366. 
885 French, ‘Introduction’, in French (ed.), supra note 158, 1, at 5. 
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between states,886 and are thus of ‘paramount importance’.887 From this perspective, the 
suggestion that a state might have reasons for ceding territory to an atoll island people 
challenges the values at the heart of both statehood and international peace and 
security. The right to self-determination, McAdam concludes, ‘does not operate so as to 
give the inhabitants of these states a right to claim land in other states’.888 
The difficulty with making this argument, however, is that the first stone has already 
been cast. As island leaders have been at pains to emphasise — and as the IPCC has 
recognised in its latest report889 — climate change inundation already threatens the 
‘sovereignty’, ‘security and territorial integrity’ of atoll island states.890 The cession of 
territory to an atoll island state might therefore be understood as an attempt to protect, 
rather than subvert, principles of territorial integrity and state sovereignty and, as a 
consequence, international peace and security. If the question here is how the 
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity should be interpreted and 
implemented in order to best protect the peace and stability of the international 
community, then the answer is far from obvious. At the very least, the assumption that 
the territorial boundaries of existing states must be maintained at all costs cannot be 
made unproblematically. 
A second reason against acting also derives from the sovereignty of potential host 
states, but relates to the lived experience of citizens and their institutions, rather than 
the state as embodied in abstract legal principles. This is the concern that the admission 
of islanders may undermine the collective autonomy or shared way of life of the 
people of a host state. The capacity to make decisions about who can enter and remain 
within the borders of a state is typically understood as one facet of the sovereignty and 
autonomy of a self-determining people.891 Without it, Walzer argues, ‘there could not 
be communities of character, stable, ongoing associations of men and women with 
                                                
886 Sharma, supra note 823, at 5. On the UN’s preference for maintaining stable territorial boundaries, see, 
for example, Rigo Sureda, supra note 484, at 216–217. 
887 Cassese, supra note 475, at 122. Compare Crawford, ‘Democracy and the Body of International Law’, in 
G. Fox and B. Roth (eds), Democratic Governance and International Law (2000) 91, at 95–98. 
888 McAdam, supra note 725, at 122, note 103. Compare McAdam, supra note 90, at 147; Oliver, supra note 
437, at 239; Wyman, supra note 123, at 209. 
889 Atoll island states are ‘experiencing major challenges to their territorial integrity’ and ‘sovereignty’. 
Adger et al., supra note 63, at 758, 771 and 775. Compare IPCC, supra note 29, at 20. 
890 See comments made by delegates from the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru and Palau during the 
63rd Session of the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/63/PV.9 (25 September 2008). Cited in McAdam, supra 
note 90, at 122–123. Compare Republic of the Marshall Islands, supra note 131. 
891 Kälin and Schrepfer, supra note 73, at 67; Solomon and Warner, supra note 331, at 249. 
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some special commitment to one another and some sense of their common life’.892 
Again, we encounter competing claims to self-determination: one seeking refuge 
within another state; the other seeking protection against such intrusion. 
In the case of an atoll island people seeking sovereignty over new territory, however — 
unlike the solutions discussed elsewhere in this thesis, including planned migration 
(Chapter 3), deterritorialized statehood (Chapter 7) and free association or integration 
(Chapter 8) — there would be no dilution of the autonomy or shared way of life of a 
receiving people. Islanders would move to a parcel of land carved out from the host 
state’s territory and ceded to them, allowing the host people to sustain its collective 
autonomy within its remaining territory. Curiously, Walzer himself makes this point, 
using the example of a ‘White Australia’ faced with swarms of desperate refugees. 
Members of White Australia could ‘yield land for the sake of homogeneity, or they 
could give up homogeneity (agree to the creation of a multiracial society) for the sake 
of the land’.893 While the cession of territory may otherwise require stronger reasons for 
acting than the other solutions discussed in this thesis — primarily because it 
challenges the territorial integrity of the host state — on this count, it may in fact place 
less of a burden on receiving populations and therefore require less weighty reasons 
for acting. 
A third set of reasons against ceding territory arises where this would impose 
unreasonable costs on the population of a host state.894 If the cession of territory would 
compromise the ability of a host state to protect the human rights of its citizens — for 
example, by removing access to valuable infrastructure, agricultural land or natural 
resources, or increasing the risk of ‘overcrowding, exploitation and unsafe living 
conditions’895 — it may have good reasons against doing so. 
Yet the costs of ceding territory to an atoll island people would not be great, and 
certainly not significant enough to interfere with the human rights of the current 
residents of Australia or New Zealand. Even when compared with the relatively small 
landmass of New Zealand (267,710 square kilometres), Tuvalu (26 square kilometres), 
Kiribati (811 square kilometres) and the Maldives (298 square kilometres) have a 
                                                
892 Walzer, supra note 429, at 62. 
893 Ibid, at 47. Bradley points out the racist connotations of such a policy. Bradley, supra note 306, at 151. 
See also A. Kolers, Land, Conflict and Justice (2009), at 147–150. 
894 On the duty to address climate change-related harms only where the costs of acting are not 
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895 Johnson, supra note 423, at 322. 
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negligible landmass, much of which remains uninhabited.896 Even if Australia were to 
cede territory to all three states, this would amount to far less than 1% of its land.897 
While this loss of territory would affect only a handful of states,898 the burdens 
imposed on those states may be offset by certain financial or legal concessions, 
including greater flexibility in meeting other climate change-related obligations.899 The 
financial costs associated with identifying land, consulting with affected communities, 
transporting islanders and building housing and infrastructure could also be shared 
among other actors — particularly those states that have reasons for acting but do not 
themselves cede territory — via a new or existing international funding scheme.900 
And, provided that island states’ maritime zones are maintained,901 the income from 
these assets could also contribute to ‘the relocation and continued livelihood of the 
displaced population’.902 
Thus, if distributed equitably among the taxpayers of the host state and other 
contributing states, the costs associated with the cession of territory should not deprive 
receiving populations of access to the goods and services associated with the 
enjoyment of human rights. Nor would they be required to adopt new immigration 
laws, modify their governing institutions or accept the dilution of their collective 
autonomy or shared way of life. It is also important to remember that, as observed in 
Chapter 2, supporting the collective resettlement of atoll island peoples — even where 
this involves ceding territory — will, in many cases, be less financially costly than 
committing to timely and effective mitigation strategies, at least in the short term. The 
collective resettlement of atoll island states to new territory therefore appears possible 
‘without serious sacrifice of our own ends’.903  
However, the burdens associated with the cession of territory are likely to be 
distributed inequitably, not only between states (as discussed above), but also between 
                                                
896 For example, only around 200 of the Maldives’ 1,190 islands are inhabited. CIA, supra note 3. 
897 Covering 7,741,220 square kilometres. Ibid. 
898 Lister, supra note 130, at 628. 
899 Heyward and Ödalen, supra note 123, at 17–18 and 21; Mayer, supra note 404, at 404. 
900 Biermann and Boas, supra note 328, at 76; McAdam, supra note 90, at 253–254 and 259–260; Talakai, 
‘Climate Conversations: Small Island States Need Action on Climate Loss and Damage’, Thomson Reuters 
Foundation (30 August 2012); Yamamoto and Esteban, supra note 26, at 165–171. See also sources supra note 
870. 
901 Caron, supra note 89; Rayfuse, supra note 68; Soons, supra note 89; Yamamoto and Esteban, supra note 
26, at ch.5. 
902 Rayfuse, supra note 133, at 11. 
903 Nagel, ‘The Problem of Global Justice’, 33 Philosophy and Public Affairs (2005) 113, at 131. 
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individuals. While every attempt should be made to identify territory that is both 
uninhabited and habitable,904 this may not always be possible. Where it is not, special 
consideration must be given to those living within the boundaries of the territory that 
is to be ceded.905 Any treaty of cession will need to clarify their legal status if they 
choose to remain, and compensate for the considerable disruption to their lives that 
leaving — even voluntarily — will entail. After all, the right to occupy a certain place 
without fear of displacement underpins most of the goods we pursue in life, including 
our livelihood, property, cultural values, spiritual beliefs and relationships.906  
Yet it is important to recall that these burdens of upheaval and dislocation will fall 
heavily on both sides — indeed, with few exceptions, the threat posed by climate 
change inundation to the lives, livelihoods, sovereignty and self-determination of atoll 
island peoples far outweighs the burden that their resettlement would impose on host 
states and their citizens.907 The problem lies in how best to minimise these burdens. 
One way of doing so is to ensure that both relocating and receiving populations are 
‘informed, consulted and able to participate actively in relevant decisions and their 
implementation’,908 a requirement echoed in Article 6 of the UNFCCC.909  
While this requires that the wishes of atoll island peoples be heard and taken into 
account in determining whether and where new territory is sought, it also requires that 
members of the receiving population participate in decisions about which territory is to 
be ceded — provided that it meets certain criteria relating to size, habitability, access to 
land and maritime resources and so on.910 While a state’s territory was, historically, 
seen as its ‘realty’, free to be sold, leased, inherited, conquered or bequeathed ‘with 
                                                
904 Kolers, supra note 832, at 115–116; Kolers, supra note 91, at 334–335 and 340; Nine, supra note 91, at 371–
372. 
905 Lister, supra note 130, at 628; Lister, ‘Self-Determination, Dissent, and the Problem of Population 
Transfers’, in F. Teson (ed.), The Problem of Self-Determination (forthcoming); Yamamoto and Esteban, supra 
note 26, at 195. 
906 Campbell, supra note 348, at 64; Moore, supra note 834, at 217–219; Stilz, supra note 584, at 582–585. 
907 Ferris, supra note 317, at 15–18; Heyward and Ödalen, supra note 123, at 16. 
908 Nansen Initiative, supra note 96, at 5. On the need for long-term planning and consultation, see Barnett 
and Campbell, supra note 12, at 173; Campbell, supra note 348, at 78; Campbell, Goldsmith and Koshy, 
supra note 114, at 6, 34 and 43–44; Ferris, supra note 317, at 10 and 20; Ferris, Cernea and Petz, supra note 
16, at 32; Park, supra note 5, at 20-21; UNHCR, IOM and Norwegian Refugee Council, supra note 95 at 3. 
909 UNFCCC, supra note 102. Compare Articles 1, 3 and 6, Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention), 
2161 UNTS 447 (1999); Principle 10, Rio Declaration, supra note 387. 
910 Nine, supra note 91, at 370–372. Compare Simmons, ‘Historical Rights and Fair Shares’, 14 Law and 
Philosophy (1995) 149, at 168.  
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little or no regard for the wishes of the inhabitants’, 911  the principle of self-
determination has more recently played a role in deciding ‘whether territory should be 
conveyed at all, and to whom’.912 Today, the cession of territory requires at least the 
‘full consent of the governments concerned’913 as well as, in certain states, the consent 
of the population.914  
In both cases, a plebiscite or referendum is the best tool for formalising this process.915 
During the decolonisation period, these were typically used to determine a people’s 
‘free and voluntary choice’, often with UN supervision.916 In 1963, Jennings suggested 
that the plebiscite ‘still has a part to play’ in resolving questions of territory and self-
determination, and — as a device for determining the ‘freely expressed wishes’ of both 
relocating and host peoples — this arguably still holds true.917 While the relevant 
population for the purposes of any referendum would be the population of the state as 
a whole — after all, the ‘peoples’ with which we are concerned are the populations of 
existing states — the wishes of any inhabitants of the land that is to be ceded might be 
granted additional weight in light of the heavier burdens they are expected to carry. 
6.4.2 Reasons for acting 
Having discussed — and, to some extent, addressed — three sets of reasons that states 
may have against ceding territory to atoll island peoples, we turn now to the reasons 
they may have for doing so. According to the account of self-determination developed 
so far, states have an obligation to take seriously the free and genuine expression of the 
will of atoll island peoples in deciding how to respond to climate change inundation. 
However, in the event that islanders wish to reconstitute themselves as a state 
elsewhere, must the cession of territory be ‘entirely reliant on goodwill and 
                                                
911 Crawford, supra note 484, at 216. 
912 Jennings, supra note 480, at 69 and 79. Compare Sharma, supra note 823, at 166–167; Jennings and 
Watts, supra note 423, at 684 and 716. 
913 G. Schwarzenberger, International Law (1957), at 303. Cited in Sharma, supra note 823, at 136. 
914 Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 680. See further Crawford, supra note 484, at 243; Jennings, supra 
note 480, at 6 and 17–18; Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 684; Oliver, supra note 437, at 238. Compare 
Principle 2, Atlantic Charter, supra note 561. 
915 Crawford, supra note 484, at 245–248. For a case in which cession was subject to a plebiscite, see German 
Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 1926 PCIJ Series A, No.7. For the possibility of cession by the people of a 
territory, see Sammut v. Strickland, [1938] AC 678. Recent examples of plebiscites include East Timor and 
South Sudan. See Crawford, supra note 484, at 243. 
916 Principle IX(b), GA Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 495; Western Sahara, supra note 136, at paras.57–58. On 
the means of exercising a right of self-determination, see Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 288 and 
713–715; Rigo Sureda, supra note 484, at 294–324. 
917 Jennings, supra note 480, at 78–79. Compare Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 684. 
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humanitarian generosity’,918 or do states have other reasons for ceding — or otherwise 
supporting the transfer of — territory?919 
In the interests of not repeating the detailed material on reasons for acting set out in 
previous chapters, this chapter focuses on those states identified in Chapter 3 as having 
the strongest reasons for acting to assist those fleeing climate change inundation in the 
Pacific region: Australia and New Zealand. While other states were also identified as 
having reasons for providing financial or technological support (including more 
distant affluent states, such as Canada, Germany, France, the US and the UK), or 
temporarily hosting islanders while a more permanent solution can be found 
(including less affluent neighbouring states, such as Fiji or Papua New Guinea), the 
cumulative weight of the reasons for acting held by Australia and New Zealand 
suggests that they are the most likely candidates for ceding territory to atoll island 
peoples, at least in the Pacific region. 
Reasons of peremptory force 
As explained in Chapters 4 and 5, self-determination is recognised as a jus cogens norm 
of customary international law and a source of obligations erga omnes, reflecting its 
fundamental importance in international law. It therefore provides states with 
significant legal reasons for assisting atoll island peoples threatened by climate change 
inundation. In fact, ‘insofar as climate change poses a threat to the right of peoples to 
self-determination, states have a duty to take positive action, individually and jointly, 
to address and avert this threat’.920 
However, as suggested in Chapter 5, the legal weight associated with reasons for 
assisting atoll island peoples may vary depending on the type of action required. 
According to Duursma, in any situation in which it disrupts the territorial integrity of 
an existing state, self-determination will normally ‘not have the status of jus cogens, but 
that of an ordinary norm of international law’ from which states can derogate921 — 
                                                
918 Oliver, supra note 437, at 238. 
919
 For an argument in the affirmative, see Nine, supra note 91, at 360–363; Nine, supra note 833, at 163–
164. Nine argues that a Lockean proviso is ‘triggered when the self-determination of a group is threatened 
because of the territorial dispositions of other groups’. Nine, supra note 91, at 363. 
920 OHCHR, supra note 13, at para.41. 
921 Duursma, supra note 534, at 103. On the idea that self-determination should not ‘dismember or impair, 
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states’, see GA 
Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137; GA Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 495; Article 46(1), UNDRIP, supra note 504. 
However, Judge Dillard has argued that it is ‘unlikely’ that ‘a principle of territorial integrity overriding 
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although Duursma admits that, in certain cases, ‘the right of self-determination offsets 
the inviolability of the territorial integrity’ of an existing state.922 Where a solution 
conflicts with the territorial integrity of existing states, the reasons that states have for 
implementing this solution may therefore not carry the full weight of a peremptory 
legal norm. That is, while states may decide to cede territory to an atoll island state in 
recognition of their reasons for acting more generally, they may not be required to do 
so as a matter of peremptory international law. However, states that choose not to cede 
territory will therefore have stronger reasons for acting to assist atoll island peoples in 
a way that does not interfere with their territorial integrity — perhaps by hosting a 
deterritorialized island state (Chapter 7) or joining with an atoll island state in free 
association or federation (Chapter 8). 
Reasons of international cooperation 
The need for ‘joint and separate action’ to address climate change inundation is 
emphasised by calls for international cooperation and burden sharing in the UN 
Charter, international human rights law and, more recently, in the context of climate 
change.923 In its report on the relationship between human rights and climate change, 
for example, the OHCHR describes international cooperation as ‘not only expedient 
but a human rights obligation’.924 Like reasons arising from jus cogens and erga omnes 
norms, these reasons are general in nature, applying not just to Australia and New 
Zealand, but to most, if not all, members of the international community. However, 
earlier chapters identified an exception to this rule. Where one state has made a prior 
legal or political commitment to another — as with the existing migration pathways 
established between New Zealand, Australia, Tuvalu and Kiribati925 — this underpins 
a specific obligation of international cooperation between them. Australia and New 
Zealand have also indicated their support for island peoples facing climate change 
inundation. Australia, for example, has made clear that it ‘is particularly concerned 
                                                                                                                                          
the right of the people to self-determination’ could be established. Western Sahara, supra note 136, Sep. Op. 
Dillard, at 120, note 1. Judge de Castro similarly found that any historical legal ties with the territory 
‘cannot stand in the way of the application of the principle of self-determination’. Western Sahara, supra 
note 136, Sep. Op. de Castro, at 171. Compare Sharma, supra note 823, at 313. 
922 Duursma, supra note 534, at 80. 
923 OHCHR, supra note 13, at para.84; Republic of the Maldives, supra note 21, at 8 and 76–78; UNHCR, 
supra note 75, at para.43. 
924 OHCHR, supra note 13, at para.99. 
925 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, supra note 352; Australian Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship, supra note 372; Immigration New Zealand, supra note 371. 
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with the effect of climate change on low-lying small island states’ and is ‘taking a 
leadership role in addressing climate change issues within the Asia-Pacific region’.926 
Building on states’ procedural obligation to ‘coordinate with each other’927 to ensure 
that the burdens of acting to assist atoll island peoples are shared between them, these 
more specific reasons of international cooperation might also provide the basis for a 
regional burden-sharing arrangement, in which different states play different roles, 
depending on their resources and capacity. As Richard and Charlotte Bedford have 
argued, ‘it is incumbent on the governments of New Zealand and Australia, the two 
most developed Pacific Islands forum countries, to work in collaboration with other 
Pacific states, including Fiji, to develop a coherent regional strategy’ to facilitate the 
collective resettlement of atoll island populations.928 
Reasons of contribution 
With consistently high greenhouse gas emissions per capita, Australia and New 
Zealand, along with other high-emitting states, also have specific reasons for acting 
arising from their contribution to the problem of climate change inundation.929 As 
Annex I and II states parties to the UNFCCC, they are required to ‘assist the 
developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects’.930 Where in situ 
adaptation becomes impossible due to the cumulative effects of climate change 
inundation, this assistance will need to take other forms — including, perhaps, the 
cession of territory to atoll island peoples seeking to re-establish themselves elsewhere.  
Reasons of capacity  
In terms of their capacity to act more effectively than others, Australia and New 
Zealand both recognise that they have particular obligations to the populations of 
Tuvalu and Kiribati arising from ‘proximity and neighbourhood’, which apply ‘over 
and above the obligations that might exist in a total global context’.931 Moreover, in 
                                                
926 Government of Australia, supra note 442.  
927 Principle 30, Maastricht Principles, supra note 282. See also commentary in de Schutter et al., supra note 
263, at 1149–1150. 
928 Bedford and Bedford, supra note 92, at 128. Compare Kostakos et al., supra note 409, at 12. 
929 Wyman, supra note 319, at 363; Yamamoto and Esteban, supra note 26, at 210. 
930 Article 4(4), UNFCCC, supra note 102. 
931 Bedford, interviewed on Carrick, supra note 71. Compare Bedford and Bedford, supra note 92, at 94–95; 
Collett, supra note 410, at vii; Kostakos et al., supra note 409, at 12.  
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terms of their capacity to absorb the costs of acting more easily, Australia and New 
Zealand have both a high GDP per capita and a small population relative to their 
landmass, with large, sparsely populated regions.932 As observed in the previous 
section, even if Australia were to cede territory to Kiribati, Tuvalu and the Maldives, 
this would represent a negligible fraction of its total area. 
During lengthy negotiations over the collective resettlement of the Nauruan people, 
the Australian government identified Curtis Island — with sufficient space, arable soil 
and access to employment opportunities on the mainland — as a possible location for a 
self-governing Nauruan community. It was willing to purchase the land from its 
existing owners, build housing and infrastructure and grant the Nauruan people 
freehold title over the island.933 While the solution on offer was one of integration 
rather than the cession of territory to an independent state, this example nevertheless 
demonstrates Australia’s capacity to provide a discrete piece of territory within which 
a displaced island people could resettle. 
Finally, it is worth reiterating the somewhat counterintuitive point made earlier about 
the burdens imposed by this particular solution. On the one hand, the cession of 
territory may require stronger reasons for acting because of the challenge it presents to 
the territorial integrity of existing states. On the other hand, it may require less weighty 
reasons for acting precisely because it requires that host states cede territory to, rather 
than absorb the populations of, atoll island states. Where a host state is concerned 
about the potential constraints imposed on the collective autonomy of its own people, 
this solution allows it to carve off a small parcel of land while preserving the legal, 
social and political institutions that its people has shaped and sustained over time. The 
burdens imposed upon it may in fact be more reasonable where it is required to cede 
territory to an island state rather than to accommodate a deterritorialized state or 
autonomous island people within its borders. 
In sum, Australia and New Zealand have reasons for ceding territory arising from 
obligations of international cooperation (particularly where existing migration 
agreements are taken into account); from their contribution to the greenhouse gas 
emissions that cause climate change inundation; and from their capacity to act, 
                                                
932 Australia has around three people per square kilometre and New Zealand around 15. World Atlas, 
‘Countries of the World by Highest Population Density’, accessible at www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/ 
populations/ctydensityh.htm These criteria are found in Wyman, supra note 90, at 461–463. 
933 Tabucanon and Opeskin, supra note 396, at 346–347. 
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understood in terms of their ability to act effectively (on the basis of their proximity 
and cultural ties to Tuvalu and Kiribati) and to absorb the burdens of acting (on the 
basis of their available land and relative affluence). The cumulative weight of these 
reasons suggests that these states can, and should, bear primary responsibility for 
acting to address the harms of climate change inundation in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Whether these outweigh the reasons against ceding territory identified above is a 
question that this thesis cannot definitively answer; at best, it can attempt to clarify the 
scope and content of these reasons, leaving the final decision to atoll island peoples, 
prospective host states, and other legal and political actors. 
6.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has laid the groundwork for the final part of the thesis by proposing a 
collective decision-making framework through which atoll island peoples can identify 
their preferred response to climate change inundation. It has also examined the reasons 
that states may have for and against implementing the first option in this framework: 
the transfer of territory to an atoll island people via a treaty of cession.  
Yet the narrative set out in this chapter — of the international legal system as a fixed 
‘jigsaw puzzle of solid colour pieces fitting neatly together’, in which the relationship 
between state, territory and people is clearly delineated — is somewhat problematic. 
As the issue of climate change inundation makes painfully obvious, the pieces often do 
not fit neatly together to produce a coherent map: the reality is, in fact, ‘messier, 
overlapping, with gaps here and there’.934 We therefore need to think more creatively 
about territory, about the relationship between territory, state and self-determining 
people, and about the nature of self-determination as a ‘plethora of possible solutions’, 
rather than a ‘rigid absolute right’ to sovereignty and independence within a defined 
territory.935 
This is where alternative solutions, such as the second and third options in the 
proposed decision-making framework, become relevant. Can an atoll island state 
preserve its existing territory by shoring up whatever land is left to create enough 
space to house a small outpost population? Can it borrow a portion of someone else’s 
territory from which to govern in exile, perhaps indefinitely? Can it share territory, for 
                                                
934 Knop, supra note 790, at 95. 
935 Pomerance, supra note 480, at 74. 
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example via some kind of merger, federation or intrastate autonomy agreement? Or, 
can it do away with territory altogether, by calling on the international community to 
recognise a new category of ‘deterritorialized’ state? And do these solutions require us 
to rethink the dominant legal understanding of statehood, in order to ensure that atoll 
island peoples retain their capacity for collective autonomy and independence in the 
face of climate change inundation, and to better reflect the demands of a world in 
which territory and other resources are becoming ever scarcer?  
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7. Self-Determination and ‘Deterritorialized’ Statehood 
7.1 Introduction 
As observed in Chapter 6, contemporary international law works to sustain a state 
system that operates, with a handful of exceptions, as a ‘radical monopoly’.936 This 
system is one in which states exercise territorial jurisdiction, negotiate treaties, bring 
complaints before the ICJ, exercise sovereignty over natural resources and maritime 
zones and provide the legal and political infrastructure within which individual and 
collective human rights are protected. ‘Evidently’, Nico Schrijver observes, ‘being (or 
having) a state still matters’.937 
Again, as with Chapter 6, this chapter takes statehood as its starting point, 
acknowledging the centrality of states within the international community and the 
‘strong preference’ for independent statehood as the goal of self-determination.938 
However, unlike Chapter 6, it moves away from the simplistic narrative connecting 
state, territory and people in favour of an alternative account of statehood and self-
determination that abandons any essential ties to territory. While state sovereignty 
may indeed be the ‘standard operating assumption’ of the international legal order,939 
this need not entail an unwavering commitment to one model of statehood. 
This chapter examines the second option in the decision-making framework proposed 
in Chapter 6: the ‘emergence into any other political status freely determined by a 
people’.940 The category of ‘any other political status’, a ‘slight but significant’ addition 
to the list of options set out in the Declaration on Friendly Relations, leaves space for 
‘unusual constitutional or other arrangements’.941 It is underdeveloped in international 
law, but is understood here as an alternative form of statehood in which the ties 
between state, population and territory are severed. As its territory gradually becomes 
uninhabitable and its citizens move elsewhere, an atoll island state might, for example, 
maintain a small outpost population on its remaining territory to act as a ‘legal anchor’ 
for its dispersed citizens, establish a permanent government-in-exile, or transition to a 
                                                
936 Kolers, supra note 91, at 334. 
937 Schrijver, ‘The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty’, 70 BYIL (2000) 65, at 66. Compare Crawford, 
supra note 564, at 31. 
938 Berman, supra note 593, at 55. 
939 Crawford, supra note 791, at 132. 
940 GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137. 
941 Hannum, supra note 818, at 41. It does not appear in the earlier GA Res. 1541, supra note 495. 
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‘deterritorialized state’. This second option therefore moves away from the traditional 
concept of the state as a territorially defined entity, towards an alternative account of 
the state as embodied in its citizens. ‘If states are territorial entities,’ Crawford 
observes, ‘then they are also aggregates of individuals’942 — and it is these groups to 
whom self-determination matters. 
Transitioning to a ‘deterritorialized’ status may allow an atoll island state to remain a 
sovereign state with international legal personality. However, it also requires a creative 
re-interpretation of existing legal doctrine and practice on the nature and recognition 
of states. According to the oft-cited definition set out in the Montevideo Convention, a 
state must have a permanent population living in a defined territory with an effective 
government and the capacity to enter into relations with others of its kind.943 However, 
while this constitutes an apparently straightforward ‘minimum threshold’ for 
statehood, this threshold becomes problematic at the margins of statehood, where 
difficult questions arise about the scope and content of the category of states. This is 
particularly relevant in the case of climate change inundation. In decoupling statehood 
from territory, the proposals considered in this chapter fail to meet the minimum 
threshold established by the Montevideo Convention. If we are to assess whether the 
legal status of atoll island states can be preserved, even after their territory becomes 
uninhabitable, we must therefore find some way of understanding statehood that 
accommodates entities that do not pass this threshold.  
One task of this chapter is, therefore, to suggest an alternative account of statehood — 
one that relies on a series of overlapping similarities between states, rather than a clear 
binary distinction between state and non-state. While this account is not without 
problems, it provides the conceptual space in which to assess whether or not an atoll 
island state can and should remain a state and, therefore, unlike the minimum 
threshold account, offers a starting point for further discussion. 
A second task is to assess whether the alternative forms of statehood considered here 
can adequately protect the autonomy, independence and self-determination of atoll 
island peoples, without placing an unreasonable burden on states elsewhere. Do host 
states have sufficient reason to recognise and accommodate the sovereignty of 
deterritorialized atoll island states? If, instead, they are prepared to grant 
                                                
942 Crawford, supra note 564, at 52. 
943 Article 1, Montevideo Convention, supra note 821. 
     
 
    
175 
deterritorialized states only a limited subset of jurisdictional competences, what space 
does this leave for self-determination? 
This chapter begins by critiquing the widely adopted ‘minimum threshold’ account of 
statehood — according to which all states meet each of the criteria set out in the 
Montevideo Convention — both in general (section 7.2) and in the specific context of 
climate change inundation (section 7.3). An alternative account of statehood is 
proposed, drawing on Wittgenstein’s idea of ‘family resemblances’ (section 7.4). This 
alternative account views the criteria of statehood as a set of overlapping similarities or 
relationships between state-like entities, rather than as a fixed minimum threshold, and 
provides the conceptual space within which to assess alternative forms of statehood in 
which sovereignty and self-determination are detached from territory (section 7.5). 
Returning to the central themes of the thesis, the final sections consider whether or not 
a deterritorialized state can adequately protect the autonomy, independence and self-
determination of atoll island peoples (section 7.6), and examine the reasons that other 
states might have for (or against) recognising or hosting a deterritorialized state 
(section 7.7). 
7.2 The ‘minimum threshold’ account of statehood 
International law envisages the extinction of a state, through succession, in terms of 
either merger with or absorption by another state, or voluntary or involuntary 
dissolution, followed by the emergence of one or more successor states.944 In each case, 
the territory of one state is taken over by another.945 The case of climate change 
inundation is, however, ‘markedly distinct’.946 A loss of habitable territory is not 
recognised as a cause of state extinction in international law,947 yet appears to rule out 
the possibility of state succession as traditionally understood. 
Given that the existing law on state succession can tell us little about the extinction of 
states as a result of the destruction of territory, perhaps we must instead identify what 
makes — and, by analogy, unmakes — a state. The criteria for statehood set out in 
                                                
944 M. Shaw, International Law (2008), at 208; Crawford, supra note 564, at 700-724; Lauterpacht, supra note 
844, at 206–207. 
945
 Per Article 2(1)(b), Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, 1946 UNTS 3 
(1978); Article 2(1)(a), Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives 
and Debts, UN Doc. A/CONF.117/14 (1983). 
946 McAdam, supra note 725, at 106. 
947 Although it is mentioned briefly in Craven, supra note 599, at 159; L. Oppenheim, International Law: A 
Treatise (1905), at 117–118; Shaw, supra note 944, at 208, note 52. 
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international law apply to the emergence rather than the extinction of states. However, 
in the absence of explicit legal rules regarding state extinction in this case, these criteria 
‘should presumably govern not merely the legal “creation” of states, but also their 
“extinction”’948 — while bearing in mind that any application of the law to the issue of 
climate change inundation is necessarily speculative. 
While statehood has ‘long been the central organising idea in the international 
system’,949 a universally accepted definition has proved elusive. Article 1 of the 
Montevideo Convention sets out the most widely used definition, in which all states 
have a defined territory, a permanent population, an effective government and the 
capacity to enter into relations with other states.950 According to this story, ‘territory, 
people and government coincide in the state to produce international law’s map of the 
world as a jigsaw puzzle of solid colour pieces fitting neatly together’,951 where each 
piece passes the threshold set by the Montevideo criteria. 
The attractions of this minimum threshold account of statehood are apparent. A clear 
and concise definition of statehood implies certainty and predictability, thereby 
strengthening the rule of law.952 If statehood is a ‘legal status attaching to a certain state 
of affairs’,953 then the Montevideo criteria provide a clear explanation of what this state 
of affairs entails. They ‘operate as threshold evaluations’ that determine which entities 
are included within the category of states, and which are excluded.954 
The application of this threshold in practice, however, is far from straightforward. The 
criteria it relies on are neither necessary nor sufficient for statehood.955 First, the final 
                                                
948 Craven, supra note 599, at 159. For Marek, for example, independence is ‘indispensable to the 
continued existence of a state … With its loss, it becomes extinct.’ K. Marek, Identity and Continuity of States 
in International Law (1968), at 188. Compare Grant, supra note 790, at 435; Wong, supra note 90, at 22. 
However, see McAdam, supra note 90, at 127. 
949 Knop, supra note 790, at 95. 
950 Article 1, Montevideo Convention, supra note 821. Similar definitions are found in Conference of 
Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission, supra note 823, at 1495; Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft v Polish 
State, 5 AD 11 (1929), at 13; Fitzmaurice, supra note 823, at 107, para.4; American Law Institute, supra note 
823, at §201. On the legal concept of statehood, see also Crawford, supra note 564; Crawford, supra note 
484, at chs.4–6; Grant, supra note 790; Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at chs.2–4; Malanczuk, supra note 
279, at chs.5 and 10. On the more recent idea of statehood as conditional or ‘earned’, see, for example, 
Williams, Scharf and Hooper, ‘Resolving Sovereignty-Based Conflicts: The Emerging Approach of Earned 
Sovereignty’, 31 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy (2002) 349; Buchanan, supra note 190. 
951 Knop, supra note 790, at 95. 
952 Grant, supra note 790, at 451 and 454–455.  
953 Crawford, supra note 564, at 5. 
954 Craven, supra note 599, at 159. 
955 Crawford, supra note 484, at 128; Grant, supra note 790, at 434–451. 
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criterion — the capacity to enter into relations with other states — is more accurately 
conceived of as an outcome rather than a requirement of statehood, depending, as it 
does, on the recognition of other states.956 The criterion of independence is often 
proposed in lieu of this capacity: ‘the right to exercise [within a given territory], to the 
exclusion of any other state, the functions of a state’.957  
Second, states have emerged despite the absence of one or more criteria. Croatia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina emerged, despite lacking effective control over some of their 
territory,958 while Burundi, Rwanda and others were recognised as states prior to 
establishing an effective government.959 Several micro-states have also emerged despite 
ongoing debate about whether or not they pass the threshold for statehood. The 
Vatican City is the smallest of these, with a territory of 0.44 square kilometres and a 
population of around 842.960 It is also unique insofar as residence permits are typically 
granted on the basis of employment with the Holy See and can be revoked at any time. 
Duursma concludes that its residents cannot constitute a permanent population within 
the meaning of the Montevideo Convention because they lack any common history or 
stable attachment to a state or territory.961 Nevertheless, the Vatican City is generally 
accepted as a state.962 
Third — and most importantly, for the subject of this thesis — even if we accept that all 
four criteria are necessary for a state to begin its existence, the absence of any of them 
does not necessarily mean its end.963 Once established, states resist extinction, whether 
their own or that of other states,964 often regardless of ‘substantial changes in territory, 
                                                
956 Craven, supra note 505, at 220; Crawford, supra note 564, at 61; Malanczuk, supra note 279, at 79. 
957 Island of Palmas, 2 RIAA (1928) 829, at 838. Other proposed criteria include self-determination, 
democratic legitimacy, minority rights protection, legality and self-sufficiency. Craven, supra note 505, at 
220–221; Crawford, supra note 484, at 134–136; Grant, supra note 790, at 437–452; Österdahl, ‘Relatively 
Failed: Troubled Statehood and International Law’, 14 Finnish Yearbook of International Law (2003) 49, at 50–
51. 
958 Craven, supra note 505, at 228; Shaw, supra note 944, at 201. 
959 Crawford, supra note 484, at 129; Higgins, supra note 544, at 40. 
960
 As of July 2014. CIA, supra note 3. See also Acquaviva, ‘Subjects of International Law: A Power-Based 
Analysis’, 38 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2005) 345, at 353–357; Duursma, supra note 534, at ch.8; 
Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 325–329. 
961 Duursma, supra note 534, at 412. Compare Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 327. 
962 The Vatican City is also unique, however, in terms of its relationship with the powerful Holy See. 
Duursma, supra note 534, at 416–417. 
963 UNHCR, IOM and Norwegian Refugee Council, supra note 95, at 1. 
964
 Crawford, supra note 564, at 715; Mushkat, ‘Hong Kong and Succession of Treaties’, 46 ICLQ (1997) 181, 
at 183–187; Schachter, ‘State Succession: The Once and Future Law’, 33 Virginia Journal of International Law 
(1993) 253, at 258–260. 
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population or government, or even, in some cases, by a combination of all three’.965 
This implies a kind of ‘ratchet effect’, 966  whereby the status of statehood, once 
achieved, is difficult to lose. Kreijen suggests that states ‘may have a complicated birth, 
but they do not die easily’,967 while Lowe goes so far as to argue that the ‘road to 
statehood is a one-way street’.968 
The strength of this presumption against extinction or ‘ratchet effect’ was apparent 
during the ILC’s debate on the draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States in 
1949. ILC members discussed whether or not to include a first Article stating that 
‘[e]ach state has the right to exist and to preserve its existence’.969 While some members 
described this right as ‘a mainspring for other rights to be declared’, others felt that it 
would be ‘tautological to say that an existing state has the right to exist; that right is in 
a sense a postulate or a presupposition underlying the whole draft’.970 Whether as an 
explicit ‘mainspring for other rights’ or an implicit ‘presupposition underlying’ those 
rights, the message is clear: the right to continue to exist as a state is seen as 
fundamental to the international legal order of states. 
This ratchet effect is said to underpin the stability and order of the international legal 
system by ensuring that international legal, political and financial obligations continue 
to be met,971 but derives strength from other motivations as well. It may, for example, 
reflect an unwillingness to intervene in the domestic affairs of a state by recognising its 
dissolution.972 It may reflect a reluctance to recognise that a state is struggling, thereby 
incurring some obligation to provide assistance.973 Or, in the context of climate change 
inundation, it may reflect a reluctance to ‘tarnish its own reputation by being seen as 
lacking any compassion for the dire fate of such island states by asking for their 
exclusion’ from the international community. 974  Participants in a recent UNHCR 
                                                
965 Crawford, supra note 564, at 700. Compare W. Hall, A Treatise on International Law (1924), at 21; 
Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 204–205; Lauterpacht, supra note 844, at 153. 
966 Thanks to Delphine Dogot for suggesting this term. 
967 G. Kreijen, State Failure, Sovereignty and Effectiveness (2004), at 37.  
968 Lowe, supra note 822, at 165. But Marek argues that ‘[t]here is a beginning and end to the state, as to 
everything else’. Marek, supra note 948, at 5–6. 
969
 ILC, ‘Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States: General Debate’, 1 Yearbook of the ILC (1949) 
61, at 259, para.26. 
970 Ibid. 
971 See, for example, Craven, supra note 599, at 159; Marek, supra note 948, at 24. 
972 Thürer, ‘The “Failed State” and International Law’, 81 International Review of the Red Cross (1999) 731, at 
737. 
973 Österdahl, supra note 957, at 63–64. 
974 Kälin, supra note 120, at 102. Compare Wong, supra note 90, at 20. 
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round-table meeting similarly insisted that ‘the legal presumption of continuity of 
statehood needs to be emphasised and the notion … that [island] states will 
“disappear” (i.e., lose their international legal personality) or “sink” ought to be 
avoided’.975 
We need not wait for climate change to ravage low-lying island states to find examples 
of states that continue to exist, despite failing to satisfy at least one of the four criteria 
of statehood. Governments operating in exile, for example, continue to be recognised 
as the representatives of existing states, despite lacking effective control over a 
permanent population living in a defined territory.976 The continued recognition of so-
called ‘failed states’, such as Cambodia, Somalia and the Congo, during prolonged 
periods of crisis, indicates that the criteria of an effective government and 
independence — and perhaps also control over a defined territory and permanent 
population — may also be waived for the purposes of ongoing statehood.977 Despite 
failing to meet one or more of the Montevideo criteria, these ‘fictitious’ states typically 
retain their status. 978  They remain members of international organisations, their 
diplomatic relations remain (largely) intact, and the treaties they have previously 
concluded remain in force. 
As these examples demonstrate, ‘a state may not fully meet all the conditions of 
statehood, or its status may otherwise be in some way anomalous, but still merit 
general recognition’.979 It therefore appears that the traditional account of statehood, 
according to which all states must pass the minimum legal threshold by meeting each 
of the necessary criteria, is misleading at best. 
7.3 Climate change inundation and the minimum threshold account  
This section applies the minimum threshold account to atoll island states at risk of 
climate change inundation. It becomes clear that identifying the point at which these 
states will fail to meet each of the proposed criteria for statehood — and therefore fail 
to pass the minimum threshold set by the Montevideo Convention — is difficult, if not 
                                                
975 UNHCR, supra note 75, at para.2 (see also para.30). 
976  See generally Crawford, supra note 564, at 688–695; S. Talmon, Recognition of Governments in 
International Law (1998), at ch.3 onwards. 
977 See generally Helman and Ratner, ‘Saving Failed States’, 89 Foreign Policy (1992–1993) 3; Kreijen, supra 
note 967; Österdahl, supra note 957; Thürer, supra note 972. 
978 Duursma, supra note 534, at 118; Grant, supra note 790, at 435; Higgins, supra note 544, at 40; Thürer, 
supra note 972, at 752. 
979 Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 131–132. 
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impossible, providing us with additional incentive to identify an alternative account of 
statehood. 
7.3.1 Territory 
A defined territory is seen as integral to statehood. Statehood, Jennings argued in 1963, 
‘is inseparable from the notion of state territory’,980 and this view is still commonly 
held today. The principle of territorial control is closely tied to principles of effective 
government and independence. As Crawford observes, ‘the right to be a State is 
dependent at least in the first instance upon the exercise of full governmental powers 
with respect to some area of territory’;981 thus, the concept of a state is ‘rooted in the 
concept of control of territory’.982  
Nevertheless, the threshold test for determining what counts as a ‘defined territory’ is 
set fairly low. A state is not required to meet any minimum territorial requirement, nor 
does its territory need to have precisely defined boundaries983 or be contiguous; in fact, 
‘little bits of state can be enclaved within other States’.984 While a state’s territory is 
usually a naturally occurring surface of the earth, artificially reclaimed land may also 
count,985 as may uninhabitable islets, reefs and rocks.986 As the Vatican City and other 
micro-states demonstrate, a state’s territory can be nominal at best. In fact, cases in 
which a state persists despite the belligerent occupation of its territory suggest that 
‘[t]erritory is not necessary to statehood, at least after statehood has been firmly 
established’.987 
As a criterion of statehood, therefore, territory appears ‘simultaneously indispensable’ 
and impossible to define.988 How much territory must an atoll island state lose, then, 
before it no longer qualifies as a state? International maritime law suggests that only 
                                                
980 Jennings, supra note 480, at 7. 
981 Crawford, supra note 564, at 46. 
982 Lowe, supra note 822, at 138. Compare Malanczuk, supra note 279, at 75; Sharma, supra note 823, at 2; 
Shaw, supra note 944, at 199 and 960. 
983 Per Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft, supra note 950, at 15. Compare North Sea Continental Shelf, ICJ 
Reports (1969) 3, at 33. 
984  Crawford, supra note 564, at 47. Crawford cites Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land 
(Belgium/Netherlands), ICJ Reports (1959) 209, at 212–213 and 229; Right of Passage, supra note 867, at 27. 
985 In re. Duchy of Sealand, supra note 588, at 684–685. Artificial islands do not count, per Articles 60(1) and 
(8), UNCLOS, supra note 862. 
986 Per Article 121(3) UNCLOS, supra note 862. 
987 Grant, supra note 790, at 435. Compare I. Shearer, Starke’s International Law (1994), at 85. 
988 Craven, supra note 505, at 224. 
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once its territory is completely submerged or reduced to a low-tide elevation will a 
state no longer satisfy the territory criterion.989 Until this occurs, ‘territory which was 
once connected to land and then submerged by the sea can continue to be regarded as 
a connected part of state territory’.990 As discussed in Chapter 1, however, atoll island 
states will become largely uninhabitable long before the last of their land is submerged, 
due to the saltwater contamination of soil and water, unpredictable rainfall patterns, 
higher storm surges and so on. We must therefore look to some other criterion of 
statehood to identify the point at which they will cease to exist. 
7.3.2 Population 
The loss of a permanent population may ‘provide the first signal that an entity no 
longer displays the full indicia of statehood’.991 However, the population criterion, like 
that of territory, has no explicit minimum threshold. Tuvalu, with a population of just 
over 10,000, is already one of the world’s smallest states,992 and it is unclear how many 
citizens would need to leave before it fails to meet the population requirement. The 48 
inhabitants of Pitcairn Island have been recognised as holding a right to self-
determination and independence,993 implying that the minimum population threshold, 
if there is one, is minimal at best.  
Ideally, a state’s ‘population should inhabit the territory and be under the control of 
the government’ of that state.994 Yet, in practice, large numbers of islanders are 
nomadic or live abroad without jeopardising the legal status of their state.995 However, 
without a sufficiently large permanent population, land cannot serve the functional 
role of territory: it no longer provides ‘the physical basis that ensures that people can 
live together as organised communities’.996 
The question then becomes whether a state fails to meet the population criterion if all 
but a tiny fraction of its population lives elsewhere. The government of Kiribati has 
                                                
989 Per Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), ICJ 
Reports (2001) 40, at para.206. 
990 In re. Duchy of Sealand, supra note 588, at 686. 
991 McAdam, supra note 90, at 124. 
992 Behind the Vatican City (842) and Nauru (9,488). CIA, supra note 3. See also Shaw, supra note 944, at 
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993 GA Res. 2869 (XXVI), 20 December 1971. 
994 Park, supra note 5, at 7. 
995 For example, around 57% of Samoans and 46% of Tongans live outside of their country of origin. C. 
Stahl and R. Appleyard, Migration and Development in the Pacific Islands (2007), at 7. 
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been advised that, even if most of its population resettles elsewhere, ‘[i]f we maintain 
our islands, get some people to live there, and be able to issue passports, we’ll still be 
able to remain a state’. 997 However, while the Administrative Court of Cologne 
admitted that the 106 persons claiming to be nationals of the ‘Principality of Sealand’ 
could in theory constitute a population (given that ‘size [is] irrelevant’), it held that 
they must also form a dynamic, cohesive, stable community.998 ‘An association whose 
common purpose covered merely commercial and tax affairs was insufficient.’999 This 
suggests that, even if there is no minimum quantitative requirement built into the 
population criterion, there may be a qualitative threshold that atoll island states will 
eventually struggle to meet. 
7.3.3 Effective government and independence 
The two remaining criteria, an effective government and independence, are closely 
interlinked. For Crawford, ‘government is treated as the exercise of authority with 
respect to persons and property within the territory of the State; whereas 
independence is treated as the exercise, or the right to exercise, such authority with 
respect to other States’.1000 In order to count as effective, a state’s government must 
have the capacity to maintain authority within its borders and fulfil its obligations 
under international law. 1001  In order to count as independent, a state must be 
(relatively) free from the authority of any other state.1002  
However, in certain cases — including those of ‘failed’ statehood discussed above — 
an effective government may be ‘unnecessary … to support statehood’.1003 An atoll 
island state might therefore continue to be recognised as a state despite a ‘very 
extensive loss of actual authority’1004 or even the temporary absence of an effective 
government or formal independence.1005 Indeed, in the absence of any competing claim 
to statehood — as is the case with atoll island states facing climate change inundation 
                                                
997 Lambourne, interviewed on Carrick, supra note 71. 
998 In re. Duchy of Sealand, supra note 588, at 686. 
999 Ibid. 
1000 Crawford, supra note 564, at 55.  
1001 Stoutenburg, supra note 90, at 66. 
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— ‘[i]n many instances the claim to continuity made by the State concerned will be 
determinative; other States will be content to defer to the position taken’.1006 Regardless 
of whether it is understood as constitutive or declaratory,1007 recognition will therefore 
play an important role in determining whether — and to what extent — atoll island 
states continue to enjoy the rights and competences of statehood. Where states are 
reluctant to withdraw recognition, an atoll island state is more likely to retain its status 
as a state despite the loss of its habitable territory, permanent population, effective 
government or capacity for independence.1008 
While this section has raised more questions than it has answered, one clear message 
that emerges from a closer examination of the criteria of statehood in the context of 
climate change inundation is that there is no clearly identifiable minimum threshold of 
statehood in international law. On closer inspection, each criterion of statehood lacks a 
clear scope and limits1009 and each is faced with counterexamples. Despite its apparent 
clarity, the mainstream account — according to which the status of statehood is 
allocated to any and all entities that meet a clearly defined set of minimum criteria — is 
therefore unconvincing.1010 Perhaps, rather than its accuracy, its popularity simply 
reflects ‘the lack of a better model’.1011 But what if a better model could be identified? 
The following section proposes an alternative account of statehood as a category of 
state-like entities that share a series of overlapping similarities or relationships, rather 
than a fixed set of characteristics. 
7.4 Pursuing a ‘family resemblance’ account of statehood 
In Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein examines many of the ways in 
which language is, or might be, used.1012 One of his aims is to discover how all of these 
                                                
1006 Crawford, supra note 564, at 668. However, these conclusions were reached in the context of state 
succession rather than climate change inundation. Stoutenburg, ‘Jane McAdam (ed.), Climate Change and 
Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives’, 22 EJIL (2011) 1196, at 1199. 
1007 On recognition, see generally Berman, supra note 593, at 81–84; Craven, supra note 505, at 240–246; 
Crawford, supra note 484, at 143–165; Duursma, supra note 534, at 110–115; Jennings and Watts, supra note 
423, at 127–203; Talmon, supra note 976. 
1008 On the role of recognition in remedying a failure to meet the criteria of statehood, see Duursma, supra 
note 534, at 430; Grant, supra note 790, at 447. On recognition in the context of climate change inundation, 
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1009 ‘[C]ommon objective operational criteria for the elements of the definition’ of statehood are lacking. 
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1010 Compare Craven, supra note 505, at 221; Österdahl, supra note 957, at 87. 
1011 Grant, supra note 790, at 414. 
1012 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (1953). 
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different uses are related to each other. What is the common feature that makes them 
all types of the thing that we call ‘language’? It appears that there isn’t one.1013 
Nevertheless, they are connected by an overlapping set of similarities or relationships, 
in virtue of which we group them together in the category of language. 
Wittgenstein explains this by analogy with games.1014 While those things that fall into 
the category of games do not share some unique set of properties, we nevertheless 
recognise them as games. Solitaire and poker involve playing cards. Poker and high 
jump involve many players competing against each other. High jump and football take 
place in a stadium. Football and tennis are ball games. Many games involve winning 
and losing, but so too do elections and auctions. ‘[W]e recognise poker or monopoly as 
games, not because of the presence of some defining characteristic common to all 
games, but because they share some (though not all) features with other games, which 
in turn share some (though not all) features with still other games.’1015  
Wittgenstein describes this in terms of ‘a complicated network of similarities 
overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities 
of detail’.1016 This network, he suggests, is best captured by the idea of ‘family 
resemblances’, ‘for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, 
features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc., etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same 
way’.1017 
The question here is whether the concept of statehood could also be thought of in 
terms of family resemblances.1018 According to this alternative account, statehood 
would be understood not in terms of a common set of characteristics shared by all 
                                                
1013 Other than the fact that all language is used as language. For Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the role of 
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states — as per the minimum threshold account — but in terms of a series of 
overlapping similarities. Norway (1940–1945)1019 and the Vatican City, for example, 
both have some capacity for independence. The Vatican City and Somalia both have a 
defined territory. Somalia and Cuba both have a permanent population. Cuba and 
Australia both have an effective government. While there is no one common set of 
characteristics shared by all these states, they are nevertheless connected by a series of 
overlapping similarities or family resemblances. 
Here, an attempt is made to reclaim the concept of statehood from the difficulties and 
counterexamples identified earlier. Rather than abandoning statehood as a victim of 
‘conceptual stretching’,1020 it might be better understood as a ‘broad family of objects 
that have altered considerably in form and meaning … rather than as a singular 
phenomenon’.1021 The category of things that we call ‘states’ is identifiable not by some 
fixed set of characteristics but by an overlapping series of family resemblances that 
continue to evolve across time and space, shaped by processes of industrialisation, 
decolonisation, urbanisation, globalisation, migration and, now, climate change. 
In fact, Crawford observes that the rules of statehood have been ‘kept so uncertain or 
open to manipulation as not to provide any standards at all’, allowing the concept of 
statehood to remain flexible enough to incorporate unorthodox entities that do not 
meet all of the criteria.1022 A more open and flexible account of statehood might 
therefore more accurately reflect state practice and more effectively respond to the 
changing legal, political, cultural and environmental demands of the world today. A 
similar approach is reflected in the work of the ILC, which — with shades of 
Wittgenstein — concluded that ‘no useful purpose would be served by an effort to 
define the term “state”’, being content to use it ‘in the sense commonly accepted in 
international practice’.1023 
                                                
1019 During World War Two, the Norwegian government operated in exile and the state of Norway 
therefore lacked effective control or jurisdiction over its territory, calling into question its capacity to 
satisfy the criterion of a defined territory. 
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1021 Ibid. 
1022 Crawford, supra note 564, at 45. 
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There are, however, many problems to be addressed in developing a family 
resemblance account of statehood more fully. Can it avoid being overly vague or 
ambiguous? Can it exclude those entities that share some state-like characteristics but 
are not states? Can it fulfil the functions that a legal definition of statehood is thought, 
or ought, to fulfil? One response to some of these problems might be to combine the 
minimum threshold and family resemblance accounts to create a two-pronged 
approach, where the former applies to the establishment of states and the latter to their 
ongoing existence. According to this approach, even if the criteria governing the 
emergence of states are ‘logically the same’ as those governing their extinction, their 
application is different.1024 Once an entity has passed the minimum threshold of 
statehood, the ratchet effect identified earlier may prevent it from falling back below 
this threshold, even if it no longer satisfies one or more criteria,1025 providing that it 
continues to share certain characteristics with other states. A ‘failed state’, for example, 
could continue to exist as a state as long as it sustains a reasonably stable population 
within reasonably well-defined borders, despite no longer having an effective 
government,1026 while the reverse might hold for an atoll island state threatened by 
climate change inundation.  
7.5 Climate change inundation and the family resemblance account 
As we saw earlier, identifying the point at which atoll island states will fail to meet the 
minimum threshold for statehood is difficult. From the perspective of a family 
resemblance account of statehood, however, this is not necessary. On this account, in 
order to continue to qualify as a state, an atoll island state would need to continue to 
share one or more similarities with other state-like entities.  
In recent work, legal scholars have suggested various ways in which atoll island states 
might retain their status as states in the face of climate change inundation.1027 While 
each theorist explicitly or implicitly adopts the traditional minimum threshold account 
of statehood, the conclusions they reach often lead them in the direction of a more 
flexible family resemblance-type account. Jenny Grote Stoutenburg, for example, sets 
out to identify ‘the thresholds at which the loss of personal and territorial effectiveness 
                                                
1024 Craven, supra note 505, at 159. 
1025 Compare Österdahl, supra note 957, at 60. 
1026 Ibid, at 60–61. 
1027 For example, Burkett, supra note 90; McAdam, supra note 90, at ch.5; Rayfuse, supra note 68; Schofield 
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would presumably occur’.1028 However, her analysis does not lead her to conclude that 
all criteria must be satisfied, but that the cumulative weight of two or three criteria 
may be sufficient to ensure the ongoing recognition of an atoll island state in the face of 
climate change inundation. In what follows, several of these proposals are examined 
from the perspective of a family resemblance account of statehood. 
7.5.1 Preserving territory on which to maintain a ‘population nucleus’ 
An atoll island state might ensure that some of its original territory remains habitable 
by means of ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ defence measures like building sea walls or encouraging 
natural coastal ecosystems.1029 It could then maintain a ‘population nucleus’ on this 
remaining territory: a small permanent population that provides a ‘legal anchor’ to the 
wider diaspora.1030 The President of Kiribati, for example, has suggested relocating his 
government to Banaba Island, the country’s highest landmass, in order to maintain a 
symbolic presence on the territory of Kiribati for as long as possible. ‘I dream that some 
of us would stay. If we had enough resources, we could build up one of these islands 
to a height a few metres above sea level to render it a place where we could 
survive.’1031  
However, setting aside the difficulty and expense of maintaining enough habitable 
territory to support the social and physical infrastructure a community requires,1032 
there is the question of whether or not this community will continue to qualify as a 
‘permanent population’ for the purposes of statehood. In order to do so, it must form a 
vibrant, cohesive, stable community that can be governed effectively over time, not 
merely an association for commercial or administrative purposes.1033 The capacity of an 
atoll island state to meet this requirement is uncertain. Its population will diminish as 
fresh water becomes scarcer, coastlines erode, its infrastructure is destroyed and its 
citizens gradually emigrate, which in turn may ‘start to erode longer-term claims to 
                                                
1028 Stoutenburg, supra note 90, at 57. 
1029 Schofield and Freestone, supra note 862, at 152–156; Yamamoto and Esteban, supra note 26, at 87–97. 
Where the aim is to preserve a natural island through artificial means, this is thought not to constitute an 
artificial island. Freestone, ‘International Law and Sea Level Rise’, in R. Churchill and D. Freestone (eds), 
International Law and Global Climate Change (1991) 109, at 113; Soons, supra note 89, at 222–223; ibid, at 62–63. 
1030 Stoutenburg, supra note 90, at 65. Compare Kälin, supra note 120, at 90–91 and 102. 
1031 Cited in McAdam, supra note 90, at 137. 
1032 Connell, ‘Population Resettlement in the Pacific: Lessons from a Hazardous History?’, 43 Australian 
Geographer (2012) 127, at 137; Yamamoto and Esteban, supra note 26, at 155–156. 
1033 In re. Duchy of Sealand, supra note 588, at 686. 
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continued sovereignty and statehood’. 1034 In the event that it eventually lacks a 
permanent population and defined territory, an atoll island state will need to rely on 
other state-like characteristics to maintain its status as a state.1035 
While the minimum threshold account of statehood is unable to accommodate this 
situation, a family resemblance approach takes into account the fact that an atoll island 
state might continue to share similar properties with some states (an effective 
government and independence), even if it eventually does not share certain properties 
with others (a permanent population living in a defined territory). 
7.5.2 A government-in-exile 
Providing that it can find a willing host, an atoll island state might continue to fulfil the 
criteria of effective government and independence by establishing a government-in-
exile. While its powers would be circumscribed by the territorial sovereignty of the 
state within which it operates,1036 an island government-in-exile could continue to 
perform certain functions of statehood, including maintaining formal diplomatic 
relations, concluding treaties, participating in international fora, exercising jurisdiction 
over its nationals abroad, providing consular services and issuing passports.1037 The 
successful operation of governments-in-exile suggests that ‘the existence of territory, 
while essential to the original constitution of that entity as a state, is not integral to the 
exercise of certain governmental functions’.1038  
Yet governments-in-exile have thus far operated on the basis that their exile is 
temporary, and their recognition is premised on the existence of a permanent 
population and defined territory to which they will eventually return.1039 Even where 
an atoll island state can maintain a population nucleus on its remaining territory, ‘the 
momentum would not be toward an eventual return home, but toward permanent 
diaspora’.1040 As islanders gradually resettle and perhaps gain citizenship elsewhere, 
                                                
1034 McAdam, supra note 90, at 159. 
1035 Stoutenburg, supra note 90, at 68; Yamamoto and Esteban, supra note 26, at 176. 
1036 Per Allied Forces (Czechoslovak) (1941–42), 10 AD No. 31, 123, at 124. 
1037 Stoutenburg, supra note 90, at 69; Talmon, supra note 976, at chs.4–6. 
1038 McAdam, supra note 90, at 135. 
1039 Maas and Carius, supra note 426, at 659; Park, supra note 5, at 6–7; Talmon, supra note 976, at 136; 
UNHCR, IOM and Norwegian Refugee Council, supra note 95, at 1–2; Wong, supra note 90, at 21–22; 
Yamamoto and Esteban, supra note 26, at 208–209. 
1040 Stoutenburg, supra note 90, at 69. 
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the role of the government-in-exile will diminish over time, undermining an atoll 
island state’s claim to effective governance and independence.1041  
Again, the traditional minimum threshold account of statehood cannot take us this far: 
it is unable to account for a government-in-exile in the first place. However, a family 
resemblance account may also exclude an atoll island state at this point. Without a 
clearly defined territory, permanent population or effective government in the long 
term, the number of similarities or ‘family resemblances’ that an atoll island state 
shares with other state-like entities begins to diminish, calling into question its 
continued recognition as a state. 
7.5.3 ‘Deterritorialized’ statehood 
It has been suggested that an atoll island state might continue to exist as a 
‘deterritorialized’ state or ‘state-in-exile’ even once it lacks a permanent population 
residing in a defined territory. 1042  Maxine Burkett, for example, proposes the 
recognition of a ‘nation ex-situ’: a sovereign entity with an elected government that 
exercises ‘long-distance’ authority over its citizens even as they scatter across the 
world.1043 A deterritorialized state, Burkett argues, offers a ‘means of conserving the 
existing state and holding the resources and well-being of its citizens — in new and 
disparate locations — in the care of an entity acting in the best interests of its 
people’. 1044  It would continue to participate in intergovernmental organisations, 
provide diplomatic protection and consular services, resolve disputes and protect 
(some of) the rights of its citizens.1045 Where provision is made for regular elections, its 
citizens, like other diaspora populations, would continue to vote for political 
representatives.1046  
                                                
1041 McAdam, supra note 90, at 136–137. 
1042 Burkett, supra note 90; Crawford and Rayfuse, supra note 123, at 250 and 253; ibid, at 138; Ödalen, 
supra note 91; Rayfuse, supra note 68, at 179–180; Rayfuse, supra note 133, at 11–12; Stoutenburg, supra note 
90, at 70–72 and 85–87; Stratford, Farbotko and Lazrus, supra note 25, at 70 and 77–79. Other possibilities 
include the creation of a trusteeship, an international administration, or even a private corporation or non-
governmental organisation to secure the ongoing status of an atoll island state. On the first two proposals, 
see Burkett, supra note 90, at 363–367; Wong, supra note 90, at 41–42. 
1043 Burkett, supra note 90. 
1044 Ibid, at 346. Compare Rayfuse, supra note 133, at 11. 
1045 Burkett, supra note 90, at 363 onwards. 
1046 On diaspora voting, see, for example, A. Sundberg, The History and Politics of Diaspora Voting in Home 
Elections (2007). On the idea of the diaspora as the ‘present-tense experience of the deterritorialized nation’, 
see Burkett, supra note 90, at 359. 
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A deterritorialized state would, therefore, look much like a government-in-exile, with 
the additional benefit of a permanent legal status that would ensure its ongoing 
recognition as a state, despite the gradual relocation of its citizens elsewhere.1047 By 
preserving a ‘vital political and cultural nucleus’ that persists over time, it may also 
help to ‘ease the rootlessness’ its scattered population face, allowing islanders to 
sustain a sense of identity arising from their common membership in a 
deterritorialized state.1048 And, provided that the deterritorialized state continues to 
exercise jurisdiction over its maritime zones — and these zones can be preserved by, 
for example, building lighthouses on outlying islands or freezing maritime baselines or 
boundaries in law1049 — the revenue they generate may also help to maintain social, 
political and legal institutions for the benefit of its dispersed citizens.1050 
Although a deterritorialized state might preserve some territory on which a 
‘population nucleus’ could remain, this is not a prerequisite for its continuing 
statehood under this proposal. ‘International law would be flexible enough to provide 
for the continued existence of such states as non-territorial entities’1051 — particularly if 
a family resemblance account of statehood is adopted. What is crucial here is that the 
deterritorialized state continues to govern effectively and retain its independence. 
Provided that recognition is not withdrawn following the loss of its habitable territory 
and permanent population, it ‘could continue to interact as part of the community of 
nations’.1052 
                                                
1047 Burkett, supra note 90, at 367–369. 
1048 Ibid, at 363 onwards. 
1049 Caron, supra note 89, at 641–651; Rayfuse, supra note 68, at 181–190; Schofield and Freestone, supra 
note 862, at 158–163; Soons, supra note 89; Stoutenburg, ‘Implementing a New Regime of Stable Maritime 
Zones to Ensure the (Economic) Survival of Small Island States Threatened by Sea-Level Rise’, 26 
International Journal of Maritime and Coastal Law (2011) 263; Yamamoto and Esteban, supra note 26, at ch.5. 
In the case of Kiribati, see Lambourne, interviewed on Carrick, supra note 71. 
1050 Rayfuse, supra note 133, at 11; Soons, supra note 89, at 230, note 90. However, on the expense of 
preserving and managing maritime zones, see Caron, supra note 89, at 639–640; Powers and Stucko, 
‘Introducing the Law of the Sea and the Legal Implications of Rising Sea Levels’, in Gerrard and Wannier 
(eds), supra note 68, 123, at 134–135; Rayfuse, supra note 133, at 12–13. 
1051 Kälin and Schrepfer, supra note 73, at 39. 
1052 McAdam, supra note 90, at 138. However, in decoupling statehood from territory, perhaps we leave 
the values of the international community vulnerable to abuse at the hands of deterritorialized states, 
which would continue to enjoy diplomatic immunity but would be free from the kinds of coercive 
intervention that a territory makes possible (blockades, sanctions, military intervention, and so on). This 
raises broader questions about the effective enforcement of international legal obligations in a world 
characterised by political, economic and military interdependence, inter- and intra-state allegiances, 
extraterritorial human rights abuse, and so on. 
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However, while a state’s independence can be qualified without its statehood being 
called into question,1053 it is thought unlikely that a state can retain its independence if 
its government and citizens permanently reside on the territory of another 
state.1054 While a deterritorialized state would have a formally recognised legal status, 
it would remain dependent on the consent of the host state(s) within which its citizens 
reside and is therefore likely to face many of the constraints imposed on a government-
in-exile.1055 Therefore, even if we adopt a family resemblance approach to statehood, 
the question of whether or not a state can continue to exist as such without a defined 
territory arises. 
7.6 Decoupling statehood from territory: What place for self-determination?  
During the 1950s and 1960s, the government of Nauru, a small Pacific island ravaged 
by phosphate mining, engaged in negotiations with Australia about resettling its 
citizens on new territory within Australian borders.1056 While the negotiations were 
ultimately unsuccessful, they offer an insight into the hopes and concerns of both an 
island people facing collective displacement and a potential host state. Much of the 
debate focused on issues of sovereignty and independence. The Nauruan government 
rejected a proposal for the gradual migration of Nauruans to Australia, fearful that this 
would result in the ‘disintegration of Nauruan society’.1057 As an alternative to this 
‘diaspora model’, it called for the collective resettlement of the Nauruan people and 
their recognition as an independent sovereign entity.1058 ‘Your terms insisted on our 
becoming Australians with all that citizenship entails’, a Nauruan official explained, 
‘whereas we wish to remain a Nauruan people in the fullest sense of the term.’1059 
Island leaders have voiced similar concerns in the face of climate change inundation. 
Marshall Island representatives, for example, have indicated that ‘a guarantee of 
sovereignty would be necessary before they would wilfully relocate to a foreign 
                                                
1053 S. S. Wimbledon, 1923 PCIJ Series A, No.1, at 25. For example, its defence, external relations, judicial 
system or monetary policy may be overseen by another state. On the independence of micro-states, see 
Duursma, supra note 534, at chs.4–8; Wong, supra note 90, at 29–31. 
1054 Grant, supra note 790, at 439–440; Wong, supra note 90, at 26–28, 31 and 40–41. 
1055 Park, supra note 5, at 7 and 13–14. 
1056 See generally Tabucanon and Opeskin, supra note 396; Weeramantry, supra note 396. 
1057 Statement by Hammer DeRoburt, Head Chief, Nauru Local Government Council. Certain Phosphate 
Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), ICJ Reports (1990), Memorial of the Republic of Nauru, at 255, para.18. 
1058 Tabucanon and Opeskin, supra note 396, at 355. 
1059 Cited in Weeramantry, supra note 396, at 294. 
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nation’.1060 Even where islanders do not call for the cession of new territory, securing 
citizenship in a new state is not seen as sufficient. Without some formal recognition of 
their ongoing statehood — perhaps via the ‘deterritorialized’ statehood model 
discussed above — islanders’ concerns about independence, sovereignty and self-
determination remain unassuaged. 
However, where the preferred solution is one in which statehood and self-
determination are decoupled from territory, the question then arises: can an atoll 
island people remain a ‘people in the fullest sense of the term’ without a territory of its 
own? As argued in Chapter 6, it is attachment to a people and a common set of 
governing institutions that is important for collective self-determination, rather than 
attachment to a particular territory. But can self-determination persist without any 
territory?1061 ‘[O]ne cannot contemplate a state as a kind of disembodied spirit’, Philip 
Jessup argued before the Security Council in 1948. 1062  Perhaps, however, the 
embodiment of the state need not be territorial — it could, instead, be ‘the people of the 
state seen as a collective’.1063 Perhaps, as Judge Cançado Trindade has suggested, 
international legal doctrine, in its obsession with territorial integrity, has become 
‘oblivious of the most precious constitutive element of statehood: human beings, the 
“population” or the “people”’.1064  
This section considers whether or not territory is necessary for the existence of a state 
and the self-determination of its people. Chapter 6 identified three functions of state 
territory: to demarcate the boundaries of state sovereignty; to underpin the stability 
and security of the international legal regime; and to provide a physical space within 
which peoples can exercise their autonomy, independence and self-determination. 
Given that it is the third function with which this thesis is primarily concerned, this 
section will consider the first two briefly before considering the third in more detail. 
First, while a state’s sovereignty may be roughly demarcated by its territorial 
boundaries, these are not watertight. The assumption that each state is sovereign 
within neatly defined territorial boundaries is just that — an assumption — and 
                                                
1060 Holthus et al., supra note 93, at 73. 
1061 On decoupling self-determination from territory, see, for example, Young, supra note 311, at 261. 
1062 Cited in Crawford, supra note 564, at 44. 
1063 Ibid, at 717. 
1064 Kosovo, supra note 542, Sep. Op. Cançado Trindade, at 553, para.77. Compare Vidas, supra note 97. 
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certainly ‘not a rule, still less a peremptory norm’.1065 On the one hand, as discussed 
earlier, a state need not have precisely defined territorial boundaries. In fact, states 
comfortably exist despite ongoing territorial disputes, even where these produce grey 
areas in which jurisdiction may be overlapping or unclear.1066 On the other hand, even 
where its territorial borders are clearly delineated, a state’s sovereignty within those 
borders is not absolute, but is constrained by international legal obligations, including 
peremptory norms of customary international law1067 and bilateral or multilateral 
agreements that delegate certain capacities to other states or intergovernmental 
organisations.1068 In the case of condominia, territorial sovereignty may also be shared 
between two or more states.1069 
‘[I]nternational law’s map of the world as a jigsaw puzzle of solid colour pieces fitting 
neatly together’ has therefore failed to materialise.1070 Like the minimum threshold 
account of statehood, the narrative that links state, territory and people attempts to 
hide the complex, often fragmented or overlapping character of sovereignty behind a 
façade of clarity and consistency. In certain cases and to a certain extent, territory does 
indeed carve out a space in which a state is sovereign; however, exclusive sovereignty 
over a clearly defined territory is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of an 
independent state or a self-determining people. 
Second, a commitment to states as clearly defined territorial entities is thought to 
contribute to the stability of the international legal order. For Jennings, for example, 
‘the stability of territorial boundaries must always be the ultimate aim’.1071 Yet security 
and stability are not always best served by a rigid commitment to the territorial status 
quo. Jennings himself admits that ‘the map of the world is constantly changing’, 
requiring us to ‘devise legal regimes sufficiently flexible’ to adjust to new legal, 
political, social — and, today, environmental — demands.1072 ‘A law which, within 
narrow limits, seems to sanction only the maintenance of the status quo, is not likely to 
                                                
1065 Crawford, supra note 484, at 245. 
1066 On disputed frontiers, see, for example, D. Hall, Land (2013), at ch.3. 
1067 Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 390–393. 
1068 In the case of micro-states, see Duursma, supra note 534, at chs.4–8. 
1069 Bantz, ‘The International Legal Status of Condominia’, 12 Florida Journal of International Law (1998) 77; 
Crawford, supra note 484, at 203 and 209; Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 565–567. For other 
‘exceptional situations’ that ‘cannot be forced into the sovereignty straitjacket’, see Crawford, supra note 
484, at 249–252. 
1070 Knop, supra note 790, at 95. Compare Hall, supra note 1066, at 50. 
1071 Jennings, supra note 480, at 70. 
1072 Ibid. 
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survive without serious modification in a still rapidly developing society of states.’1073 
Jennings was writing at the height of decolonisation, but this is also true of a world in 
which the impact of climate change on the stability and security of the international 
legal order will only be exacerbated by law’s failure to adapt. Law’s role is not to 
protect the status quo at all costs but to ‘provide a peaceful alternative for the adoption 
of modifications’1074 — including, perhaps, the model of deterritorialized statehood 
discussed above — which may foster, rather than undermine, international stability.  
Third, states are thought to carve out a space in which the members of a self-
determining people can shape and sustain their own legal and political institutions, 
free from undue external interference. On this view, territory grounds jurisdiction and 
therefore represents ‘the physical basis’1075 or ‘locus’ of self-determination:1076 a space in 
which peoples can exercise their collective autonomy and independence. Without a 
habitable territory, an atoll island people will be forced into permanent exile, where its 
capacity for self-determination may be gradually undermined and its statehood called 
into question. ‘[O]nly if displaced nations get new territory’, Schuppert argues, ‘will 
they be able to actually exercise their right to self-determination.’1077 
Can the population of an atoll island state continue to exist as a self-determining 
people without a territory of its own? On the one hand, a deterritorialized state is likely 
to retain many of the competences it had previously exercised, including the capacity 
to issue passports, adopt legislation, exercise personal sovereignty over its citizens, 
engage in formal diplomatic relations, negotiate and conclude certain treaties and 
participate in international organisations. Like governments-in-exile, it may continue 
to be recognised as a sovereign state ‘with sovereign powers in respect of [its] own 
people and citizens’, wherever they are.1078 To a greater or lesser extent, it will therefore 
continue to protect its citizens’ rights, represent their interests in the international 
sphere, govern certain aspects of their behaviour and maintain the institutions that 
                                                
1073 Ibid. 
1074 Duursma, supra note 534, at 109. 
1075 Stoutenburg, supra note 90, at 61. See also Crawford, supra note 791, at 128; Crawford, supra note 484, 
at 204; Wong, supra note 90, at 20. 
1076 Moore, supra note 599. 
1077 Schuppert, supra note 134, at 17. However, Nine equivocates about whether territory is necessary for 
self-determination. Nine, supra note 91, at 363. And, for Ödalen, securing sovereignty over new territory ‘is 
but one, very radical, way of institutionalising a group’s right to self-determination’. Ödalen, supra note 
91, at 230. 
1078 Herbert Morrison, former British Secretary of State for the Home Department, cited in Talmon, supra 
note 976, at 232, note 135. Compare Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 328. 
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they have helped to shape and sustain over generations. In doing so, it will help to 
sustain an island people’s capacity for autonomy and effective government, and to 
preserve the attachments that have formed throughout its history of cooperation under 
shared political institutions.  
On the other hand, a deterritorialized state will no longer have many of the 
competences typically associated with independent statehood. It will not have the 
capacity to control the movement of goods and people or accept binding international 
legal obligations with respect to a given portion of the earth (although it may continue 
to accept and fulfil non-territorial obligations). It may not have its own currency, 
military, police force or independent judicial system. Its capacity to enforce its 
legislation or to tax its citizens’ income or property will be highly circumscribed. And, 
crucially, whatever competences it does retain, it will exercise these only with the 
consent of the host state(s) in which its government and people reside. While it may 
therefore retain some capacity for effective government, it is unlikely to remain 
independent in the sense currently accepted in international law. 
However, neither statehood nor self-determination is an all-or-nothing concept. As the 
family resemblance account makes clear, states are not identifiable by one set of criteria 
that is common to all and only states, but by a series of overlapping resemblances 
between states. And, as the collective decision-making framework proposed in Chapter 
6 makes clear, peoples may choose from a range of possible modes of self-
determination, including independent statehood, free association or integration with 
another state, or ‘any other political status’. In each case, the emphasis is on a family of 
state-like entities or modes of self-determination rather than one fixed model of either.  
It might therefore be helpful to understand the model of deterritorialized statehood as 
encompassing a range of options, some of which provide the deterritorialized state 
with more competences — and thus offer its people greater room in which to exercise 
their autonomy and self-determination — while others provide less.1079 It would then 
be up to island and host states to agree on an appropriate model, subject to ‘iterative 
processes of evaluation and amendment’ in consultation with their governments and 
citizens.1080 
                                                
1079 On sovereignty and self-determination as a continuum rather than a fixed concept, see also Nine, 
supra note 91, at 372; Ödalen, supra note 91, at 226. 
1080 Burkett, supra note 90, at 366. 
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At the minimal end of this continuum, islanders will be dispersed across multiple host 
states and the bundle of jurisdictional competences that their state enjoys will be 
limited at best.1081 It is likely to retain its legislative jurisdiction (its authority to 
regulate its citizens and their property) but forfeit its enforcement jurisdiction (its 
authority to enforce its legislation by executive or judicial action).1082 While it may 
therefore remain able to legislate with regard to the property, income or conduct of its 
citizens, the effect of this legislation will depend on the willingness — or otherwise — 
of other states to enforce it. In this case, while a deterritorialized people will retain 
some capacity for self-government, its autonomy will inevitably be constrained by its 
inability to enforce and adjudicate its own legal rules, particularly where its citizens 
are scattered across multiple host states whose territorial sovereignty takes precedence 
over its personal sovereignty. 
At the maximal end of the scale, islanders will be collectively resettled within one host 
state, where their state will exercise a more extensive bundle of competences, including 
both legislative and enforcement jurisdiction. While it is unusual for a host state to 
grant a government within its territory such extensive powers, it is not without 
precedent. Under the Allied Powers (Maritime Courts) Act of 1941, for example, the 
British government permitted the Allied governments-in-exile to establish maritime 
courts within its jurisdiction, subject to certain conditions.1083 According to the then 
British Attorney General, these governments-in-exile are ‘recognised by us as 
sovereign governments’ and ‘[w]e are enabling them to administer in our territory 
their laws before courts just the same way as they would have administered them in 
their own territories’.1084 Such ‘relaxations of [the] territorial authority’ of the host state 
indicate that ‘there is intrinsically no such degree of rigidity in the concept of territorial 
authority as to rule out reasonable adaptations thereof to exceptional 
circumstances’.1085 
At the far end of the continuum, a deterritorialized state might even be granted an 
extended lease or de facto sovereignty over a portion of land on which its citizens can 
                                                
1081 See generally Talmon, supra note 976, at ch.5. 
1082 ‘[T]he first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a state is that, failing the 
existence of a permissive rule to the contrary, it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of 
another state’. S. S. Lotus, 1927 PCIJ Series A, No.10, at 18. 
1083 Talmon, supra note 976, at 217–218 and 240–241. 
1084 Cited in ibid, at 218. 
1085 Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 461. 
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rebuild their lives.1086 While the territorial sovereign would retain ‘residual’ or de jure 
sovereignty, the deterritorialized state will have the capacity to exercise full 
governmental authority over this territory for a set period or in perpetuity.1087 
While the self-determination of a deterritorialized island people may be ‘unavoidably 
circumscribed’ in law,1088 this need not prevent its members exercising a significant 
degree of self-determination in practice. Only where a host state actively exerts 
substantial control over a deterritorialized state, overruling its decisions ‘on a wide 
range of matters and doing so systematically and on a continuing basis’, will it lack 
independence.1089  
7.7 Reasons for and against accommodating a deterritorialized state 
The extent to which an atoll island people wishing to transition to a deterritorialized 
state will retain some capacity for autonomy and independence will depend on where 
it sits along the continuum identified above. This, in turn, is influenced by the reasons 
that host states have for — or against — accommodating newly deterritorialized states. 
During its negotiations with Nauru, the Australian government proposed the collective 
resettlement of the Nauruan people on Curtis Island, where they could establish a self-
governing Nauruan Council under Australian jurisdiction. 1090  Here, the Nauruan 
people ‘should be enabled to manage their own local administration and to make 
domestic laws or regulations applicable to their own community’.1091 However, this 
was not a satisfactory solution for the Nauruans, who ‘wanted to shape their own 
destiny’1092 and, fearful of the implications of Australia’s assimilationist policies, saw 
recognition as a separate sovereignty entity as the only means of doing so. At this 
point, the negotiations reached a stalemate. As the then Australian Prime Minister 
Robert Menzies explained to the Premier of Queensland in 1962, ‘[n]o Australian 
government would be likely to agree to the establishment of a separate Nauruan 
                                                
1086 Yamamoto and Esteban, supra note 26, at 200–201 (and see their hybrid ‘Vatican solution’ at 205–206). 
1087 See examples in Crawford, supra note 484, at 207–209; Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 568–569; 
von Glahn and Taulbee, supra note 1009, at 157–158. 
1088 Ödalen, supra note 91, at 233. 
1089 Crawford, supra note 484, at 130. 
1090 Tabucanon and Opeskin, supra note 396, at 346–347. 
1091 Weeramantry, supra note 396, at 292. 
1092 According to a UN Trusteeship Council Report, cited in ibid, at 287. 
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community as an enclave within the borders of Australia’.1093 But what reasons did 
Australia have for refusing to accommodate a Nauruan state within its borders? And 
how might these reasons vary depending on the scope of autonomy granted to the 
incoming state? 
7.7.1 Reasons against acting 
In the case of deterritorialized statehood — unlike the cession of territory considered in 
Chapter 6 — the territorial integrity of existing states goes unchallenged. Host states 
are not required to relinquish sovereignty over their own territory but to recognise the 
limited jurisdiction of another state within their territorial borders. Those states that do 
not host the government or citizens of a deterritorialized state are required to continue 
to recognise it as a state (by, for example, maintaining formal diplomatic relations or 
observing existing bilateral treaties)1094 and, in some cases, to provide financial or in-
kind support for the resettlement of its citizens and institutions. 
However, the task of hosting a deterritorialized island state generates its own set of 
reasons against acting. First, as with the planned migration proposal discussed in 
Chapter 3, a state may have reasons against accommodating a deterritorialized state 
arising from concerns about the dilution of the autonomy or shared way of life of its 
own people. A sudden influx of islanders with their own customs, values and rules 
may be interpreted as a threat to the existing social, legal and political institutions of 
the host state.1095 However, as observed in earlier chapters, atoll island populations are 
relatively small and therefore unlikely to overwhelm the existing institutions of a host 
state. And, unlike the planned migration scenario, the members of a deterritorialized 
state will retain at least some of their own legal and political institutions, thereby 
lessening their impact on the political culture of a host state. In fact, if a 
deterritorialized state is granted greater independence and autonomy — including 
legislative jurisdiction plus some enforcement or judicial jurisdiction — this may 
impose certain constraints on a host state’s sovereignty but will also minimise the 
extent to which islanders must be accommodated within the existing institutions of a 
host state, thereby insulating its shared way of life. 
                                                
1093 Cited in Tabucanon and Opeskin, supra note 396, at 345. 
1094 A deterritorialized state need not be recognised by all states in order to continue to enjoy many of the 
competences of statehood, but will have the capacity to exercise its jurisdiction only within those states 
that do recognise it. Talmon, supra note 976, at 120–125 and 207–209. 
1095 Stratford, Farbotko and Lazrus, supra note 25, at 75. 
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Second, a state may have reasons against hosting a deterritorialized island state where 
this would impose unreasonably high costs on its own citizens, perhaps in terms of a 
tax increase, higher unemployment rates or overcrowded schools, hospitals and other 
public services. Again, however, the number of displaced islanders — and the financial 
costs associated with their resettlement — is likely to be minimal, particularly if those 
states that do not host deterritorialized populations contribute financial, technical or 
human resources. When the Australian government offered to fund the resettlement of 
the Nauruan population to Curtis Island in the 1960s — including purchasing land, 
building housing, utilities and infrastructure, and establishing a Nauruan Council — it 
estimated the cost at US$22.4 million, or around AU$224 million in today’s 
currency.1096 This equates to around 4% of Australia’s current immigration budget.1097 
And, as above, the financial costs of hosting a deterritorialized state may also decrease 
as it is granted more autonomy and independence. If islanders are able to establish and 
maintain their own judicial system, for example, the costs of expanding or modifying a 
host state’s existing judicial institutions will be minimised. 
A third reason against acting was identified by the Australian government during its 
negotiations with Nauru. Australia cited ‘security concerns’ relating to the existence of 
a separate sovereign entity within its territory and proposed, instead, that the Nauruan 
people establish itself as a self-governing community.1098 Nauru, in response, identified 
‘ways and means whereby the future may be safeguarded as perfectly as possible to 
our mutual interest’,1099 including inviting the Australian government to establish an 
office responsible for monitoring Nauru’s compliance with the proposed Treaty of 
Friendship between Australia and Nauru, and proposing that any violation of the 
treaty would render Nauru’s sovereignty null and void.1100 
These negotiations, while ultimately unsuccessful, reflect the need for an iterative 
process of deliberation between island and host communities, with the aim of 
assuaging the concerns identified here. All parties must work together to agree on the 
location of a deterritorialized state and its citizens, and the scope and content of the 
bundle of competences it will exercise. Where will its government reside? Will 
                                                
1096 Tabucanon and Opeskin, supra note 396, at 346–347. 
1097 The Department of Immigration and Border Protection has a budget of AU$5.9 billion for 2014–2015. 
Commonwealth of Australia, Portfolio Budget Statements 2014-15. Budget Related Paper No.1.11: Immigration 
and Border Protection Portfolio (2013), at 6. 
1098 Tabucanon and Opeskin, supra note 396, at 345. 
1099 Weeramantry, supra note 396, at 294. 
1100 Tabucanon and Opeskin, supra note 396, at 348. 
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islanders be resettled together or dispersed across several states? If the former, how 
can the burdens imposed on the host state be more equitably distributed between other 
actors? If the latter, will all of the host states consent to the same bundle of 
competences? To what extent will the deterritorialized state have the capacity to 
enforce its legislation, within both the state in which its government is based and the 
state(s) in which its citizens live?  
Where these concerns cannot be addressed and a state has strong reasons against 
hosting a deterritorialized state, it may therefore have stronger reasons for supporting 
an alternative option. A state that prioritises territorial sovereignty over an exclusive 
political identity will have stronger reasons for hosting a deterritorialized state or 
joining with an island state in federation or free association (as discussed in Chapter 8), 
while a state that wishes to preserve its political and cultural integrity from outside 
interference will have stronger reasons for ceding territory to a displaced atoll island 
state (as proposed in Chapter 6).1101 Australia’s willingness to propose alternative 
solutions during its negotiations with Nauru indicates an awareness that, while it may 
have particular reasons against hosting the state of Nauru within its borders, its 
general reasons for acting to assist the Nauruan people persist.  
7.7.2 Reasons for acting 
Again, this section considers only those reasons for acting that are specific to the 
solution at hand, with the assumption that other reasons for acting identified in 
Chapters 2, 3, 5 and 6 — including reasons of international cooperation and 
contribution — apply where relevant and need not be restated here. 
In Chapter 6, we saw that states may be unwilling to cede territory to an atoll island 
state where this interferes with their own territorial integrity and self-determination. 
While self-determination is widely recognised as a jus cogens or peremptory norm of 
customary international law 1102 and a source of obligations erga omnes, 1103 this is 
thought to extend only to those situations in which it does not disrupt the territorial 
integrity of existing states.1104 However, in this case, deterritorialized statehood does 
not threaten the territorial integrity of existing states, and an atoll island people’s claim 
                                                
1101 As per Walzer’s ‘White Australia’ example, cited in Chapter 6. Walzer, supra note 429, at 47. 
1102 ILC, supra note 274, at 85, para.5. See also sources cited supra note 511. 
1103 East Timor, supra note 160, at para.29; Israeli Wall, supra note 503, at paras.88 and 155–156. 
1104 I.e. in the case of peoples under colonial or foreign domination, or the peoples of existing states. 
Duursma, supra note 534, at 103. 
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to self-determination may therefore retain its peremptory status. Thus, where states 
choose not to cede territory, they may have particularly strong reasons for acting to 
assist atoll island peoples by hosting a deterritorialized state — or by agreeing to 
merge with an atoll island state (Chapter 8) — arising from the peremptory nature of 
self-determination. 
Certain states may also have reasons arising from their capacity to act. The relative 
ease with which a state can accommodate an atoll island people will depend on the 
amount of available, habitable land it has. As observed in Chapter 6, Australia and 
New Zealand have both a high GDP and a small population relative to their landmass, 
with large, sparsely populated regions and numerous offshore islands.1105 And, as 
noted earlier, the costs involved will be relatively minimal, particularly if distributed 
among all those with reasons for acting. While Australia and New Zealand were 
identified in Chapter 3 as having primary responsibility — and therefore particularly 
strong reasons for hosting a deterritorialized island state — other, more distant, 
affluent states may also have reasons for providing financial, logistical, technical or 
other support, depending on the model of deterritorialized statehood adopted. 
The members of a deterritorialized state will either resettle collectively in one area or 
disperse across several states. In the first scenario, islanders’ housing, infrastructure 
and political, legal and social institutions will be concentrated in one location, thereby 
lowering the costs associated with construction, maintenance, transport and 
communication. However, while this will minimise the overall cost of resettlement, it 
will unduly burden the host state1106 and — unless a suitable portion of habitable, 
uninhabited land can be found — those currently living in the area in which islanders 
are to resettle. In the second scenario, the costs will be distributed across several states. 
Given that this scenario involves greater distances and dislocation, this will increase 
the overall cost but distribute this cost across several actors, thereby minimising the 
burdens imposed on each actor. In both cases, those states that have reasons for acting 
but do not host a deterritorialized state or its citizens can also shoulder some of the 
                                                
1105 Australia has around three people per square kilometre and New Zealand has around 15. World 
Atlas, supra note 932. 
1106 Lister, supra note 130, at 628. 
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financial burdens via a new or existing international funding scheme or loss and 
damage mechanism.1107 
In any case, either scenario will be significantly less costly, in the short term at least, 
than committing to mitigation and adaptation strategies that enable islanders to stay 
where they are. Where states are unable to agree on or meet timely and effective 
mitigation targets, and they have the capacity to assist those in distress as a result, then 
this generates strong reasons for doing so. And, where they are unwilling to cede 
territory, the peremptory character of self-determination demands that they take some 
other action to protect the self-determining status of atoll island peoples — whether by 
accommodating a deterritorialized state within their borders or joining in free 
association or federation with an atoll island state. 
7.8 Conclusion 
While international law is often thought to rely on certainty and stability, one of its 
central concepts — that of statehood — lacks a clear, reliable definition. By raising 
difficult questions about the ongoing existence of states whose territory is rendered 
uninhabitable, climate change inundation prompts us to re-examine the legal concept 
of statehood, challenging us to clarify what we mean when we use the term ‘state’.  
That international law — and, in this case, the legal concept of statehood — will need 
to be flexible and inventive in adapting to the ‘post-territorial’ problem of climate 
change is nothing new.1108 In 2011, for example, the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Antonio Guterres, called for ‘innovative legal frameworks for statehood to 
preserve [the] national identity’ of atoll island peoples.1109 It is in this spirit that this 
chapter has examined the most legally problematic of the three options set out in the 
collective decision-making framework proposed in Chapter 6. 
However, the idea of a state without a defined territory of its own challenges the 
mainstream legal understanding of statehood, sovereignty and self-determination. It 
remains unclear whether island and host states could agree on a model of 
deterritorialized statehood that provides adequate protection for the autonomy and 
independence of a displaced atoll island people, particularly within an international 
                                                
1107 Biermann and Boas, supra note 328, at 76; McAdam, supra note 90, at 253–254 and 259–260; Talakai, 
supra note 900; Yamamoto and Esteban, supra note 26, at 165–171. 
1108 John Knox, speaking at OHCHR Seminar, supra note 186. 
1109 Guterres, supra note 330. 
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legal framework premised on territorial sovereignty. As Young observes, ‘states 
organised according to currently accepted principles of sovereignty … find it difficult 
or impossible to accommodate’ claims to self-determination made by those who do not 
have jurisdiction over a defined territory.1110 
A people’s chosen mode of self-determination ‘should be based on a general conviction 
that the particular solution selected is the one that will yield the greatest advance in 
terms of human rights and minimum order for all those concerned’.1111 Perhaps, 
however, the first two options in the decision-making framework proposed in Chapter 
6 –  — maintaining a ‘sovereign and independent State’ or emerging into ‘any other 
political status freely determined by a people’, understood here in terms of 
deterritorialized statehood — cling too tightly to statehood to achieve these aims. The 
third option — entering into ‘free association or integration with an independent State’ 
— allows us to explore a relational, overlapping concept of self-determination that 
shies away from the rigid boundaries of either statehood or territory. This final option 
may therefore provide a more flexible, responsive solution to the problem of climate 
change inundation; one whose focus lies on the people at the heart of the debate. 
  
                                                
1110 Young, supra note 311, at 255. 
1111  Reisman, ‘Communities in Transition: Autonomy, Self-Government and Independence (Panel 
Discussion)’, 87 ASIL Proceedings (1993) 248, at 249. 
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8. Self-Determination and the Retreat from Statehood 
8.1 Introduction 
This final chapter of the thesis has two functions. The first is to examine the third 
option of the collective decision-making framework proposed in Chapter 6: to enter 
into ‘free association or integration with an independent State’.1112 The question here is 
whether or not some non-state arrangement can ‘substitute wholly or partially’ for the 
framework of statehood and the rights and competences attached to it.1113 Can a people 
persist as a self-determining entity without the formal legal independence or exclusive 
territorial jurisdiction typically associated with statehood? This third option is 
considered in the final chapter because it is perhaps the most complex of the three 
options set out in the proposed decision-making framework, raising numerous 
questions and possibilities. This chapter therefore offers a springboard for further 
research into the ways in which statehood, self-determination and international law 
may adapt to the challenges posed by climate change inundation. 
Despite its contingency, the territorial state has come to dominate our understanding 
of the world today. ‘In some ways, it is hard to think what the alternative might be.’1114 
Chapter 6 — which examined the possibility of re-establishing an independent state on 
new territory elsewhere — stayed faithful to this mainstream legal narrative, in which 
a self-determining people normally requires both statehood and territory. Chapter 7 
took a detour from this narrative, suggesting that statehood might be decoupled from 
territory while still protecting the self-determination of a people to a greater or lesser 
extent. This final chapter moves still further away, assessing the extent to which an 
atoll island people might sustain its capacity for collective political autonomy with 
neither exclusive territorial jurisdiction nor statehood.  
If the state is understood as instrumentally valuable in protecting the human rights of 
its citizens — including their collective capacity for self-determination — yet fails to 
fulfil this role in certain cases, this may prompt a shift towards ‘a political order that is 
less state centred and more centred on people’.1115 After all, as argued in Chapters 6 
                                                
1112 GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 137. 
1113 Alfredsson, ‘Indigenous Peoples and Autonomy’, in Suksi (ed.), supra note 528, 125, at 135. 
1114 Craven, supra note 505, at 204. 
1115 Anaya, supra note 527, at 156. 
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and 7, ‘the state is not an aim in itself’1116 but a means to an end — in this case, the 
effective protection of the individual and collective human rights of its population.1117 
This shift requires us to modify the account of self-determination set out in previous 
chapters, which emphasised both autonomy and independence, where the latter was 
thought to require that atoll island peoples retain their statehood in order to remain 
self-determining. Yet this emphasis on formal legal independence offers little room for 
discussion about the ways in which self-determining peoples interact with and impact 
upon others within and across borders— a process exemplified by the issue of climate 
change inundation.  
Drawing inspiration from Iris Marion Young’s relational account of self-determination, 
this concluding chapter therefore develops a more nuanced understanding of self-
determination grounded in reciprocity and interdependence rather than a rigid 
emphasis on exclusivity and independence (section 8.2). Once a people has emerged 
through a history of participation in the governing institutions of its state, Young’s 
account urges us to pay attention to the ways in which it interacts with — rather than 
distances itself from — others. According to Young, self-determining peoples should 
not seek to remain siloed within impermeable territorial and political boundaries but to 
engage in an ongoing process of negotiation and consultation to ensure that each does 
not arbitrarily interfere with — or ‘dominate’ — the interests and values of others.1118 
Rather than commit to one fixed model of political autonomy and independence — as 
embodied in the state — this chapter looks to ‘the myriad of alternatives, complexities, 
competing demands, and just “different shades”’ that characterise the exercise of self-
determination today.1119 A brief empirical survey identifies various non-state models of 
political autonomy, identity and interaction, including indigenous and other examples 
of intrastate autonomy, federal states and entities in free association (section 8.3). These 
models are assessed according to the extent to which each is able to protect the 
collective autonomy and international legal status of peoples, where the former is 
understood in terms of their capacity to govern themselves in areas of importance to 
their members and the latter in terms of their capacity to interact with other members 
of the international community, within certain parameters. Section 8.4 then considers 
                                                
1116 Ustor, ‘Independence and Interdependence’, in A. Grahl-Madsen and J. Toman (eds), The Spirit of 
Uppsala (1984) 52, at 54. 
1117 Compare Anaya, supra note 527, at 7–8; Craven, supra note 505, at 247–248. 
1118 Young, supra note 625, at 184–185. 
1119 French, supra note 885, at 4. French cites Knop, supra note 790, at 107. 
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some of the reasons that other states might have for and against integrating or joining 
with an island people in free association or federation. 
The second function of this chapter is to draw the thesis to a close by revisiting some of 
its main arguments. Section 8.5 provides an overview of some of the key points of 
interest or realisations that have emerged, sometimes unexpectedly, from the research 
and have shaped the thesis as a whole. Section 8.6 concludes by highlighting several 
avenues for further research into statehood, self-determination and climate change 
inundation. While these do not exhaust the possibilities for future research, they 
provide an indication of the empirical and theoretical directions in which the thesis 
might lead. 
8.2 Self-determination as reciprocity and interdependence 
Chapters 6 and 7 identified an apparent paradox at the heart of self-determination and 
statehood, particularly where these are thought to require formal legal independence 
and exclusive jurisdiction over territory. In a world in which territory is a finite 
resource, the more emphasis that is placed on the relationship between legal 
independence, territorial sovereignty and self-determination, the more difficult it 
becomes for new — or, in this case, shifting — claims to self-determination and 
statehood to be recognised. Even where a state recognises the validity and urgency of 
an island people’s claim to self-determination, this does not exempt it from protecting 
the self-determination of its own people from unreasonable intervention. 
However, this paradox arises only where self-determination requires that peoples exist 
as legally independent entities within precisely defined political and territorial 
boundaries. On this account, each self-determining people must be ‘altogether 
independent of the will of other[s]’,1120 free from any external interference within its 
defined territory. Voices from indigenous and minority rights movements, 
cosmopolitan philosophy, feminist theory and elsewhere remind us, however, that to 
deny the relational, reciprocal nature of self-determination is to ignore its defining 
feature — for what is the aim of self-determination if not to craft one’s own identity in 
a world of different others? Speaking before the UN Working Group on Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights, Craig Scott observes: 
                                                
1120 Christian Wolff, cited in A. Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Non Intervention: The Law and its Import in the 
Americas (1956), at 5. 
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‘[P]eoples, no less than individuals, exist and thrive only in dialogue with each 
other … We need to begin to think of self-determination in terms of peoples existing 
in relationship with each other. It is the process of negotiating the nature of such 
relationships which is part of, indeed at the very core of, what it means to be a self-
determining people.’1121 
The emphasis here is on self-determination as reciprocity rather than exclusivity. From 
this perspective, the paradox identified above is not a paradox at all but a defining 
characteristic of a pluralist world. After all, ‘if my feelings of communal identity, and 
aspirations to have political institutions expressive of that identity are important to me 
and justify my claims to self-determination, they might be important to others’ as 
well.1122 To understand self-determination as reciprocal is to require that peoples ‘do 
not claim for themselves something that they are not willing to grant for others’.1123  
Young’s account of self-determination emphasises its reciprocal and relational rather 
than exclusive nature. Like Scott, Young observes that peoples, like individuals, are 
engaged in complex webs of action and interaction, with the result that ‘it is difficult 
for a people to be independent in the sense that they require nothing from outsiders 
and their activity has no effect on others’.1124 This is not a fact that many would deny, 
when pressed. Even those who understand sovereignty in terms of formal legal 
independence or freedom from ‘subjection to any other authority’1125 recognise that 
relationships between members of the international community are more accurately 
characterised by inter- rather than independence.1126 
Drawing on feminist and neo-republican theory, Young understands self-
determination not in terms of freedom from any external interference but in terms of 
freedom from domination — the possibility that others might arbitrarily interfere with 
a people’s sphere of autonomy without taking into account the consequences for that 
                                                
1121 Scott, ‘Indigenous Self-Determination and Decolonisation of the International Imagination: A Plea’, 18 
HRQ (1996) 814, at 819. 
1122 Moore, supra note 582, at 151. Banai reaches a similar conclusion by relying on Rawls’ first principle of 
justice. Banai, supra note 463. 
1123 Banai, supra note 463, at 61. 
1124 Young, supra note 625, at 185. Compare Anaya’s account of indigenous self-determination in a world 
of ‘multiple and overlapping spheres of human association and political ordering’ rather than ‘narrowly 
defined, mutually exclusive “peoples”’. Anaya, supra note 527, at 102–103. 
1125 Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 382. 
1126 Ibid, at 125. 
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people.1127 On this account, an atoll island people that transitions to a self-governing 
entity within another state should enjoy access to ‘their own governance institutions 
through which they decide on their own goals and interpret their way of life’, free from 
any arbitrary constraints imposed by the state within which its members live.1128 
However, Young’s relational account also presupposes that peoples interact with, and 
impact upon, others, particularly where they coexist within the borders of a state. 
Peoples that share land, resources and socio-economic, legal or political institutions 
should ‘acknowledge the legitimate interests of others as well as promote their own’, 
not only in resolving shared problems but also in deciding how best to pursue their 
own values and goals.1129 ‘Self-determination’, as Scott observes, ‘necessarily involves 
engagement with and responsibility to others’.1130 
Young’s ideas — particularly her emphasis on autonomy, reciprocity and 
interdependence rather than formal legal independence — are used to modify the 
account of self-determination developed throughout the thesis by shifting its emphasis 
from independent statehood to alternative non-state institutional models like 
federation, free association or intrastate autonomy. Chapter 4 argued that, while a 
history of cooperation under state-like institutions of government may be necessary for 
the emergence of a self-determining people,1131 its capacity for self-determination may 
persist even after the framework of statehood falls away.1132 Alongside the examples of 
free association, federation and indigenous or minority rights-based models of self-
government discussed below in section 8.3, Young’s account provides additional 
theoretical resources for thinking about the ways in which it might do so. 
The remainder of this section examines autonomy and international legal status — 
both of which are central to the exercise of self-determination — in more detail, 
assessing the extent to which each can be retained in the absence of independent 
statehood. Section 8.3 adds empirical substance to this account by identifying various 
                                                
1127 Young, supra note 625, at 184–185; Young, supra note 311, at ch.7. Young draws on Pettit’s neo-
republican account, among others. P. Pettit, Republicanism (1997). Compare Moore, supra note 590, at 133. 
1128 Young, supra note 625, at 187. 
1129 Ibid. Compare Young, supra note 311, at 259–260. Similar ideas have developed in the context of 
minority and indigenous rights (discussed further in section 8.3 of this chapter). For a brief overview, see, 
for example, A. Eide and E. Daes, Working Paper on the Relationship and Distinction between the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to Minorities and Those of Indigenous Peoples, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/10. 
1130 Scott, supra note 1121, at 819. Compare Summers, supra note 506, at 232. 
1131 Compare Stilz, supra note 584, at 579–580. 
1132 Ibid, at 591. 
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non-state entities that exercise more or less autonomy and enjoy a greater or lesser 
degree of international legal status. 
Autonomy, defined in previous chapters as a people’s capacity to make and enforce its 
own laws and practices through its own legal and political institutions, is not generally 
thought to require formal legal independence or statehood but, rather, ‘independence 
of action on the internal or domestic level’.1133 As the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) makes clear, a people’s right to self-determination 
entails ‘the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal 
and local affairs’.1134 According to a reciprocal account of self-determination, a people’s 
capacity for autonomy requires an ongoing conversation between that people and the 
state within which its members reside about matters of shared interest, as well as a 
space in which it can develop and sustain its own institutions of government and 
‘negotiate freely [its] political status’,1135 ‘free of external domination’.1136  
‘International legal status’ is used here as an umbrella term for the capacity to accept 
international legal obligations and engage with states, organisations, adjudicative 
bodies and other actors in the international sphere, a capacity often referred to in terms 
of ‘international legal personality’ or ‘sovereignty’. While this capacity is thought to be 
closely linked with statehood, 1137  neither sovereignty nor international legal 
personality are confined to states alone. Many non-state entities enjoy what Stephen 
Krasner calls ‘international legal sovereignty’ (recognition of their capacity to engage 
with states, conclude treaties, belong to international organisations and so on) without 
necessarily enjoying ‘Westphalian sovereignty’ (formal legal independence and 
freedom from external interference in their legal and political institutions).1138 In 
Western Sahara, for example, the ICJ accepted that a non-state entity with ‘common 
institutions or organs’ of government to which its members are answerable could, in 
                                                
1133 Heintze, ‘On the Legal Understanding of Autonomy’, in Suksi (ed.), supra note 528, 7, at 8. Compare 
Hannum and Lillich, ‘The Concept of Autonomy in International Law’, 74 AJIL (1980) 858, at 869. While 
some equate autonomy with internal self-determination (for example, Brownlie, supra note 645, at 6; Eide, 
‘The Universal Declaration in Time and Space’, in J. Berting et al. (eds), Human Rights in a Pluralistic World 
(1990) 15, at 25), the former term is used here for its emphasis on the maintenance of a people’s unique set 
of common governing institutions rather than (merely) the participation of its members in the governing 
institutions of a state. 
1134 Article 4, UNDRIP, supra note 504. 
1135 Daes, ‘An Overview of the History of Indigenous Peoples: Self-Determination and the United 
Nations’, 21 Cambridge Review of International Affairs (2008) 7, at 23. 
1136 Moore, supra note 590, at 133. Compare Sharma, supra note 823, at 240. 
1137 See, for example, Island of Palmas, supra note 957, at 838–839; Hannum, supra note 818, at 15. 
1138 S. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy (2001), at ch.1. 
     
 
    
210 
principle, enjoy ‘some form of sovereignty’, 1139  despite its lack of formal legal 
independence. Others agree but frame this capacity in terms of international legal 
personality. ‘To the extent that bodies other than states directly possess some rights, 
powers and duties in international law’, Jennings and Watts argue, ‘they can be 
regarded as subjects of international law, possessing international legal personality’.1140  
India and the Philippines, for example, were founding members of the UN prior to 
achieving formal legal independence.1141 Hong Kong has joined various international 
organisations, including the World Trade Organisation, despite its status as a former 
British colony and now a Special Administrative Region of China. The Sovereign 
Military Order of Malta engages in diplomatic relations and concludes international 
treaties with states despite not exercising control over any territory. And, as discussed 
further in section 8.3, the member states of certain federations have some capacity to 
conclude international treaties, as do former non-self-governing territories in free 
association with another state. 
Like autonomy, international legal status is therefore attributable to a range of liminal 
or ‘anomalous’ entities 1142  that enjoy certain rights and competences under 
international law, despite the fact that they are not recognised as — and do not claim to 
be — legally independent states..1143 An atoll island people that chooses integration or 
free association with another state may therefore, to a greater or lesser extent, retain its 
capacity for self-government and its voice in the international community — and, 
therefore, its capacity for self-determination both within and outside the borders of its 
host state.1144  
Drawing on this account, the following section proposes an understanding of self-
determination as a continuum along the two axes identified here: autonomy and 
                                                
1139 Western Sahara, supra note 136, at para.149. 
1140 Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 16. 
1141 The examples in this paragraph, and others, can be found in Crawford, supra note 484, at 116–125; von 
Glahn and Taulbee, supra note 1009, at 154–157; Hannum, supra note 818, at 14–19; Krasner, supra note 
1138, at 15–16 and 24. 
1142 Crawford, supra note 484, at 116 and 124. 
1143 Ibid, at 116–125; Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 330–331. For the ICJ’s observation that ‘the 
subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their 
rights’, see Reparations, supra note 548, at 178. 
1144 On the idea that external self-determination is not necessarily limited to states with formal legal 
independence, see Summers, supra note 506, at 248–249. 
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international legal status.1145 It identifies possible institutional arrangements at various 
points along this continuum and examines the extent to which each might allow a 
displaced atoll island people to remain an autonomous entity with some international 
legal personality. 
8.3 Non-state solutions: Preserving autonomy and international legal status 
The previous section proposed a flexible account of self-determination as ‘a plethora of 
possible solutions’ negotiated by interdependent actors rather than ‘a rigid absolute 
right’ to formal legal independence and statehood.1146 But, were atoll island peoples to 
choose a non-state solution, what would be lost with the retreat from statehood? As 
Chapters 6 and 7 made clear, statehood is traditionally associated with a range of 
benefits, rights and competences and is therefore seen as ‘a ticket of general admission 
to the international arena’,1147 as well as a useful shield against outside intervention. 
Perhaps for these reasons, free association and integration are ‘often perceived as 
somehow lesser solutions’ in UN and state practice.1148 Even those working closely on 
autonomy and self-government see it as a second-best option; as ‘one step below full 
self-determination’ or independent statehood.1149 Rather than empowering peoples to 
exercise their capacity for self-determination, perhaps these non-state models entail a 
loss of ‘independent power, authority and authenticity’.1150 
Island peoples may themselves be reluctant to accept a loss of statehood, particularly 
where their independence has only recently been achieved. 1151  During lengthy 
negotiations over resettlement in Australia, for example, Nauru (although not a state at 
the time) rejected several proposals from the Australian government on the basis that 
                                                
1145 Compare the Liechtenstein Draft Convention on Self-Determination, which envisages a continuum of 
self-administration from cultural autonomy and self-government through to full political independence. 
Watts, ‘The Liechtenstein Draft Convention on Self-Determination through Self-Administration: A 
Commentary’, in Danspeckgruber (ed.), supra note 534, 365. See also Moore, supra note 599; Nine, supra 
note 91, at 372; Ödalen, supra note 91, at 226; Young, supra note 311, at 253–254. On the idea that 
international legal personality comes in degrees, see Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 330–331. 
1146 Pomerance, supra note 480, at 74. Compare Hannum, ‘Rethinking Self-Determination’, 34 Virginia 
Journal of International Law (1993) 1, at 64–66. 
1147 M. Fowler and J. Bunck, Law, Power and the Sovereign State (1995), at 12. Compare Crawford, supra 
note 484, at 115–116 and 126. 
1148 Klabbers, supra note 549, at 192. Compare Berman, supra note 593, at 55 and 69; Hannikainen, supra 
note 583, at 81. 
1149 Hurst Hannum, speaking at the Nordic Human Rights Symposium at the Åbo Akademi Institute for 
Human Rights (19 October 1996). Cited in Hannikainen, supra note 583, at 86. 
1150 Anghie, ‘Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International 
Law’, 40 Harvard International Law Journal (1999) 1, at 70. 
1151 McAdam, supra note 90, at 156. 
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these offered inadequate protection for Nauruan identity, sovereignty and self-
determination. 1152  Instead of ‘participat[ing] in what was essentially their own 
disappearance’,1153 the Nauruans insisted on recognition as a sovereign entity engaged 
in a treaty of friendship with Australia, where the latter would exercise control over 
defence, quarantine, foreign affairs and civil aviation, leaving Nauru otherwise free to 
exercise its autonomy and independence free from the threat of assimilation within a 
larger state.1154 
However, this thesis assumes that island peoples are entitled to freely express their 
preferences, even where these do not conform to the expectations of others or to the 
traditional model of independent statehood. In exercising their right to self-
determination through the decision-making framework proposed in Chapter 6, some 
island peoples may prefer a non-state solution. McAdam, drawing on interviews with 
residents and officials, suggests that islanders’ primary concerns lie with ‘the 
maintenance of community and culture, rather than “the state” per se’.1155 Similarly, 
indigenous peoples often seek to exercise their right to self-determination as ‘distinct 
political entities with which other political entities, such as states, must negotiate 
agreements and over which they cannot simply impose their will and their law’, 
without seeking statehood.1156  
Where a non-state framework is better able to protect collective identity and autonomy 
than a conventional or deterritorialized state, this may therefore be an island people’s 
preferred choice — for the time being, at least. As the General Assembly has made 
clear, the right to self-determination is not a one-off decision. Peoples who choose free 
association or integration retain ‘the freedom to modify the status of that territory 
through the expression of their will’ in the future.1157 
                                                
1152
 Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v Australia), ICJ Pleadings (1991), Vol. II, at paras.18 and 20. 
See further ibid, at 149–153; Tabucanon and Opeskin, supra note 396, at 346–347; Weeramantry, supra note 
396, at 292. 
1153 Anghie, supra note 396, at 501. 
1154 Tabucanon and Opeskin, supra note 396, at 347. 
1155 McAdam, supra note 90, at 156. 
1156 Young, supra note 625, at 180. Compare H. Diez Palanco, Indigenous Peoples in Latin America: The Quest 
for Self-Determination (1997), esp. at ch.2; Sharma, supra note 823, at 240–241; Young, supra note 311, at 255–
256. However, this may simply reflect an awareness of states’ reluctance to recognise a right to external 
self-determination or secession for indigenous groups, as discussed in section 8.4.1 of this chapter. 
1157 Principle VII(a), GA Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 495. Compare Article 6, GA Res. 2064 (XX), 16 
December 1965. However, in the case of climate change inundation, this is complicated by the fact that 
atoll island peoples will not have a pre-existing territory of their own whose status they can modify, 
raising the spectre of secession from a future host state. Stahl, supra note 724, at 31. 
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But, in choosing free association or integration within another state, might atoll island 
peoples in fact be ‘participating in their own disappearance’? While it is difficult to 
address this question in the abstract, evidence suggests that this need not be the case. 
In fact, the non-state frameworks discussed below may in fact reflect a more suitable 
means of institutionalising self-determination — understood in terms of reciprocity 
and interdependence rather than exclusivity and independence — than the rigid 
formality of independent statehood, which insists, against all evidence to the contrary, 
that states (and the peoples they represent) remain isolated within clear territorial and 
political boundaries. 
A brief survey of empirical examples will help to flesh out the continuum of non-state 
self-determination proposed in the previous section. Depending on where the chosen 
institutional framework sits on each axis of this continuum, an island people will have 
more or less autonomy (including the capacity to design, adopt and enforce policies 
and legislation or to exercise personal or territorial jurisdiction) and a greater or lesser 
degree of international legal status (including the capacity to maintain diplomatic 
relations, to negotiate and conclude treaties or to participate in international 
organisations). 
Free association 
Peoples in free association with an independent state are self-governing entities within 
the territorial jurisdiction of that state. 1158  Examples include the former British 
Protectorates of the Cook Islands and Niue, both in free association with New 
Zealand,1159 and Palau, the Marshall Islands and Micronesia, formerly part of the Trust 
Territory of the Pacific Islands and now in free association with the US.1160 
While the status of associated peoples varies depending on the particular 
arrangements in each case,1161 the framework of free association sits furthest along the 
                                                
1158 See generally Hannum, supra note 818, at 384–389; Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 280. In the 
context of climate change inundation, see McAdam, supra note 90, at 153–158; Wong, supra note 90, at 38; 
Yamamoto and Esteban, supra note 26, at 201. 
1159 GA Res. 2064 (XX), supra note 1157; GA Res. 3285 (XXIX), 13 December 1974. 
1160 Under Compacts of Free Association. See further Dema, supra note 337; Keitner and Reisman, ‘Free 
Association: The United States Experience’, 39 Texas International Law Journal (2003) 1. 
1161 On the differing approaches of the Cook Islands and Niue, for example, see McAdam, supra note 90, 
at 154–156. 
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two axes of the continuum of self-determination identified earlier. 1162 Associated 
peoples enjoy a wide sphere of autonomy, including ‘the right to determine [their] 
internal constitution without outside interference’. 1163  They typically ‘possess 
unlimited legislative competence over [their] own affairs’,1164 including the capacity to 
establish and maintain democratic governing institutions and judicial systems with 
wide-ranging jurisdiction.1165 The Niue Assembly, for example, retains the capacity to 
‘make laws for the peace, order and good government of Niue’, including ‘the power 
to repeal or revoke or amend or modify or extend, in relation to Niue, any law in force 
in Niue’,1166 including the Constitution itself.1167 
Peoples in free association also enjoy a ‘separate international status’1168 with extensive 
rights and privileges.1169 In their 2001 Joint Centenary Declaration, the Cook Islands 
and New Zealand are described as ‘equal states independent in the conduct of their 
own affairs’, and the Cook Islands’ capacity to enter into international treaties, 
maintain diplomatic relations and accept responsibility under international law is 
emphasised.1170 The Cook Islands is also a member of various international bodies, 
including the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), WHO and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB). Although the principal state typically retains control over 
citizenship, immigration, foreign affairs and defence, it must consult with the 
associated people in exercising this power. 
However, peoples in free association tend to be attached to a defined territory over 
which their government retains some jurisdiction, if not full territorial sovereignty. In 
the case of climate change inundation, any remaining atoll island territory will 
presumably come under the jurisdiction of the state with which a people is 
associated.1171 Yet where this territory is largely uninhabitable, islanders will need to 
resettle within the existing territory of the principal state. As noted in previous 
                                                
1162 Crawford describes it as ‘one of the more significant possibilities of self-government’. Crawford, supra 
note 564, at 626. 
1163 Principle VII(b), GA Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 495. 
1164 Hannum, supra note 818, at 388. 
1165 The High Court of Niue has ‘all such jurisdiction (both civil and criminal) as may be necessary to 
administer the law in force in Niue’. Article 37(2), Niue Constitution Act (29 August 1974). 
1166 Article 28, ibid. 
1167 Article 35, ibid. 
1168 Crawford, supra note 564, at 494. 
1169 Hannum, supra note 818, at 17; von Glahn and Taulbee, supra note 1009, at 154–155. 
1170 Preamble and Clauses 4, 5 and 6, Joint Centenary Declaration of the Principles of the Relationship 
between the Cook Islands and New Zealand (11 June 2001). 
1171 Stoutenburg, supra note 90, at 61. 
     
 
    
215 
chapters, Australia’s proposal to establish a self-governing Nauruan community on 
Curtis Island indicates that a receiving state may have reasons for granting a territory-
less island people certain jurisdictional rights over some of its territory.1172 Where this 
is not the case, however, some form of deterritorialized free association will need to be 
negotiated between island and host peoples, which may have implications for 
islanders’ autonomy and international legal status. 
Federalism 
The second non-state option explicitly referred to in the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations is that of integration with an independent state1173 — as, for example, the 
Cocos (Keeling) Islands has chosen.1174 Integration ‘should be on the basis of complete 
equality’ between receiving and relocating peoples: ‘both should have equal status and 
rights of citizenship and equal guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms without 
any distinction or discrimination; both should have equal rights and opportunities for 
representation and effective participation at all levels in the executive, legislative and 
judicial organs of government’.1175 
One framework through which this equality might be realised is that of federalism,1176 
a union or ‘association of different, overlapping and interacting communities’1177 that 
enjoy formal legal equality within an overarching federal structure.1178 The member 
states of federal entities participate in both ‘self-rule’ (within autonomous legal and 
political institutions) and ‘shared rule’ (via representation in the central organs of the 
federal government), 1179  and engage in an ongoing process of negotiation and 
                                                
1172 Compare Yamamoto and Esteban, supra note 26, at 178. 
1173 See generally Angelo, ‘To be or not to be … Integrated, That is the Problem of Islands’, 2 Revue 
Juridique Polynesienne (2002) 87. 
1174 GA Res. 39/30, 5 December 1984. 
1175 Principle VIII, GA Res. 1541 (XV), supra note 495. 
1176 On a federal solution to climate change inundation, see, for example, Caron, supra note 89, at 650; 
McAdam, supra note 90, at 156; Rayfuse, supra note 68, at 178; Yamamoto and Esteban, supra note 26, at 
199–202. 
1177 Tully, ‘Federations, Communities and their Transformations: An Essay in Revision’, in A. Lecours 
and G. Nootens (eds), Dominant Nationalism, Dominant Ethnicity (2009) 195, at 195. For a more orthodox 
definition, see Rudolf, ‘Federal States’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law 
(2012), at para.1. 
1178  As distinct from decentralisation within a unitary state. Hernandez, ‘Federated Entities in 
International Law: Disaggregating the Federal State?’, in French (ed.), supra note 158, 491, at 493; Rudolf, 
supra note 1177, at para.3. 
1179 D. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (1987), at 12. Others describe this in terms of the division of 
sovereignty between member and federal states. Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 571. 
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contestation about the appropriate balance between them.1180 Federalism — even more 
so than the asymmetrical model of free association — might therefore be seen as the 
institutionalisation of the idea of self-determination as reciprocity and 
interdependence, founded as it is on the interrelationship between different but 
formally equal peoples whose shared and conflicting interests must continually be 
renegotiated. 
Where free association sits at the maximal end of both axes of autonomy and 
international legal status, federation offers substantial opportunities for the former but 
less scope for the latter. Federal member states enjoy significant autonomy, including 
the ‘authority to decide … the law of the region differently and separately from the 
state or federal legislation governing the rest of the country’1181 in certain areas 
(including education, health, culture, language, economic development, trade, social 
affairs and the use of land and natural resources), as well as capacities for adjudication 
and law enforcement.1182 In most cases, the federal administration ‘is confined to 
matters of national importance’ (including foreign affairs, immigration and customs) 
and federal courts act only as ‘supreme courts of last resort’.1183 Member states are, 
therefore, ‘totally independent as far as their competence reaches’.1184 
Their international legal status tends to be more limited, however, with the federal 
state taking primary responsibility for diplomatic relations, treaty negotiation and 
ratification and participation in international organisations.1185 Yet, subject to federal 
approval, member states may be able to engage in international cooperation or 
conclude treaties with foreign actors on matters within their competence.1186 To this 
                                                
1180  Duchacek describes this process in terms of ‘cultivating jurisdictional diversity’. Duchacek, 
‘Perforated Sovereignties: Towards a Typology of New Actors in International Relations’, in H. 
Michelmann and P. Soldatos (eds), Federalism and International Relations (1990) 1, at 4. 
1181 Harhoff, ‘Institutions of Autonomy’, 55 Nordic Journal of International Law (1986) 31, at 31. 
1182 See generally Heintze, supra note 1133, at 24–27. 
1183 Rudolf, supra note 1177, at para.9. 
1184 Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 249 (emphasis in original). 
1185 ‘The federal state shall constitute a sole person in the eyes of international law.’ Article 2, Montevideo 
Convention, supra note 821. Compare Fitzmaurice, ‘Third Report on the Law of Treaties’, II Yearbook of the 
ILC (1958) 20, at 24; Malanczuk, supra note 279, at 81. 
1186 On the treaty-making capacity of the member states of the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, 
Switzerland and others, see Crawford, supra note 484, at 117; Hannum, supra note 818, at ch.16; 
Hernandez, supra note 1178, at 501–508; Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 249–252; Rudolf, supra note 
1177, at paras.12, 18–21 and 35. 
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extent, they may be ‘recognised as subject[s] of international law’1187 with the capacity 
to ‘assert their distinctiveness internationally’.1188 While the individual members of 
each constituent people are citizens of the federal state, they may also hold dual 
citizenship within both federal and member states.1189 
Once again, however — with the exception of sui generis states like Belgium, which has 
both territorial and linguistic federal structures1190 — federalism traditionally requires 
territorial jurisdiction.1191 As the Nauruan example suggests, a receiving state may 
carve out a portion of its territory on which a displaced island people can re-establish 
itself as a self-determining member state of the larger federal entity. Where this is not 
possible, however, an alternative non-territorial federal solution will need to be 
identified. 
Other non-territorial autonomy arrangements 
Integration does not necessarily entail federation or jurisdiction over a defined 
territory. Island and host peoples may prefer some alternative non-territorial intrastate 
autonomy arrangement like those adopted by certain indigenous peoples and minority 
groups. While some insist that sovereignty over territory is essential for the ongoing 
self-determination of atoll island peoples, 1192 evidence suggests that it is neither 
necessary nor sufficient, particularly where self-determination is detached from 
statehood. Even those who emphasise the importance of territorial jurisdiction for the 
pursuit of collective autonomy and self-determination admit that ‘there is some 
possibility of non-territorial self-determination for dispersed groups’.1193 
                                                
1187 Rudolf, supra note 1177, at para.16. Other non-state, non-federal entities — including Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, the Åland Islands, the Faroe Islands and Greenland — also have some international legal status. See 
generally Hannum, supra note 818, at chs.7–17. 
1188 Hernandez, supra note 1178, at 508.  
1189 Although it is generally the former that counts from the perspective of international law. Rudolf, 
supra note 1177, at para.8. 
1190 See, for example, Hannum, supra note 818, at 408–412. 
1191 On the idea of federalism as a territorial concept, see, for example, Heintze, supra note 1133, at 24; 
Kimminich, ‘A “Federal” Right of Self-Determination?’, in Tomuschat (ed.), supra note 522, 83, at 98; 
Rudolf, supra note 1177, at para.5. In the context of climate change inundation, see Park, supra note 5, at 18, 
note 132. 
1192 For example, Nine, supra note 91, at 363; Schuppert, supra note 134, at 17. For those who define self-
determination in terms of territory, see Banai, supra note 463, at 49; Brilmayer, supra note 607; Oeter, supra 
note 484, at 326. 
1193 Moore, supra note 590, at 131. Compare Nine, who equivocates about whether territory is in fact 
necessary for islanders’ self-determination. Nine, supra note 91, at 363 and 366. 
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Young’s relational account, introduced above, allows us to move away from a rigid 
commitment to exclusive jurisdiction over territory, while acknowledging that access 
to land and resources remains important for individual and collective wellbeing. Given 
that territory is a finite resource — as highlighted by the problem of climate change 
inundation — tying self-determination to territorial sovereignty risks arbitrarily 
denying certain peoples the capacity for autonomy and self-determination. Instead, 
Young suggests that, so long as peoples recognise and allow for the legitimate interests 
of those they interact with, ‘jurisdiction can be spatially overlapping or shared, or even 
lack spatial reference entirely’.1194 Such arrangements will require ongoing consultation 
and negotiation between island and receiving peoples to ensure that each is free from 
the arbitrary interference of others. 
Autonomy need not apply territorially. Where the members of a people are dispersed 
across one or more states, its sphere of autonomy may be personal or functional rather 
than territorial1195 — as is the case, for example, with the Saami of Norway, Finland 
and Sweden.1196 Its members may continue to elect representatives to local and national 
governing bodies and to sustain shared institutions with the capacity to legislate and 
adjudicate on certain matters, collect personal taxes and implement policies relating to 
language, education, religion, media and issues of cultural importance.1197 However, 
without territorial jurisdiction — and the capacity for enforcement and control with 
which it is typically associated — the extent to which an island people can continue to 
govern itself effectively in those areas that matter to it becomes uncertain. 
At the minimal end of the axis of international legal status, an atoll island people may 
be absorbed into a receiving state and become ‘totally extinct as an international 
person’.1198 Yet, even as a non-state entity without territorial jurisdiction, an island 
people may continue to engage internationally. The Sovereign Order of Malta enjoys 
significant international legal status despite having no control over territory,1199 while 
the French, Flemish and German-speaking communities of Belgium retain the capacity 
                                                
1194 Young, supra note 311, at 261. Compare Klabbers, supra note 549, at 202; Kolers, supra note 91, at 340–
342; Kolers, supra note 832, at 117–118. 
1195 For a four-part typology of autonomy, see Heintze, supra note 1133, at 18–24. On autonomy and 
jurisdiction generally, see Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 382–385, 391–407 and 456–463. On non-
territorial autonomy, see Coakley, ‘Approaches to the Resolution of Conflict: The Strategy of Non-
Territorial Autonomy’, 15 International Political Science Review (1994) 297. 
1196 See, for example, Hannum, supra note 818, at 247–262. 
1197 For a list of desirable capacities, see Hannikainen, supra note 583, at 90–94. 
1198 Jennings and Watts, supra note 423, at 210. 
1199
 Ibid, at 125; von Glahn and Taulbee, supra note 1009, at 154. 
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to engage in international cooperation and conclude treaties on matters within their 
sphere of autonomy.1200 Indigenous peoples also have ‘the right to maintain and 
develop contacts, relations and cooperation … [with] other peoples across borders’.1201 
Without any jurisdiction over territory, however, an atoll island people will be unable 
to negotiate or conclude treaties that apply territorially. With rare exceptions, non-
state, non-territorial arrangements will therefore lie at the minimal end of both axes of 
autonomy and international legal status. 
8.4 Implementing a non-state model of self-determination 
8.4.1 Reasons against acting 
As with the deterritorialized statehood proposal discussed in Chapter 7, the options 
considered here — free association, federation or some other form of non-territorial 
intrastate autonomy — do not challenge the territorial integrity of existing states. 
However, unlike deterritorialized statehood, these options do not require a receiving 
state to recognise the existence of an independent state within its territory either. The 
ongoing debate about indigenous rights to self-determination indicates that states’ 
concerns about their own independence, territorial integrity and political unity are 
assuaged where peoples within their borders are able to exercise autonomy and enjoy 
some international legal status without also achieving formal legal independence and 
statehood.1202 Speaking before the Commission on Human Rights’ Working Group on 
the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Canadian government 
explained that it ‘accepts a right of self-determination for indigenous peoples which 
respects the political, constitutional and territorial integrity of democratic states’.1203 
One of the primary reasons against ceding territory to or hosting a displaced atoll 
island state — that is, the protection of the receiving state’s territorial integrity and 
political unity — is therefore inapplicable in the case of free association or integration. 
                                                
1200 Hernandez, supra note 1178, at 505. 
1201 Article 36(1), UNDRIP, supra note 504. Compare Article 19 of the Draft Saami Convention. Åhrén, 
Scheinin and Henriksen, ‘The Nordic Saami Convention: International Human Rights, Self-Determination 
and Other Central Provisions’, 3 Ga ́ldu C ̌a ́la (2007) 1, at 101. 
1202 Alfredsson, supra note 1113, at 132; Anaya, supra note 527, at 111–113; ILA, Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
Interim Report of the Hague Conference (2010), at 9–10. 
1203 The US and Australian governments have made similar statements. All cited in Anaya, supra note 
527, at 111–112. Hence Article 3 of the UNDRIP (supra note 504) is circumscribed by Article 46(1). 
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However, other reasons against acting may still arise. While these reasons have already 
been addressed in earlier chapters,1204 one is worth revisiting in some detail here. 
A state may have reasons against joining in free association or integration with an 
island people where it believes that an influx of islanders will threaten the autonomous 
institutions or shared way of life of its own people. Yet, as observed in previous 
chapters, atoll island peoples are relatively small and therefore unlikely to adversely 
affect a host state’s legal, political or cultural institutions. And, where this issue is of 
particular concern, a potential host state may voice its preference for free association or 
federation (rather than a more fluid, overlapping model of intrastate autonomy in 
which islanders are dispersed across its territory), which may better insulate its 
existing institutions against unwanted expansion or modification. 
However, as we near the conclusion of the thesis, it becomes clear that these responses, 
while relevant, fail to address a more fundamental misconception. According to the 
reciprocal account of self-determination developed earlier in this chapter, any attempt 
to exercise self-determination necessarily involves negotiating relationships with 
interdependent others, both within and across state borders. As is true of much of the 
current debate around self-determination — and, indeed, of this thesis itself — this is 
often concealed behind the façade of exclusive independence typically associated with 
self-determination and statehood. What is important from the perspective of this 
reciprocal account, however, is not that peoples continue to exist alone within clearly 
defined legal and territorial boundaries, but that peoples engage in an ongoing process 
of negotiation and consultation about how best to pursue their own values and 
interests without adversely impacting upon — or, in Young’s terms, arbitrarily 
interfering with or dominating — others.  
This process is not one that suddenly becomes necessary when an island people 
collectively resettles within the borders of another state. It has been necessary all along. 
Climate change inundation is but one striking example of the ways in which self-
determining peoples arbitrarily — or at least negligently — interfere with the 
autonomy, integrity and self-determination of others elsewhere. To argue that states 
have reasons against merging with an atoll island people arising from their desire to 
protect their own autonomous institutions from unwanted interference is to 
                                                
1204 See especially sections 6.4.1 (Chapter 6) and 7.7.1 (Chapter 7) on ‘Reasons against acting’. 
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conveniently overlook the fact that such interference is a pervasive feature of the 
international community. 
However, in a debate characterised by an almost unwavering commitment to 
exclusivity and independence, this process of negotiation will be made easier where an 
atoll island people chooses to relinquish its claim to independent statehood. Until the 
parameters of the conversation change — an issue that the final section of this chapter 
returns to — it is enough to recognise, for now, that states will have less weighty 
reasons against merging with a displaced island people where this does not require 
them to accommodate a separate state within their existing territorial borders. 
8.4.2 Reasons for acting 
Again, as in previous chapters, this section considers only those reasons for acting that 
are specific to the solution at hand, with the assumption that the general reasons for 
acting identified earlier — including reasons of international cooperation, contribution 
and capacity — apply where relevant and need not be restated here. 
As observed throughout the thesis, self-determination is widely recognised as a jus 
cogens or peremptory norm of customary international law and a source of obligations 
erga omnes — at least to the extent that it does not disrupt the territorial integrity of 
existing states.1205 Given that the options of free association and integration discussed 
here threaten neither the territorial integrity nor political unity of the receiving state, 
the claim to self-determination made by atoll island peoples who choose one of these 
options presumably retains its peremptory status.1206 Where a state has concerns 
relating to the cession of territory or the recognition of a separate state within its 
borders — such as those expressed by Australia in its negotiations with Nauru1207 — it 
may therefore have stronger reasons for supporting a non-state solution like free 
association or federation, arising from the legal weight attached to the peremptory 
norm of self-determination. 
As discussed in previous chapters, those states that can act more effectively and absorb 
the burdens of acting more readily — on the basis of their proximity and cultural ties 
to affected atoll island states, or their relatively high GDP and low population density 
                                                
1205 See Duursma, supra note 534, at 77–109. 
1206 Ibid, at 82. 
1207 Tabucanon and Opeskin, supra note 396, at 345. 
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— may also have reasons arising from their capacity to act. In addition to the weighty 
reasons for acting arising from their historical relationship with Nauru, for example, 
the Australian, New Zealand and British governments also acknowledged reasons for 
acting to assist the Nauruans arising from their capacity to rehabilitate the island or to 
resettle its occupants elsewhere.1208 Australia’s proposal to purchase land and establish 
an autonomous Nauruan community on Curtis Island — chosen for its size, arable 
land, and proximity to employment opportunities on the mainland1209 — indicates both 
its capacity and its willingness to act. 
Where an atoll island people chooses integration with another state, the latter will 
undoubtedly shoulder some burdens as a result, including assuming responsibility for 
any debts, granting citizenship to islanders and modifying existing institutions, laws 
and policies where necessary.1210 However, these burdens will be offset to some extent 
by the rights it accrues, including jurisdiction over a former island state’s potentially 
lucrative exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and other maritime zones.1211 
The aim of this and previous sections on reasons for and against acting to assist atoll 
island peoples threatened by climate change inundation is not to draw any conclusions 
about which of the three proposed options — finding new territory, transitioning to a 
deterritorialized state or joining in free association or integration with another state — 
is most likely to succeed or can most adequately protect islanders’ self-determination. 
Instead, as explained in Chapter 1, the aim is to outline a legal and theoretical 
framework within which a conversation about the future of atoll island peoples can 
take place. By examining some of the theoretical, legal and empirical implications of 
these solutions and assessing the reasons that other states may have for and against 
contributing to their implementation, the hope is that islanders — in consultation with 
host states — can make a free, meaningful and informed decision about their ongoing 
status as self-determining peoples. 
This brings us back to some of the central questions of the thesis. Is the legal principle 
of self-determination applicable outside of the narrow contexts in which it is 
                                                
1208 Ibid, at 354–355. 
1209 Ibid, at 346–347. 
1210 On the succession of states and the transfer of rights and duties, see Jennings and Watts, supra note 
423, at 208–219. 
1211 Compare Caron, supra note 89, at 650; Rayfuse, supra note 133, at 8–9; Soons, supra note 89, at 230; 
Yamamoto and Esteban, supra note 26, at 195 and 200. In the case of a federation, the receiving state and 
relocating people must decide who exercises these rights internally. Ibid, at 214; Rudolf, supra note 1177, at 
para.6. 
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traditionally applied? If so, what role can it play in ensuring that the collective 
autonomy or ‘destiny’ of a people can be protected against a grave external threat like 
that of climate change inundation? What is the role of law, theory and practice in 
providing a framework within which a meaningful conversation about the future of 
island peoples can take place? And how does this framework itself shape the terms of 
the conversation? As the thesis draws to a close, the final two sections of this chapter 
return to these questions, revisiting some of the answers that have been reached and 
identifying avenues for future research. 
8.5 What has emerged from the research? 
This penultimate section looks back over the thesis to see what has been achieved, 
while the next and final section looks forward to what is yet to come. This overview is 
framed around those points of interest that have emerged somewhat unexpectedly 
from the research and have in turn shaped the path of the thesis.  
The first of these appeared in Chapter 2. According to one widely held view, a 
manifest failure of human rights protection at the domestic level provides states 
elsewhere with an entitlement to intervene to remedy this failure. This entitlement 
temporarily transcends the barriers to intervention imposed by the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of states. However, in certain cases, such a failure may also provide 
states with positive reasons — including legal obligations arising from treaty and 
customary international law — for taking remedial or corrective action. In Mutua’s 
words, these states are no longer merely ‘saviours’ who intervene to protect the human 
rights of ‘victims’ elsewhere.1212 They also have reasons for acting arising from their 
own contribution to the problem and capacity to act.  
Climate change inundation — defined in Chapter 1 as the process whereby climate 
change-related harms interact with existing vulnerabilities and will eventually leave 
low-lying coral atoll island states uninhabitable — is one of these cases. Any human 
rights-based analysis of climate change inundation therefore requires a theory that is 
conceptually broad enough to understand human rights (in their international 
dimension, at least) in terms of not only entitlements to intervene but also positive 
reasons for action. It is for this reason that Charles Beitz’s functional account of human 
rights was adopted as the basis of the thesis’s theoretical framework. Drawing on 
                                                
1212 Mutua, supra note 256. 
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(though departing somewhat from) Beitz’s account, Chapter 2 identified four broad 
sets of reasons for acting to address climate change inundation, arising from 
peremptory norms of customary international law, legal obligations of international 
cooperation, states’ own contributions to climate change inundation and states’ 
capacity to address its harms. These reasons for acting reappeared in Chapters 3, 5, 6, 7 
and 8, becoming more specific through their application to each potential response to 
climate change inundation. 
A second realisation that shaped the thesis emerged in Chapter 3. Many understand 
the value of self-determination in terms of individual membership in a democratic 
state in which citizens are free from discrimination and have an equal opportunity to 
vote and participate in common institutions of government. However, through an 
analysis of the proposed ‘planned migration’ response to climate change inundation, it 
became clear that individual migration to a democratic host state cannot replace 
everything of value that is lost when a state’s territory becomes uninhabitable. Self-
determination is valuable not merely as a generic right to membership in any 
democratic, rights-protecting state but as a unique claim to the specific constitution 
and political institutions that reflect the particular values and interests of a people.  
This realisation fed into Chapters 4 and 5, which argued for a broad, responsive 
account of self-determination as both a basic guiding principle and a set of fixed legal 
rules. Instead of confining self-determination to those peoples identified by an existing 
legal rule (including those under colonial or other forms of foreign occupation or 
subjugation), Chapter 4 identified self-determining peoples as the populations of 
existing states with a history of cooperation under shared institutions of government. It 
is this common history that provides a people with both the motive and capacity to 
sustain those shared institutions of government through which it exercises both 
autonomy and independence. And it is the capacity to sustain these specific 
institutions that is important for the ongoing self-determination of a people.  
Building on this account, Chapter 5 argued for the recognition of climate change 
inundation as a grave external threat to the self-determination of atoll island peoples. 
This laid the groundwork for the collective decision-making framework outlined in 
Chapter 6, which identified three potential options for atoll island peoples: obtaining 
new territory through a treaty of cession (Chapter 6); transitioning to a deterritorialized 
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state or state-in-exile (Chapter 7); or joining within another state through free 
association or integration (Chapter 8). 
Several further realisations emerged in relation to the reasons that states have for (and 
against) implementing each of these options. A first general point relates to the fact 
that taking positive steps to protect island peoples’ capacity for autonomy and 
independence (by ceding territory, hosting a deterritorialized state, joining in free 
association or federation or contributing financial or technological resources) is likely 
to be significantly less costly, in the short term at least, than refraining from interfering 
with these capacities in the first place (by committing to effective mitigation and 
adaptation strategies that enable islanders to remain where they are). And, where 
states are unable to agree on or meet timely mitigation targets and have the capacity to 
assist those harmed by their failure to do so, this generates strong reasons for 
providing such assistance. 
A second point relates to the often surprising implications of a host state’s priorities for 
the reasons it has for or against implementing each proposed solution. Imagine that 
state A is one of a handful of states with primary responsibility for addressing the 
harms of climate change inundation. Chapter 6 observed that, where state A is 
concerned with protecting the identity, autonomy and shared way of life of its own 
people from a sudden influx of newcomers, it will have stronger reasons for ceding 
territory to an atoll island state, thereby insulating its people and existing legal, 
political and socio-economic institutions from unwanted interference. However, where 
state A’s primary concern is protecting its territorial integrity rather than shielding the 
collective identity of its people from an influx of islanders, it will have stronger reasons 
for hosting a deterritorialized state or joining in free association or federation with an 
atoll island people, thereby leaving its territory intact.  
Similarly, where state A agrees to host a deterritorialized state or merge with an atoll 
island people but is particularly concerned about protecting its existing institutions 
against modification or expansion, it will have stronger reasons for granting an atoll 
island state or people greater independence and autonomy. By allowing islanders to 
maintain their own legal and political institutions within a wide sphere of autonomy, 
state A will minimise the financial, legal and political burdens associated with 
adapting its own institutions to incorporate atoll islanders. However, where state A is 
concerned instead with ensuring that it retains full jurisdictional authority over its own 
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territory, it will have stronger reasons for encouraging atoll islanders to participate 
within its own legal and political institutions. 
Chapters 7 and 8 moved away from the mainstream legal narrative of statehood and 
self-determination, in which both are thought to require a permanent population living 
in a defined territory under an effective government. This is reflected in two final 
points of interest, which also have implications for further research beyond this thesis. 
The first relates to the ‘minimum threshold’ account of statehood set out in Article 1 of 
the Montevideo Convention. While this account is widely accepted in international 
legal doctrine and practice, it proves unsatisfactory, both in general and in the specific 
context of climate change inundation. This realisation led to the development of an 
alternative ‘family resemblance’ account of statehood in Chapter 7, according to which 
those entities that belong to the category of states are not defined by some fixed set of 
necessary criteria but by an overlapping series of similarities. Just as there is no one 
fixed model of self-determination — as demonstrated by the options set out in the 
Declaration on Friendly Relations and elsewhere — perhaps there is also no one fixed 
model of statehood. 
The final point of interest emerged earlier in this final chapter and also challenged 
received legal wisdom about the relationship between self-determination, statehood 
and clearly defined political and territorial boundaries. Climate change inundation 
draws our attention to what should already be clear: self-determining peoples do not 
exist in isolation from one another but in a web of more or less unequal relationships in 
which the actions of one impact upon many others. Despite the emphasis of the UN 
and others on formal legal independence and statehood as the pinnacle of self-
determination, this realisation suggests that self-determination may be better served by 
an emphasis on interdependence and reciprocity, both within and across existing 
territorial borders. The final section of this chapter concludes the thesis by identifying 
avenues of further research relating to some of these issues. 
8.6 What is yet to come? 
This thesis has made several original contributions to the fields of international law, 
self-determination and statehood, as well as to the growing debate around climate 
change inundation. Among other achievements, it has provided an alternative 
interdisciplinary account of self-determination that moves beyond the narrow contexts 
in which it is traditionally thought to apply, argued for the recognition of atoll island 
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populations as peoples with a right to self-determination in the face of climate change 
inundation and proposed a collective decision-making framework through which they 
can freely express their wishes regarding their future self-determining status. There 
remains, however, substantial room for further thought and analysis. 
This thesis has operated largely within the parameters set by mainstream legal theory, 
doctrine and practice, in the hope of gaining recognition and support from as wide a 
range of readers as possible. Yet the final two chapters have begun to challenge some 
of these parameters by suggesting an alternative understanding of statehood based on 
Wittgenstein’s idea of family resemblances, and by reconceptualising self-
determination in terms of reciprocity and interdependence. In doing so, they have laid 
the groundwork for more radical questions and proposals to emerge. This concluding 
section identifies four potential areas of future research.  
First, as explained in Chapter 1, one of the main aims of this thesis is to outline a 
framework within which atoll island peoples can discuss and express their preferred 
response to climate change inundation. An essential area of further research therefore 
involves building on the legal and theoretical tools provided in this thesis to create a 
practical model for consulting directly with atoll island peoples, as well as with those 
who will potentially receive them. This requires long-term planning. Even before 
resettlement begins, the process of researching available options, negotiating within 
and across states, engaging in local consultations at origin and destination sites, 
finding adequate financial support and coming to a decision will take many years.1213 
A lengthy lead-in time is therefore necessary in order to ‘ensure a viable solution well 
before the actual disappearance of the state’.1214 
A second line of research concerns the reasons for acting identified throughout the 
thesis. Several questions need to be addressed in more detail before we can provide a 
complete account of which states have reasons for acting and which costs they are 
required to bear. How are the four sets of reasons to be weighed against each other, 
particularly where they point to different actors or require different kinds of action? 
How great a burden is each actor required to bear and how should this be assessed? 
What happens if one or more states fail to follow through on their reasons for acting? 
                                                
1213 See, for example, Barnett and Campbell, supra note 12, at 173; Campbell, supra note 348, at 78; 
Campbell, Goldsmith and Koshy, supra note 114, at 6, 34 and 43–44; McAdam, supra note 90, at 248; 
Nansen Initiative, supra note 96, at 21; Park, supra note 5, at 20–21. 
1214 Solomon and Warner, supra note 331, at 295. 
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Should we extend our analysis to actors other than states, particularly given the vast 
inequalities between individuals, cities and regions within states? And how might this 
pluralist schema of reasons for acting apply beyond the problem of climate change 
inundation? 
Third, while the account of self-determination proposed in Chapters 4 and 5 is 
sufficient for the purposes of this thesis, it remains open to further development. In 
particular, it would benefit from a broader definition of the peoples that hold a right to 
self-determination. While ‘peoples’ were defined in Chapter 4 as the populations of 
existing states with a history of cooperation under common institutions of government, 
this definition was chosen as a means of addressing the case study at hand while 
bracketing off wide-ranging debates around secession. With further research, however, 
this definition could be extended to include non-state groups that participate in shared 
governing institutions of whatever sort, including indigenous, nomadic and minority 
peoples. It is important that a comprehensive definition of ‘peoples’ includes entities 
other than those that correspond directly to existing states, in order to address the 
impacts of unjust annexation — or climate change inundation — on non-state groups, 
and to construct an account of self-determination that does not privilege Western 
notions of statehood, sovereignty and autonomy. This is particularly important where 
self-determination is understood in terms of reciprocity and interdependence rather 
than formal legal independence, as proposed in this final chapter. 
A fourth and related avenue of research involves pursuing a more flexible account of 
the relationship between people, land, territory and state, prompted by a shift away 
from the relative environmental stability of the Holocene age — which underpins 
many of the presuppositions of international law, including the stability of territorial 
boundaries — towards the instability and uncertainty of the Anthropocene age.1215 This 
may require a pluralistic account of sovereignty, self-determination and statehood, in 
which each is understood as a continuum of entities that share an overlapping series of 
family resemblances, rather than as a fixed category of identical actors. While Chapters 
7 and 8 have moved in this direction, there is still substantial work to be done in 
unpacking each of these constituent elements — people, self-determination, 
sovereignty, statehood, territory and land — and exploring the relationships between 
them. Inspiration might be drawn from alternative legal and political frameworks of 
                                                
1215 Vidas, supra note 97. 
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interaction and negotiation both above and below the state level, as well as Pacific 
islanders’ alternative understandings of land.1216 
This speaks to a broader point about the role of international law in a world of rapidly 
changing and often challenging socio-economic, geopolitical and environmental 
conditions. If international law — in this case, the international legal rules and 
principles relating to the recognition and protection of human rights and self-
determination — is to continue to fulfil its purpose in the face of these changing 
conditions, it must remain flexible and responsive. As David Caron observes, 
‘inasmuch as nature declines to negotiate, it is we and our laws which must adapt’.1217 
The ideas proposed here in relation to climate change inundation represent a small 
fraction of the changes required to address the upheavals that our planet — and the 
social, political, legal, geological and biological systems that depend upon it — is 
unlikely to avoid in the decades to come.  
                                                
1216 Islanders often ‘recognised a clear centre but their relationship to the land became increasingly vague 
with distance from it’. Campbell, supra note 348, at 62. On similar medieval conceptions of territorial 
jurisdiction as ambiguous or overlapping, see Hall, supra note 1066, at 26–27. 
1217 Caron, supra note 89, at 653. 
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